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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
MAKING RELIGION ACCEPTABLE IN COMMUNIST 
ROMANIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1943-1989 
This dissertation focuses on religious gatherings in communist Romania and the Soviet 
Union, 1943-1989. Church was one of the few opportunities for voluntary associational life and 
is invaluable for the study of power, ideology, and belonging in an everyday social setting. This 
project is based on archival documents and memoirs, uncovering how state officials and 
religious representatives struggled to establish religious practice that would be acceptable to all. 
Although ideologically atheist, state officials regarded some religious gatherings as acceptable 
and others unacceptable, but not due to utterances of beliefs or performance of traditional 
sacraments, but because of social aspects: how people related to one another, what kinds of 
people came, the settings of the gatherings, and affective characteristics like enthusiasm, 
engagement, and authenticity. Even though believers participated in religious gatherings for 
their own reasons, state officials policed them as contests for mobilization. 
This project compares the cases of the Romanian Orthodox Church and Reformed 
Church of the Transylvanian region of Romania and the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
Baptist Church in the Moscow region of the Soviet Union. Based on comparisons, the role of a 
Church's culture in shaping church-state relations becomes clear. Officials largely considered 
traditional Orthodox hierarchy and rituals as religiously unproblematic, but they 
underestimated the power of such features of Orthodoxy to endure and mobilize successive 
generations. The hierarchical nature of the Orthodox Churches did not preclude spirited 
negotiations over acceptable Orthodox religiosity, but non-conforming or innovating priests 
were marginalized relatively easily. Protestant Churches have had a more entrenched custom of 
decentralization in governance and Scriptural interpretation, factors which presented officials 
with difficulty in centralizing the management of such churches and which at times led to 
protracted interpersonal battles and inner-church divisions. One such case sparked the 
Romanian Revolution in 1989. Officials in Romania and the Soviet Union handled the problem of 
religion very similarly in defining the acceptable limits of religious activity in practice, but 
virulent attacks on religion in the Soviet Union prior to WWII made for a stronger lingering 
religious antagonism there after the War than in Romania, where Orthodoxy was at times 
incorporated into the state’s nationalist discourse.
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A Note on Transliteration and Translations 
For Russian transliteration, I have used the system employed by the Library of Congress, 
except that я is replaced with ia, й with i, and ё with e, as is customary. Some Russian terms are 
commonly anglicized, such as Moskva (Moscow) and Oblast’ (oblast), and I have tried to follow 
such conventions. For Russian places with gendered or adjectival place names, like Moskovskaia 
Oblast’, I have chosen the simpler form of “Moscow Oblast.” Oblasts are similar to provinces. 
There are several Russian religious terms to note. I have translated upolnomochennyi as 
“commissioner,” although most others have preferred to use “plenipotentiary,” an accurate, if 
cumbersome equivalent. Initsiativniki can be translated variously as “initiative group” and 
“initiativists”; orgkomitet as “Organizing Committee”; Sovet literally means “council,” but is 
commonly translated as “soviet” for certain governmental bodies. Dvadtsatka has as its root 
dvadtsat’ (twenty) but is in the nominative form with a diminutive ending, like a “fiver” or 
“tenner,” but without a corresponding English equivalent, I have kept the original throughout. 
Glasnost’ means “openness,” and perestroika means “restructuring,” but as policies under 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Russian terms are commonly used. 
Officials in Romania and Russia use the cognate “cult” (cult in Romanian and kul’t in 
Russian), but the connotation is not expressly negative as in English and can be rendered as 
“religion” or “denomination” as well. Those religious groups that English-speakers might 
designate “cults” are generally referenced in Romanian and Russian as “sects.” Thus I have 
translated Romania’s Departmentul Cultelor as the Department of Religions. 
In Romania, many names of localities have Hungarian counterparts. I have used the 
Romanian names even when the content is focused on Hungarians to reduce reader confusion. I 
have, however, put the Hungarian name at first mention for Hungarian readers. In the case of 
the Greek-Catholic Church, officials refer to those who joined the Orthodox Church as “reveniți” 
(lit. “the returned”), and those who did not join as “nereveniți,” or the “non-returned.” This use 
of language was to indicate that the incorrect path was away from Orthodoxy and the correct 
one was back toward it. I have chosen to replicate the use of such wording within quotations to 
show the construction of this discourse, not to agree with its underlying assertions. 
In cases where the capitalization in Hungarian, Romanian, or Russian seems to be 
unconventional for the language or it may communicate something of significance, such as 
official attitudes, I have chosen to retain the capitalization in English, even if unconventional for 
English. However, non-capitalization was not always purposeful. 
1   
I – Introduction 
The importance of religious gatherings as voluntary associations has been overlooked in 
contemporary research of Romania and the Soviet Union, despite the obvious coincidence of 
this type of associational life and major transformations in Eastern Europe. In Poland, Pope John 
Paul II undergirded the power of Solidarity by endorsing it; many supported Solidarity both as 
workers and Catholics.1 In East Germany, the notorious Erich Honecker resigned two days after 
a series of stand-offs with large crowds who gathered in and around St. Nikolai’s Church in 
Leipzig for regular prayer meetings and demonstrations; the Berlin Wall came down a month 
later.2 In Romania, it was the defiance of a Hungarian Reformed Pastor, László Tőkés, and the 
support of his parishioners and other local Romanians which sparked the Revolution and 
Ceausescu’s downfall.  
Also missing have been studies of everyday religious practice in communist contexts. 
There have been some key studies of the Soviet case between the World Wars in which scholars 
have analyzed religions and religious policy at the level of institutions or leaders. There have also 
been histories of specific religions in communist Eastern Europe, as well as numerous memoirs 
by pastors and priests describing their experiences, especially if they had been in prison. Yet 
much of this work has given the impression that religion in the communist countries is reducible 
to one narrative of “atheism-persecutes-religion.” 
This is the first study of its kind where officials’ reports have been analyzed in detail to 
uncover what kind of religion was problematic to state officials and why. The kind of religion 
that was acceptable to officials becomes clearest by identifying its negative counterpart, the 
unacceptable cases. These cases show that in Romania and the Soviet Union after World War II, 
ultimately, officials’ concern about religion had much more to do with political power than it did 
with the veracity of ideological truths. The broad outlines of acceptable religiosity were 
extremely similar in both countries. The restrictions authorities enforced in their efforts to 
create religion-free public space included limiting religious activity to church services within 
church buildings and shielding youth from religious influence. Within the services, the Bible was 
1 Marian S Mazgaj, Church and State in Communist Poland: A History, 1944-1989 (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland & Co., 2010). 
2 Wendy Tyndale, Protestants in Communist East Germany: In the Storm of the World (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2016); David Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests: Religious-Based Activism and Its 
Challenge to State Power in Socialist Slovakia and East Germany (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2014). 
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read, creeds were recited, traditional prayers were uttered, sacraments were performed, hymns 
were sung, and sermons were preached—with authorities scrutinizing sermons the most closely 
for acceptable content. Officials even considered acceptable “strictly religious” content, 
exegesis, or moralistic messages urging listeners to honesty, industry, and loyalty to the 
government. Aside from the obviously unacceptable—ideological confrontations of state-
sponsored atheism or messages opposing the political powers—authorities considered 
unacceptable those sermons that advocated increased zeal, participation, or the forging of 
communal ties. Those that performed their religious duties in a perfunctory or didactic manner 
were the ones who escaped discipline or were even rewarded.  
Although in attempting to describe this phenomenon I am using terms that officials did 
not readily deploy (“acceptable” and “unacceptable”), this is in part because in communist 
discourse there was no provision for certain forms of religion—it was supposed to disappear. 
Theorists did not debate which kinds of religion were better than others, but officials charged 
with overseeing religion did distinguish which ones were more problematic than others. As 
Moscow official A.A. Trushin put it in the case of certain problematic Orthodox priests whose 
registration he revoked, they had become “so enthralled” in preaching, performing rites, and 
“individual work with believers” that they “stepped over their borders [perestupali svoi granitsy] 
and violated soviet legislation.” Trushin, perhaps unwittingly, admitted that there were ways to 
transgress not just legislation, but other “borders,” as he did not identify any specific legal 
violations the priests had made but described how their sermons “were not limited” to “’holy 
writings’ and the gospel” but touched on “moral issues” and “raising children.”3 Beyond 
enforcing legislation, officials drew borders and defined limits to religion in practice. 
This work is unique because it is comparative across two countries and two branches of 
Christianity, Orthodoxy and Protestantism, to show how church cultures shaped church and 
state interactions. I study the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church and Evangelical 
Christians-Baptists Church in the Soviet Union and the Romanian Orthodox Church and 
Reformed Church in Romania from the end of the War until 1989. The Russian Orthodox Church 
and Romanian Orthodox Church have been the dominant religious institutions in their 
respective countries, with roughly two-thirds of citizens identifying themselves as Orthodox in 
Romania (13,000,000), and wild fluctuations in estimates in the Soviet case, ranging from a 
                                                          
3 Keston Archive, “Council for Religious Affairs of Moscow Oblast, Report,” 1962, Archive file <KGB 53>, p. 
42. Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 1, Del. 58. 
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quarter to half the population, from 40-100,000,000.4 The Baptist Church in the Soviet Union 
was the largest protestant denomination and claimed around two million adherents, most of 
whom lived in Soviet Ukraine, but who were very active and visible in Moscow and the 
surrounding region. The Reformed Church of Romania, a Hungarian institution of around 
700,000 members, is the largest Protestant denomination in Romania and the fourth largest 
denomination overall, after the Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, and Roman-Catholic Churches.5  
Although Romania and the Soviet Union were ideologically atheist states from World 
War II until they fell, they still permitted churches to operate—however restricted religious 
practice may have been in believers’ or humanitarians’ eyes. Although there may have been 
many committed communists who envisioned a religion-free future, the postwar religious 
situation in communist Soviet Union and Romania can better be described as one of state 
authorities trying to favor certain kinds of religious activity over others. This situation requires 
analysis of what kind of religiosity would be acceptable in “atheist” societies, and why other 
forms of religious practice would be unacceptable. This work focuses on the regulation of 
Christianity in the Soviet Union and Romania. 
Because the traditional content of Christian religion conflicted with the state ideology of 
atheism, it is clear that what state agents found unacceptable cannot be reduced to “religion.” 
Rather, what made religious practice unacceptable to authorities was the degree to which it 
mobilized people toward a religious affiliation or when it questioned established church or state 
truth claims. In their dealings with church personnel, state representatives wished for 
centralized churches where all participants respected the hierarchies and truths in place, even if 
those truths conflicted with communist ideology. If congregations maintained acceptability in 
authorities’ eyes, officials did not treat the religiosity of their gatherings as problematic. If the 
                                                          
4 Numbers in the case of the Soviet Union are highly disputable and subject to considerable fluctuation. 
Official estimates of the 280 million citizens were close to 40 million believers, but many people assume it 
was at least twice that number. In the Soviet Union, the pressure to deny religious affiliation was much 
greater than in Romania. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, those who identify with the 
Orthodox Church has gone from 31% to as high as 75%, according to various estimates, although the 
percentage of regular church attendees remains around 5%. See, for example, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/02/10/russians-return-to-religion-but-not-to-church/. Accessed 
November 6, 2014.  
5 In Romania, there were roughly 12,000,000 Orthodox adherents in 1948. The number grew in 
proportion to the population as the latter increased. There were approximately two million Hungarians 
living in Romania, and roughly 700,000 considered themselves Reformed, and most of the remainder 
were Catholic. 
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gatherings transgressed the lines of acceptability, officials treated them as highly threatening to 
state power and applied extraordinary measures of surveillance and discipline against them.  
Because religious gatherings were among the few opportunities for voluntary public 
assembly in communist Romania and the Soviet Union, they are extremely important sites for 
the study of power, ideology, and belonging in everyday social settings. Believers, clergy, church 
hierarchs, and state officials were actors in a struggle whose central battle was not “atheism vs. 
religion” or “us vs. them,” but the power to mobilize people. Acceptability was not related to 
creedal beliefs or traditional practices, nor reducible to expressions of political opposition or 
“dissidence.” The differences between acceptable and unacceptable religious gatherings fell 
along social-communal lines: what kinds of people came, the settings of the gatherings, and 
affective characteristics of the interactions like enthusiasm, engagement, and authenticity. 
Studying religious gatherings reveals that even though believers participated in them for their 
own highly individual reasons, state officials policed them as contests for mobilization. 
Place of Project in the Field and Historiography 
This dissertation project addresses several arenas of research. As a study pertaining to 
“religion,” it touches a number of established fields, including church histories, religious memoir 
and biography, everyday “lived” religion, secularization, studies of worldview, and comparative 
religion. But as a study of institutions and social formations, it speaks to studies of power in 
communist countries, including debates about totalitarianism, civil society, ideology, and sub- or 
youth-cultures.  
Scholars and religious representatives frequently write histories of particular religious 
institutions. There are works pertaining to the Baptist Church, Reformed Church, and Russian 
Orthodox Church in Russia and the Soviet Union over the period this dissertation covers, but no 
history of the Romanian Orthodox Church to date.6 These works attempt to tell the story of 
                                                          
6 Michael Rowe, Russian Resurrection: Strength in Suffering: A History of Russia’s Evangelical Church 
(London: Marshall Pickering, 1994); Walter Sawatsky, Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II (Kitchener, 
Ont.; Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1981); István Tőkés, A Romániai Magyar Református Egyház Élete, 
1945-1989 [The Life of the Romanian Hungarian Reformed Church, 1945-1989] (Budapest: 
Magyarságkutató Intézet, 1990); Dimitry Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 
1917-1982, vol. I, II vols. (Crestwood, N.Y: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984); Dimitry Pospielovsky, The 
Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, vol. II, II vols. (Crestwood, N.Y: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1984); Jane Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1986); Jane Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness, 
St. Antony’s Series (Houndmills [England] : New York: Macmillan Press ; St. Martin’s Press in association 
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these churches, sometimes with brief comparative remarks to other confessions, usually with an 
emphasis on the politics of the hierarchies with less attention to experiences of clergy or 
believers. They also have tended to present a “church” perspective, lacking state archival 
material (often with good reason, as it was not readily available in most cases). 
There are also numerous biographies and autobiographies of religious figures who lived 
in the time and place of this study, particularly if the subject served time in prison. The genre in 
such cases ranges from martyrology to evangelistic tracts to recollections. Other scholars and 
co-religionists have written about figures who populate the pages of this book, and those who 
are familiar with so-called religious "dissidents" of the Soviet Union or Romania might recognize 
some of the names that follow.7 The goal for the present work is not to add detail to the lives of 
prominent dissidents, but to better understand the context of their religious activity. In fact, the 
label "dissident" is misleading for many of these religious figures, since the term connotes one 
who dissents from mainstream beliefs and opinions, or more crudely, one who opposes the 
political regime. Although it is quite certain that all of these figures disagreed with the political 
regime in major or minor ways, it is also important to consider that their actions were often not 
first or foremost politically inclined so much as religiously situated. Their immediate (or even 
long-term) goals were not the overthrow of the government, but typically something like 
religious renewal, reform, or simply the harmony of belief and practice. 
One reason outspoken or visible religious figures are labeled “dissidents” is simply 
because they displayed the characteristics common to other dissidents: courage in their non-
conformity. There were ways that clergy could practice that would gain them rewards, namely 
by practicing religion in the way that state officials preferred. Rather than “dissident,” I have 
preferred to use the term “non-conformist,” as many of the figures who practiced religion 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 1996); Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History 
of Russian Orthodoxy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2003). 
7 Oliver Bullough, The Last Man in Russia: The Struggle to Save a Dying Nation (New York: Basic Books, 
2013); The accounts of Aleksandr Men’ are too numerous to list here, so I note the most respected 
accounts. Zoia Maslenikova, Aleksandr Menʹ: zhiznʹ [Aleksandr Men’: Life] (Moskva: Zakharov, 2001); Yves 
Hamant, Alexander Men: a witness for contemporary Russia (a man for our times) ([S.l.]; London: 
Oakwood ; Cassell, 2000); Wallace L Daniel, Russia’s Uncommon Prophet: Father Aleksandr Men and His 
Times, 2016; Koenraad de Wolf, Dissident for Life : Alexander Ogorodnikov and the Struggle for Religious 
Freedom in Russia (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2012); Peter Rumachik, Pavel Rumachik, 
and Luba Rumachik, A Path Not Lined with Roses, ed. Sam Slobodian, trans. Christopher J Lovelace (Maple 
Grove, MN: Baptist International Evangelistic Ministries, 1999); Natasha Vins, Children of the Storm: The 
Autobiography of Natasha Vins. (Greenville, S.C.: JourneyForth, 2002); László Tőkés, With God, for the 
People: The Autobiography of Laszlo Tokes as Told to David Porter. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1990); Ferenc 
Visky, Szerelme Szorongat [His Love Constrains Us] (Kolozsvár [Cluj-Napoca, RO]: Koinónia, 2004). 
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“unacceptably” in state eyes were doing so in religious leaders’ view as well. The comparative 
aspect of this project allows us to see them as part of a struggle that was common to multiple 
branches of Christianity in Romania and the Soviet Union.  
Religion in Communist Countries 
A number of historians and anthropologists have written on religion in communist 
countries, particularly in the Soviet Union. Scholars like Heather Coleman, Daniel Peris, Edward 
Roslof, and Glennys Young have written on religious topics in the Soviet interwar period.8 
Tatiana Chumachenko, Sonja Luehrmann, Aleksei Marchenko, Mikhail Shkarovskii, Catherine 
Wanner, and Sergei Zhuk have written on various religious themes from the postwar period in 
the Soviet Union.9 Douglas Rogers’ account of Old Believers spanned several centuries of 
change, and Scott Kenworthy’s history of Russia’s most famous monastery spanned the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10 This is the first study where religious ministry officials’ 
reports have been analyzed in conjunction with believers’ accounts toward understanding the 
pragmatic frameworks within which actors tried to variously resolve the tensions resulting from 
Soviet discourse and legislation pertaining to religion. 
                                                          
8 Heather J. Coleman, Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905-1929 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005); Daniel Peris, Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Edward E Roslof, Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, 
and Revolution, 1905-1946 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Glennys Young, Power and the 
Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village (University Park  Pa.: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997). 
9 T. A. Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the 
Khrushchev Years, trans. Edward E. Roslof (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Sonja Luehrmann, 
Secularism Soviet Style: Teaching Atheism and Religion in a Volga Republic (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2011); Sonja Luehrmann, Religion in Secular Archives: Soviet Atheism and Historical 
Knowledge, 2015; A. N. Marchenko, Religioznaia Politika Sovetskogo Gosudarstva i ee Vliianie na 
Tserkovnuiu Zhizn’ v SSSR [Religious Politics of the Soviet State in the Years of N.S. Krushchev’s Rule and its 
Influence on Church Life in the USSR] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Krutitskogo podvor’ia; Obshchestvo liubitelei 
tserkovnoi istorii, 2010); M. V. Shkarovskii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ pri Staline i Khrushcheve 
(Gosudarstvenno-tserkovnye otnosheniia v SSSR v 1939-1964) [The Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin 
and Khrushchev (State-Church Relations in the USSR, 1939-1964)] (Moskva: Krutit︠s︡ koe Patriarshee 
Podvorʹe Obshchestvo li︠u︡ biteleĭ t︠s︡ erkovnoĭ istorii, 1999); Catherine Wanner, Communities of the 
Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism, Culture and Society after Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2007); Catherine Wanner, ed., State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and 
Ukraine (Washington, D.C. : New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Oxford University Press, 2012); 
Sergei I. Zhuk, “Popular Religiosity in the ‘Closed City’ of Soviet Ukraine: Cultural Consumption and 
Religion during Late Socialism, 1959-1984,” Russian History 40, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 183–200. 
10 Douglas Rogers, The Old Faith and the Russian Land: A Historical Ethnography of Ethics in the Urals, 
Culture and Society after Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott M Kenworthy, The Heart 
of Russia: Tinity-Sergius, Monasticism, and Society after 1825 (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
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There are fewer scholars of religion in Eastern Europe. In Romania, Ioan-Marius Bucur, 
Lucian Leuştean, and Cristian Vasile have written on issues pertaining to the Orthodox and 
Greek-Catholic Churches in the communist era for Romanian-speaking audiences.11 Religion in 
the GDR has seen more English-language publication than other former communist countries.12 
As for comparative studies of religion in Eastern Europe, Sabrina Ramet and David Doellinger 
have been among the very few scholars to comparatively analyze religion in the late socialist 
and immediate post-communist context.13 The diversity of the region causes the topic to be 
pursued almost exclusively by national scholars who write for domestic audiences, making the 
edited collection by Bruce Bergland and Brian Porter the only relatively recent English-language 
publication representing the many East European countries, although it still could not include 
the gamut of religions in each country as well.14 This work represents the first attempt in the 
field at comparative analysis across state and faith lines using state archival documents. 
Power, Totalitarianism, and Civil Society 
In communist Eastern Europe, although officials largely wanted to keep religion out of 
the public sphere, it is a crucial lens for understanding questions relating to power, civil society, 
and social formations. Responding to stereotypical characterizations of these societies as 
“totalitarian” or “police states,” this research builds on the community of scholars who have 
demonstrated that citizens did impact their governments in important ways; the governments 
were not immune to social pressure, nor were they capable of “total” control.15 Yet studying 
                                                          
11 Ioan-Marius Bucur, “Istoria Bisericii Unite (Greco-Catolice): 1944-1953 [The History of the Uniate 
(Greek-Catholic) Church: 1944-1953]” ([s. n.], 2002); Lucian Leuştean, Orthodoxy and the Cold War: 
Religion and Political Power in Romania, 1947-65 (Basingstoke, England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009); Cristian Vasile, Între Vatican și Kremlin: Biserica Greco-Catolică în Timpul Regimului Comunist 
[Between Vatican and Kremlin: The Greek-Catholic Church in the time of the Communist Regime] 
(București: Curtea Veche, 2003); Cristian Vasile, “Comunismul Și Biserica: Represiune, Compromitere Și 
Instrumentalizare [Comunism and the Church: Repression, Compromise, and Instrumentalization],” in 
Comunism Și Represiune În România: Istoria Tematică a Unui Fratricid Național, ed. Ruxandra Cesereanu 
(Iași: Polirom, 2006), 171–89. 
12 Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests; Bernd Schäfer, The East German State and the Catholic 
Church, 1945-1989 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); Tyndale, Protestants in Communist East Germany. 
13 Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., Protestantism and Politics in Eastern 
Europe and Russia: The Communist and Postcommunist Eras (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992); 
Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests. 
14 Bruce Berglund and Brian Porter, eds., Christianity and Modernity in Eastern Europe (Budapest; New 
York: Central European University Press, 2010). 
15 Scholars like Moshe Lewin, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Lewis Siegelbaum, Steven Kotkin, Gail Kligman, and 
Katherine Verdery have effectively made this case. The Romanian and Soviet states and their institutions 
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religious gatherings still shows that the states demonstrated strong paradigms of control, 
making “grass-roots” gatherings extremely difficult and dependent on secretive measures. 
There were, however, limits to state control of religion. Even if antagonism against 
religion affected the majority of Soviet and Romanian citizens, the fight against religion was 
never the ultimate priority for the Communist parties and had to be balanced with regard to 
other concerns. Nathaniel Davis argues that in the case of the Soviet Union, "The communists 
never considered the religious problem as being of immediate and overriding urgency. They 
repeatedly chose to pursue short-range political objectives even at the cost of their long-range 
goals. Their resolve varied according to time, circumstances, and place."16  The states did not 
anticipate just how durable religious participation would be, nor how successfully certain 
denominations or movements could attract people. Nor, more mundanely, did they anticipate 
how much administrative personnel and time religious organizations would require when they 
incorporated management of religious institutions into the wholesale management of society. 
The issues in need of resolution were numerous and complex, from finding cooperative 
personnel in leadership positions to managing clergy, to overhauling theological training, to 
monitoring the finances of the churches, to providing them with materials like candles, to 
handling requests for building construction, renovation, or use to even settling disputes within 
denominations. The number of petitions for church registration was often overwhelming. All of 
these issues needed oversight and coordination among the various levels of government 
bureaucracy. 
The ministries of religion were limited by the lack of definition of their functional 
capacity and the need to always be wary of trends emerging from within the inner party 
leadership. For example, after Stalin granted concessions to church leaders to re-open some 
churches, thousands of petitions to open churches were submitted yearly from the mid-1940s 
until 1951, but only a fraction of these were granted. The Soviet councils for religious affairs 
never received guidance on how many to open. Local councils feared being labeled pro-Church, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
were shaped by their tasks (they did not begin fully formed), and particular state-citizen relations were 
formed by their interactions. There are also a few scholars of Soviet history, such as Scott Kenworthy, 
Sonja Luehrmann, Edward Roslof, Daniel Peris, Catherine Wanner, and Glennys Young, who have explored 
the complexities of the churches and states and their dynamic relationships. An example of a scholar who 
employs the category of “totalitarian” as explanatory would be H. David Baer, who writes Communism 
"distorted the soul" when it demanded people cooperate with its construction. He argues that “official 
atheism for the churches was communism's totalitarian claim on society, its vision of an all-embracing 
socialism that allowed no place for independent institutions and associations.” 
16 Davis, A Long Walk to Church, 238. 
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but they also were instructed to normalize church-state relations and open churches as 
needed.17 The governments of both Romania and the Soviet Union struggled to manage 
religious bodies effectively while balancing other governmental concerns and exigencies. Yet 
that does not mean that they projected weakness on this front; on the contrary, the lack of 
competency and potential vulnerabilities were hidden behind sporadic shows of force, the 
specter of police intelligence or blackmail, red-tape, bureaucratic dead-ends, and general 
antagonism. 
Scholars have also debated the extent of atomization in communist society and whether 
“civil society” existed.18 It’s worth asking whether ordinary people (religious or not) found niche 
groups to which they felt like they belonged, or whether members of society were effectively 
atomized and isolated during this period. The study of religious formations speaks directly to 
this debate. The “associational life” found in religious formations remained an ever-present 
opportunity for people to mobilize around a “cause” or identity, but people could also 
participate in religion and remain isolated from their co-participants—a way of participation 
that state actions tried to foster.  
This work shows how religious formations could be powerful or weak. Increased state 
antagonism sometimes actually helped strengthen community ties, as people needed others for 
bonding in adversity. This is most evident in the case of the Baptists (Chapter VIII), and the 
conditions that made for fragile communities is most evident in the non-conformist Orthodox 
groups discussed in Chapter VI.  
Niche communities or societies, it seems, were always regarded by state authorities as 
potentially threatening. In the realm of religious practice, we find that the collective moral 
authority of the state collided with the potential power of voluntary associational life in religious 
gatherings, even though those who gathered rarely articulated large public goals or proclaimed 
a clear unifying platform, but simply projected a corporate desire to be free to define their own 
pursuits. State officials were wary of variations in church gatherings, as they presented 
opportunities for people to create new ways or languages of belonging. It was acceptable for 
people to practice religion as individuals ritualistically, but building a corporate identity and 
“thickening” communal relations threatened the “imagined communities” of belonging typically 
promulgated by the state (e.g. as fellow socialist citizens, workers, or members of the party or 
                                                          
17 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 105. 
18 Hannah Arendt, for example, has argued that “totalitarianism” is possible when society is atomized, 
when people are alienated from each other and life is highly segmented. 
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dominant national group). Any type of gathering could present the opportunity for people to 
mobilize, to form bodies of power; it just so happens that religious gatherings were among the 
few opportunities to do so. There were many occasions wherein believers began to speak of an 
“us,” but oftentimes state officials found ways to redivide the people and prevent a community 
from “activating.”  
The legitimacy of an authority is often considered to be dependent on the believability 
of its ideology. Yet some scholars of the region have recently argued that ideological discourse 
had become empty by the 1970s in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and that society’s 
focus had shifted enthusiastically toward consumption, even while citizens played pro forma 
roles in repeating the ideologies, pretending that they were meaningful.19 The late socialist 
period was not a titanic struggle of state ideologues and dissidents, these scholars argue; 
dissidents were in fact marginal to everyday society and commoners considered them to be “out 
of touch.” While agreeing that ideological debate lost its former urgency, my study of religious 
formations shows that ideas could still mobilize people as long as they appeared to be 
presented in “authentic” ways. This research shows that youth and intellectuals were not simply 
attracted to consumption and still discussed matters of “truth” in earnest. Yet state officials 
found certain religious gatherings threatening not because they were sites of struggle over 
religious or atheist “ideas,” but because they were examples of voluntary and enthusiastic 
corporate belonging outside of state-approved avenues—the same aspects that attracted many 
participants. 
This work connects to growing research on aspects of social life in communist countries 
that have largely been ignored in studies of communist power. Contributors to the edited 
collection Socialist Escapes suggest that the communist countries endured in part due to their 
flexibility in accommodating all kinds of activity that early pro-communists might never have 
identified as compatible with communism, like tourism, music, art, camps, and other activities. A 
consideration of religion is missing from this collection.20 Many citizens sought religious 
gatherings for affective qualities like “authenticity,” which was opposed to didacticism; some 
                                                          
19 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Paulina Bren, The Greengrocer and His TV: The Culture of 
Communism after the 1968 Prague Spring (Ithaca, [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press, 2010); Juliane Furst, 
Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
20 Cathleen M. Giustino, Catherine J. Plum, and Alexander Vari, Socialist Escapes: Breaking Away from 
Ideology and Everyday Routine in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015). 
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people sought ideologies they could believe in and act upon. There are scores of incidents in 
Romania and the Soviet Union in which religious gatherings became highly popular, with 
participants praising them as “authentic” for things like “openness” and “warmth,” comments 
which indirectly compared them favorably to other more scripted arenas of society and the 
accepted social-political discourse.  
Youth have figured importantly in recent studies of the post-war period in communist 
Eastern Europe, especially in those of Julianne Furst and Alexei Yurchak. In each of the cases 
presented in this work, youth religious formations emerge, and they challenge state and church 
authorities, often at the same time, but not necessarily as “dissidents” intent on political 
overthrow so much as people wanting to have their own spaces of activity without the usual 
inhibitions. Furst shows how Soviet youth in the era of “mature socialism” both conformed and 
rebelled, were cynics and believers, careerists but also idealists. There were many visible groups 
of religious youth, and while they were often skeptical of those in power, being idealistic, they 
looked to change the scenario they encountered rather than accept it as inevitable. They sought 
what was “true,” but tired of pedanticism, they actively sought to facilitate non-political 
gatherings where the dominant tones would be ones of fun, belonging, and pushing the 
boundaries of established form or content. This work adds a site of youth activity overlooked to 
date, in the realm of religion.  
Ways of Conceptualizing Religion in Communist Lands 
Church vs. State? 
In part because the stories of “non-conformist” religious figures who were subjected to 
censure and harassment reached concerned audiences abroad, many people have characterized 
the experience of the religious under communism as "the state persecuting the church." This is 
only partly the case. Although it is true that the impulse to close churches, circumscribe religious 
activities, harass, torture, imprison, and kill believers, did not arise by widespread or popular 
demand, but from state officials and a minority of loyal, zealous citizens, the religious were not 
powerless. The states had many tools for justifying or covering acts of repression or violence, 
but they did not predetermine people’s reactions. Some victims of repression capitulated and 
hoped for better times, and some fought back. The playing field was never even, but how 
believers responded to the state had real impacts on their religious life. Believers had agency 
and influenced state religious policy, as subsequent chapters demonstrate.  
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Other treatments of religion in communist Eastern Europe have customarily yielded 
narratives of collaboration or victimhood, since some churchmen responded to strict limitations 
on religious practice by cooperating with officials. Although these do tell part of the story, they 
reduce complexities to an “us-them” dichotomy, and “collaborators” are derided for betraying 
the understood “us.”21 State and religious actors shared a common struggle: to define 
acceptable religiosity. Religious representatives often disagreed about aspects of state dictates 
on religion, and many called upon state institutions to resolve inner-church disputes. Relatively 
few believers saw their situation as so dichotomous or occupied by two monolithic entities, 
church and state. 
Some have regarded the states’ ministries of religion (Council for Church Affairs in the 
Soviet Union and Department of Religions in Romania) as little more than repressive secret 
police organs; Russian scholar Tatiana Chumachenko describes Soviet religious officials as "over-
procurators who represented the ideology of militant atheism."22 Adherents to this view see 
bodies like the council as "organ[s] for control" of the church but ignore the way in which such 
institutions, by their existence, guaranteed a status quo relationship between the church and 
state, even if that status quo was subject to change. Existence of such councils acted to ensure 
that churches continued to exist, even if in a limited form. Although interaction "took place on 
official terms," at a minimum churches could be recognized as legitimate bodies. Although far 
from satisfactory, the fact that officials granted churches an audience for their grievances or 
requests23 meant there was a framework for religious existence, and these agencies were 
frequently referees between church and state bodies—sometimes advocating for church rights 
against certain authorities’ preferences. 
Although communist leaders in the Soviet Union in the 1920s made draconian moves 
against the Orthodox Church to lessen its influence in governance, after World War II in the 
Soviet Union and Romania those in power did not attempt to isolate the churches from the state 
so much as transform the nature of the churches’ incorporation into the state. With each of the 
                                                          
21 H. David Baer, The Struggle of Hungarian Lutherans under Communism (College Station: Texas A&M 
Univ. Press, 2013), 3–4. Baer shows the basic division that existed then among churchmen and that 
remains today. He maintains such categorization, asking whether compromises with the government 
were necessary given such a reality, or whether church leaders “betrayed” the “true” mission of the 
church by cooperating to such an extent. 
22 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 8. An over-procurator is the name associated with the 
representative of the tsar who monitored and influenced church affairs in pre-Revolutionary Russia. 
23 Ibid., 36. 
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religions after World War II, the states took on new roles in terms of regulating religious affairs 
with increased efforts in influencing, guiding, manipulating, and managing religious personnel. 
Scott Kenworthy noticed this discrepancy in his study of monastic life in the Soviet Union after 
World War II. Soviet authorities had shifted from once defining all religious belief as equivalent 
to superstition to defining clergy as another occupation. In attacks on monasteries in the late 
1950s, for instance, officials identified “’illegitimate’ pilgrimages and pilgrimage organizers,” as 
well as religious “’fanatics,’” both of which had understood corollaries: legitimate pilgrimages 
and the religiously normal.24 
In Romania, the state may have imprisoned many religious leaders, but it also 
contributed to the salaries of registered clergy and theological professors and to scholarships for 
seminary students. Contemporary observer Miranda Villiers notes that "pensions, medical 
assistance, rest-homes by the sea and holiday houses in the holidays" were possibilities for 
clergy of the Church. As Villiers put it in 1973, "Such facts are proof that the Church is not 
merely tolerated within an officially atheistic, communist State, but that it has a positive role 
which is recognised and encouraged by the secular leaders."25 The situation for churches in the 
Soviet Union was less amenable throughout, as even the former national Orthodox Church was 
almost never praised for its role in society. The Orthodox Church was allowed to receive 
donations and money for sale of candles or rendering of other services, but they were obliged to 
“donate” varying percentages to the state, particularly its “peace fund.” Yet what remained was 
sufficient for salaries and church upkeep, although small rural churches struggled for want of 
donations.26 
In addition to state-persecuting-church, many have seen the church-state relationship 
as built upon atheism-vs.-religion—a battle of ideologies. Although it is true that officials 
expected clergy to avoid ideological and apologetical debate or risk discipline, it is also true that 
officials after World War II in the Soviet Union and Romania permitted people the “freedom of 
conscience,” which meant that each individual could hold his or her own private beliefs. But in 
public, only the state had the prerogative of proclaiming official truth. As noted above, officials 
in the ministries of religions overlooked the fact that contrary propaganda was proclaimed at 
                                                          
24 Scott Kenworthy, “The Revival of Monastic Life in the Trinity-Sergius Lavra after World War II,” in State 
Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, ed. Catherine Wanner (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 146. 
25 Miranda Villiers, “The Romanian Church Today,” Religion in Communist Lands 1, no. 3 (1973): 4. 
26 Jane Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1986), 49–52. 
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nearly every church service as long as the themes were self-referentially religious and did not 
inform public behavior beyond basic moralistic concepts like honesty, industry, and patriotism.  
That church-vs.-state and atheism-vs.-religion are too reductive is made more evident in 
the fact that the states and the churches in question were far from unified. Much of Western 
history is made up of church divisions, and the communist period is one of both church unity 
and division. In the Soviet Union and Romania, for many believers and clergy, the most 
threatening "heresy" no longer came from “sects” or “schismatic” groups, but from the state 
and its agents. In this way, and as we will explore throughout this book, as state agents 
sometimes pitted themselves against believers (e.g. by sending them to prison), they 
inadvertently created the opportunity for believers to consider Christianity something shareable 
with those of other Christian confessions. Believers could now see those of other denominations 
not necessarily as enemies or competitors, but as co-laborers in a common struggle, and 
ecumenism did flourish in some circles, notably in prison. 
But ecumenism was far from the norm, perhaps still unusual. Some religious 
representatives considered “atheist” state agents less their enemy than traditional enemies, 
including “sectarians,” Jews, or neighboring ethnic groups. Others would not put aside 
traditional animosities that existed between their respective denominations. After all, 
confidence in the rightness of one’s own tradition did not necessarily diminish, and others’ 
heresy was not rectified by a heretical state. Across communist lands, some believers and clergy 
regarded church hierarchs cooperating with the state as acting as the “arm of Satan.”  
A significant problem in viewing the situation as divided neatly between “church” and 
“state” is that the state could not easily be distinguished from the church. Some church leaders 
were state agents, and others did not oppose serving both state and church interests. 
Moreover, “the church” is multiple things at once. As some saw it, the church was an institution 
that rendered services (performing certain essential rites), necessitating open doors. Yet “the 
church” can also be an informal, undefined community. Its unscripted connections of people are 
not synonymous with the church leaders. In many ways, church is both an institution and an 
amorphous body of belonging that can be universal or local.  
Moreover, religious affiliations often overlap with other affiliations such as national 
ones, and the relative power of a religious affiliation is ever in flux. It becomes necessary to 
consider overlapping affiliations in this work especially as it pertains to Romania's Reformed 
Church. This church was almost exclusively comprised of Hungarians, and so attacks on the 
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Reformed Church might be regarded by some as an "ethnic" attack, whereas attacks on 
Hungarians were not necessarily seen as "religious attacks" since some Hungarians were 
Reformed, others Catholic, Baptist, atheist, and so on. In the case of Baptists in Romania, 
Orthodox believers often saw their growth at the expense of the Orthodox Church as 
threatening, but so did state agents, who considered it “a threat to the unitary and indivisible 
character of the Romanian national state."27 In the mind of many Romanians, even so-called 
“atheist” ones, to be Romanian was to be Orthodox. For nationalists in Romania and Russia, 
evangelical denominations were considered Western and non-traditional, and therefore, non-
Romanian or non-Russian. State agents often paired with Orthodox representatives in 
combatting loss of churchgoers to such protestant denominations. Beyond nationalism, state 
agents may have also been concerned for churches with “Western” connections mobilizing 
people.  
Niche in the Field: Religion as Site of Associational Life with Power to Mobilize 
Scholars Bruce Berglund and Brian Porter-Szűcs perceptively noticed a major deficiency 
in the field of Christianity and religion in Eastern Europe, that “archive-based, historical research 
into East European Christianity in the modern period has been largely absent from the scholarly 
literature.” They also noted the need for “a critical reconsideration of the analytical categories 
and teleological narratives that have previously obscured the actual experience of religious life 
and faith.”28 Although there are scholars of “everyday” or “lived” religion who have attempted 
to get outside the confines of theological (intellectual), institutional (church), or biographical 
lenses for studying religion,29 this field is not well established in the discipline of history for East 
European or communist contexts.30 The present work is an attempt at redressing this deficiency. 
My focus is on one particular aspect of religion: religious gatherings as sites that state 
officials monitored because they feared that such gatherings encouraged alternative identities 
and ideologies as well as voluntary mobilization of citizens. By making the gathering the central 
                                                          
27 Ioan-Marius Bucur, “Church and State Relations under the Communist Regime: The Case of Romania,” 
in Religion and Political Change in Europe: Past and Present, ed. Ausma Cimdina (Pisa: PLUS, 2003), 171. 
28 Berglund and Porter, Christianity and Modernity in Eastern Europe, xiv, 2. 
29 See, for example, the works of the following scholars in American and British contexts: David D. Hall, 
ed., Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1997); Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Congregation and Community (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1997); Grace Davie, The Sociology of Religion: A Critical Agenda, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013). 
30 Marion Bowman and Ülo Valk, eds., Vernacular Religion in Everyday Life: Expressions of Belief (Bristol, 
CT: Equinox, 2015). Folklorists and anthropologists have been much more rigorous in applying theoretical 
developments to this region than historians. 
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lens of focus, one can move beyond considerations of why people go to church or participate in 
religious activities. It becomes unnecessary to determine exactly what people believe and how 
that relates to what a “church” believes. A study of religious gatherings demonstrates that 
religious associations are live, in-flux organisms with partly constraining – not predetermining – 
cultural patterns and traditions. Religious life is not restricted to institutions or hierarchs but is 
dynamic and responsive to historical changes and conditions. 
The word “community” deserves definition. As sociologist Craig Calhoun puts it, 
“community suggests a greater 'closeness' of relations than does society. This closeness seems 
to imply, though not rigidly, face to face contact, commonalty of purpose, familiarity and 
dependability.”31 Any association may range from a simple aggregation of people to one where 
all participants are related by several kinds of bonds at once. The relationships and nature of 
those relations matter. The poles of a proper spectrum are not “individual” vs. “community,” 
but on the relative strengths of the bonds between people.32 Things like frequency of 
interaction may influence strength of community, though the bonds of "familiarity" or “common 
interest” are relatively weak (e.g. going to church every Sunday with the same people may cause 
one to act on behalf of the others there, but it may not - familiarity is not enough). Specific 
responsibilities carry more weight, such as being economically interdependent, or being a 
member of an organization with clear duties. Also potentially strong are those among relatives, 
among kin, as well as bonds of friendship. 
People weigh the risks and benefits of their actions according to the often complicated 
outcomes which might result with regard to the various communities to which they belong. For 
instance, if one belongs to a church community but is also a citizen of a state, she must weigh 
the costs and benefits of upholding the expectations of one membership when it conflicts with 
another. That the states in Romania and the Soviet Union often seemed to suggest that strong 
allegiance to a church or church community was in conflict with being a citizen made for a great 
struggle during the whole of the states' existence.  
                                                          
31 C. J Calhoun, “Community: Toward a Variable Conceptualization for Comparative Research,” Social 
History 5, no. 1 (1980): 111. 
32 Ibid., 109–20. A corporate body could be considered atomized when the links between people are 
weak. When ties are weak, conflict easily results in people abandoning the group. But where people are 
linked by many different kinds of ties rather than a single one, it becomes less likely that one will leave an 
association. Bonds between people may be strong or weak, and although historical ties often guide 
actions, they never predetermine them. In order to study a community, one must attend to the 
relationships that exist between the people, and the nature of those relationships. 
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Whether “community” existed in the churches of this study is part of the inquiry and 
argument of this project. I argue that generally speaking, most people practiced religion in a 
fragmentary way, individualistically, and this was quite satisfactory to state agents. Even where 
religion was gaining in popularity, the communal relations were far from durable, as the 
relations among people were based primarily on frequency and common interest. There are, 
however, a few instances from this research where the opposite seemed to emerge and true 
communities were formed. 
Methodology 
Countries and Churches Selected 
Romania and the Soviet Union have adherents to Judaism and Islam, as well as several 
denominations of Christianity, including Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek-Catholic (Uniate), 
Lutheran, Presbyterian, Reformed, Baptist, Pentecostal Churches, as well as Seventh-Day 
Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Unitarians. For this paper, I have chosen to compare 
Christian faiths that had been present and relatively widespread before the First World War.  
For Romania, I have researched the Romanian Orthodox and Hungarian Reformed 
Churches, primarily in the Transylvanian region. For the Soviet Union, I have researched the 
Russian Orthodox and Baptist Churches in the Moscow region. Both territories contain around 
seven million people, although Transylvania is twice as large as Moscow Oblast. The Orthodox 
Churches in both cases are nationally predominant and very hierarchical, while the Protestant 
churches are widespread but historically less intertwined with the state. Comparing dominant 
(Orthodox) with minority churches reveals the relative role of the threat that the Orthodox 
Churches presented as alternative avenues for mobilizing citizens en masse. Adding Protestant 
churches reveals how differences in church cultures and traditions led to variations in state 
management and state relations, as well as how churches variously dealt with internal disputes.  
The four faiths researched were both historically present and relatively large as well as 
accepted in communist times, which the Roman- and Greek-Catholic Churches were not. In both 
countries the Roman-Catholic Church never received complete acceptance due to its allegiance 
to a foreign power, the pope. In both the Soviet Union and Romania the Greek-Catholic Church 
(also commonly known as the Uniate Church) had a long historical presence since being formed 
in 1596 at the Union of Brest. In this Union, certain Eastern Orthodox Churches accepted papal 
authority in Rome, while maintaining much of the practices and traditions of Orthodoxy, leading 
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to the name “Uniate.” In the Soviet Union in 1946 and Romania in 1948, this Uniate Church was 
declared "reunited" with the Orthodox Church ostensibly by popular demand. In fact, this was a 
highly coercive maneuver whereby prominent church leaders were imprisoned if they did not 
"voluntarily" sign their names in agreement with the disappearance of their Church and its 
property. Those who wished to remain faithful to their denomination practiced underground. 
The importance of the Greek-Catholics in the Romanian case will be obvious whereas the 
geographic focus on Moscow means Greek-Catholicism is absent from the Soviet case.  
I have chosen to study Christian denominations because of their religious 
predominance. Studying non-Christian religions, such as Buddhism, Islam, or Judaism, would add 
even greater depth to our understanding of communist officials’ management of religion and 
would likely involve issues of officials’ ethnic, racial, or religious prejudices. The issue of Jews in 
Romania and the Soviet Union, for example, presents several very significant variations to the 
study of religion in these contexts. Judaism was an acceptable religion in both countries, but 
problems like cultural and governmental antisemitism alongside Jewish requests to emigrate 
from Russia to Israel make for additional difficulties in studying state management of Judaism as 
a religion. Nevertheless, I have, even in the title, used the word “religion” rather than the more 
specific term “Christianity” because officials aimed to address the Christian religions not 
according to such terms as “Christianity” in distinction from other faiths, but according to a 
Marxist notion that all religions were equal in being superstitions doomed to fade out with a 
socio-economic changes in society—even if for practical reasons officials did make important 
distinctions. 
Comparing the countries of Romania and the Soviet Union is reasonable due to their 
similarities in rule, and because in both countries the Orthodox Church is a central and powerful 
national-cultural institution. They also have leadership chronologies that make for convenient 
comparison. One challenge to the field of Russian and East European studies is that the region is 
comprised of more than a dozen countries, all necessitating language expertise and knowledge 
of particular histories and cultures. This reality often restricts fruitful comparative discussion, 
and scholars often ignore research from neighboring countries. Neither “communism” nor 
“religion” was a monolith across Eastern Europe, yet the region has been shaped by communist-
socialist rule and the presence of distinctive religious bodies.  
19                                      
 
Sources 
Several kinds of sources mitigate against a one-sided perspective. For each Church, I 
have used recollections and memoirs from participants of religious gatherings, such as from 
believers or members of the clergy, alongside utterances from officials, including secret reports, 
court cases, and accounts of the authorities’ interactions with believers. Most of the sources 
have been almost unused by other scholars since the government reports were deemed secret 
in communist times and are still difficult to locate. In 2015 in the counties of Transylvania, only 
two regional archives contained such reports (Sălaj and Mureş Counties). For Soviet reports, I 
have used material from the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), City Archive of 
Moscow (TsGA Moskvy), and copies of Moscow Oblast reports (TsGAMO) made in the 1990s and 
held by the Keston Archive at Baylor University. To supplement the relative dearth of documents 
from the 1980s, I have relied more on memoirs, samizdat, and interviews with actors from both 
countries.33  
The reports largely come from the ministries of religion. In the Soviet Union, until 
around 1965, there were two ministries: the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs 
(CROCA) and the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC). After 1965, they merged into 
the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), although divisions still existed in addressing various 
confessions. In Romania, the agency was initially the Ministry of Religions, and later the 
Department of Religions. 
These agencies comprised part of the apparatus of supervision, which also included 
police, secret police, other local officials, and even any other citizen who participated in this 
network of information. In both countries, the ministries had central offices to whom regional 
offices reported. Regional officials worked with religious counterparts of their region, and 
central offices dealt with top hierarchs. Although the ranking system is largely secretive, it 
seems to be commonly asserted that a local state commissioner, although holding an official 
government post, held a lower-ranking position than leading church hierarchs. All churches and 
church personnel had to be registered and approved by the ministries.  
                                                          
33 The individuals and churches whose narratives I analyze do not fall equally in the “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” category. When exploring the differences, I have found that “acceptable” was usually 
defined negatively: many historical actors in religious institutions discovered what was unacceptable by 
inadvertent transgression and subsequent discipline. Thus, many of my subjects were the transgressors of 
acceptable religiosity. The two categories defined one another.  
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Ministry officials were mostly functionaries whose primary purpose was to ensure that 
religious practices were being carried out according to law. They oversaw the finances of the 
churches as well, ensuring that they reported earnings for tax purposes and the like. They also 
had to approve building use and renovation for religious functions. They oversaw selection of 
religious personnel for any committees and the selection of important positions in deaneries or 
bishoprics of his territory. They also held regular hours for receiving anyone with issues or 
problems to discuss in the religious realm. 
Organization of Dissertation 
Due to the simultaneity of the events in question, the dissertation is organized variously 
by chronology, geography, and religious confession. The postwar eras of Joseph Stalin and Nikita 
Khrushchev in the Soviet Union align almost exactly with the era of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 
Romania, and the eras of Leonid Brezhnev, his aged successors, and Mikhail Gorbachev align 
with the era of Nicolae Ceauşescu. These two groupings of eras roughly align with both 
countries’ shifting approaches to managing religion. In the first religious era in both countries, I 
take the experiences of the respective Orthodox and Protestant denominations together, but in 
the later Brezhnev/Ceauşescu eras, I consider the denominations separately due to the 
extensive non-state sources available and in order to streamline the narratives. The narratives 
of different faiths do intertwine at times, but they also are distinctive, representative of the 
particular institutions and cultures of each faith.  
Chapter II tells the story of Stalin’s new approach to religion and the reemergence of 
public religiosity in the Soviet Union. Chapter III covers Romania’s communist officials’ attempts 
at establishing the reliability of the churches until 1956. Ch. IV goes back to the Soviet Union and 
addresses Nikita Khrushchev’s reaction to bourgeoning religion and the tensions resulting from 
his anti-religion campaign until his removal from office in 1964. Ch. V covers the same period in 
Romania—still under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej—and the state crackdown on uncontrolled 
religious movements until Dej’s death in 1964. 1964 suggested liberalization to believers under 
Brezhnev and Ceauşescu, but officials instead worked at normalizing religious practices against 
attempts by clergy and believers to enliven or innovate them. The remaining four chapters 
covering 1964-1989 are separated by religious confession: the Russian Orthodox Church and 
Romanian Orthodox Churches make up Chapters VI and VII, and the Evangelical Christians-
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Baptists of the Soviet Union and the Reformed Church of Romania appear in Chapters VIII and 
IX. A conclusion focusing on comparisons of the states and denominations follows as Chapter X.  
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II. The Return of Public Religion to the Soviet Union, 1943-1958
By the time the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the religious situation in the 
Soviet Union was very bleak. But the story of communism in Russia began in 1917 with what 
many would call a triumph for the Russian Orthodox Church. The abdication of the last Romanov 
Tsar gave the institutional freedom necessary to elect their first patriarch since Peter the Great 
abolished this head position of the church some two centuries prior. Just over a week after the 
Bolsheviks came to power in the October Revolution, the Church elected Patriarch Tikhon to the 
office. 
 But the Bolsheviks essentially nationalized all land and property, including the Church's, 
and it no longer was a legally recognized institution with rights or legal powers. It no longer had 
the right to register births or administer marriages. The Bolsheviks and the Orthodox Hierarchy 
were in direct confrontation at this beginning moment, with each denouncing the other in turn, 
either for political or ideological reasons. A physical confrontation did not truly begin until the 
Civil War was over, in late 1921 and early 1922. The ravages of World War I and the Civil War 
left people starving and dying of disease. In order to gain some revenue and help stabilize food 
supply and the society in general, one of the Bolshevik strategies was to insist the Church hand 
over its valuable goods toward this effort. The Patriarch complied by asking all parishes to give 
up any valuables except those used for sacraments (golden chalices for serving the Eucharist, for 
example, were to be held back). But this sacrifice was branded as too partial and selfish by the 
Bolshevik government, given the needs of society, and officials and locals were enjoined to take 
these articles as well. Fights ensued as believers attempted to defend their precious ritual items. 
This struggle deepened. Clergy were arrested, as were bishops. The Patriarch was put 
under house arrest. Leftist-leaning clergy gained the upper hand. So-called "Renovationists" 
were favored by the Bolshevik government as a way of breaking the grip of the existing 
hierarchy and as an opportunity for collaboration rather than opposition. Many of the churches 
were handed over to the Renovationists, a group which quickly won disdain almost equal to that 
of the Bolsheviks among the erstwhile Orthodox leadership. After Tikhon was released from 
house arrest, perhaps sensing the inevitability of the Bolshevik government, he began to 
concentrate his efforts on the "enemy within," the Renovationists. 
Attention to the Church waned slightly in 1924 and into 1928. This period was marked 
by an internal church struggle more than an external battle with the state. In addition to the 
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problem of the Renovationists, Tikhon's death in 1925 brought about a problem of succession. 
Most of those qualified to succeed were in prison or exile. The acting head of the church was 
Metropolitan Sergii (a.k.a Sergius), who after his release from prison in 1927 pledged his 
allegiance to the Soviet government in a statement on July 24. This declaration alienated many 
and caused dissenters to begin to organize underground, as they felt that cooperation with "the 
antichrist" could not be tolerated in this fashion. Movements called the "True Orthodox Church" 
and "True Orthodox Christians" took shape and remained underground, opposed to the 
"Sergiites" well into the latter half of the century. 
Evangelical denominations, however, did benefit some from the weakened role of the 
Orthodox Church in society, as prejudice against them no longer had state backing. In fact, since 
they gained most of their converts from the Orthodox Church, some officials regarded their role 
of weakening the Church as positive. With the power of the Orthodox Church a primary concern, 
officials did not target the Protestants in the USSR, which included the Lutherans, Mennonites 
(mainly German origin), Evangelical-Christians (Brethren), Baptists, Pentecostals, and Seventh-
Day Adventists.1  Evangelical denominations “experienced truly phenomenal growth” during the 
first decade of Soviet rule, increasing in numbers five or six times their size in 1917, due to 
relaxed controls on proselytism.2  
Joseph Stalin, who had succeeded Lenin in 1924, commenced a mass drive to 
industrialize the Soviet Union in 1928. The relative laissez-faire of the so-called New Economic 
Policy came to an end, and rural churches suffered new attacks during the mass collectivization 
campaign. Valuables were taken, icons and bell towers were destroyed, churches became 
warehouses for goods, and so on. There was also violence against and mass arrests of clergy and 
believers bold enough to attempt to save their churches. On top of all of this, anti-religious 
messages and scientific materialism were promoted while religious worldviews were denigrated 
as vestiges of superstition.  
As part of the regime’s attempt to further reduce the power of religious bodies, in 1929 
the Law on Religious Associations was passed. With the 1929 law, youth were prohibited from 
attending, and adults were prohibited from proselytizing. Officials made training or placing new 
                                                          
1 Walter Sawatsky, “Protestantism in the USSR,” in Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and 
Russia: The Communist and Postcommunist Eras, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1992), 239. 
2 Walter Sawatsky, Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II (Kitchener, Ont.; Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 
1981), 38–39. 
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priests extremely difficult, and by thinning the ranks, the government hoped that priests would 
not be able to do much beyond performing the basic rites of the church. Churches were 
forbidden from engaging in any acts of social welfare as well. The material side of churches was 
suffocated too, with almost absolute barriers to publishing or distributing bibles and literature, 
producing candles, or building or renovating. The government severely restricted the rights of 
religious associations, forbidding “expansion” and “expansionist” activities, a particularly 
problematic situation for Evangelical denominations.3  Many believers, especially elders of the 
church, were arrested as “kulaks” (wealthier peasants) or for maintaining contacts with co-
religionists abroad. Officially, numbers declined drastically, and in reality, the denominations 
suffered greatly due to harassment and the incarceration and deaths of many of their leaders. 
The national change to a six-day week also made church gatherings more difficult. In Moscow, 
only one of the six Evangelical churches remained open. Although relations among Evangelical 
denominations were traditionally fraught with disagreements on doctrine and practice, the only 
Evangelical church open in Moscow attracted brave Protestants from the Evangelical-Christian 
and Baptist faiths in particular.4  
Stalin leveled another attack during the Great Purges of the late 1930s. By the time of 
the beginning of what was to become World War II, it is estimated that in the Orthodox Church 
alone, since 1917 the 160,000 Orthodox clergy, monks, and nuns had dwindled down to 80,000 
due to imprisonment, execution, or other coercive measures. In Odessa, scholar Nathaniel Davis 
writes, when the Germans entered the city they found only one of 48 churches open, with no 
priests. In Kiev, there were two open churches, with three priests serving (down from nearly 
1,500 before the revolution). There were only some 200-300 churches open in the entire Soviet 
Union in 1939.5 It appeared that the institutional church was indeed in danger of dying out.   
This chapter explores the results of the new path Stalin charted for religion during 
World War II and the fifteen years following, prior to Nikita Khrushchev’s anti-religion campaign 
in the Orthodox and Evangelical Churches, primarily in the Moscow region. Although Stalin may 
have anticipated that his concessions would lead only to a kind of religiosity that would be 
private and publicly invisible, he unwittingly created the space for religious practice that 
transgressed the desired limits both of communist ideologues and of pragmatic officials wishing 
                                                          
3 Sawatsky, “Protestantism in the USSR,” 242. 
4 Sawatsky, Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II, 46–48. 
5 Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 2003), 12–13. 
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to “satisfy” people’s “religious needs.” Perhaps Stalin believed that relatively few would wish to 
continue religious practice, but the number of petitions to open churches and subsequent 
religious activity made the management of the religions an overwhelming task for officials. By 
1947 the Orthodox and Baptist Churches were mobilizing people in large numbers, and officials 
could observe that they were more than outlets for vestigial superstition, as officials typified 
religious practice. Even pragmatic communists wanted at most religious practice that would be 
characterized merely by ritualistic participation in a weekly service, whereas hardliners and 
idealists regretted Stalin’s concessions to religion, since to them, it remained incompatible with 
communism. This tension would endure largely unresolved until the late Gorbachev era. 
By 1948 the possibility of registering churches closed as the regime no longer welcomed 
the religious openings, but officials were now faced with the problem of normalizing religious 
practice. According to communist ideology, religion was supposed to disappear. The problem for 
officials was explaining why it was not only not declining, but “activating” in both the Orthodox 
and Evangelical Churches. Their response was to blame priests, pastors, and “active” members 
as the agents, and characterize “ordinary” believers as the ones influenced by them. This 
describes the scenario officials faced until the death of Stalin, but also the years following, 
including the first several years under Khrushchev until roughly 1958. 
Stalin’s Wartime Concessions 
Stalin’s policy shift during the war is what changed the bleak trajectory for the Orthodox 
and Evangelical Churches. From the war’s beginning, church leaders urged the faithful to 
support the war effort against the very real threat of the rapidly advancing Nazis. Some 
churches reopened without legal authorization, but also with a tacit understanding that it was 
acceptable for the extraordinary times. Upon the Nazi invasion, Metropolitan Sergii had 
immediately made patriotic and anti-German proclamations, urging believers to support the 
cause against the invaders, even drawing on historic and religious discourse about the holiness 
of the Russian (not Soviet) cause.6 Evangelical believers did not publicly reflect on the hardships 
caused by state persecution during this time, but focused instead on the hardships of the war 
and the supposed evils their fascist enemies were committing against their co-religionists.7 But 
believers in occupied territories noticed that the Nazis allowed churches to reopen. In Kiev, 
                                                          
6 Dimitry Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, vol. I (Crestwood, N.Y: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984), 194–99. 
7 Sawatsky, Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II, 55. 
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some twenty-five churches reopened during the several-year occupation.8 Not that all was ease 
and light behind enemy lines, but this was one “benefit” for some believers during occupation 
and a boost to Nazi propaganda.9 
Concessions in the Orthodox Church 
By the fall of 1941, as the Nazi Army marched steadily eastward, Stalin saw fit to stop his 
fight against religion. Anti-religious propaganda ceased, and the League of the Militant Godless 
was disbanded.10 But religiosity was still largely underground. Sergei Mechev was one priest 
who went underground in 1927 in reaction to the Sergiite proclamation (see above). He often 
visited the home of professor and scientist Nikolai Pestov, who was a scholar of theological 
topics in secret, until Mechev was arrested and executed as a supposed conspirator in 1942. 
Pestov’s daughter, Natalia, witnessed the many clandestine meetings and interactions with 
people whose parents were underground, arrested, or killed, and their family was acquainted 
with other followers of Mechev (called Mechevites). She recalls how “At the beginning of the 
war every priest who visited our home was either arrested, exiled, or disappeared who knows 
where.”11 Early in the war, state agents viewed clandestine activity as akin to conspiracy. A 
priest who will be featured below, Mikhail Trukhanov, was a student in 1941 and was arrested 
for “organizing a circle for studying the bible” at a public institution.12 He was not tried, but 
simply sent to prison, where the warden, when meeting him, remarked, “you are really a 
Christian? Ha-ha-ha!!,” as though Trukhanov was a rare, even comical remnant of a dying breed.  
What truly changed matters for religious practice was a meeting that Stalin held on 
September 4, 1943—after the pivotal battle that the Soviet Union won at Stalingrad—to which 
he invited foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, future head over church affairs Georgii Karpov 
(a former NKVD colonel who presided over religious cases, arresting and persecuting 
problematic religious personnel), and the three remaining heads of the Orthodox Church, 
                                                          
8 Davis, A Long Walk to Church, 16. 
9 For more on church openings under German occupation, see Volume I of Pospielovsky. He writes that 
German policies conflicted here: anti-Slavic racism, preference for non-Russian nationalities for 
collaboration, and the indisputable boon to German favor that opening churches wrought. Pospielovsky 
cites evidence of massive revival of religiosity behind German lines, many church openings, baptisms, 
reemergence of priests, etc. See pp. 224-246. 
10 Daniel Peris, Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998). 
11 N. N. Sokolova, Pod Krovom Vsevyshnego [Under the Blood of the Most High] (Moskva: Izd-vo, 
Pravoslavnoe bratstvo sviatogo apostola Ioanna Bogoslova, 1999), 13. 
12 Mikhail Trukhanov, Vospominaniia: Pervye Sorok Let Moei Zhizni [Recollections: The First Forty Years of 
My Life], ed. V. A. Zvonkova, vol. 1, 2008, 78. 
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Metropolitans Sergii, Aleksei, and Nikolai. Stalin quizzically questioned why they seemed 
inactive as of late, inviting them to come out of the shadows. Stalin consented to their request 
to elect a patriarch,13 even encouraged them to act quickly, and four days later there was a 
gathering of bishops—many of whom had suddenly reappeared from arrest or exile—where 
they elected Sergei patriarch, filling the position that had been vacant since 1925 due to state 
restrictions. Stalin also granted his consent for theological training of additional numbers of 
clergy for desperately understaffed churches, journal publication, consecrating bishops, 
ordaining additional priests, and producing now-scarce candles.14  
Although it might appear that Stalin made these concessions in order to better ensure 
Soviet loyalty at a time when it was of utmost concern for the war effort, thus demonstrating 
that he knew that many citizens still longed for more religious access, his concessions were 
offered only after the war appeared to be favoring the Soviet Union.15 In addition, scholars have 
noted, Stalin might have also felt that loyal Church hierarchs could play a very important role in 
international relations, as well as domestically. They could demonstrate Soviet religious 
tolerance to the world (particularly the Allies), and also help rein in churches located in newly-
acquired or Soviet-desired territories to the West.16 Stalin was willing to sacrifice ideological 
constancy during WWII, as Catherine Wanner, puts it, to “merge sacred and secular goals” for 
the war effort. The Church likewise issued letters that urged people, based on their religious 
convictions, to support “the Motherland.”17 Yet it should also be noted that far to the east of 
the front, very few churches opened. Most of those that opened had proximity to the Western 
front, demonstrating that for Stalin, this was to shore up loyalty where it mattered most.18 
                                                          
13 In the world of Orthodoxy, each Autocephalous (i.e. National) Orthodox Church has its own Patriarch, 
who stands at the church’s head. Beneath him are the ranks Archbishop / Metropolitan, Bishop, 
Archpriest, Priest, Deacon, Laity (there are more distinctions and sub-rankings than this, but these 
comprise the major ranks). In Orthodox Churches, a Synod or Council is theoretically over the hierarchy, 
but it is often comprised of the leading hierarchs as well. 
14 Davis, A Long Walk to Church, 17; Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917-
1982, 1984, I:201–2. There is much more intrigue to this meeting with Stalin than I can present here. 
15 Scott Kenworthy, “The Revival of Monastic Life in the Trinity-Sergius Lavra after World War II,” in State 
Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, ed. Catherine Wanner (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 119. 
16 Dimitry Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, vol. II, II vols. 
(Crestwood, N.Y: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984); Davis, A Long Walk to Church. 
17 Catherine Wanner, Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism, Culture and 
Society after Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 55–57. 
18 Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, 1984, I:206. Pospielovsky notes 
that two cities to the East with populations over one million, Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) and Sverdlovsk 
(Yekaterinburg), had in operation three churches and one church, respectively. 
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Evidently, Stalin now saw the Church as an institution that did not threaten his authority but as 
one capable of being, as Scott Kenworthy puts it, “co-opted to serve the legitimacy of the 
Stalinist state.”19 
The government formed the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church 
(CROCA) at the level of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union as an information-gathering 
and monitoring organ, tracking all religious affairs and ensuring that the Church abided by Soviet 
legislation. The Church also had to receive approval for all personnel moves, thus even the 
appointment of the Patriarch had to receive approval, thereby allowing the government 
leverage in managing church affairs.20 The head of the Department of Religious Cults, Karpov 
being its first, reported to the Central Committee. Below Karpov were those who presided over 
certain oblasts, who in turn had raion- (district-) level functionaries. Those at this lower level 
were grouped into commissions who operated at a level analogous to executive committees of 
the city and district-level councils (or soviets). Commissioners were to know the laws and 
amendments of the USSR, but in reality, they closely followed the instructions of their superiors, 
and ultimately of the head of the Council, who guided their interpretation and application of the 
law. 
Karpov was charged with forming the Council and acting as go-between for the church 
and state. Karpov’s Council was supposed to monitor and guide church-state relations, and its 
primary tasks included reporting on the Church to the state, and relaying state wishes to the 
Church.21 Part of the Council’s reporting was to include statistics and recommendations for 
future state actions.22  
For its part, the episcopate (i.e., the bishops) of the Orthodox Church accepted the 
Council and the compromises proposed by Stalin and his representatives. They were given a 
voice but were required to support the state and its political positions. What was expressed as a 
“preference” or “recommendation” by the Council in reality was more like “guidelines for 
action” for the Church.23 Church leaders were granted some freedom to travel abroad with the 
understanding that they would promote state interests or express state concerns. The bishops 
were the ones through whom the Council would exert its influence over the broader church 
                                                          
19 Kenworthy, “The Revival of Monastic Life,” 124. 
20 Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, 1984, I:214. 
21 T. A. Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the 
Khrushchev Years, trans. Edward E. Roslof (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 15. 
22 Ibid., 17–18. See this section of Chumachenko's work for much more detail about the Council. 
23 Ibid., 36. 
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activity; they would supply those under them with guidelines and discipline the non-
conformists.24  
It was Church leaders’ fears of the terrors of the 1930s, T.A. Chumachenko argues, that 
“compelled [them] not only to avoid overstepping the limits of permitted activity but also to 
continually thank the Soviet regime ‘for the freedom given to all religious associations’ and to 
consciously spread an obvious lie by exaggerating the church’s well-being in the country.”25 The 
churches were not granted any new legal status; rather, their improved position was based on 
“resolutions, instructions, circular letters” which were rarely publicly seen.26 This was likely a 
strategy of Stalin’s in order to prevent any constitutional or pragmatic limitations to his future 
dealings with the churches, a situation church leaders probably sensed and tried to respect.  
Churches gradually opened, and the Church consecrated more bishops and ordained 
more priests to fill the many vacancies. In mid-1944 the Theological Institute reopened in 
Moscow, shortly after Sergii’s death. Aleksei succeeded Sergei as Patriarch in 1945, and later 
that year the churches were granted certain legal rights, such as leasing or owning objects and 
property. The Patriarch requested that the great Trinity-Sergius Lavra (monastery) be returned 
to the Church for “spiritual and patriotic” reasons, and CROCA granted the request in 1946.27 
The problem of Renovationism and the Sergiite schism diminished, as time and a sufficiently 
harrowing degree of persecution now brought the remaining leadership and clergy into 
submission and sufficient unity.  
People petition for churches, exposing state tensions 
People petitioned to open Orthodox churches in large numbers. Churches did not open 
automatically but required that a petition be submitted by a group of twenty people from a 
given locale, along with some sort of justification (such as no nearby church or the nearest 
church is at capacity) that warranted an additional one in a district. From the time that 
commissioner A.A. Trushin28 started working on January 1, 1944 until July 1, 1947, there were 
1,722 petitions for opening 390 churches across the Moscow Oblast and City. Most of the 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 46. 
25 Ibid., 52. 
26 Ibid., 85. 
27 Kenworthy, “The Revival of Monastic Life,” 126. 
28 For more on Aleksei Alekseevich Trushin, see Edward E. Roslof, “‘Faces of the Faceless’: A.A. Trushin 
Communist Over-Procurator for Moscow, 1943-1984,” Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 18/19 (2002): 
105–25. Roslof notes that Trushin had experience working with Karpov before and was probably his pick 
for the important post. Trushin served for over four decades as commissioner for Moscow Oblast. 
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churches in question had stopped functioning in 1938-40, with some stopping in 1931-1937 and 
others supposedly even in 1941. But only 55 churches were approved to open during that three-
and-a-half year period, as some 60-70 of them were actively being used for other purposes and 
could not easily be handed over, and another 80-90 lacked “convincing grounds” for opening, 
such as too few petitioners. With many of the petitions being repeat requests, it is difficult to 
ascertain on what grounds the remaining 175 or so churches were rejected.29 In the first quarter 
of 1947, the Executive Committee of the Moscow Oblast received 86 petitions for opening 73 
churches, fifteen original ones with 58 repeat requests. Some petitions did not represent large 
groups of people, but they complained about distances of ten or more kilometers to the nearest 
church, a formidable distance indeed when transport was spotty, requiring many kilometers of 
walking.30 
Officials analyzed each petition based on the proximity of other churches, the number 
of believers, and the number of times requests had been repeated. Across Moscow Oblast (not 
including the city proper) in 1948, there were 1,070 churches not being used as churches, with 
855 occupied in some other capacity, while 215 were available to be re-opened as churches. In 
1918, there had been 1,492 churches in operation compared to only 124 in 1948. There were 
five districts (raiony) and eight cities without active churches compared to 52 districts and eight 
cities with active churches. Citizens from all districts and cities submitted requests for openings. 
In the city of Moscow, all churches were occupied – none were “free” to be handed over 
without new arrangements.31 
Officials and functionaries were not all of the same mind in responding to petitions. 
Chumachenko argues that CROCA chief Karpov, when trying to carry out Stalin’s wishes, would 
sometimes defend believers’ interests in conflict with local authorities, who often had no 
interest in making space for religious activity, but had a vested interest in keeping things as they 
were, especially if the building was being used for state purposes.32 Tension arose from the goal 
of the Religious Council, since it aimed “‘to preserve normal church-state relations and to 
improve them for the good of the Motherland.’“33 But what was “good” for the Motherland, and 
when did it overlap with what was “good” for religious bodies? What was “good” for the 
                                                          
29 GARF, f. 6991, op. 1, d. 192, 73-74. 
30 Ibid., 11–14. 
31 GARF f. 6991, op. 1, d. 337, 52. 
32 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 8. 
33 Ibid., 10. 
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Motherland or for the churches was a matter of opinion and therefore highly contentious, and 
Stalin’s WWII shift was not well received or implemented on the local level by many atheist 
officials. “At best,” writes Chumachenko,” the majority of local authorities tolerated that policy 
only as temporary and necessary due to the extreme situation of World War II.” Despite even 
direct orders by Stalin, some officials delayed the opening of churches and seminaries, and only 
dogged persistence (perhaps including bribery) got certain institutions open, while the example 
of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra shows that having the backing of Stalin and Karpov is what made its 
opening possible.34 
Old manners of dealing with believers and clergy in the 1930s (rudeness, heavy-
handedness) carried over into the newly formed Council, and those who had a history of 
experience in religious affairs were often appointed as local agents.35 Local commissioners 
tracked and approved all potential appointments for church positions, placement of clergy, and 
admission to theological education. Information about such persons was obtained from the 
police organs, and commissioners might then accept or deny an appointment or admission.36 
But not all state representatives approved of such a council for religious affairs. In 1946, 
the head of Agitprop (whose job was to promote atheist and materialistic ideologies) severely 
criticized the work of the Council, accusing the Council of overstepping its bounds and 
representing church interests rather than state interests. This criticism came despite the 
Council’s plea that they acted only in accordance with government instructions. According to 
Agitprop officials, the Council was supposedly exaggerating the extent of religiosity of the 
people and should be more wary of clergy, whom Agitprop considered unpatriotic. Agitprop 
attacked the Council for not producing the conclusions that ought to exist—namely that 
religiosity was on the decline and patriotism on the rise.37 It appears that Stalin allowed the 
tension between the ideologues of Agitprop and pragmatists of the Council to persist.38 His non-
interference may have stemmed from his ambivalence toward resolving the inherent tension 
between communist ideology and religion alongside the pragmatic concerns of maintaining a 
content population. 
                                                          
34 Note that this approach was not uncommon in the Soviet Union. One example is that in the 1930s when 
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There were tensions on a more local level as well. The new government line supporting 
religion made it “untimely,” in Trushin’s view, to convert a certain church into a “club,” for 
example, though some years earlier such a conversion would never have been opposed by a 
government official.39 On the other side, despite supposedly having Stalin’s tacit consent, 
believers were getting frustrated by their inability to register their church communities. In 
districts without legally approved prayer houses (the name for Evangelical churches), Evangelical 
believers were meeting without authorization, risking sanctions. In the Orthodox Church, 
informants also notified the Council of certain people identified in Moscow Oblast who were not 
registered or did not have the proper authorizations but had been carrying out religious activity 
or conducting rites. Some of these were coming in from beyond the Moscow region, as 
evangelists and pastors often traveled between congregations. In such cases, Trushin passed the 
information onto the police and requested the results of their investigation.40 
Petitioners were not appeased by the fact that fifty religious communities had been 
registered in Moscow Oblast from 1944 to 1947, with over 150 before that, since those were 
not their churches.41 Believers requested “Comrade Stalin” aid them in getting church 
authorizations after petitions met rejection or simply went unanswered.42 One group asked 
“Dear Comr. Stalin” to listen to their request to open a church in their village which was closed 
in 1938 and was currently functioning as a mill. The nearest church to them was supposedly 50 
km away.43 Repeated rejection seemed to have the effect that the number of requests gradually 
went down each year.44 
Although believers had to battle local officials and representatives from CROCA to get 
churches open or positions filled, newly opened churches had to struggle to stay open in the 
face of a barrage of bureaucratic obstacles, and bishops had to face bureaucracy when making 
personnel moves. Nevertheless, local officials no longer had free rein to pursue an obviously 
anti-religious line. Even though security organs arrested religious individuals who were 
suspected of disloyalty to the regime, what mattered now was public reputation. In 1947 Karpov 
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instructed commissioners that there should not be “interference in internal church life by 
representatives of soviet organs.” Apparently authorities were “sometimes forgetting that the 
church in the USSR is separate from the state” and so they were “carrying out meddling in the 
inner life of the church.” One example was of a local chairman of the executive committee who 
called in a local Rector and ordered him to remove the warden.45 Yet state representatives did 
not cease meddling in church affairs because they had to constantly deal with the tensions 
caused by state needs for building use, their ideological commitment to communism, the law, 
instructions from superiors, and domestic and international reputations. In short, officials 
needed to appear not to meddle in church affairs, but a variety of governmental policies 
required them to do so. 
In territories newly gained or regained during the war, Stalin still needed to assert 
authority where it had not been or where it had waned during the occupation. He even hoped 
to rely on church leaders of the Orthodox and Evangelical Christians-Baptists Churches based in 
Moscow in reasserting control in areas like Ukraine. The Orthodox Church was called upon to 
manage the entire Greek-Catholic Church of Ukraine, as it was declared “re-united” with the 
Orthodox Church in 1946, and all properties and parishes were handed over to the Orthodox 
Church. 
The clandestine religious activity that characterized the period until Stalin’s policy shift 
did not disappear entirely, though Natalia Pestova noticed that as the war continued, the 
situation generally relaxed. Even “Mechevites” were above-ground, attending the Church of the 
Holy Prophet Elijah on Obydenskii Street.46 Yet the years of intense harassment and persecution 
made churchmen and laity wary, as they knew that the rule of law existed less on paper than 
according to someone’s whim. So “activation” depended on relationships of trust, as people 
found out about dynamic priests by word of mouth. After the war when Pestova wanted advice 
on some important life questions, she “heard that in one of the churches in Moscow there is the 
kind of priest who gives proper answers and advice to anyone who turns to him.” She traveled 
across town and waited nervously, hoping that what she had been told was true, and relieved 
when the rumors proved reliable.47 
Religious antagonism remained. Pestova attempted to keep her beliefs hidden for fear 
of repercussions at school, and her answers to questions still had to demonstrate a command of 
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Marxist-Leninist principles. Living in such a vast city as Moscow, she sometimes attended week-
day services without fear of being seen by her classmates, especially if the church was not near 
school grounds. Hearing that the Liturgy of a certain church “differ[ed] very much from the 
usual, that many [we]re admiring its unusual chants,” she decided to pay a visit. Yet when there, 
she met eyes with one of her professors. They now had secret knowledge that could be used 
against one another, so once outside of the church, they, without needing to discuss the matter, 
“pretended that we did not see each other (as in those years was expected).”48 
Religious figures with backgrounds too compromising also kept themselves hidden, and 
Pestova’s family had relationships with many such people. The Marfo-Mariinsky Convent on 
Bol’shaya Ordynka in Moscow had been closed long before the war, but they were close to one 
of its former nuns, to whom they often gave housing, as well as to one of its former spiritual 
fathers. The nun had a codename and false history to help cover her, and she and Pestova 
would often go together to visit this spiritual father, who lived outside the city and was occupied 
in the religious underground. 
Stalin’s concessions to the church made an immediate impact for those wishing to join 
the clergy. Orthodox believer Dmitrii Dudko (a priest featured below) wanted to become a 
priest, an impossibility before the war, but late in the war he read in the newspaper that in 
Moscow The Theological Institute was now open and that classes were being offered. He 
applied and was accepted. In 1947 the seminary moved its instruction to Zagorsk (Sergiev 
Posad), and Dudko happily studied there, glad for the changes that made church work a 
possibility for a young man like him.49 
The Orthodox Church, though not having the quantities of churches, clergy, or 
participants of before the 1930s, was no longer at death’s door. Churches were not re-opening 
quickly, nor without all kinds of hassles,50 but by 1947, one could witness crowded churches, 
ringing church bells, religious processions, and the like.51 It was too early for anyone to know, 
however, whether the religious situation was becoming normalized in any way, as policies could 
shift in a moment. 
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Concessions in the Evangelical Christians-Baptists Church 
Being relatively small, Protestant denominations were addressed less immediately than 
the Orthodox Church. About eight months after the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs 
(CROCA) was established in 1943, in 1944, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC) 
was established for covering the remaining religions, listed as Armenian, Old Believers, Catholic, 
Greek-Catholic, Lutheran, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist, and “sectarian organizations,” according to 
its original formulation. The Protestant-Evangelical denominations were lumped together as the 
lattermost.  
A few months later, leading representatives of Evangelical and Baptist Churches, at 
officials’ covert insistence, decided to merge into a unified council, a structure that 
unsurprisingly coincided precisely with the wishes of Stalin’s government. On October 26, 1944, 
forty-five delegates met in the Central Baptist Church in Moscow, with travel, accommodation, 
and provisions provided by the state. Unification of the Baptist and Evangelical Christian 
denominations was supposedly the unanimous wish of the delegates. As scholar Walter 
Sawatsky noted, for decades these groups failed to form a union, but with the aid of Stalin’s 
government, they resolved their differences in a matter of hours.52 Stalin and others evidently 
wanted to replicate the single institution structure of the Orthodox Church for the many 
Evangelical denominations. To them, the “command structure” of the Orthodox Church with its 
rigid hierarchy and culture of “submission” (deference to authority) was convenient as long as 
the patriarch, metropolitans, and bishops were cooperative, to whom clergy were expected to 
submit. For Protestant denominations, there was no command structure; they were 
decentralized, and the formation of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists 
(AUCECB) in 1944 was the first step toward creating a hierarchical structure for the Protestant 
churches. The Council was over the Senior Presbyters (who oversaw districts) and Presbyters 
(heads of churches), and theoretically, the Council was formed by democratic vote of 
representatives from the churches. 
The AUCECB brought together Evangelical Christians and Baptists, and soon after some 
Pentecostals joined—though the ECB leadership imposed its bias by requiring they cease the 
practices of speaking in tongues and foot-washing during services—as did Mennonites later. 
Most existing church communities joined or petitioned to join the Council to obtain legal status, 
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though some preferred to remain underground. The Council was intended to oversee and 
discipline the churches, its leaders and practices. The state had to approve its leaders.53 
This Council signified the new legal status of the erstwhile “sectarian” denominations 
that had not been recognized in the 1930s. Forming a union had not been something church 
leaders had been discussing at the time. Baptist believer Aleksandra Ivanovna Mozgova was the 
typist at the initial AUCECB conference in Moscow in 1944. She noted that many former church 
leaders were in prison, not invited, or not present, and the new ones had made decisions, it 
seemed, “in the offices of the Council of the Affairs of Religious Cults and of other bodies.”54 Yet, 
these new leaders were known figures from within the Evangelical and Baptist Churches, not 
outsiders. 
When the new commissioners for the Council for Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC) met 
for the first time in 1944, the leadership reminded them that the CARC was there, 
fundamentally, to ensure compliance of religious organizations with the legislation and act as 
the branch of the government that handled all affairs related to legal operation of religious 
organizations.55 Even though the Orthodox Church represented the majority and was re-
established and granted its own Council body first, by law there was no state religion with rights 
over another. Instead of Stalin’s precepts of 1929, those emphasized included Lenin’s basic 
principles of the law of separation of church and state and of school and church, and people’s 
right to the freedom of personal religious conscience.56 
Even though the Orthodox Church was de jure on par with all others, CARC 
Commissioners witnessed how their leaders esteemed the Orthodox Church more highly, a 
reversal of its fate in the earliest years of the Soviet Union. In this meeting, Council leaders 
provided the commissioners with a ready-made narrative to guide their attitudes toward the 
denominations under their care. In the Orthodox Church during the time of the attack of “Fascist 
Germany,” Metropolitan Sergei of the Orthodox Church “unambiguously announced to all of his 
believers the danger that started to threaten the Soviet Union and mobilized all of his believers 
to resist the German invaders,” with the result that the Orthodox Church displayed great 
“patriotism.” But the “Muslims, Armenians, Old Believers, evangelical Christians and Baptists, 
such religious organizations like Roman-Catholic, Greco-Catholic and Lutheran Churches, instead 
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of the mobilization of believers to resist the German invaders, openly went over to their 
defense, starting to greet them like liberators from the Bolsheviks and almost entirely started to 
serve the interests of German imperialism.” And when the Red Army came to “liberate” them, 
certain representatives from these religions in these Western regions did not welcome their 
liberators.57 It seems commissioners were to consider them as foreigners within, a potential fifth 
column not to be trusted as “one of us;” CARC leaders did not tell commissioners that many 
representatives from these religions did enjoin co-religionists to resist the Nazis.  
The precise cause of the shift in discourse which elevated the Orthodox Church is 
unclear. It may have stemmed from lingering pre-Soviet prejudices that saw the Russian 
Orthodox Church as a national, and therefore nationally trustworthy, institution. Stalin’s 
government was indeed shifting in a more pro-Russian nationalist direction at this time. Jews, 
for example, though far from pro-Nazi, were not praised for being “patriotic.” The post-war era 
saw a more pronounced departure in discourse from the liberal-leftist ideologies of the 1920s 
toward anti-Semitic and nationalist sentiments.  
CARC leaders told CARC commissioners to be in close cooperation with the leaders of 
these religions, since collaboration was needed for predictable religious practice:  
First of all, every commissioner must be occupied with studying the political-
moral situation of the head workers of the religious cults. Without knowing the 
kind of political physiognomy of every given leader of a religious association, his 
kind of moral situation, it would be very hard for this commissioner to work on 
the given religious cult, keeping in mind his relatively frequent communication 
with the leaders of religious cults in daily practical work. Until now almost no 
commissioner has been occupied in his work with these exceptionally important 
issues of the present.58  
They were given instructions for the proper procedures in registering religious communities. 
Last, they were reminded that in their relations with clergy, they “must not be permissive of 
elements of familiarity and obsequiousness”—whether on their part or that of the clergy—but 
instead “conduct themselves with a feeling of dignity” as representatives of the Council.59 In 
other words, they should not let leaders bribe or persuade them to be soft in their work 
managing religious institutions. 
It took the commissioners some time to get normalized relations established, as it 
seems they did not have proper records of churches, especially those that had formerly existed. 
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In Moscow Oblast the new commissioner, Comrade Besshaposhnikov, was working on simply 
counting all of the churches, especially those that had been closed. His counterpart at CROCA 
had been working on it for two years now, and he had only been at it a few months. His 
requests to other local bodies for assistance in this task went largely unanswered, it seems. 
Starting with the Old Believers, he traveled around, district by district, asking whether they had 
any closed churches. Jewish communities were his second priority, and Protestants, it appears, 
third.60 Although his focus was on the Old Believer and Jewish communities, his superiors 
warned him to keep his eye on “sectarian” activity. Events that “evangelical christians-baptists” 
were organizing outside of Sunday services in which children and youth were participating in 
programs tailored for them troubled officials, who instructed commissioners to 
“disperse/dismiss the community” with a “notification of the Council.”61 
It seems that Besshaposhnikov did not act aggressively on his comrades’ warning, at 
least if his reports are any indication. Despite not even having established the basics of the 
religious landscape, every commissioner was nevertheless supposed to write quarterly 
informational reports for their own office and local Party-Soviet leadership, and the reports 
were to include statistics of registration, financial matters, notes on clergy, as well as the 
activities of religious organizations and the work conducted by the commissioners.62 But one 
official, Comr. Sadovskii, took the fledgling commissioner to task: “Tov. Besshaposhnikov 
communicated nothing, literally nothing about the activities of religious organizations in 
Moscow and Moscow Oblast.” Although the commissioner had written about his tasks and what 
occupied his time, his audience wanted to know much more precisely the status and activity of 
each religious organization.63 He was to be their eyes, but his reports left them feeling blind. 
Early on, Besshaposhnikov allowed a few churches to register. Moscow Central Baptist 
Church was registered in 1945, not a surprise given it had been the only Evangelical church 
remaining in Moscow prior to 1944. Its registration application claimed 4,600 members, and the 
church’s physical capacity was listed as 1,500.64 In Kiev Oblast, dozens of Baptist churches were 
registered in 1945.65 But to register Evangelical churches was complicated. According to 
guidelines, communities were not supposed to gain registration without having a clergy-
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member attached to the community. It was not supposed to be permissible for “sectarian” 
groups to simply choose someone from among themselves who lacked any verifiable 
qualifications, so this kept them (or was supposed to keep them) from being registered, since 
Evangelical denominations had not customarily required theological training. The state’s 
preference was to have clergy approved by a church’s “center” (in this case, the AUCECB), so 
that the training of clergy could be tracked by state officials.66 In addition, registration required 
a minimum of twenty signatures, the building needed to have all verifications done for sanitary 
and fire safety, after which the “religious center” would need to grant its approval, followed by 
the Council and the local executive (oblast/raion) committees.67 ECB communities needed to 
overcome several bureaucratic hurdles before being granted legal status. Until then, believers 
would either have to join up with an approved community, or simply take the risks of 
unauthorized gatherings. 
Yet, the consequence of Stalin’s opening doors was a blossoming of church activity 
among Evangelical believers. Numbers attending church rose dramatically, and leaders and 
pastors now faced dizzying demands of under-staffed churches and requests to visit, preach, or 
baptize. In fact, AUCECB leader Zhidkov was calling for religious restraint from evangelists, 
worrying that there were renegade pastors conducting activity or preaching messages that 
would not be endorsed by the AUCECB leaders.68 
Government Less Conciliatory Toward the Churches 
In terms of Stalin’s use of the Church, however, it appears that 1948 was a “turning 
point.” The war and the most chaotic years following had subsided. The congeniality Stalin had 
shown toward the Orthodox hierarchs waned. The Church had proved useful during wartime, 
but now it needed to prove usefulness to Stalin “even in peacetime,” as scholar Dmitry 
Pospielovsky argues. Even in September 1944 the Party (CPSU) Central Committee decree called 
for “‘renewed antireligious efforts’“ by means of propaganda, but acts had not accompanied 
these words as yet. Governmental concessions stopped, but they did not give way to terror, and 
some hardline communists resented the concessions they felt had only been only justifiable in 
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wartime.69 Religion was still ideologically “incompatible” with communism—”even in the flexible 
Stalin’s application of it”—as Pospielovsky puts it.70 
If Stalin’s meeting with Orthodox Church hierarchs in 1943 had been, as Pospielovsky 
argues, a sort of “quid pro quo” where “a relative liturgical freedom and tolerance for the 
Church” would be exchanged for serving the regime’s “foreign policy interests and 
propaganda”71 evidently the “relative liturgical freedom” was poorly defined. It is hard to 
imagine that Stalin desired burgeoning and publicly visible religiosity. Perhaps he believed that 
the weakened state of the Church by 1943 meant that his concessions would only result in a 
modest number of churches opened, services held at predictable and limited times, that only 
older generations still clinging to disappearing superstitions would attend, and religiosity would 
end there. But by 1947 the churches showed themselves to be sources of power for the ways 
they could mobilize people. Since domestically churches were not limited to being simple 
outlets for “satisfying” people’s “religious needs” but were animating people toward identities 
and ways of belonging at odds with those purportedly aligned with communism, state agents 
would need to police religious practice more strictly to minimize its mobilizing power. 
Management of the Orthodox Church 
The number of Orthodox participants increased each year of the 1940s, plus more 
people were taking part in rites like baptisms, weddings, and burials. Trushin noted in Easter of 
1948 that “All active churches, both in the city of Moscow and in the oblasts were strongly 
overfilled with those present.” Plus, there were people surrounding the churches and milling 
about, many of them young people, whom informants characterized as mere “onlookers.”72 The 
spectacle of some 12-13,000 estimated at the Easter service at Elokhovskii Sobor on 
Spartakovskaya Street, with 9,000 in the church and 4,000 outside, must have caused officials 
considerable consternation, as the pragmatically-granted concession was for people to “satisfy 
their religious necessities,” not for a spectacle of religiosity.73 Christmas participation was not 
quite that of Easter, but still thousands attended each of the bigger churches.74  
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Although the opportunity to open churches had quickly disappeared, reflecting the 
Council’s intention not to “promote a revival of religious life,”75 evidently enough had changed 
to afford significant religious renewal. Nearly every church was growing in the Soviet Union in 
the 1940s and 1950s, and state leaders were concerned. Anti-religious propaganda and the 
bureaucratic obstacles to church activity did not dissuade believers as desired, and church 
influence was only growing.76 
Commissioner Trushin, assessing “the state of religiosity” in the city and oblast in 1950, 
equivocated. He wrote that it was “very hard” to answer the question of how the state of 
“religiosity” compared with the wartime period, but he did admit that it had not “sharply 
declined.”77 In a stock phrase that Trushin used in consecutive reports, he most certainly 
distorted the truth of the situation when he declared that “by observations and discussions both 
with members of the church councils, rectors of the churches, as well as site visits with local 
councils and party organs, it can be judged that religiosity and interest in the church has 
gradually declined.” This was backed up by the claim that attendance, participation in rites, and 
revenue all went down,78 although even his own evidence elsewhere had pointed to the 
contrary. Trushin allowed the tension between reality and wishful thinking to remain, as the 
Marxist claim about religious obsolescence was supposedly a scientifically incontrovertible fact. 
Trushin justified why religion was only “gradually” declining (or not declining at all) by arguing 
that “the more the population departs from the church, the more priestly servants and 
churchmen try to exert their influence on the surrounding population.”79 He also suggested that 
choirs (evidently separable from the religion itself) were what was attracting people.80 
Commissioners attempted to portray religiosity as on its deathbed, only kept alive by 
artificial means. One “cause” of its persistence was younger priests “activating” congregations, 
and state agents took note of eager seminarians. Dmitrii Dudko was an unsuspecting young 
seminarian, not understanding the limited nature of Stalin’s concessions. During his classes on 
preaching (homiletics), the professor “scolded him in front of the students,” saying “for some 
time I have noticed you have an anti-soviet stench. You give one or two sermons and have 
already become proud - you want to alter everything.” The professor unwittingly illuminated 
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what unacceptable religiosity looked like, the desire to change, dynamize, or not submit meekly 
to the status-quo. This kind of religiosity was “anti-soviet” because it did not signal 
submissiveness and was unsafe in its creativity. 
Dudko was then interrogated by state agents about some “controversies” about which 
he had no idea. Being a “village boy, not knowing worldly trickery and cunning,” he had given 
some of his poems to an inquisitive fellow student, in which he wrote what “he thought and 
felt,” including politically.81 As the secret police offered rewards, manipulated, or urged students 
to assist secret service agents for the good of the country by informing them of any unpatriotic 
acts, Dudko’s poetry provided unpatriotic sentiments as evidence to arrest him, even if it was his 
public demeanor that made authorities wary of him.82 Agents arrested Dudko while he was 
away from the Seminary, around Eastertime of 1948. Agents, with help from informants, 
gathered information about visitors, scrutinized interactions, and monitored priests’ activities in 
the functioning churches and seminaries.83  
State agents did not want engaged priests like Dudko “activating” congregations. In one 
village, the attendance in an Orthodox church had dwindled to 150, but within four months, a 
certain Priest Sorokin under age thirty had it up to 800 attending, including some youth. Still, 
informants explained the increased attendance as resulting from the priest’s sermons urging 
congregants to attend more regularly, insinuating that believers would not without spiritual 
manipulation. He visited various homes, and the commissioner claimed that he visited the home 
of the party secretary of the kolkhoz, and “ignoring his protests, held a prayer service in the 
home,” and “for a long time kept urging Comr. Vavilin to ‘venerate the cross.’” Whether or not 
this happened, the anecdote effectively demanded officials act, since this was a clear violation 
of the laws on freedom from proselytism. The commissioner requested that the Patriarchate 
remove Priest Sorokin from the register, and the Church did. His parishioners apparently 
pleaded for Sorokin to be returned, not accepting his replacement. To try to pacify them the 
patriarch sent an archbishop, who upon arrival found some 700-800 there to demand Sorokin’s 
return. The archbishop argued Sorokin could only “gain such authority among the believers” 
because he urged regular attendance, youth participation, and organizing a choir. That the 
people might have wanted these things was not discussed,84 and apparently not the point.  
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In the city of Moscow, priest Vsevolod Shpiller, having previously emigrated, arrived 
back from Bulgaria in 1950 and became Rector of Nikolo-Kuznetskaya church. He was not young, 
but middle-aged, but he acted like one fresh with new energy in the eyes of the commissioner: 
“By all his activities and behavior Shpiller strives to strengthen the church parishioners and 
spread his influence on the surrounding population.” His predecessor Smirnov, noted the 
commissioner, also had worked zealously in promoting religious education, in getting a strong 
church choir together, and even having the bells rung out “powerfully.” As he saw it, Shpiller—
like the “obscurantist” Smirnov who died in 1950—was continuing the efforts, “often delivering 
sermons, spreading religious propaganda.”  
Officials were wary of Shpiller’s confidence, since people had come to like him and were 
attending church more often. Informants also observed that on Shpiller’s name day - despite 
being a work day - some 600-800 worshipers gathered at church, and many of them presented 
him with gifts. The report-writer claimed that Shpiller had actually instigated especially active 
church members to have the parishioners gather for his name day.85 
Thus, despite claims of a “gradual” reduction in religiosity, Trushin expressed concern 
about the “activation” of certain churches in the Moscow region, with an eye for the “methods 
and tricks [priemami]” of clergy that were “already well-known to us, namely: by the 
establishment of additional services, the frequent giving of sermons, strengthening of the choir, 
supporting of the clean-up and comfort in church, etc., etc.”86 Although Trushin named a few 
priests, he treated the problem somewhat generically, as more of a problem of widespread 
reactivation than of specific priests, and he also focused blame on the general conditions of 
post-war effects (presumably people seeking religion as a consolation) and the youth of 
priesthood, but not on the general condition of people’s persistent interest in religion. In official 
discourse, church activation only occurred due to spiritual manipulation. 
In 1951, there was still a vexing number of petitions to open churches, some of them 
still directed to “Comr. Stalin,” but officials’ ambition to approve them had ceased. After all, 
wasn’t it enough? Shouldn’t they be satisfied by now, commissioners wondered?87 The 
remaining groups still trying to petition after repeated rejections were pretty well isolated from 
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others doing the same thing, separated by a lack of awareness of one another and distance. 
Officials could easily deflect blame onto other bureaucratic barriers and prevent disappointed 
believers from knowing where to lay blame for their failed petition. 
It is worth noting, however, that the battle line was not simply between believers and 
state officials. Churches had conflicts and problems of their own, and they often relied upon the 
Religious Council to sort them out. Some 150 complaints reached the desk of commissioner 
Trushin in 1951 from one parish alone, with the primary dispute dealing being about the church 
money box, with accounting procedures and use of the money. Warring groups, including the 
executive organs and the clergy, the auditing commission and the warden, and disputing groups 
from within the church, complained against each other to the Commissioner, asking for a 
resolution, with some believers complaining that the patriarchate was not dealing with their 
problems.88  
More common were disputes that arose between the warden (whose function was 
Church caretaker, manager of resources, and go-between for clergy and parish) and the rector 
(the head priest), and congregants usually took sides with one or the other and would then fight 
amongst themselves. Such disputes were important for commissioners to track because 
although “Sometimes these squabbles and conflicts have a positive effect, i.e., positive in the 
sense that a part of the believers, seeing the creation of disgrace in church, cease their 
attendance,” the opposite outcome could also occur, that “from the duration of the conflict 
more and more partisans were gradually engaged, the consequence of which resulted in 
activation of parishioners.”89  
Churchmen themselves invited state officials to “meddle” in church affairs, as hierarchs 
did not always respond as they wished to problems or conflicts. In disputes, commissioners 
observed that hierarchs almost never reacted to initial complaints, but only after the conflict 
had taken on “a protracted character.” Then the Church would typically just transfer the rector 
to another congregation, as the warden was usually a long-time resident of the community.90 
Priests who wanted to make some changes had to have an amenable warden, as wardens were 
not afraid of using their local authority to make complaints or denunciations against a priest 
they did not like. For many churchmen, the Church’s relationship with the state was not 
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reducible to church-vs.-state, as their interactions with Council officials helped normalize 
relations and legitimized the authority of the Council in religious affairs. 
In dispute situations, a commissioner like Trushin could only do so much, as his position 
stipulated that he “in no measure interferes in inner-church affairs.” Therefore, he would simply 
recommend petitioners to take their concerns to the local bishopric or the patriarchate. If the 
situation seemed to “go outside the borders of the church,” then he would “undertake 
corresponding measures through the Moscow patriarchate.”91 Commissioners, if they had to, 
would call upon church hierarchs to immediate action, such as to transfer a priest, which was a 
simple solution that did not render the priest unemployed. Commissioners did not wish to 
meddle, but nor did they want the passivity of Orthodox hierarchs to allow inner-church 
disputes to become conflagrations, as they preferred church life free from activation—whether 
due to conflicts or zeal. 
Management of the ECB Church 
As noted above, at first the attention of the commissioner for the Council for the Affairs 
of Religious Cults (CARC) was tracking and cataloguing Old Believer, Jewish, and Muslim 
communities. The Evangelicals were temporarily ignored.92 Finally, in the second half of 1948, 
Besshaposhnikov made a proper accounting of the Moscow Baptist Church, estimating some 
3,500 members from a range of ages, but weighted toward older people. Officials also noted 
that a few hundred came from neighboring towns, especially for Sundays with communion (the 
Eucharist) or religious holidays. Between the first two counting periods, although a few 
members died, they also gained around 260, 200 of whom came from other faiths, and 60 from 
new baptisms (because Baptists stress a “believer’s baptism,” the 200 were likely already of an 
Evangelical faith, whereas the other 60 probably were either Orthodox believers baptized as 
infants or new Christians). Relying on the church’s numbers, the commissioner estimated that 
over the past four years the church lost about 1,000 to the combination of deaths and those 
taken from the membership roll for various reasons—”not a bad sign” to him—, but he felt the 
need to study it more. It was most likely that either the initial membership tally was inaccurately 
high, or the more recent membership total was too low, since all subsequent data consistently 
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showed church growth. Otherwise, the commissioner had no problems to note; all was in 
order.93 
Although he had initially neglected them, Besshaposhnikov declared in 1949 that “The 
most active religious community is the evangelical Christians-baptists and seventh-day 
Adventists. They have a tendency for growth and expansion, not only at the expense of the 
members of a believers’ family or of those who had [previously] departed from the community, 
but also due to the involvement of new members from other sectarian groups and 
denominations.” But his presentation of the numbers was at a minimum confusing, but perhaps 
purposefully misleading, as this report indicated a loss of 1,300 over the last four years, a claim 
which would not correspond to the earlier claim about their tendency for “growth and 
expansion.”94 His report in 1950 seemed more accurate when it noted growth of nearly 2,000 
members since 1945, half from other faiths and half from new baptisms. Many of the new 
joiners were supposedly originating from the Pentecostal Church, although at this time, many 
Pentecostal leaders were reneging on the 1944 decision to join the AUCECB and were no longer 
advocating registration. It could be that the commissioner falsely claimed this significant 
number of Pentecostals joining the Council to somehow support the notion that ordinary 
Pentecostal believers preferred official registration and loyalty to the Council rather than to 
their denomination, or it may have been accurate.95 Workers, like shopkeepers, nurses, 
cleaners, and factory workers, constituted a “significant number” of those being baptized. A 
worse sign for Besshaposhnikov was that there were also examples of people with more 
advanced education or professional careers attending the ECB church in Moscow (even 
requesting a secret church wedding), plus young people were regular participants in services.96 
To state officials, religion was supposed to be intellectually untenable and irrelevant to youth. 
The church in Moscow was averaging 1,500-1,800 attendees (above official capacity) at 
their two Sunday morning services and 1,000-1,200 on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday evening 
services.97 They also had a sizeable 120-person choir. This evident popularity necessitated that 
the commissioner explain: “The evangelical christians try to make the prayer meetings 
accessible and attractive not only to their own members, but also to foreign visitors. Teaching 
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on evangelical themes does not tend to be protracted and does not tire the listeners.” The 
popularity existed despite changes officials imposed to lessen the attractiveness of the services. 
In the past, services would likely have featured teachings, prayer, choral songs accompanied by 
organ, soloists, poetic readings, and personal stories told by members. But now, they were 
enjoined to carry out “a few simplifications,” with the only music to be sung by choir or 
congregation, and teachings were only done by those who were the officially approved pastors. 
Solos, “declarations,” and stories from life “did not tend to happen.” Yet officials observed, “the 
religious society continues to grow.”98 The demographic scenario was not pleasing either, as the 
ratio of men was increasing. Religious Affairs officials statistically tracked the profile of 
attendees, and they tended to stereotype the average church-goer as an older woman without 
advanced education or profession. Thus when religious participants did not fit stereotypes with 
regard to gender, education, professional status, or age, officials noted it with apparent 
concern.99 
In 1950 the commissioner still asserted that the Baptists were growing only from among 
family members, Pentecostals, and other “sectarian groups.” He also provided his ethnographic 
account as to how someone new might view the service—perhaps he or a colleague visited it for 
the first time. Visitors would  
observe the simplicity in the conversations between members; members only 
call each other brother or sister; they themselves can participate in joint singing; 
the teaching and preaching is in an accessible form; they understand it. 
Summoning them to lead a sober way of life: to not consume alcoholic drinks, 
they don’t smoke tobacco, they don’t unsettle family life, and so on—it 
especially resonates among women. The teaching is of moral support, and in 
certain instances material help is also arranged on the part of certain members 
of the community… 
One woman was overheard saying that she had been invited a few times and attended, but 
worried that with Orthodox parents still alive, whether she “could really do this,” but she felt 
that “nevertheless it’s better” at the Baptist church.100 She showed more concern for family 
opinions than Soviet ones. 
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Apparently the prayers of the congregation were sometimes led by members, especially 
from among the most active members (“the aktiv”), and this concerned Besshaposhnikov. One 
such activist in his prayer “asked the lord god, that he would turn to the true path those who are 
in attendance for the first time.” After this “incident,” presbyter (an ordained senior pastor) 
Orlov (and, notably, a leader from the AUCECB) “declared” that corporate prayer will only be led 
in the future by the preachers. Also problematic, one member of the Council of AUCECB, 
Goliaev, tended toward “polemical attacks,” and another, Karev, was the kind of person that 
“the intelligentsia understands.”101 For officials, this religiosity was teetering on unacceptability, 
since engaging in apologetics and attracting intellectuals was not what religion was supposed to 
do. When those occupying the pulpit tried to persuade attendees to change their mind or faith 
about something, it was certainly moving away from the idea of “personal conscience,” which 
ought to be free from infringement by religious “propaganda.”  
While the Moscow Baptist Church was growing, a few smaller communities of the ECB 
Church were seeking registration around the oblast.102 Active groups of non-registered Baptists 
petitioned to open churches, but they were being denied. While the Council and the 
government wanted registration for the sake of regulation and surveillance, they did not want 
more churches.103 Registrations were granted very reluctantly, and with every possible 
bureaucratic obstacle placed in the way. The dilemma was that denying registration led to 
unauthorized religious gatherings for which state agents could sanction participants. When 
believers moved underground, surveillance was more difficult.  
With popularity, growth, and petitions it might be easy to assume that the “Evangelical 
Christians-Baptists” were one harmonious group, moving and growing in common mind and 
spirit. But fractures threatened to break the union. As mentioned above, Pentecostal leaders 
sparred frequently with the leadership of the AUCECB, who tried to impose guidelines on the 
Pentecostal Church that stripped away some of its particularity (e.g., speaking in tongues).104 
State officials even noticed that the members of the Council had discrepancies between them, 
meaning they were not so united in the Council that gave them a legal standing. At the pulpit in 
Moscow’s Baptist Church, the commissioner wrote, lead pastors “from time to time” “channeled 
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poisoning” [otravlenie] against fellow leaders.105 One might assume that Protestants shared a 
common “enemy,” a common “they” (the state) who could be accused of the obstacles faced in 
routine religious practice, but it was not enough to permanently erase their own differences or 
struggles over leadership.  
The initial euphoria of the openings in the Evangelical churches also met a cold shoulder 
from state representatives. The official publication of the AUCECB, the Fraternal Herald (Bratskii 
Vestnik), ceased publication from the latter half of 1949 until 1953 for unexplained reasons. 
Church leaders invested noticeable energy toward stifling the effervescence of the churches, 
and contact with fellow denominations abroad ceased. Local officials were given freer hand to 
make restrictions, as for example, the main Evangelical church in Kiev was confiscated, and the 
other three were forcefully joined together into one building.106 Evangelical believers once again 
began to fear persecution.  
The Stalin-Era Trajectory Continues after His Death 
Scholar T.A. Chumachenko was right to argue that in Stalin’s final years, from 1948 to 
1953, he made a noticeable move toward increased repression of church liberties, and the 
persecution even intensified in the year following his death. It appears that Stalin no longer 
considered the Orthodox Church as useful diplomatically, as the face of the Church provided 
little gain for an increasingly cold relationship with the Western powers.107 It could also be that 
Stalin was annoyed at the “lack of thankfulness” of the believers, as displayed by the persistent 
barrage of petitions, the spectacle of large numbers attending church, and the undesirable 
dynamization of priests and believers alike. It was distinct from the obsequiousness displayed by 
the leading hierarchs in international contexts. 
Although Stalin may have dealt brutally with the church in the past and only partially 
opened the door to religious practice, Trushin reported that after “the illness and then end of 
Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, in the [Orthodox] churches of the city of Moscow and Moscow Oblast 
by order of the church center, special church services were organized. At the beginning services 
were held for the recovery of Comr. Stalin, but after the funeral, every church did a requiem.” 
These services took place with “a large conglomeration of people,” and rectors all gave sermons 
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about “the life and activities” of Stalin. The Patriarch did the same in his church, and during his 
sermon, a “great part of the believers standing in the church were crying.”108 Even in the Council 
for the Affairs of Religious Cults report, the commissioner mentioned the death of Stalin and 
that all churches held services for him. But since he did not provide any specific examples of 
denominations or churches, it might cause one to question how evidence-based this claim 
was.109  
People had appealed to “Comrade Stalin” while he was alive, and they still tried to 
appeal to his name after his death. In the petitions to open churches that were submitted after 
Stalin’s death, some of them even quoted excerpts from talks by Patriarch Aleksei and 
Metropolitan Nikolai, referencing their claim that when the “church center appealed to 
Comrade Stalin with any kind of request, that all requests were satisfied.” Therefore, they 
asserted, their request to open a church should also be satisfied; they had faith in his name and 
hoped it carried weight with officials.110 
Religious Management Continues 
But the name carried much less weight than inertia and the officials still in power. 
Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs chief Karpov, whom Stalin had appointed, 
continued the Stalinist trajectory. Karpov described what the ideal church leader would be in 
one report to the Council: “‘The Council is not interested in having diocesan bishops in the USSR 
who would be energetic and theologically educated men. A certain number of cultured and 
theologically educated hierarchs is necessary, however, for the church’s work abroad and to 
represent the church [to foreigners].’“111 In short, there was to be window dressing with as little 
substance as possible. As I.I. Ivanov put it as he reviewed the work of the Council for Russian 
Orthodox Church Affairs in 1956, “‘Send the more obscurantist and reactionary [bishops] into 
monastic retirement and assign others who are more loyal and less fanatical in their place. … 
The old saying, ‘Like priest, like parish,’ is used for a reason.”112 If religion would be permitted, it 
should at least be subservient to state goals. 
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But now officials were faced with a surprising degree of interest in religion across the 
populace, even among “target” audiences for Soviet propaganda: professionals and youth. The 
1940s and 1950s marked a major increase in applications and interest in attending the Orthodox 
seminary among young men, some of whom had secular degrees.113 A CPSU Central Committee 
resolution of July 7, 1954 was concerned that youth were attracted to the ROC and other sects 
due to “high quality sermons, charity work, individual indoctrination and the religious press.”114 
More dynamic priests like Vsevolod Shpiller were claiming a relatively high percentage of 
converts to Orthodoxy. Troubling for state officials, however, was that many were converting in 
reaction to existential crises from non- or anti-religious environments. Such people saw an 
increasingly visible church, experimented with participation, and perhaps later were baptized.  
Perhaps because it was difficult to keep religion benign and uninteresting to future 
generations, certain officials stood opposed to any kind of religion at all. Without Stalin’s 
guidance, it appears that 1954 saw many more instances of harassment of religious personnel at 
the instigation of certain pro-government organizations like local branches and committees of 
the Party, Komsomol, the Znanie Society (The All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political 
and Scientific Knowledge), and trade unions. Certain youth were physically bullied, and 
members of the above organizations who were religious or wanted to avoid confronting religion 
might have faced demotion or expulsion.115 Some of these voices increasingly scrutinized the 
work of the Council after Stalin’s death, and Moscow commissioner Trushin was not exempt 
from the accusations that Karpov and his team were too soft on religion. Whereas Karpov still 
saw the Orthodox Church as useful, opponents in the Communist Party saw the Church as 
incompatible with communism and as its clergy as politically unreliable. The increase in anti-
religious propaganda in 1954, however, was met by opposition in the Church and dominant 
figures in government like Molotov, and Stalin’s trajectory held.116 
Yet officials still expected adjustments in CROCA. In Trushin’s work, for example, 
Karpov’s office noted “insufficiencies”: his reports were “poor” and “uninteresting” because 
they did not provide “concrete activity of the clergy toward strengthening the influence of the 
church;” he also tended toward “wide generalizations” and often failed to give the precise 
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situation of the churches.117 Commissioners’ reports had to respond to political trends and 
demands. 
Commissioners for the Council of Russian Orthodox Church Affairs were no longer 
overwhelmed by the number of petitions to open churches, as submissions had dwindled. But 
without the issue of petitions, Trushin’s reports lacked focus and were repetitive or formulaic. 
Now some churchmen were asking about adding buildings, electrifying the parish, and other 
such modifications. Trushin tended to simply copy passages from earlier reports, for example 
replicating exactly the same passages on Vsevolod Shpiller in 1955 from five years earlier about 
his dynamic activity and name-day, thereby giving the impression that there were no new 
problems, just the same ones as before.118 It was indeed true, however that the state line on 
religion was unclear at this moment, so either Trushin wanted to play it safe by regurgitating old 
material, or he simply felt he could get away with being lazy. 
The Growth of ECB Churches  
Among the Evangelical churches, Stalin’s death did not bring a warming of church-state 
relations. In fact, anti-religious propaganda in the press increased briefly in 1953 and 1954 but 
was held in check by Khrushchev. It seems Khrushchev, who was battling for power, did not 
endorse the unleashing of anti-religious propaganda that some others in leadership desired at 
the time.119 
In the management of the Evangelical Christians-Baptists Church, the year following 
Stalin’s death featured the same issues: disagreements between the members of the Council, 
the Moscow church still growing each quarter, more unregistered groups across the oblast, and 
more requests for registration.120 Unlike the Orthodox Church, Evangelical communities were 
growing in places where they had not historically been, but there were only a few registered 
churches in the oblast.  
At the Christmas service in 1953 in the Moscow Baptist Church, the commissioner drew 
attention to the participation of many youth under 25, especially young women, although he 
also noted that all activity was within the law.121 There were lists and lists of people who had 
taken part in baptisms recently. Once the weather had warmed sufficiently, hundreds had taken 
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part in the past year, with dozens getting baptized at once. Each participant was listed according 
to name, birthday, address, and occupation, and these were submitted to the Council for the 
Affairs of Religious Cults. It must have been an experience not only for believers to witness 
dozens being baptized in a river with crowds on the shore, but it also must have made an 
impression on the commissioner to receive pages of names of people recently baptized.122 The 
church was visibly growing and mobilizing people.  
Easter of 1955 was a major affair once again for the Central Baptist Church in Moscow. 
They held five gatherings, on Saturday night, Sunday morning and evening, and two more on 
Monday. At the main gathering an estimated 2,200-2,400 attended. Each of the seven pastors 
preached for fifteen minutes, including the head of the Council Iakov Zhidkov, and the choir or 
congregation sang in between. The church was full, and people filled the corridors and 
everywhere where they could fit.123 The same went for Easter of 1956—it was more than full. 
Yet, noted the commissioner, “all holiday prayer gatherings passed in full order.”124 He did not 
offer plans of action or explanations in response to the growing popularity of the Evangelical 
Christians-Baptists Church. (It should be noted here, however, that the primary concern for the 
Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults during the 1950s to this point had been Jews and Jewish 
communities; in that way, Protestant groups were of secondary concern). As with the Orthodox 
Church, state agents had no clear directive for what to do with increasing religious practice, as 
sporadic anti-religious propaganda was having little effect. 
Khrushchev, De-Stalinization, and Flourishing Religion 
In the mid-1950s, religious life was blossoming, even flourishing in the Orthodox and 
Baptist churches in Moscow and across the oblast. With statistical and visible evidence to 
suggest religiosity was increasing in popularity, this flourishing became a worrying prospect for 
those advocating a Marxist-Leninist-Materialist-Atheist-Communist state.125 Many believers or 
clergy who had received ten-year sentences during or after the war were being released in the 
period following Stalin’s death, and many who had received 25-year sentences received 
reductions, and still others received amnesties or judicial reviews that resulted in rehabilitation. 
This meant that in the mid-1950s, many active church leaders, pastors, and believers were 
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released into their former communities.126 The release of prisoners after Stalin’s death, says 
anthropologist Catherine Wanner, “infused these isolated evangelical communities with new 
vitality.”127 Just as with Stalin’s wartime concessions, this release of prisoners helped boost 
religious life in the Soviet Union. 
One of the beneficiaries of Khrushchev’s amnesty was Mikhail Trukhanov, who had been 
arrested in 1941 for organization of a bible study, released in 1949, and re-arrested shortly after 
Stalin’s death. He had been falsely accused of being “the leader of some kind of nuclear gang 
who had decided to drop an atomic bomb on the Kremlin,” an incredibly serious charge for 
which he received a ten-year sentence. Due to Khrushchev’s amnesty he was released and 
rehabilitated in 1956 from his status as a political prisoner.128 Having only grown in his faith and 
desire to enter the priesthood in prison, now as a 42-year old he immediately applied to the 
Moscow Theological Academy but was denied for “unknown reasons.” He managed to receive 
ordination, however, by drawing on personal connections. A friend who was close to a bishop in 
Chernigov agreed to ordain him in March 1958, thus providing a way for Trukhanov to enter the 
priesthood.129 Prison and seminaries released new priests to the Orthodox Church. Recent 
seminarians differed from the priests compromised enough to survive the terrors of the 1930s, 
as some benefitted from real attempts by Orthodox leaders to cultivate a dynamic theological 
education after Stalin’s concession.130 
Khrushchev also gave a boost to religion when he denounced the “personality cult” of 
Stalin and his excesses. The speech he made in a closed party congress in February 1956 
denounced the direction Stalin had taken the party and promoted a more idealistic Leninist 
model. But having criticized Stalin, who had become so identified with the Soviet Union and the 
Party, he also dealt a blow to any idealized conception of the party, opening the possibility for 
alternative ideals to find the light of day. Part of Khrushchev’s process of de-Stalinization also 
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produced a sort of “thaw” where works whose publication would have previously unthinkable 
were now gaining public audiences.  
The release of many prisoners from the Gulags after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin’s excesses, and the relative “thaw” that eventually allowed works like 
Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich to be published did not “satisfy” the desires 
of the religious, but only seemed to encourage more people to explore religion. Scholar 
Nathaniel Davis also postulates that Khrushchev’s modifications to the pension system “allowed 
many older believers to retire and worship without fear for their livelihood.”131 Once retired, the 
older generation felt free to participate in religious activities without fear of repercussions. But 
even young people did not fear as generations before. 
Not coincidentally, some young people who had not spent their growing years with any 
connection to the church had become curious about religion and its claims. In 1956, for 
example, seventeen year olds Aleksandr Il’ich Borisov and his friend decided “it was time to put 
an end to our ignorance” and see what religion really was for themselves, deciding to visit an 
Orthodox Church, a Baptist Church, a synagogue, and a mosque. When they entered the small 
Orthodox church on Briusov Lane off of Tverskaya Avenue in Moscow, the service was already in 
progress as they unwittingly went in through the side doors, entering next to the choir. He was 
surprised to see among the choir members men and women with “intelligent” looks, and “not 
old.” He regarded it as something unusual to witness what he perceived to be a mix of solemnity 
and intimacy among the participants.  
Yet as the young men stood gazing, they heard hushed talking about them, the “spies” 
who came in, and at “such a time” too. “Confused and upset,” Borisov and his friend slipped 
quietly back out the door. This ended their religious quest for the time being, but two years later 
Borisov took his godmother’s suggestion to try an Orthodox Church again.132 The priesthood and 
the monasteries were attracting more youth who wanted to pursue a career in the Church, what 
some considered a portent of the inability of Soviet ideology to convince the next 
generations.133 There were youth, particularly intellectuals, who were raised in an idealistic 
culture but who were looking to ideals other than communism to capture their imagination 
(though joining the Orthodox Church presented its own obstacles to curious youth, as we will 
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explore in detail in Chapter VI). Even if youth were a small percentage, the problem 
commissioners had to address was the increasing popularity of religion. 
In the Orthodox Church 
In 1956, Trushin was still commissioner for CROCA in Moscow Oblast, and despite 
Khrushchev’s more liberal line, not all state organs were satisfied with his work. Trushin’s 
colleagues from the Oblast Executive Committee criticized his work, saying “In your report you 
did not write anything about work with clergy, about the situation and activity of religious 
communities in the cities and village locations, about measures of the clergy toward 
strengthening and expanding of the church and of parish activities, as well as about material-
economic activity of the church.” Trushin had also failed to catch wind of the changing politics in 
1956: “In addition, in your report neither did you write about the reactions of the clergy to 
events which took place during the reporting period. For example, about the personality cult of 
Stalin … It’s necessary to look at how the clergy reacts to political events and communicate this 
in your accounting-informational reports.”134 As leader, Khrushchev’s example was to be 
followed. How church leaders and commissioners now regarded Comrade Stalin signaled their 
allegiance to the current line. 
In his next report, Trushin made sure he included some more information on this 
subject. He wrote about how his visits with various clergy were also opportunities to discuss 
“political topics” in addition to inner-church ones: the personality cult of Stalin, the statements 
of Josip Tito, and recent events in Hungary and Egypt. He noted that “an overwhelming majority 
of the servants of cults are loyally disposed to the measures of the party and Government and 
correctly orient themselves to issues of the international situation.”135 Trushin did not go in to 
details, only suggesting that all was in order. 
Also in response to the demand of his readers, Trushin produced a special report about 
the increase in “preaching activities.” In it, Trushin noted that having more young clergy and 
training on preaching in seminary were increasing religiosity. He described sermons as 
“spreading church ideologies,” and they were “directly or indirectly calling believers to zealously 
relate to Christian doctrine.” In the Orthodox Church, the liturgy was the primary focus, but 
homilies were expected on Sundays and especially high church holidays. The problem was 
increasingly one of content: “sometimes their sermons are not restricted to only ‘pure’ 
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interpretations of so-called priestly writings and the gospel. At the end of their sermons they 
often touch upon moral issues, raising children, relationships to work and of person to person, 
calling to attend church more often and accept ‘the holy sacraments’, and etc. etc.”136 
Extemporaneous or premeditated sermons with anything other than purely religious matter 
were unacceptable and unsafe. State representatives regarded ritualism as benign because they 
saw it as disconnected from the territories over which communist ideology was supposed to 
prevail, including morality, education, child-rearing, social relations, and even how people spent 
their time.  
But alongside this special report, Trushin’s other reporting only referred to a generic 
“activation” of churches in 1957, but without any correlating explanations, insights, conclusions, 
or suggestions.137 Again, state organs were disappointed: why did he only keep to the “facts?” 
His readers were struggling to know what conclusions to draw because he was not providing 
insight as to the real situation and conditions.138 Whether officials were worried that religion 
was flourishing, or their comments mark the first heralds for the anti-religious campaign to 
come,139 they wanted on-the-ground detail, concrete trends, not generic or recycled phrases 
from earlier reports. 
Officials primarily had to deal with the numbers of adults attending church more than 
youth activity, although state agents had been concerned for several years already about 
younger generations’ interest in the Church.140 The problem was not an increasing number of 
churches, as church openings had been basically capped since 1948.141 Attendance en masse 
was highly problematic, as on Sundays and religious holidays, state officials witnessed huge 
numbers of participants, and in some cases, cathedral capacities of 5,000 were being exceeded. 
Whereas a few thousand visited the Trinity-Sergius Lavra outside of Moscow on feast days in the 
years following its opening, by 1956 ten to fifteen thousand pilgrims attended.142 In September 
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1958 on the holiday of the Feast of the Cross, at the “Pimen” Cathedral, which has a capacity of 
4,000, some 8,000 were estimated to have attended, and 39 baptisms were performed.143 On 
Sundays, and especially on special holidays, “all Muscovite churches were overflowing with 
those praying, but in some churches believers, not fitting in the building, stood outside within 
the church yard.” This situation was observed at churches outside the city as well. Perhaps 
people sensed a thaw after 1957, as there were 49 petitions to open twenty-two churches in the 
first half of 1958, and another fifteen oral petitions were made to the commissioner.144  
As before, state agents needed to place the blame on someone for “activating” these 
citizens; they continued to focus on the influential ones rather than those seeking influence. 
Again officials raised the issue of preaching, claiming that theological institutions had been 
putting more emphasis on “the subject of homiletics” and offering training in “drafting church 
sermons,” which they identified as having a marked influence on church attendance. Preachers 
were being trained in how to conduct themselves at the pulpit, use their voices – all with the 
effect of improving “religious propaganda,” which was made more effective by priests 
recognizing the need to “adapt to modern conditions” and “the modern environment.” Priests 
had been “considerably strengthening their preaching activities,” such that the services were 
almost always accompanied by a sermon, the “goal” of which was “animating interest in 
religion.” It is curious that officials would describe the recent sermons as problematic for 
increasing interest in religion, as though otherwise, sermons did not do so. Trushin’s informants 
noted that priests were no longer just talking about “eternal life after death,” a comment which 
suggests that certain topics like immortality were considered esoteric and therefore benign. The 
classic rites (baptism, marriage, confession), which were supposed to be mere rituals, were now 
being “accompanied by explanations of their ‘divine meaning.’” To Trushin, sermons were 
crossing lines of acceptability, and he repeated earlier phrases about sermons straying from 
“‘pure’ interpretations” and engaging in discussions of morality, child-rearing, work, and 
relationships while encouraging attendance and participation in rites.145 
Trushin provided some new names this time. Priest Solertovskii, who had been serving 
in the Church of St. John the Warrior in Moscow, reportedly commented that few had remained 
with the church, in particular youth, “who strayed like sheep from the herd,” but that he, as 
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their “pastor” will “preach the word of god, in spite of any hardships, stopping at nothing and 
not afraid of any persecution.” He praised donations for the renovation of the church as 
“establishing comfort for those visiting and the kingdom of heaven for yourselves.” After adult 
baptisms, he gave speeches with words of advice (naputstvennye rechi). At a recent baptism of a 
young woman, he remarked, “You have been reading newspapers, novels, and do not know the 
word of god. Now, when starting in christian faith you read the bible, study the prayers, go to 
the church of god and listen to the word spoken by your pastor, who leads you on the true 
path.”146 To Trushin, priests should not be heightening their own importance or that of religious 
“truth” in people’s lives. 
One priest of the village of Turbichevo, Tomashevich, before the start of the service was 
“meeting youth at the entrance, suggesting they go closer to the altar […].” Another, a priest in 
Dmitrov, at the end of the service was “talking affectionately (laskovo) with the parishioners, 
patting kids on the head, praising the fact that they came with their mom or grandma to church, 
reminding the latter to obey parents and adults.” Upon his arrival in the village for services, 
“they [were] running up to him and he [was] giving them candy and sitting them in his car, 
promising to drive them around after.” Another priest would remind parents of the “necessity 
to bring children to church and teach them prayers.”147 State agents found it undesirable that 
the next generation would see a religious figure so positively. 
A priest in the village of Novoselki was another. His predecessors were the types who 
“didn’t linger” at the church, thus “believers visited it passively” and income and earnings of the 
priests “were insignificant.” From the start the new priest added services during the week and 
improved the choir. From the “more fanatic believers” he borrowed money and improved the 
church. “In his very first sermon” he declared that he would not assess fees for his services, 
since he worked “not for money, but for ‘faith in Christ.’” Trushin tried to paint a dark view of 
this, saying that the people were paying him in cash, and that way, he could “reach in with his 
filthy hands” and take what suited him without claiming it for tax purposes.148 Anti-religious 
propaganda at the beginning of the Soviet Union often painted priests as money-grubbing, and 
these narratives were routinely used by officials whenever the issue of a priest’s handling of 
money arose or when he seemed interested in enlivening church life. 
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One of the main problems Trushin cited in this report is that “in many congregations” 
after priests finished their sermons, they walked about the parish and “directly and indirectly, 
summon[ed] the believers to treat the Christian faith zealously.”149 To him, the acceptable case 
was that a priest would finish his purely religious homily and avoid direct contact with (or 
influence on) believers. Only in such a case would believers visit church “passively,” as believers 
of Novoselki did before their current active priest was serving. For religion to remain acceptable, 
Trushin believed, it should be characterized by distance and indifference, not familiarity or 
intimacy.  
Trushin, as before, explained the increased church activity by writing “clergy and 
churchmen [we]re trying to extend their influence on the surrounding population and intensify 
the activity of their congregations.” This “intensification” was manifested by “offering additional 
services, the strengthening of singing choirs, by maintaining cleanliness and comfort in the 
church, the widespread practice of walking about the parish, with frequent appearances with 
sermons, and etc. and etc.” “Young clergy” were considered the main instigators, and some 170 
were in the Moscow Oblast who recently finished seminary. Some of these had “middle [i.e. 
technical] and even higher secular education,” meaning they were not the ignorant priest of 
socialist imagination.150 
Trushin also believed part of the problem was that the scientific-atheist propaganda 
wasn’t keeping up with religious propaganda, which was all too quickly “adapting to current 
conditions.” Promoters of religion were not giving into the obsolescence which was supposed to 
be their destiny. In addition to simply repeating the concern for young clergy and their training, 
Trushin wrote about state efforts to track visitors to further monitor influence, as well as to 
make note of priests visiting one another, to track any bonding that might be taking place 
among them.151 His report a year later in 1959 added the concern that more people were 
applying to join the monastery too, and this also needed attention.152 Again Trushin repeated 
the concern from a year ago about the increased work with youth and children, about priests 
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patting children’s’ heads, etc., but without names attached as with last year. Also, children of 
school age were noted at various services, and some were serving as altar boys in the services 
and “doing confession and taking communion after the services.”153 
An issue that was gathering increasing state attention was that of choirs. Trushin noted: 
“One of the methods and techniques of clergy and churchmen seeking to extend their influence 
on the surrounding populace and step up the activity of the church is the pursuit of 
strengthening the choirs. For this reason churchmen have lately been paying greater attention 
to the issue of selecting personnel necessary for them […]”.154 First they put more energy into 
sermons, and now into choirs, which were improved by attention to hiring a conductor and 
singers. Officials analyzed the composition of choirs according to gender, age, and employment 
status. Ten people from the All-Russian Theater Society were named as singing in choirs, seven 
from the State Musical-Pedagogical Institute, ten from the State Committee on Radio and 
Television Broadcasting, four from the Ensemble of the Soviet Opera, four from the Moscow 
State Conservatory, and so on, with other affiliations and people listed with their full names and 
birthdates. Like those with the above professional affiliations, commissioner Trushin found it 
“completely unacceptable” that “pensioners, receiving state pensions, [were] continuing to 
work in churches, receiving for this additional monetary remuneration.”155 He saw such people 
as demonstrating loyalties mixed between church and state, their flirtation with church a sort of 
thankless betrayal. 
One example where “religious workers and churchmen” were “seeking to extend their 
influence and intensify churches” was in the Rizhskii district, where several churches were 
spending money and hiring professionals for choirs.156 All-Saints Church was one of Moscow’s 
churches which was experiencing the most “congestion.” Quite a few were being baptized 
there, informants noted the presence of many children particularly on the eve of the new school 
year, and holidays were particularly crammed. The church income had increased the last few 
years, and subsequently, they have put more funding toward a choir and church upkeep. 
Toward spreading its “influence,” All-Saints spent more than 600,000 rubles—a considerable 
sum—in 1958 on the choir, which enlisted 34 singers. Among this group a few were named, 
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including a pensioner, a housewife, but also a singer in the theatrical society, a wife of a party 
member, and a singer in a choir of a local school of music.157 This was an example of an 
activated, religious, and socially diverse body of people. To officials, communism should not 
have competitors to its universal appeal. 
Another example of the problematically active church life was the lone church in 
Baumanskii district, the Bogoyavlenskii Cathedral, which often attracted large numbers in large 
part due to the fact that this was Patriarch Aleksii’s cathedral. Protopresbyter and manager at 
the Patriarchate Nikolai Fedorovich Kolchitskii also served at the Patriarchal cathedral. Officials 
considered him “very crafty” [khitrii] and was said to “have a large influence not only on a 
number of workers in the center of the city, but also on the surrounding population.” He “often 
g[ave] sermons” in front of visitors and “strongly care[d] about their religious-moral education.” 
One “young woman” was overheard in another Cathedral “telling a group of believers her 
impressions” of Father Kolchitskii, that he was an “incessant fiery preacher of God’s word who is 
able to ignite the hearts of the listeners by his teachings,” and that she “loved to visit” Father 
Nikolai’s Cathedral.158 
Kolchitskii supposedly put forward considerable effort toward the improvement of the 
parish and was reported to have said that he wanted to improve the building not just because 
visitors attend there or because it was the cathedral where the patriarch served, but because 
“where everything is clean, comfortable, warm, light and magnificent, people are willing to rush 
there, and not leave.” He was reported to have spent “considerable effort” on putting together 
a “good and powerful church choir” which at the time of reporting had recently been drawing 
not just believers but some others who expressed their visit to the church as a result of “their 
desire to hear a good choir of singers.” In addition to the Patriarch, Kolchitskii, and the choir, 
some five other priests served, a few of whom also were quite active and had influence on the 
“surrounding population.”159 
In Leninskii Raion, there were five churches, twenty-one servants of the church (priests 
and deacons), and 85 people considered active church functionaries (v tserkovnom aktive), of 
whom 46 were pensioners, fifteen were homemakers, and twenty-four were workers. Trushin 
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then named some of them, including professor of an architectural institute, emergency services 
dispatcher, school employee, welder, master at a building trust, locksmith foreman, and 
cleaning woman. Among the pensioners were listed former employees of a blood transfusion 
institute, two bookkeepers, a nurse, a cashier, and a head of a department store. He named the 
three churches that were best attended in the district and with the highest number of 
participants in rites (baptisms, weddings, etc). Officials were getting more serious about 
discovering the inner details of these churches, their composition, and the sources of their 
popularity. Trushin was finally giving more details and names.160 
But a state response was as yet inchoate. By 1959-1960, holiday church gatherings were 
massive. In January 1959 all-night services were held for Orthodox Christmas, and over the two 
days, “all churches in the city of Moscow were filled with believers.” The most popular were the 
evening services, although some night-time ones were very popular as well. They tried to 
estimate numbers based on how many people were thought to be occupying a square meter, 
how large the churches were, and the fact that they were completely full. The author estimated 
that over the Jan 6-7 period, some 150-180 thousand attended Orthodox liturgy, but he offered 
what was evidently a consolation to his readers with the claim that the “overwhelming majority 
(85-90%)” were middle- and upper-aged women, but “only 10-15% were men of old age.” Also 
of note were visits by some foreigners at one particular cathedral. Although there were “no 
incidents of any kind noted,” there was the troubling spectacle of an increased number of poor 
people mingling around major churches, sometimes as many as fifteen to thirty.161 The 
spectacle of crowds was bad enough; there were not supposed to be people so poor as to be 
begging the charity of believers, since in communist society, there were not supposed to be any 
impoverished groups or need of charity. Later that year, even the feast of the Annunciation 
brought an estimated 90-100,000 Orthodox believers to church, this time 90-95% were middle-
aged and older women, 5-10% were men. Easter crowding was as bad as or worse than 
Christmas.162  
Officials frequently mentioned that the composition of attendees was made up of a 
majority of older women as a sort of consolation. This fit several biases of theirs, it seems. First, 
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officials associated older people with superstitions and dying customs, of which religion was 
one. Second, officials clearly were more concerned about male participation, showing that they 
incorporated a gender bias that saw men as of more consequence in Soviet society. Although 
the above statistics did show the predominance of older women, officials were not unconcerned 
about the spectacle of large numbers of attendees as well as poor beggars. The problem in 
essence was that the Orthodox Church was popular once again. 
In the ECB Church 
Evangelicals comprised a fraction of Orthodox believers, but they experienced similar 
trends. At the Easter services of 1956 at the Evangelical Church in Moscow, there were the same 
preachers, same services, but even more people than 1955. This year, “the prayer building was 
overcrowded,” with 2,400 “or a little more” in attendance at the main Sunday morning service, 
and people had to huddle outside the entrances.163 Even the preceding Holy Week services were 
packed. Thursday morning had 2,200 attend (most were thought to be from the suburbs, 
commuting to work), and the evening service had 1,900. On Friday’s morning and evening 
services, 1,000 and 1,500 were there, respectively. At Saturday’s night service, 2,200 came. On 
Easter Sunday, there were eight sermons, with choral or congregational singing in between at 
three services, with a total of 4,500 in attendance. On Monday, two more services brought in 
1,900. Despite this kind of mobilization of believers, however, the commissioner only remarked 
that “All prayer gatherings passed in full order. No violations of any kind were observed.”164 
Where violations were occurring was in the regions beyond the Central church of 
Moscow, at locales scattered across the country. In 1957 the “center” (Council for the Affairs of 
Religious Cults) sent a circulatory letter to its oblast commissioners about issues going on 
countrywide. Signaling what local inspectors should focus on, the letter drew attention to and 
provided examples of Evangelicals’ work among youth, applications for new churches, opening 
prayer houses (presumably without official approval), disseminating legislation on religious life 
(perhaps about constitutional religious rights), and other such developments.165 Moscow Oblast 
inspectors in turn echoed this perception of an increase in unregistered Baptist activity in the 
region lately, as well as the setting up of new prayer gatherings. Many members of the Moscow 
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congregation were leading this activity across the oblast, especially “from the youth.” The 
commissioner counted sixteen groups involving 820 people in early 1958, causing him to 
conclude that “The Evangelical christians-baptists and Pentecostals developed broad measures 
and major activity over the last two years.”166 
One such emerging community was in the city of Dedovsk, a medium-sized industrial 
town over an hour’s commute from Moscow in the Istrinskii and Krasnogorskii districts. 
Probably due to information provided by a certain presbyter Karpov, officials learned that I.N. 
Krylov, a 60-year-old from Kalinin Oblast, reportedly baptized a total of eighteen people on two 
occasions in Dedovsk in 1956.167 What they did not mention was that a group of Baptists had 
been gathering there for some ten years already and had been requesting registration for the 
past six years.168 After Baptist believer Vasiliy Yakovlevich Smirnov built a house on 
Pushkinskaya Street in 1946, a small group gathered there several times a week for prayer, bible 
study, and singing. Eventually, they could not fit, so he removed a wall to make half of his house 
one big room. As many as 200 packed into this little dwelling at once in the mid-1950s.169 Young 
Petr Rumachik, who married one of Smirnov’s daughters, was ordained as a minister in Dedovsk 
in 1955. An older man, Aleksei Fedorovich Iskovskikh was the first head pastor while they still 
met in homes.170 
Once again in 1956 a group of twenty-five filed a petition to open a church in a “private” 
dwelling on Pushkinskaya Street, the very home owned by Smirnov. State organs rejected this 
petition due to the fact that the home did not meet “sanitary and fire conditions.” It did not 
matter that, according to officials’ information, a group of some 20-40 was already gathering 
and would continue to gather twice a week, Saturday and Sunday evening in Smirnov’s home.171 
The reality was probably that meetings were held more often and involved more people, but 
state representatives had no incentive to make registrations reflect the existing reality so much 
as the desired future one, which was ideally no churches at all, but only a few sparsely attended 
ones as a pragmatic second-best option.  
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The Baptist community in Dedovsk was growing, whether officials would allow it to 
register or not. Their baptisms in the mid-1950s occurred in the open, and one time they 
baptized as many as 40.172 But political winds were shifting again. Regular attenders started to 
notice state representatives mingling outside or even attending some of these gatherings 
beginning in 1958-1959.173 
Officials seemed to have ready explanations for the bourgeoning of the Baptist 
communities by 1958:  “the free propaganda and activity of preachers” from among Baptists 
and Pentecostals, the “connivance and encouragement” of certain leaders, insufficient activity 
of local authorities, and the need for more information about the preachers and groups 
involved. Making tracking difficult for officials, ECB preachers often traveled between 
communities and oblasts, as was the case in Dedovsk, where the one who baptized eighteen 
had some connections to Kalinin Oblast.174 
The Evangelicals’ decentralized activity was highly problematic for officials. The 
commissioner noticed the “considerable number of these preachers” (probably a good number 
were lay-preachers) who would hold baptisms or prayer meetings all over the oblast.175 He also 
characterized them as having an “active group [aktiv] of believers” who held meetings in homes. 
Another general report from 1958 covering all of the religions mentioned that the problem 
lately was the Baptist church’s spread across the region, unique among the religions. With more 
and more wanting to be baptized, the bottom line was that the phenomenon was growing each 
year.176 
Of the “violations of Soviet legislation” in ECB churches, officials mostly blamed those 
who “spoke in the capacity of leaders and preachers” from the Evangelical Christians-Baptists 
denomination. Even the leader of the Council and Baptist minister at Moscow Central, Zhidkov, 
was apparently overheard remarking that “it’s not so important who baptizes, but it’s important 
who is baptized.” This reflected the custom of the Baptist church where “a significant number of 
such preachers provide for the growth of the religious association of the evangelical Christians-
baptists, conducting the rites of baptism and organizing prayer meetings in different populated 
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areas of Moscow Oblast.” That they were even traveling around was nothing less than the 
attempt to spread religious propaganda.177 
The commissioner characterized Baptists as using “the most varying forms and 
methods” and even “accounting for local conditions and individual characteristics of each 
person.” Such techniques succeeded in drawing “women and youth” in particular “into their 
midst.” Even though believers sensed a changing religious climate and took a more clandestine 
approach, they grew in numbers, but authorities still noticed their gatherings “hidden” in 
apartments of believers and “often in the forest.”178 In Dedovsk, while still wanting to have an 
officially registered prayer house, believers had been working with youth. On a monthly basis 
youth were invited for Sunday festival-events, which featured solo and choral singing, dramatic 
readings and so on. Officials concluded that these measures ensured the faith would stay alive 
while convincing some of them to become the next generation of preachers.179 
State agents had a better handle on ECB churches in the cities than the oblasts. At 
Moscow Central Baptist Church, not only was the sanctuary often crowded with more than a 
thousand at each, foreigners also frequently attended this church (it was the church of choice 
for many Protestant visitors from the West).180 All of this was legal and authorized. In the case of 
the delegations and foreign visitors, it was the job of ministers of the Moscow Church and 
leaders of the Council like Karev and Zhidkov to accompany them as tour guides, and all these 
interactions were observed and recorded.181 In Kiev, there were four church communities in the 
city with attendance around 1,700 where there were several sermons and readings by believers 
at their two to four services per week. In Kiev Oblast, there were 94 smaller Evangelical 
Christians-Baptists communities, around 6,000 people. Average attendance ranged from 30 to 
80% of members at these churches (quite good) and approached 100% on holidays.182  
One person who attended a Baptist Church in Kiev in the latter half of the 1950s was 
young Natasha Vins, along with her family. Her father was an electrical engineer and her mother 
a teacher, and she recalls boarding the bus on Sunday mornings, as fellow Christians greeted 
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each other and chatted. Her parents and grandmother sang in the choir.183 But these would 
become the “good old days” before long. By 1959, Khrushchev’s anti-religion campaign was 
beginning. The Vins family and the Baptist believers would encounter increasing harassment in 
the coming years, when simply traveling to church as a family with young children would no 
longer be ordinary religious activity, but underground activity.  
Conclusion 
Stalin’s invitation during World War II to the Orthodox and Evangelical Christians-
Baptists Churches to “reactivate” resulted in religious effervescence in both Churches. Both 
denominations featured extensive petitioning for church registrations, increased attendance 
and new converts, and new, young clergy to fill growing needs. As noted above, although during 
the war officials regarded the Orthodox Church in particular as useful for helping rally the 
people, afterward its ideological incompatibility became more visible, as was the reality that it 
offered an alternative avenue for belonging, identity, and power. Churches were still necessary, 
however, to Soviet officials if they wished to claim to foreigners that there was freedom of 
religious conscience in the Soviet Union, and they could be useful for aligning people with state 
interests and for allowing people to “satisfy their religious needs” as private individuals. 
Stalin wanted to permit “religion” to satisfy individuals, but not for individuals to form 
groups. In the Soviet Union, individuals were granted the freedom of a personal conscience, but 
not the right to a communal identity or belonging other than as Soviet citizen. State 
representatives did not want to accommodate groups’ demands for more churches, as they 
represented belonging and power. People petitioned for churches to open in groups, and in 
groups state representatives would have to approve or deny them—either way potentially 
increasing their sense of communal belonging.  
In communist societies, there were not supposed to be collectives of people wanting to 
be religiously active. According to Marxist ideology, any remaining religiosity under socialism or 
communism was supposed to be a passing vestige, populated only by isolated remnants of the 
disenfranchised bourgeoisie—not emerging groups and certainly not new generations or 
converts! Because socio-economic changes were to render religious content meaningless, only 
the formulaic and ritualistic aspects would be left behind. State representatives regarded 
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ritualism as benign because they saw it as disconnected from spheres that mattered to them, 
including morality, education, child-rearing, social relations, and leisure time. They 
underestimated just how much people found religious rituals powerful in terms of offering 
enduring meanings and frameworks for communal identity and belonging. 
Even if they misunderstood why churches continued to attract people, they endeavored 
to monitor churches for signs that religiosity was exceeding individualistic ritualism, which they 
considered quiet church life. Practically speaking, acceptable religiosity for officials was having 
predictable church services, abstract sermons, and little social interaction among the few 
participants, who, at best, were mostly older women whom many officials stereotyped as the 
most acceptable type of participant. The worst case scenario was an active church attended by 
youth, men, and professionals with a priest or pastor engaging the people and animating them 
toward greater participation and religiosity. Such a scenario thereby made religion a competitor 
to the Soviet cause since it meant that religion could be universally appealing and mobilizing. 
In their work trying to normalize religiosity toward something that resembled aged 
clinging to a dying ritual, officials acted as though certain believers or clergy were to blame for 
“activating” church life. They scrutinized seminarians, priests, pastors, active laypeople, and 
those in monasteries as individuals potentially responsible for animating crowds.184 They 
ignored the agency of believers as audiences and communities and as well as the agency of 
religion itself to attract people.  
In the Evangelical Christians-Baptists Church, as in the Orthodox Church, attendance and 
participation grew after 1943. The number of young clergy and even youth interest was on the 
rise. Despite some elements of a cultural thaw at the top levels of government in the late 1950s, 
religion did not experience a warming of relations with government officials. By 1958-1959, the 
government was in the process of promoting a new line, one with a goal to stem the tide of 
Baptist growth and bourgeoning Orthodox religiosity. Officials would not call this new line 
“persecution,” but “measures toward liquidating violations of the soviet legislation on cults.”185 
What officials did not predict well, however, was the effect that new attacks on religion would 
have on these religious communities, especially their subsequent level of mobilization, as the 
chapter on Khrushchev’s anti-religion campaign will demonstrate. 
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III. New Romanian Government and Renegotiated Religion, 1945 – 1956
As the Soviet Union gained authority in postwar Eastern Europe in the late 1940s and 
1950s communist authorities made attacks on religious institutions resembling those in the 
1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union. Levels of violence, arrest, and church closings varied by 
country, but the goal of subduing church authority politically and ideologically was the same.1 
Yet coercive measures by state agents to gain the submission of church representatives in 
Romania gradually waned in favor of finding a balance between control and service to state 
goals. Frontal attacks were increasingly seen as harming a state’s global or domestic reputation 
by making citizens or international audiences indignant. Moreover, as Nathaniel Davis notes, 
some officials believed that religion was supposed to die away on its own given the right socio-
economic conditions and should not necessitate such attention.2 Thus, as in the Soviet Union, 
authorities in Romania attempted to prevent the church from internally thriving, even while it at 
times promoted the church as a tool of national mobilization. But unlike in the Soviet Union, in 
Romania, the process of gaining ascendancy over the church was not as protracted, thorough-
going, devastating, or deadly.  
By 1947 Soviet-backed Romanian communists had gained hold over the offices of 
power, and the incarceration or execution of church leaders continued as needed for the new 
ruling powers to feel sure that the churches submitted to them and to redefine what would be 
considered acceptable religious freedoms and practices. As part of deepening its control across 
society, in 1947 the Communist Party began to forcefully reorganize Romanian institutions 
according to Stalin's soviet paradigm and ensure loyal personnel occupied positions of power. 
Industries and commerce were nationalized according to the economy of central planning, and 
collectivization also commenced. Opposition parties were liquidated, as were all independent 
media. All education was nationalized; religious schooling was forbidden. 
Yet religious life in the Orthodox and Reformed Churches in Transylvania, the two 
Romanian churches of focus for this study, continued despite the rise of the communist party. 
The Churches maintained their traditional hierarchies, which included the patriarch, 
metropolitans, and bishops in the Orthodox Church and two Bishops, under whom are Deans, 
who administer a given diocese, then clergy, and laity. The Reformed Synod was theoretically 
1 Nathaniel Davis, “Religion and Communist Government in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” 
(Dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1960). 
2 Davis, A Long Walk to Church, 6. 
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representative and a check on the Bishops. Churches were still open for services, and seminaries 
remained, yet not without new distinctions that state authorities, with the expected 
cooperation of church leaders, began to make between acceptable and unacceptable religiosity. 
Officials reworked the laws pertaining to religion and religious organizations, and they identified 
which religions would be granted legal status.  
Yet state agents defined acceptable religiosity in response to unanticipated events and 
movements, not just according to legal or ideological concepts. They further defined religious 
unacceptability when they encountered stubborn religious movements or personalities, for 
example, and when the unsuccessful 1956 revolution broke out in Hungary. Such occurrences 
led authorities to assert greater control over religious movements that had been somewhat 
neglected previously, especially within the Hungarian Reformed Church (the Transylvanian 
region of Romania was and is the home of a significant Hungarian minority, and many of them 
adhere to the Reformed Church). In this chapter, the state’s and churches’ efforts to establish 
religious normalcy and the potential problems that always threatened to disturb it are the 
primary focus. 
New Regulations on Church Life Cause New Tensions 
The Need for Reliable Cadres: First Crackdowns 
In 1947, before any new legal measures pertaining to religious life were drawn up, the 
emerging communist authorities looked to elevate the power of those who were loyal and strip 
power from those seen as dangerous. The pro-Communists were extending their power and 
authority in Romanian society, and part of this process included scrutinizing religious leaders 
and personnel, just like all other leading figures in society, for the degree of their loyalty toward 
the emerging regime. Many hierarchs and prominent clerics from the Orthodox, Roman-
Catholic, and Greek-Catholic Churches were imprisoned, as well as a select few from the other 
churches as well. The arrests, imprisonments, and even executions were often swift and extra-
judicial. As scholar Cristian Vasile discovered, the prevailing attitude was “’it’s better that we 
arrest ten non-guilty than let one villain escape.’”3 Yet this does not mean that the emerging 
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authorities simply applied blanket criteria without scrutinizing people on an individual basis, just 
that they tended toward caution when it came to the reliability of cadres.4 
Roman- and Greek-Catholic hierarchs were the hardest hit by this scrutiny, in large part 
because the emerging, Eastward-facing communist government would not tolerate the Church’s 
connection to an outside, Western power (the Vatican). Representatives of the Catholic Church 
had long denounced communism and the Soviet government, and more recently, Pope Pius XII 
had not denounced Soviet enemies, the Nazis, sufficiently to gain Stalin’s trust.5 In Romania, all 
of the Roman-Catholic bishops were arrested, many were executed, and the five dioceses were 
reduced to two. The existing Patriarch Nicodim was ill and died in 1948, although some would 
claim potential foul play on the part of the emerging authorities. A rapidly rising figure, Ioan 
Marina, was installed as Patriarch Justinian of the Orthodox Church, having been only a parish 
priest up to 1944. His ascendancy to Archbishop and Metropolitan of Iaşi and then to Patriarch 
of All Romania likely stems from his hiding communist activist (and by 1947 General Secretary) 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej when he escaped from prison in 1944 during the War. The new 
Patriarch was given more power of oversight and interference in the lives and work of those 
beneath him. Numerous church academies, seminaries, and schools were closed.6 
1948 Religious Policy and the Legal/Theoretical Framework 
The "Law of Religions"7 of 1948 subsequently outlined the legal framework for religious 
life in Romania, and the Constitution of 1965 merely added details to this framework, which 
would last the entire communist period. Articles from these statements had the appearance of 
guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion while leaving significant room for the state to 
manage cases as needed according to the more sophisticated layers of religious acceptability. 
Article 30 of the Constitution declared: “Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all citizens of 
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the Socialist Republic of Romania. Anybody is free to share or not to share religious beliefs. 
Freedom of religious worship is guaranteed. Religious creeds are free to organize and function. 
The organization and functioning of religious cults is regulated by law.”8 Denominations needed 
to be pre-approved by the Ministry of Religions (Ministerul Cultelor) to be legal, and there were 
fourteen approved and legally sanctioned religious denominations during the communist 
period, with no recognized religious associations beyond those major denominations.9 The 
Ministry of Religions was charged with issuing licenses for pastors and granting permission for 
the construction of religious facilities. As long as the denomination, building, and clergy were 
pre-approved, congregations could gather together for weekly worship. 
But by and large, taking the "Soviet model," the churches were "driven from the public 
space, from schools, hospitals, institutions of charity, army and prison […].” Whether the regime 
even wished to suppress all “religious sentiment” and to what extent the regime was “atheist” is 
a matter of debate, as is the extent to which the Church could have influence in the public 
sphere.10 As Keith Hitchins puts it, the guarantee of “religious conscience” to individuals was put 
into tension by the fact that the state made communal religious practice a “public concern” 
subject to its scrutiny and discipline.11 Nevertheless, there was a legal framework within which 
religions could practice, which provided a legal discourse that religious personnel could draw on 
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to negotiate approvable religion. Although one might be led to think that the resulting question 
would be where the line between “legal” and “illegal” religious practice was, this does not 
correlate to “acceptable” and “unacceptable” religious practice. The legal framework 
established in 1948 was very basic and left most definition to an on-the-ground, needs-based 
interpretation. Religious management was not about an objective interpretation of the law and 
its words, but rather, “the law” was often wielded as a cudgel for disciplining those whom the 
authorities had identified as potentially problematic according to their own notions of 
acceptability. Legality was part of the window dressing. What needs definition is the historically 
fluid line between acceptable and unacceptable religiosity in the eyes of state and church 
authorities as it was defined by their actions and writings, and as it changed over time and space 
according to contexts. 
This question of just what constituted “normal” or “acceptable” religious practice 
informs the various “cases” which follow. Rather than attempting to present a linear picture of 
events, of “what happened” followed by “what happened next,” what follows is an analysis of 
the attempts by state and church officials, in negotiation with each other and with clergy and 
believers, to define and regulate acceptable and unacceptable religiosity. 
‘Reunification’ of the Orthodox Church 
Some religious institutions were simply illegal. Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and 
most notably, the Greek-Catholic Church were not given legal standing. The Greek-Catholic 
Church was a church of some one and a half million in the Transylvanian region. Also known as 
the Uniate Church, it came to being in the sixteenth century at the Union of Brest when many 
Orthodox hierarchs accepted some aspects of the Catholic Church, including papal primacy. In 
recently acquired parts of the Soviet Union, church and state authorities already had cooperated 
in the plan for the “Uniate” Church to renounce its union with the Vatican and “reunite” with its 
“mother” Orthodox Church in 1946. In Romania, the same basic thing occurred, with the process 
beginning in earnest in August 1948.12  
Apparently at state agents’ suggestion and Patriarch Justinian’s agreement, the 
hierarchs and clergy of the Greek-Catholic Church were supposed to voluntarily rejoin the 
church, but when no bishops agreed, state agents used intimidation, threats, and arrest to coax 
12 Vasile, Între Vatican și Kremlin. See Vasile’s monograph for comprehensive research on the broader 
international and geopolitical situation of the Greek-Catholic Church. 
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lower hierarchs and clergy into signing forms indicating their desire to join the Orthodox 
Church.13 The authorities wanted as many Greek-Catholic clerics as possible participate in this 
“reunion,” but they considered the bishops “dangerous,” “fanatic,” and “adversarial” and not 
amenable to such an act.14 They arrested all eight of the bishops, many of whom had urged 
Greek-Catholic believers to stand firm in their beliefs and had threatened those who agreed to 
the union with excommunication. Most died shortly after under unknown circumstances.15 
Nevertheless, a celebration was held to commemorate the occasion on October 21, 1948, in 
Alba Iulia. Thousands of believers were present to commemorate the occasion expressing the 
“religious unity of Transylvanian Romanians,” who were throwing off the “tyrannical” 
Habsburgian legacy.16 The Greek-Catholic places of worship and monasticism thereafter 
belonged to the Orthodox Church.  
The “reunion” of 1948 was a carefully staged drama. The plan for reintegration included 
a phase where a certain delegation of pro-union Greek-Catholics traveled about collecting 
signatures, first from those “who already were shown to be favorable and who are sure, then to 
those over whom they are able to put some pressure based on existing material. They will get as 
many signatures as they can.” “Material” that could pressure was probably equivalent to 
blackmail in many cases.  The whole effort was to take place “without noise, with vigilance, 
preventing any troubles, keeping watch for hostile elements, preparing the ground for 
sustaining the action of returning to orthodoxy as well as sustaining the signed priests […].” Next 
to follow was a big gathering of Greek-Catholic priests on Oct. 1 in Cluj, where one of “the most 
determined and best speakers” of the previously chosen delegation was to read “the 
proclamation of returning to Orthodoxy” and to put it to a vote.17 As for the one Bishop 
scheduled to be present, Iuliu Hossu, he “will be supervised with great attention the whole 
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time.” After the intended favorable result for the “return” to Orthodoxy was achieved, the next 
day the delegation traveled to Bucharest to be received by a big welcoming party, and on 
Sunday, an urgently called Orthodox Synod would be held in which the Synod would welcome 
their wayward brethren back into the fold. On the 10th of October, the following Sunday, every 
religious service “in each Greek-Catholic parish” was to be “devoted to returning to Orthodoxy.” 
After the service, the appeals of the delegation from Cluj and from the Patriarch were to be 
read. In these announcements “the meaning of returning to orthodoxy will be shown, also 
accentuating the fact that, in reality, as witnessed even in the religious service just heard, there 
is no difference between the two Romanian churches.”18 While many expressed loyalty to the 
“reunion,” state security agents tracked, intimidated, and arrested those who would not 
“reunite,” trying to ensure they join the Orthodox Church or leave the priesthood, but not 
practice Greek-Catholicism clandestinely.19 
In this effort of “reunion,” we see the first major action of cooperation between the 
state and church toward creating the idea of a unified “Romanian” church. Yet clergy and 
believers would not be so easily persuaded, even if the leaders cooperated. After the 
“reunification” of 1948, the “Greek-Catholic problem” became (and remained, for the next fifty 
years) a problem of and within the Orthodox Church. Although commissioners from the Ministry 
of Religions would label the difficulty associated with enforcing this union among clergy and 
believers simply one of attempting to ensure that hierarchs and clergy promoted this union 
(assuming believers blindly followed leaders), believers made their own determinations as to 
the “truth” of the situation. 
General Regulation of Denominations and Their Influence  
Authorities did not interfere fundamentally in the “ideologies” of the Orthodox Church, 
in its rituals or doctrines, but they meddled heavily in its operations as an institution, in its 
ability to manage itself or extend influence. Agents heavily scrutinized Orthodox hierarchs and 
priests, and those they deemed “dangerous,” “reactionary,” or “adversarial” toward the regime 
in positions of power were initially arrested in 1947 and 1948. Yet even after this first wave, the 
authorities were still concerned about the reliability of certain bishops, Archpriests (protopopi), 
and priests. In the patriarchate, officials felt “the majority are elements hostile to the regime,” 
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and “reactionary elements” were being appointed and engaging in “propagandistic” measures 
toward “strengthening religion.” Among the metropolitans and bishops, “In appearance they all 
have an attitude of understanding with the state,” but officials were still concerned about 
Metropolitan Bălan and Bishop Colan of Cluj. Among priests, there were some “hostile elements 
on the frontier” in Timisoara, and “many reactionary priests” in the capital, Bucharest, who 
“preach from the pulpit with implicit meanings [subînţelesuri]” and were trying “to attract 
people toward the church.” It would take time to build the kind of relationship where 
authorities could trust that church representatives would act according to their principles of 
acceptable religiosity.  
While the churches were being combed and sifted for reliability, the Ministry of Religion 
itself was still forming (not to mention the new communist government as a whole): it was a 
ministry-in-progress still trying to reckon with the myriad issues it faced involved in trying to 
establish the loyalty of the religions. The various sectors of the government had to harmonize 
their respective duties, and they had to resolve unexpected tensions or misunderstandings that 
arose between them, often on the fly, such that meetings were even characterized by “having a 
spontaneous character and minutes were not being drawn up.” The Ministry of Religions, 
outside officials believed, “was managing with difficulty, not intransigent enough, sometimes 
yielding to these difficulties or finding a solution to them too late.” As for some of the inspectors 
within the department, the majority was comprised of “bourgeois and petty bourgeois 
elements,” and “very few inspire trust in the tasks in which they are entrusted,” working 
“superficially without political orientation.” In short, there was much work to be done on all 
fronts in the early years in the arena of religion management.20  
But even while the Ministry was forming itself, a whirlwind of changes had swept across 
the religious landscape. The Ministry of the Interior had carried out hundreds of arrests and 
caused dozens of deaths, many clergy had quit or fled, and scores of believers switched faiths. It 
happened at such a pace that the Ministry could not keep up. In 1950 the Ministry recognized its 
need to recover information about the dismissal of Orthodox priests over the years, as the 
priesthood was very large. But it took time, effort, and personnel to start tracking who worked 
where, since when, who had quit, retired, stopped due to illness, etc. Having moved past 
subduing leaders and establishing reliable cadres, the Ministry was gradually making the minutia 
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of the religious world its prerogative, starting to define “normal” religious practice. Also, with 
the focus on the largest denomination (now even larger with the Greek-Catholic Church 
incorporated), many smaller or more marginal religious movements avoided the brunt of the 
Ministry’s gaze at this time. 
Religious Activity Scrutinized 
The desired outcome of the wild post-war years for both the state and churches was 
normalcy; the Ministry of Religions wanted some sort of normalization of religious affairs, and 
church leaders wanted to know what to expect from the body that oversaw their activities. 
Although this process of normalization could be seen simply as a governmental attempt to 
centralize and consolidate religious institutions and religious practices to make them more 
contained and more observable (controllable), it still remains to be answered just what kind of 
religiosity the Ministry of Religions considered centralized, consolidated, controllable, safe, or 
simply: acceptable.  
Given that each church presented its own history, culture, institutional structure, and 
personalities, there was no single formula or seamless transition toward cooperation with state 
policies and state officials. Rather, the process of learning to cooperate was negotiated 
differently among the churches due to the impact of such variables as institutional culture, 
practices, and personalities. Those denominations that tended toward models of hierarchy and 
submission found the transition less rocky than those that operated according to decentralized 
or democratic models, for example. Yet in all churches, the leaders were the first ones subject to 
scrutiny, followed by the clergy. 
When analyzing the reliability of churches, Ministry officials often wrote about them in 
contradictory ways. Sometimes officials praised Church cooperation and other times they 
expressed distrust. In a report from 1951, Ministry officials reported that the Orthodox Church 
(or BOR, Biserica Ortodoxă Română) as a whole maintained a “position of collaboration”  with 
the regime “in all actions,” including encouraging workers to conform to the state plans and in 
demonstrating support for propaganda campaigns like “the fight for peace.” This was a 
communist slogan that was intended against the supposed war-mongering of the capitalist-
imperialists of the West (against supposed Western aggression in Korea), and religious 
personnel were enjoined to let their religious compatriots at home and abroad know that they 
supported the fight for peace. Officials observed “small aberrations” by “certain elements from 
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the clergy”; some sympathized with “the kulaks or with the disposed classes,” encouraged by 
fellow “enemies of the regime” and even by “a few from the central bishopric.” And as for the 
over twelve million Orthodox believers (representing 84% of believers country-wide), officials 
felt that they were “not militant members of the denomination, but just preservers of certain 
religious traditions.” They “put up little active resistance both to the non-orthodox movements 
as well as toward other worldviews,” leading this official to characterize them as having “an 
attitude of passive religiosity.”21 Ministry officials, therefore, considered the bulk of the 
population to be loyal. 
The BOR leadership cooperated in many ways, especially self-regulating its practices. In 
a Synod meeting of 1950, the times for Vespers and Liturgy became standardized, as well as the 
times for parish meetings or catechism.22 Ministry Officials desired stricter scheduling of 
religious services to ensure predictability and ease of monitoring. The BOR also complied with 
state demands to overhaul the training and education of the clergy, as officials characterized the 
“atmosphere” of theological schools as “mystic – fanatic,” encouraging “blind obedience,” 
offering very little “civic education,” and having a faculty that was “reactionary.”23 Officials 
aimed to shape theological instruction with professors and courses that emphasized fulfilling the 
duties of liturgy and sacraments without mysticism alongside loyalty to the government and 
attention to government-initiated civic efforts. 
In another generalizing report soon after, Ministry officials said that “most [clergy] are 
giving help to patriotic actions” like the “fight for peace” and supporting local authorities on the 
agricultural plan. In terms of internal church discipline of priests, there were no “grave 
aberrations,” but the BOR’s disciplinary wing “left much to be desired” because it was too 
severe at times. Certain officials felt church discipline had the “tendency to become instruments 
more and more by which the central leadership of the bishoprics sanction – with exaggerated 
severity and sometimes even unfounded on church violations – priests particularly known by 
their activities as being more attached to the regime.”24 So whom did state officials trust? They 
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apparently trusted the bulk of believers, but they were not at the point of trusting the reliability 
of all of church leadership.  
Orthodox clergy did have complaints early on under the new regime, but they tended to 
be of a material nature. The revenue for priests mostly went down due to changes in giving 
among the people, a situation related to upheavals in agriculture and a drop in attendance. The 
clergy were trying to take measures to get more people to come to church—not necessarily for 
religious “indoctrination,” but for more elemental concerns. The complaints Ministry officials 
overheard or received had to do with salary and fees, and nothing relating to specifically 
religious-spiritual matters emerged.25 The state paid one-third of the salaries of registered 
priests, making their authority in the registration process more than simple meddling. 
The dynamic issue of trust-mistrust is evident in one internal report of the Ministry of 
Religions from 1953. The report writers characterized the Orthodox Church as emerging from a 
history of supporting the “bourgeois-landlord” regime and promoting an “unhealthy mysticism,” 
both of which aimed at the “subjugation of the masses.” Although they did not define it 
precisely, officials used the term “mysticism” negatively to connote the situation wherein clergy 
or believers displayed a marked emotional enthusiasm for spiritual matters and emphasized 
spiritual considerations over and above issues of the everyday, “natural” world. But now more 
positively, the current BOR displayed a “loyal attitude toward the regime.” The believers, 
however, they categorized as “not active, but resistant,” as evidenced by the proliferation of 
certain movements within the Orthodox Church. There were the stylists (stilişti), Romanian 
Orthodox believers who insisted upon the Old Style or Old Rite (Stil / Rit Vechi), which was the 
use of the traditional Julian calendar instead of the modern Gregorian one adopted by the 
Orthodox Church in 1923  (not to be confused with the Old-Rite Russian Orthodox Church, which 
was legally approved). Officials characterized them by “bigotry and refractory ideas of progress.” 
The Lord’s Army, a home-grown Orthodox renewal movement, was another movement whose 
participants resisted communist leadership, and officials characterized it as “sectarian, 
dynamic.” One more major issue officials noted within the BOR was the “reintegration of the 
Orthodox churches of Transylvania” (i.e. the disbanding of the Greek-Catholic church)], which 
the authorities euphemistically referred to as the abolition of the “concordat” with Rome for the 
“liberation from the domination of the Vatican.” The act of “unification on 21 Oct. 1948,” and 
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what followed was simply the “consolidation of reintegration.”26 By 1953, more so than 
reliability of hierarchs or clergy, the issues of uncontrolled movements within the Orthodox 
Church and managing the “return” of the Greek-Catholic Church formed the core “problems” of 
the BOR.   
In the eyes of state officials, each Church presented its own particular “problems,” but 
they were not all equally problematic. In the Catholic Church, the issue of relations with the 
Vatican and unreliable hierarchs came first. In regard to the Reformed Church, state officials 
mentioned one movement, “Bethanism” (featured below), but otherwise the main problem was 
the “essential importance of catechism” to the Church in line with its tradition of doing 
catechism with youth prior to their confirmation.  Officials’ assessments of the approved 
“neoprotestant” churches (Baptist, Pentecostal, Brethren and Seventh-Day Adventist) was the 
harshest. Their presence in history was explained as an outcome of the “conditions of 
degradation of bourgeois societies,” and they were characterized by “recruiting members from 
the exploited strata,” by “very active proselytism,” by being “dynamic,” by “constant motion and 
effervescence,” with “maintenance by foreign funds,” by “individual propaganda and by small 
rings,” and as “apparently rationalistic, [yet] mystical in substance.”27 This kind of religiosity was 
precisely the opposite of state officials’ desire for religious practice to be predictable, banal, 
preferably static or even dying out. In fact, the neoprotestants became the paragon for 
undesirable religiosity, against whom other religious manifestations could posture favorable 
status: non-recruiting, non-proselytizing, stable, without innovations, lacking foreign 
interference, without charismatic leaders and grassroots gatherings, and “rational”—replacing 
any kind of mysticism or spirituality with the supposed level-headedness of science, analysis, 
and common sense. That all of the religions professed a supernatural being, a monotheistic 
“God,” at the center of their core beliefs, was evidently acceptable to state officials when these 
beliefs were expressed in rituals or a predictable manner. Having a “god” that remained 
confined to prescribed limits sufficiently naturalized the supernatural. “God” was, in this sense, 
supposed to be akin to a superstition or quaint custom that made little determination in terms 
of how people should act here, now, or in the future.  
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In the minds of the Ministry officials composing the report, each denomination basically 
fit into one of three categories – “Denominations whose leaders and believers almost in the 
majority are alongside the regime and collaborate with it on the major acts which it 
undertakes,” religions “which could be alongside the regime, though they’re impeded to this by 
their leaders,” and religions which “are categorically against the regime of popular democracy.” 
Although they do not explicitly categorize each denomination, it seems they saw the BOR as 
belonging to the first, the Catholics and Reformed to the second, and the neoprotestants to the 
third. This statement is also telling for the way that it placed a relative importance on the role of 
church leaders rather than everyday believers in tipping the balance toward cooperation.28 
Eliminating Non-recognized Movements 
Neoprotestantism was a sort of “disease” that religions could potentially carry, and it 
could then activate. The 1948 governmental regulation of religion forbade organizations and 
movements, whether within or outside of the officially recognized church institutions.  State 
officials expected church leaders to ensure that their clergy and flock were not encouraging or 
participating in any such movements. Both the Orthodox and Reformed Church had such 
formations, the Lord’s Army and the Christian Endeavor (CE) Society, respectively. Participants in 
these movements considered them as intra-church movements that complemented or 
supplemented their membership and activity in the official church by enlivening faith practice or 
affording activities not typically offered in their local church expression.  But officials considered 
such movements undesirable for the power they represented, as they existed somewhat outside 
the command structure of the churches. Communist authorities wanted clear lines of command 
and limits to the number of bodies or church representatives with whom they would need to 
interact. 
Lord’s Army  
The Lord’s Army was an organization that was started by Metropolitan Bălan after 
World War I with the goal of enlivening religious practice within the Orthodox Church in 
Transylvania, where the Church was not predominant. Perhaps in response to emerging 
protestant movements in Romania, in response to some changes in modern life, or for 
specifically Orthodox concerns of Bălan’s, he partnered with priest Iosif Trifa in developing the 
movement known as the Lord’s Army, aided in part by their publication Lumina Satelor (The 
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Light of the Villages), which Trifa served as editor. Lord’s Army meetings featured lay reading of 
the Bible, learning contemporary hymns and songs, and opportunities for lay faith-testimonies. 
But Trifa and Bălan had a falling out, and eventually the Orthodox Church defrocked 
Trifa. Yet Lord’s Army circles had already spread across Romania but were largely associated 
with Trifa rather than with Bălan. Even after his death in 1938, the schism within the Army that 
occurred after Trifa’s defrocking remained, as some adhered to Trifa’s legacy and others wished 
to remain within the Orthodox Church. By the time of communism, then, the Lord’s Army was 
not officially accepted within the ranks of the Church, nor did it have separate legal status, nor 
was it united under one leader. In 1949, the Orthodox Synod named it as forbidden from further 
operation. In addition to such “missionary associations,” all kinds of organizations, including 
even those of a diaconal nature for serving the sick, orphans, or elderly, were banned.29 
Instead, in 1949 Patriarch Justinian proposed and the Synod approved the creation of a 
Parish Committee, something within the official ranks of the church and managed by the local 
parish. The head was to be a clergyman, and it was to preside over all church activities, such as 
organizing a choir, helping the needy, mission activities, etc. Yet for these activities, the parish 
committee was to use only materials officially approved by the BOR, such as the Holy Scriptures, 
the songs of the Holy Liturgy, or other official books for catechism. Thus pamphlets published 
voluntarily or songs composed by laymen were also forbidden. To be acceptable, Orthodox 
religiosity was to be centralized.30 
By this time, the Lord’s Army had become particularly popular in Transylvania and 
Moldavia. There were groups scattered across these regions, with varying sizes and enjoying 
differing levels of support from and integration with Orthodox priests and hierarchs. A simple 
decree by the Synod did little to limit the mass of activity that had been going on for years, 
although participants adapted to the times by attaching different labels to the same activity (e.g. 
instead of Lord’s Army gathering, “catechism conference”), or by simply trying to limit its 
visibility. 
 Ministry of Religions director Ion Nistor wrote a lengthy update on the state of the 
Lord’s Army in Romania in 1950. He presented scores of examples of widespread activity, often 
with detailed information. The Synod’s decree was being broken repeatedly, without systematic 
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sanctions. No matter what the gatherings were now being called, many of them still featured 
banned activity such as “songs and sermons improvised by laymen or of the defrocked priest 
Trifa.”31 Their other problematic aspects included holding services outside of Sundays and holy 
days, having clandestine meetings, and being “sustained by mystic and reactionary elements 
from among laymen and from among the clergy.” In addition to fostering “unhealthy 
mysticism,” “there are numerous reactionary and hostile elements who try to use religious 
belief of the masses in order to estrange them from the regime.” Here, Nistor was participating 
in delineating unacceptable religiosity according to pronounced interest in spirituality and 
renewal, and he linked this to being against the regime, which was by definition “progressive.” 
Also, it seems that from the beginning state officials regarded religious activism as a product of 
the scheming of clergy, not as something that was an object of people’s longing.   
The Lord’s Army, however, was much more than simply an inner-Orthodox problem. 
Such decentralized religiosity meant that some groups “introduce practices foreign to the 
orthodox dogmas and canons,” had “lay preachers who are altogether similar with 
neoprotestant preachers,” and “sing in groups, in churches and in specific houses, hymns 
foreign to orthodox liturgical songs.” Indeed, it seemed that this form of religiosity led people 
away from that which was acceptable (and Orthodox) toward something undesirable: “by these 
practices [they] get closer to the neoprotestant denominations, the Lord’s [Army] thus 
becoming a path for these denominations.”32 Because they both encouraged lay participation, 
modern hymns, Bible study, prayer, and lay testimonies, all that was needed for Army members 
to convert to neoprotestantism was for their adherents to comingle. 
The “problem” was undoubtedly one of social control and mobilization. From the point 
of view of the Ministry of Religions, as exemplified by Nistor, the Lord’s Army  
cultivates initiative and independence toward church authority with regard to 
religious songs, the interpretation of the Bible, and preaching by laic elements. 
In particular, preaching by laics – among the most essential neoprotestant 
elements and among the most foreign to the orthodox concept [concepţia 
ortodoxă] – is the consequence of non-recognition of the priesthood. The 
adoption of this custom by ‘The Lord’s Army’ and the bringing of it, now, in the 
parish committees and in the life of the parish, will bring an alteration and a 
devaluation [ştirbire] of the concept of the role of the priest. Besides, the lack of 
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orthodox theological training of the lay preachers leads to confusion of all kinds 
in interpretation by them of religious notions.33 
Decentralization only led to anarchy, in the minds of the Church and State authorities (the Lord’s 
Army had “given enough proof of unhealthy and anarchic mysticism”), and both had interests in 
maintaining authority. In the words of Nistor, the Lord’s Army, by “logic,” had those “elements” 
which led to “the non-recognition of sacerdotal [priestly] authority” that the Orthodox Church 
established (and which evidently the Ministry now respected). Keeping all of this in mind, Nistor 
thought that “it is easy to foresee that if appropriate measures are not taken, the B.O.R. may 
wake up in the future with some internal upheavals, hazardous for its unity.” Clearly, Ministry 
officials wanted Orthodox unity not religious “upheaval.” Without the “necessary guidance,” 
Lord’s Army participants might switch to neoprotestantism or engage in “disobedience, 
indiscipline, and criticism” “in larger proportions” than currently was the case. Nistor did not 
offer much by way of solution except to propose a special meeting of the Ministry to discuss 
controlling LA activities. He also suggested that the publication Lumina Satelor have its content 
and title changed, since it was too heavily associated with the Lord’s Army.34 
The Ministry had to attend to the current leaders of the Lord’s Army, beyond its general 
characteristics. When Trifa had been defrocked, those who remained with him (called by some 
the Trifist Army) leaned closer to the neoprotestants, whereas other Lord’s Army members tried 
to remain closer to the Orthodox Church according to its original intent. After Trifa’s death in 
1938, Traian Dorz had emerged as one of the few broadly-known Lord’s Army leaders. He had 
been a leading figure in Army publications, along with Trifa’s son, Titus. But the divisions 
remained despite having Dorz as a recognized leader. Dialogues between these two camps had 
reached an impasse, and the Church’s banning the LA did not bring them together even though 
those in the pro-Orthodox camp like Dorz now had even less reason to entrust themselves to 
the Church leadership. Despite Dorz’s wish to keep the Lord’s Army closer to the Orthodox fold, 
state and church leaders evidently did not consider his activities acceptable because he 
represented an organization that these authorities regarded as having characteristics too similar 
to neoprotestantism. To authorities, these religious groups operated according to what they 
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called “anarchic” principles, as people had the power to vest authority in others democratically, 
not subject to clearly identified offices or avenues of control. 
But the effect of the abolition in 1948 led even more away from the Orthodox Church, 
as “this sympathy [for the neoprotestants] became more powerful in the ranks of the Army who 
had not been leaving the Orthodox Church […]” and “its members converted heavily to the ranks 
of neoprotestants.” Now, there were three groups: Trifists, former-Lord’s-Army-neoprotestants, 
and Orthodox-leaning Lord’s Army members, where the former two were trying to attract the 
latter. All of this had to remain underground.35 Even before the official ban of the Lord’s Army in 
1948, Dorz and some other Army representatives were invited to a meeting in 1946 at which 
they were essentially publicly ridiculed by Metropolitan Bălan.36 Dorz, who was firmly pro-
Orthodox, felt that neoprotestants were "profiting by this hatred" of anti-Army Orthodox 
priests, that they were "stirring up the brothers against the Church and attracting them with any 
kind of promises." He called it the greatest "temptation" the LA had faced in its history, that it 
would "lose forever the healthy orientation and purpose" for which it was founded. This meant 
that Dorz felt entrapped on two sides by hostile Orthodox priests and proselytizing 
neoprotestants.37 Yet he carried on, showing a lack of consideration for state opinion by working 
with youth. In October 1947, he organized a week-long bible school in Chiuieşti for youth, some 
of whom then went on mission-trips.38 
Yet with the changes in regime, authorities did not overlook such activities. Dorz was 
arrested just before the new year of 1948 and was released in April. He had been too active 
publishing, meeting, and proselytizing in prison. In his police file in 1950, it was written about 
him that he was a "good organizer," "very crafty," and that he knew how to lead the 
organization "under different forms," all of which made him "a dangerous element for the 
current regime."39 He was put in prison again in 1950 for a year. In 1951, to reduce his being 
followed, Dorz left his homeland of Bihor for Simeria in the region of Hunedoara, where Lord’s 
Army gatherings began to take place with greater regularity in the surrounding region over the 
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next two years. He, along with leaders Cornel Rusu, Ioan Opriş, and Ioan Florea were arrested 
toward the end of 1952 and spent the next four years in prison, “guilty of hostile activity against 
the regime, done within the Lord’s Army.” This group of leaders had been specifically tracked for 
the two previous years and had several informers, and a local priest’s declaration against them 
served the judicial proceedings.40 The Securitate, the state’s secret police organ, had for some 
time worked on tracking Lord’s Army activity by recruiting people as participants, and they 
counted on local priests and recruits who posed as participants to supply information.41 
During this period, Lord’s Army gatherings had to adapt to a changing religious 
landscape. In many ways, the "center of the Army"42 was wherever Dorz was, and what’s more, 
adversity did not necessarily act as a complete hindrance to the prospering of the Lord’s Army. 
At first, after the Lord’s Army was declared illegal and in light of the first wave of arrests 
(including Dorz on Dec. 31, 1947), their gatherings were "more timid," more scattered, often 
late at night, and "camouflaged."43 With Dorz re-arrested in 1950 and again in 1952, meetings 
continued, though some stopped participating out of fear. Those who remained, however, 
bonded through shared adversity. Continuing to meet illegally "created a state of fearlessness, 
of spiritual effervescence which was increasing." Although Army activity diminished in some 
places during this period, there were even some areas in which it activated for the first time. It 
was energizing in some ways that they had a leader whose travails resembled the Apostle Paul, 
because as soon as Dorz would be released, he would start writing again, and it seemed like he 
would not be held in chains due to their prayers. In the Lord's Army, there was an “awareness of 
unity, an awareness of brotherly solidarity," and it was growing. Trouble was more than simply 
"trouble," but a situation that was also accompanied by "help," and therefore camaraderie, of 
others.44 
In a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the status of the 
various religions in Romania in 1951, a certain C. Bădău summarized the Lord’s Army as active 
despite being abolished, and that “in some localities” its adherents were “functioning masked as 
a church committee.” Also, its “power center” was in Sibiu and “sustained by Metropolitan 
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Bălan,” who did not yet abolish Lumina Satelor.45 In several instances, officials mention Bălan 
and Sibiu as sustaining the Lord’s Army, perhaps suggesting that Bălan still liked the idea of the 
Lord’s Army, even if he did not like its leaders or its current form. Although the number of 
supportive Orthodox priests was declining, the Lord’s Army was “surviving measures of 
abolition” by being active “clandestinely” or “being camouflaged.” One report was brave enough 
to reflect on how the Orthodox Church, especially in Transylvania and Bukovina, had deployed 
“an incorrect application of abolition measures” toward the Lord’s Army, from which the 
“situation came about that a large number of former members of the respective association left 
the Orthodox Church, crossing over to the neoprotestant denominations.”46 It may have been 
easy for officials to criticize in hindsight “incorrect abolition measures,” that forbidding the 
Lord’s Army pushed adherents underground or toward neoprotestant groups, but they did not 
offer a more compelling alternative course of action. 
State officials offered their own narrative of the developments of the Lord’s Army. As 
they saw it, the Lord’s Army was set up by Bălan as a means of offering Orthodox believers 
alternatives to the sects emerging after the First World War. Although he was originally Bălan’s 
right-hand man, Trifa supposedly erred by getting more and more mystical and propagandistic 
in his running of the publication Lumina Satelor; he “started to lead the Army independently 
from the Orthodox Church and from the line on which the founder had given it initially, with the 
tendency to transform it into a ‘mini church.’” The state considered it “the most powerful 
missionary movement organized in Romania and it was not exceeded in effects and also in scale 
except by the spontaneous eruption of mysticism caused by Petrache Lupu.” Petrache Lupu was 
a simple villager of Maglavit who spread the word about specific conversations he had with God 
in 1935, and as a result, tens of thousands flocked to him and Maglavit in response to his call to 
repentance and the possibility of receiving healing. One of the Lord’s Army’s problems was “a 
slow slip” toward “the style of religious life of the mystic neoprotestants,” with many Soldiers 
eventually switching allegiances to the neoprotestants, in particular the Pentecostals. In 
addition, “the religious moral climate created by the activity of the Army was as favorable as 
possible for any kind of action with obscurantist tendencies and even with the tendencies of 
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fascist reactionary resistance.” Officials were able to paint the picture of the Lord’s Army as 
composed of two harmful, however distant, tendencies at once. First, they described it as 
neoprotestant in nature, as too mystical; and such an over-focus on spiritual realms meant its 
proponents deliberately ignored scientific-materialistic “facts” (obscurantism). At the same 
time, they broad-brushed it as fascist since some Army adherents had also dabbled in the 
movement known variously as the Legionary (Legionnaire) movement, Iron Guard, or Legion of 
the Archangel Michael, a movement encompassing some mixture of advocacy for Romanian 
nationalism and the Orthodox Church in opposition to communism, capitalism, and Jews. 
Because of such a purported stain, “the continuation of the activities of the Association of the 
Lord’s Army certainly presents a real peril both for church life and for new cultural and political 
orientation of the people.” This is why “even the leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church 
decided to proceed with abolition of this association.”47 Perhaps surprisingly, state officials were 
concerned with dangers to church life and readily identified common interests with the BOR. 
Even certain officials at the highest level felt that a solution to the Lord’s Army 
“problem” would be for the Orthodox Church to adopt the Lord’s Army under its umbrella. They 
wrote that the former organization should somehow be incorporated into the parish committee, 
as this would prevent the undesirable scenario of switching allegiances (e.g. to the 
neoprotestants). In short “different disruptions and perilous deformations will be avoided.”48 
This suggestion would be considered seriously in the late 1950s, but not just yet. 
It was a battle of allegiances. If Trifists and former-Army-neoprotestants were trying to 
convince Army participants to join their ranks, Army members were still trying to influence non-
participating Orthodox. A pilgrimage or religious festival was one opportunity in which believers 
would gather, presenting an opportunity for interaction. When an Orthodox pilgrimage to a 
monastery and gathering occurred in the region of Arad in 1954, the Ministry’s local 
commissioner was present with his colleagues to monitor and report on this particular event. 
The commissioner inquired of the pilgrims where they were from, whether there were any Army 
members among them, and whether their local parish was “contaminated with neoprotestants.” 
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All participants were supposed to have obtained permission to attend the pilgrimage from their 
archpriest.49 
This particular pilgrimage happened to feature several dubious incidents. First, the three 
commissioners from the Ministry of Religions division in Oradea who were present found out 
that there was a gathering at a spring featuring an orator, when typically only a priest, hierarch, 
or monk preached in Orthodox contexts. The content of his “oration” was “religious freedom 
which today can no longer be restricted by any state, arguing that the divine power is greater 
than any law made by people. God rules over all things on earth, only that people for this have 
to be believers and this is demonstrated by prayer, gatherings and repentance, leaving behind 
all bad things.” The commissioners went to ascertain exactly who this “citizen” orator was, and 
when they got his information and asked him about his “motive” for doing this, he replied that 
he was “a true believer of the church and leads a life of a true Christian” and that some of those 
who were sick or suffering there but believed in God “drove him to speak about the divine 
power.” The commissioner determined, “in short,” that the man was “a Lord’s Army fanatic.”50 
Fanatic was another effective epithet for the unacceptably religious, the overly zealous. 
The lead commissioner discovered that there were LA adherents present, and that 
several priests seemed to be supporting LA activity. He also found out that during the times 
when no services were being conducted, the pilgrims stayed in groups “on the edge of the 
forest, around fires, passing the time with church songs from the Lord’s Army.” Not that the 
whole thing was purely holy, as a number of youth held a large dance which 350 attended, and 
the commissioner felt that they “had in view a certain promiscuity” and that another “immoral 
scene” arose when a large group of women bathed naked in the spring for healing, covered only 
by a sort of “apron.” He had told the bishop last year that this should stop, and yet “the same 
immoral spectacle” occurred again. But for all of these “scenes,” the commissioner could not 
identify any specific LA leader. As a counterweight to such manifestations, he was quite satisfied 
by the “good sermon” of Archpriest Engiş Vasile, who signaled political reliability by referencing 
international affairs like Indochina (perhaps the French evacuation of the former colony) and 
internal issues such as the “performance of workers in the summer” and the “fulfillment of 
obligations toward the state and covering the significance of the [national holiday] of the 23rd of 
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August.”51 This sermon was “good” in the direction of its summons: not toward spiritual zeal, 
but deference for the governing bodies. 
The following year the same event occurred, with what the commissioner felt was 
“more accentuated” LA activity, but the LA songs and testimonies by some laymen were 
restricted to the late evenings. Despite all the efforts by commissioners and clergy to have a full 
schedule of events to limit any Army opportunities, at night they were still active. But the 
commissioner did not mention any specific incidents this time.52 It’s also worth mentioning that 
pilgrimages were permitted as Orthodox customs, despite the potential they held for interaction 
and influence between pilgrims, clergy, monks, and even agitators from among fringe 
movements.  
More often than during such special events, people were gathering in local churches 
and homes. In Mureş County, for example, there was a regular gathering in private homes in “an 
unregulated way” of LA people characterized by “ecstatic zeal and acute mysticism.” The 
reporting commissioner viewed their meetings with skepticism as a gathering of social oddities, 
since they stressed “eternal life, ignoring the life in which workers live / they do not drink a 
single kind of drink, do not smoke, do not eat meat    do not take part in fun activities,  but in 
conclusion are dedicated totally to ‘so-called eternal life.’” The priest’s account was that he was 
trying to “attract them to the church and bring them out of this state of bigotry / unhealthy 
mysticism but they are exhibiting resistance.” Not smoking, drinking, or eating meat (during 
fasts) was a sign, to officials, of anti-social behavior. As they saw it, people who did not conform 
to social norms were not politically reliable either. The commissioner took the situation to the 
local organs of state to develop measures to stop their gatherings, and as to the church’s 
responsibility, the local orthodox priest “will continue with measures of explanation and 
attraction.” The commissioner also made sure that the local archpriest was informed of all 
known Army activity in his diocese.53 
Beyond advocating measures by priests to discourage Army activity, Ministry officials 
also benefitted from infiltration of the Army for further information. In Alba County, the local 
commissioner uncovered a Lord’s Army group, so he acted. He focused in on the director of the 
school, whose deceased father had been a priest, “verified” him as “a trustworthy citizen,” and 
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convinced him to “enter among the Soldiers, pretending that he too accepts their type of view 
of the religious problem.”54 From here, he hoped this informer could provide him with more 
details concerning the participants and the content of their gatherings, which would prove 
useful in the event of any disciplinary proceedings. It is not clear how successful this recruitment 
was.  
But examples from commissioners country-wide only served to demonstrate that the 
problem was far from controlled. A 1955 Ministry report provided an overview of new LA 
activity which had been discovered in the regions of Arad, Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj, Craiova, and 
Hunedoara. They identified a new leader in the Hunedoara region, and elsewhere a retired party 
member was discovered hosting Army meetings. At another Army meeting, some Brethren (one 
of the approved neoprotestant denominations) participated and even evangelized, while the 
local priest failed to act in his “cowardice.”55 In short, officials were trying to block the spring, 
but it seemed that damming one source only produced new bursts of LA activity elsewhere. 
Until officials determined whether Army activity demanded more aggressive response, Army 
activity would continue. 
Bethanists 
If the Lord’s Army was the most unacceptable religious movement of the Orthodox 
Church, that of the Reformed Church was clearly what officials labeled the “Bethanist” 
movement. The Bethany Society was another name for the movement affiliated with the 
Christian Endeavor (CE) Society and originally formed as the Young People's Society of Christian 
Endeavor and started by Francis Edward Clark (1851-1927), an American Congregationalist 
minister. What began as a gathering of young people in New England eventually came to 
encompass tens of thousands of societies and some three million members across the globe 
(including a group of Reformed Hungarians in the early 1900s in the Austro-Hungarian Empire). 
The society had as its goals to deepen the Christian life of its members and service to God while 
deepening their relationships with one another.  
By the time religious life become more restricted, there was lively participation in CE (if 
not in numbers, at least in quality) in several regions of Romania. Ferenc Visky was a young 
minister and just married when he and his wife decided to cross the border into Romania from 
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Hungary after World War II ended. He and his brother-in-law, Antal Papp, had been shaped by 
their participation in CE events in Hungary, and Visky had decided to start his career where his 
father had lived, and where is brother-in-law Antal lived, in northern Romania.  
In 1947 Visky got a position as an associate pastor in Salonta (Nagyszalonta). The church 
gave his family living quarters on a floor of an old school. They didn't find close connections with 
anyone for months and missed their congregation back in Hungary greatly. He was rarely given a 
chance to conduct the service, though he enjoyed working with children and youth in their 
religion class, as this was still a compulsory aspect of the local school (the education reform 
hadn't happened yet).56 
Visky remembers that the "official stiffness dissolved" after a period, and he was even 
allowed to preach from time to time. The head pastor eventually granted Visky permission to 
hold a bible study in the church conference room.  Popularity caused the room to be "packed," 
so they requested the sanctuary for the meeting (as many as 600 came, even people of other 
faiths).57 The head pastor also allowed additional evangelical services on Tuesday and Friday 
evenings, and he himself would sometimes attend. When the head pastor gave Visky the chance 
to preach during Sunday services, the church became "crammed." The local Dean Aladár Arday 
took a good view of it at first, while the head pastor looked at it less favorably. What was Visky 
doing to attract these people? According to one of his friends, he "took up the battle against 
sin," he "chastised, he chided, and wonder of wonders, his preaching drew crowds.”58  
Most other pastors and leadership regarded Visky and his activities with suspicion or 
passivity, but a small group of like-minded pastors began to meet periodically. The quarterly 
official gatherings of pastors were not a place for "friendly relations," Visky recalls. The other 
pastors and leadership largely regarded him and his activities with suspicion, and he felt "the ice 
of our isolation" from them. But, a few pastors heard what Visky was trying to do and sought a 
friendship with him. Sandor Szilágyi was one of them. He showed up in their kitchen around four 
o’clock in the morning one time, and when Visky came out to identify the source of the noise, 
Szilágyi said, "I heard that you are believing people, so I thought I could come to you at any 
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time!"59 Szilágyi invited Sándor Karczagi, who was a teacher at the time, and a few other pastors 
from the nearby counties came too. With every meeting their "unconditional trust" of each 
other grew, as did their commitments to religious practices. They met for an entire day once per 
month, reading the Bible and talking.60 But it wasn't just "exegesis," but their thoughts, 
struggles, and difficulties of personal and familial nature. They sang, ate, confessed, prayed and 
teased each other. "This was more than friendly company,” says pastor Sándor Karczagi, “We 
formed a very tight community.”61 They considered these gatherings necessary, as "the official 
[institutional] opportunities were far from satisfying the desires for a deeper community" but 
instead served the purposes of “furthering the communist ideology" among the clergy.62 
Visky’s brother-in-law, Antal Papp, was well known in his town both as a very successful 
farmer and as highly religious. Thus when it was time to choose the president of the collective 
farm in his home village of Agriş (Egri), a debate broke out. The people seemed to only want one 
person, Antal Papp, to be the president of their collective. The party committee was not sure 
what to do—they did not want to invoke the ire of the people, who said the only condition 
which they stipulated before engaging in "communal agriculture,” was if the president was this, 
as Visky quipped, “kulak-list leading, Reformed-believer Antal Papp." Working against him was 
the fact that he had had five servants who worked for him previously, but to his credit he not 
only had paid fair wages but built houses for them; in his favor, therefore, was that “he did not 
exploit them, but raised them from poverty." Aware of the official atheism of the state, Papp felt 
compelled to note the following to the committee: "There is a yet more serious exclusionary 
reason as well: I am a believing Christian man, and I want to remain so. It's not possible to serve 
two masters." The committee consulted each other, and still decided to name him president in 
consideration of the people’s wishes. Papp spoke up: "'Comrades, I declare before you, and 
don't forget this: if a conflict will arise between the politics of the party and its direction and my 
faith and the will of my Lord Jesus Christ, I tell you beforehand: I will choose the will of Jesus 
Christ, my Lord.'” As for the committee—probably quite uncomfortable—, “[s]ilence was the 
response.”63  
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Having been chosen, Papp led the collective in accordance with his expertise and his 
faith, not fearing consequences. One of Papp's decisions was that the village would not work on 
Sunday. He was permitted this display of faith because he was able to get his village to always 
provide the demanded quota. He also attracted negative outside attention because he was 
instrumental in re-building the tower onto their church. His village was performing very well, but 
perhaps too well, in fact, since his faith and good performance were both so visible.64 Papp was 
publicly mingling faith with communist initiatives. Even if production stayed high, would the 
authorities tolerate it?  
Similarly, János Fekete, father of eight and pastor in Crăciuneşti (Nyárádkarácson) led 
bible studies and religious education, while knowing how such activities were viewed by the 
state. Like Papp, he did not avoid the public sphere and led the effort to bring gas to the 
village.65 He was an active pastor and community member, and neither of these were kept 
secret.  
Cobbler Jenő Nagy was converted during the Second World War and became a member 
of CE in the Târgu Mureş (Vásárhely) area. Due to the lack of pastors during wartime, with the 
bishop’s approval he began holding services in the area. After his work-day was done, he would 
hold bible studies in various villages. Commissioned by the local pastor, he also held bible 
studies in a bakery, which the owner let for this purpose. This work continued with the regime 
change. In the first half of the 1950s, also at the invitation of the local pastor, he held a one-
week evangelism series at one of the major Reformed Churches in the city of Târgu Mureș.66 He 
also held “evangelism weeks” in the surrounding region, in Pănet (Panit), Câmpeniță (Mezőfele), 
and Crăciunești, and elsewhere. Some pastors would even meet with him – although he was a 
layman – and seek advice or ideas for evangelical work.67 His abilities as an orator and 
reputation as a strong believer gained him opportunities to carry out the kinds of activities 
typically only the prerogative of ordained clergy. Fellow CE participant and Reformed Pastor 
Laszló Szőke recalls that from 1948 to 1958 there were many demands for CE leaders like them 
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in the Mureş region, in preaching, holding bible studies, or presiding over other religious 
holiday-type events.68  
In Zalău (Zilah) as well, a CE group emerged and became active in the 1950s when 
several lay people had renewal experiences.69 They met weekly, prayed, and studied the bible in 
homes. They also tried to visit the sick and help each other, but not in an institutionalized way. 
Some also participated in “quiet day” gatherings at the Viskys and gathered with others at Antal 
Papp’s home for New Year celebrations.70 This group connected with other CE groups by letter, 
meetings, or unofficial conferences such as those held in conjunction with a wedding or baptism 
of a CE participant.71 The movement, though not large, was active in a range of cities and 
villages in Transylvania, and pastors and lay people were increasing in their religious activity. 
These CE-related gatherings, with people like Visky, Szilágyi, and Nagy at the charismatic 
center, increased in popularity as more were invited or became interested. The “quiet day” 
gatherings grew in number to ten pastors, and then their wives began to meet with each other 
too for bible study. They once had 70 in attendance. Eventually more laity took part in these 
monthly “quiet days” (csendesnapok) than pastors.72  These opportunities were rare for the 
homo-social bonding that they afforded, where men shared intimately with men, and women 
with women. Participants from different regions would get together more rarely, but they too 
found it encouraging that their movement was alive and healthy. 
Yet while their community was growing, times had changed. Although no longer 
meeting officially as CE members, their unofficial gatherings were clearly purposeful and 
popular, and for that reason, suspicious. CE participants regarded the purpose of the CE Society 
to be renewal of the church, including both members and superiors (and participants), but most 
of the other clergy and church leadership found the mobilizing power of this movement 
threatening, especially since its energy did not emanate from the institutional core, but its 
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periphery. In 1948 when such societies were forbidden, certain church affiliates joined the 
rhetoric of the state, calling participants of the CE Society “Bethanists” (a short-hand rendered 
from Bethany Society) and describing them as serious threats to the church. After Visky had 
been pastor for many months in Salonta, his fellow pastor confessed to him: “Until now I have 
been listening to you like a police detective. I was searching for something that I could catch you 
in, what kind of heretical doctrines you're preaching. What is it that you’re saying against our 
creed, what are you stirring up against the church. The dean sent a kind of accusatory letter 
against you. At first I too suspected you, but ultimately I realized that the accusations are 
unfounded. I am hearing the pure reformed teaching from you.”73 Since 1948 when such 
societies had been forbidden, any layperson or clergy member now had the power (even “duty”) 
to "snitch" on people affiliated with such evangelical movements, and so the risk of association 
increased.74  
Prior to the Communist era, the Reformed hierarchy had tolerated the CE movement, 
but it was never supported officially and brought under the church umbrella, a situation that left 
participants vulnerable once the state outlawed such extra-church formations. In the Târgu 
Mureş region, Pastor László Szőke noted that they customarily sought prior approval for any 
extra-curricular church activities from the bishop, but when they stopped receiving 
authorization, they continued to do the same evangelical activities anyway. They did not feel 
that such activities as reading the bible, praying, singing, and talking should be clandestine, nor 
did they fear being reported, despite knowing they had informers in their midst.75 In the Zalău 
group, for example, one of its regular attendees turned informer, as did the brother of the 
leader, Porcsalmi.76 
The church leadership – including local Deans or the Bishop – were active in warning 
those engaged in “Bethanist” activities to cease; they were not simply silent or passive. CE-
participant and pastor János Lőrincz, while on an extended sick-leave for a serious illness he had 
suffered, continued visiting families as he was able in the Cluj area. In 1950 Lőrincz received a 
warning from his dean, Dezső László, who reported that “the authorities had noticed [his] 
comings and goings and considered [him] the traveling secretary of the then banned CE Society. 
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He suggested that I enter congregational service as soon as possible.”77 The responsibilities of a 
parish pastor plus the requirement that parish pastors receive permission to leave the parish 
would restrict his freedom to travel (and thus, influence). Another restriction was that the 
bishop had the power to relocate assistant pastors, as they were directly under his 
management. The bishop relocated Visky in 1950 and in 1956, each time to a smaller or more 
rural parish. Likewise, Valentin Török of Abramuţi was found by the local religious affairs 
inspector to be engaging in “bethanist” activities. The Church thereby transferred him as 
punishment to a parish in the Cluj region that boasted only 20 Reformed families (“the majority 
old”), as “he would not be able to continue his bethanist activities here.”78  
Despite being relatively small in numbers, “Bethanism” was one of the state’s primary 
concerns pertaining to the Reformed Church in the 1950s. During a 1952 visit with Bishop 
Vásárhelyi an official from the Ministry of Religions noted that one of the main problems in the 
Reformed Church was “The bethanist problem known under the name of C.E. (Christian 
Association) [sic].” In his report, the official expressed concern for Church and State reasons, 
although its danger was put as vaguely as could be: “This movement has an unhealthy mystic 
character and is hostile to the Reformed confessions, and under the mask of religion within the 
church, an enemy propaganda is made against the regime in an indirect way.”79 “Enemy 
propaganda” was a vague catch-all, probably referring to what officials called “obscurantism,” 
promoting worldviews that conflicted with scientific-materialism. Further pointing to the state 
concern for the Bethanist movement, the department had a list of all the priests in the 
Reformed Church, and next to the names of some were written some cautionary labels – one 
had “kulak” written, another “fanatic,” another “bigot,” but the most common one was 
“bethanist.”80 
A 1953 report summarizing the situation in the Reformed Church noted that overall, 
things were better than before when “duplicity” had marked church dealings with the state. 
State representatives now found the two current bishops to be loyal, and their recent efforts in 
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leadership and their influence over the priests and believers satisfactory.81 Yet mystic 
movements like Bethanism were still a danger, and in 1953, the Church’s battle against such 
“reactionary” elements—those not actively supporting a pro-communist agenda—was ongoing. 
Although observers said that it did not grow over the last year, it did not “disappear” either, 
being “sustained by a bunch [sic] of reformed priests.” The report-writer asserted that young 
priests who had graduated from seminary tried to promote this movement in their parish 
“under cover of certain loyal actions,” and examples of this might have been the local public 
successes mentioned above by CE participants Papp and Fekete. The Ministry “enlightened the 
leadership of the reformed church” about the “turmoil among believers caused by the bethanist 
current,” (by “turmoil” read “enthusiasm”) and the leadership responded “by measures of 
punishment of the guilty servants,” like punitive transfers. The Ministry promised to “follow the 
bethanist priests, but in the event that they persist, they will propose to the leadership their 
removal from the clergy.” Although not a large movement, the Bethanist movement was 
considered “important by the danger which it could constitute if it would spread, its principle 
characteristics being a combination toward an unhealthy mysticism and propagation of passivity 
and disinterest with regard to worldly matters.”82 In short, Bethanists were transgressing the 
boundaries of acceptable religiosity, leading people away from social expectations toward more 
enthusiastic and active religious participation. To state officials, normative religiosity meant 
religion should be of secondary importance; otherwise, religious zealots demonstrated their lack 
of political and social reliability toward communist agenda. 
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It was essential to have the cooperation of the church leaders in combating inner-
church movements like Bethanism. This is why state officials were increasingly pleased with the 
cooperation by Reformed Church leaders, who in the eyes of the state authorities in the first five 
years had only done the bare minimum to support state trajectories and efforts, occupying a 
position of “intransigence.” Good Bishops and Deans demonstrated the requisite attentiveness 
to state slogans and trajectories to the clergy, particularly at conferences. At the time of the 
1953 report, for example, in certain regions church leaders had gotten pastors to respond quite 
vocally to initiatives like having a vote against imperialist powers using bacteriological weapons 
in Korea, whereas in other regions, leaders were struggling to mobilize pastors to participate in 
the “fight for peace” committees.   
“Mystic” movements such as “Bethanism” undermined state guidance, as they offered 
more starkly contrasted worldviews that did not incorporate state slogans and elevated the role 
of the supernatural in everyday life. Whereas acceptable religiosity safely cohabitated with state 
slogans by keeping somewhat to the background compared to state slogans and state 
campaigns, clergy were called “mystics” when they did not incorporate such language or signal 
political reliability. In Oradea, for example, of 97 pastors, thirteen were considered as having 
“negative manifestations” and five had “even openly hostile manifestations,” meaning that they 
had acted or spoken in such a way that they were singled out as politically unreliable.  Such 
priests were deflating enthusiasm for state efforts, and the local inspectors believed this 
scenario was “absolutely in connection with the existence of the bethanist movement.” In Arad, 
certain pastors there did not “collaborate with the local organs” satisfactorily due to leadership: 
“the respective dean is inadequate, having hostile manifestations toward the regime.” For the 
coming year of 1954 in the Reformed Church, therefore, the Ministry would need to focus its 
attention on: “a) supervision of the bethanist movement; b) settlement of the cases of the 
inadequate deans.”83 As officials saw it, the problem of influence and mobilization came down 
to leaders – both church leaders and the leaders of such movements as Bethanism. 
The way pastors became suspected of “mysticism” or “bethanism” was not just by 
attending Bible studies. At this time, the way to signal reliability to the state was to join in the 
promoted rhetoric, for instance joining in the “fight for peace.”84 The pastoral conferences, 
although “guided” by church leaders and usually attended by local representatives of the 
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Ministry of Religions, were nevertheless gatherings where ideas, attitudes, and allegiances could 
be conveyed. There was typically a “theological” theme as well as a political-social one of 
current state interest (e.g. promoting the “fight for peace,” or celebrating the achievements of 
socialism, etc.), and the degree to which pastors engaged or displayed enthusiasm for the 
state’s themes was often regarded as a projection of their private opinions as well. At a regional 
conference in October of 1956 one pastor spoke up against the expected discourse, saying that 
“first of all they should be Calvinists and not materialists.” Later, a pastor called for further 
support for “the rehabilitation of priests, …recognition of the bethanist movement,” and for the 
“intensification of religious belief.” The inspector was frustrated that these latter comments 
were said; the Dean, who had gone outside, was “not active enough” in combating the 
“negative manifestations and attitudes” at the conference.85 
Yet for all their failure to deploy the correct phrases or signal allegiance, and for all of 
the warnings and disciplinary transfers, Visky and others continued their work in the 1950s, but 
not without changing their methods. Instead of organizing specifically CE-related gatherings, 
they would invite each other for events that did not need specific approval and were simply part 
of life, like weddings, baptisms, and name-days. They would arrive at the designated spot and 
meet prior to or following the weekend event, having bible studies, singing, and discussion. It is 
unclear how long their activity would have been tolerated, as the 1956 revolution attempt in 
Hungary changed the course of events precipitously.   
Conclusion 
The new communist government’s process of establishing country-wide authority 
included subduing the societal power of the churches, a phenomenon that occurred across 
Eastern Europe at this time to varying extents. When the Soviet government did the same in the 
1920s and 1930s, the results there were much more devastating and deadly for believers and 
church leaders. In terms of the severity of coercion, the situation in Romania during this period 
were more analogous to the same period in the Soviet Union when Joseph Stalin enlarged the 
opportunities for the religions to reestablish themselves but with significant limitations (see 
Chapter II). In both countries, officials aimed to promote church leaders loyal to the government 
                                                          
85 Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Fond “Minsterul Cultelor şi Artelor – Direcţia Studii (1945-1963)," Dos. 
53, 1956, 44, 46. Note that although Protestants in Romania typically use the word for pastor (Romanian 
pastor, Hungarian lelkipásztor or lelkész), Romanian officials used the word priest (preot), showing the 
influence of Orthodox on officials’ language. 
102 
 
and demote or punish those who resisted. They both treated the Orthodox Church in particular 
as internationally useful for bolstering government reputation and domestically useful for 
restricting the societal power of religious manifestations the state considered problematic, like 
the Greek-Catholic Church and Lord’s Army movement. But the Orthodox Church was not 
unique for its usefulness, only its size and societal presence. State officials likewise promoted 
church leaders in the Reformed Church who were loyal and expected them to participate in 
stamping out effervescent religious movements, as the case of Bethanism reveals. 
But Romanian communist officials as a whole lacked the antagonism, severity, or 
determination in the first decade of communist rule that Soviet officials projected during the 
same period. In the Soviet Union, there was the legacy of two decades of church-battling and 
purges, with many of the same perpetrators remaining as officials after the war. In Romania, 
many church leaders were imprisoned or killed for political reasons, and citizens fell afoul of the 
authorities for resisting government initiatives like collectivization, but officials for the most part 
did not target church leaders or believers out of a baseline religious antagonism. Rather, officials 
from the Ministry of Religions clearly had the goal of guiding religion toward that which they 
considered more acceptable—away from mysticism or dynamism to a regulated predictability. 
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IV. Soviet-sponsored Anti-Religious Campaign and Church Divisions, 1956-
1964 
In 1959-1960, what has become known as Nikita Khrushchev’s attacks on religion, or 
anti-religion campaign, became obvious. Although over the course of 1958 to 1964 the 
campaign had periods of aggressive anti-religious propaganda and action as well as relative 
inactivity, the results were extensive. The number of Orthodox churches went from upwards of 
13,000 down to around 7,500, the number of clergy declined significantly, most seminaries were 
closed and admissions at others reduced, and greater tax burdens were levied at churches and 
priests.1 Those who participated in Evangelical Christians-Baptists (ECB) communities that had 
been repeatedly denied registration by state authorities now faced sanctions for “illegality,” and 
many leaders or pastors of such churches were imprisoned. 
Unlike Stalin’s efforts toward weakening religiosity in the 1930s, Khrushchev did not use 
mass imprisonment or execution—although hundreds of priests and believers were arrested, 
sent to camps, or exiled—but preferred continual doses of antireligious and scientific-materialist 
propaganda alongside bureaucratic oppression in the form of personnel moves and the 
“consolidation” and closure of churches. Hooliganism also appeared according to local initiative. 
Ukraine was a target area, having been left relatively alone earlier but boasting more than half 
the registered churches in the USSR. In this chapter, Khrushchev’s attacks and then their 
consequences are viewed with particular attention to Moscow Oblast, taking the Orthodox and 
ECB churches in turn. 
Yet the fruit of the anti-religious drive would be bitter for Khrushchev and other 
officials, as unforeseen consequences—namely a religious dynamization—nullified any state 
“gains” at the expense of the Churches. Mass church closings and harsher regulations galvanized 
an opposition, creating vocal critics.2 But what’s more important, the weakness of Orthodox and 
ECB church leaders’ response toward persecution of religion and their seeming complicity 
animated priests and believers in both churches. Many Baptists expected their Church to follow 
their tradition of separation from the state, but they believed the cart of the Church had 
1 Scott Kenworthy, “The Revival of Monastic Life in the Trinity-Sergius Lavra after World War II,” in State 
Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, ed. Catherine Wanner (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 142; Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian 
Orthodoxy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2003), 33. 
2 Catherine Wanner, Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism, Culture and 
Society after Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 59. 
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become hitched to the horse of the state, and both were heading in the wrong direction and in 
need of reform. The resulting inner-church divisions remained for most of the communist era, as 
later chapters explore.  
Khrushchev’s Attacks 
Although church influence and religiosity was on the rise (See Chapter II), it is not 
entirely clear why Nikita Khrushchev commenced a frontal assault on religious life in 1959-1960. 
It may be that he believed that complete communism was achievable and that religion remained 
a major vestigial obstacle to eliminate. It may also have been an attempt to "assert ideological 
leadership" after creating ambiguity in denouncing Stalinism.3 Another possible reason which 
had little to do with the activities of lay believers but ultimately hit them hardest of all, is that 
Khrushchev and other high officials perceived an increasing “defiance” in behaviors and 
statements of Orthodox Church heads Patriarch Aleksei and Metropolitan Nikolai of Krutitsy and 
Kolomna.4 In addition to these plausible explanations, I contend that the impression had grown 
among party leaders that religion had become too prominent of an alternative, enthusiastic site 
of communal belonging, its incompatible ideology notwithstanding. Party leaders feared a 
situation where church leaders, clergy, and believers were increasingly resisting a church life 
marked by inferior status and utter submissiveness as gratitude for being allowed to exist. 
Although the order of importance of the above in Khrushchev's and other leaders’ 
minds is not certain,5 it is clear that he sensed that the institution of the church was not under a 
firm enough grasp, and that more aggressive moves would be expedient. General Marxist 
ideology stated that the final socioeconomic phase of development, from a socialist society to 
communist one would be accommodated by a disappearance of "superstition" and "religion." If 
                                                          
3 Davis, A Long Walk to Church, 33–34 “The best answer [as to why Khrushchev launched the antireligious 
campaign] seems to be that Khrushchev really did dream of leading the USSR to full and true communism 
by 1980.” 
4 Ibid., 36. 
5 T. A. Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the 
Khrushchev Years, trans. Edward E. Roslof (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 148; Mikahil V. Shkarovskii, 
“The Russian Orthodox Church in 1958-64,” Russian Studies in History 50, no. 3 (2011): 71. In terms of 
political maneuvering, as Chumachenko argues, it was not Khrushchev but others who instigated the 
tougher stance against religion, and that he did not stop the "hard-liners" from winning over those who 
argued for religion’s usefulness. She postulates that Suslov, who was considered "'the nation's chief 
ideologist' by the orthodoxy of his thought", advocated a "hard line" against religion. He helped write the 
Central Committee's resolutions and likely wrote in his preferences. See also Shkarovkskii for more on 
leading ideologists in Khrushchev’s government. 
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there were adherents to the Marxist faith, they evidently did not trust this to happen without a 
struggle.  
One piece of the problem was thriving religiosity; the other was the atrophy of 
propaganda. A correspondent for Literaturnaia Gazeta, V.D. Shaposhnikova, wrote a letter in 
1958 to M.A. Suslov, chief of Agitprop (the body overseeing government propaganda) in which 
she worried that with regard to some Baptist preachers whom she observed, “’we [advocates of 
scientific-atheist propaganda] are very weakly armed against such a force.’” She lamented that 
“’we do not know the place of religion in contemporary life’” and that attempts by some 
atheists to counter religiosity were merely “general phrases and well-known citations from the 
classics of Marxism-Leninism.’” Suslov also excerpted other parts of the letter: “’At the Museum 
of the History of Religion and Atheism in Leningrad, all is routine and stagnant.’” and “’Lectures 
of the Knowledge Society lack atheistic ammunition, [they are full of] dogmatism  . . . [and] 
bitterly disappointing for the listener.’”6  
The situation, therefore, was not a void of ideology, but that official ideologies were for 
the time being failing to mobilize or animate people. Religious ideologies were only some of the 
alternatives available for public adoption (others could include, for example, discourses about 
“democracy” or “freedom”), but religious ones were among the most common ideologies 
presented as alternatives. Clergy bold enough to engage listeners at an ideological level, those 
who preached with conviction in favor of a religious worldview and against an atheist one 
sometimes attracted people in good numbers, despite the obvious danger in doing so (as we will 
discover particularly in Chapter VI). As ECB scholar Walter Sawatsky points out, state 
propaganda in the 1950s aimed at “the incompatibility between religion and science and the 
opposition between communist and religious morality.” But, it also often jettisoned rationalistic 
argumentation in favor of “slander, scandal-mongering about the clergy, and accusations of 
collaboration with the Nazis.” Such messages, he argues, “strained the credulity of the 
population in general.”7  
Yet officials did not admit that citizens did not necessarily become mobilized only—or 
even primarily—due to convictions about ideological “truth” communicated by clergy or Soviet 
propagandists, but in large part due to the affective nature of gatherings, people’s experiences 
of belonging to something new, different, or “authentic.” When people gathered voluntarily and 
                                                          
6 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 149–50. 
7 Walter Sawatsky, Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II (Kitchener, Ont.; Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 
1981), 135. 
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enthusiastically for a religious gathering, that meant that it was a site of power. Sensing this, 
state representatives combatted it as such, using techniques common to the entire postwar 
period to disrupt religious community formation. In the Orthodox Church, this meant primarily 
isolating the priest from the congregation. In the Baptist Church, this meant bureaucratic 
obstacles to legalizing their gatherings, followed by fines or imprisonment for illegality.  
The anti-religion campaign only became obvious over time, revealed by the actions of 
state representatives and church leaders; there was no official announcement of a new line on 
religion, perhaps to avoid provoking domestic or international reactions. It was internally 
signaled when members of Agitprop scrutinized the work of the Council for Russian Orthodox 
Church Affairs (CROCA). In line with Khrushchev’s denunciation of some of Stalin’s excesses in 
his secret speech in 1956, some officials regarded Stalin’s concessions toward the church as a 
result of the "cult of personality" which made room for deviations from socialist ideology. Some 
regarded CROCA and its counterpart, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC), as 
aberrations in and of themselves. Although it is probably too simplistic to see the struggle within 
the government as between advocates of a war against religion and defenders of a normalized 
relationship between church and state, certainly opinions seemed to gravitate toward one of 
these two poles. At a minimum, critics of the Councils argued, the Councils should invest much 
more effort toward limiting religiously zealous bishops and priests and replacing them with 
more deferential ones.8 
Officials of CROCA and CARC began to reveal the new line to churches within their 
jurisdiction increasingly in 1958 and 1959. Officials dealing with the ECB Churches focused on 
the younger generation and their attendance and participation in churches. To officials, religious 
conviction was a personal matter to which only adults could subscribe, whereas children needed 
protection from superstitious influence. Childhood attendance was widespread among 
Protestants, less so in the Orthodox Church. In January 1959, Kiev Oblast commissioner A. 
Oleinikov did not likely fool anyone when he promoted more severe restrictions against youth 
as protecting adults: “Since children attending prayer house in reality only hinder adult persons 
praying and distract them from prayer, it will be strongly recommended to parents to not bring 
children of preschool and school age to prayer houses.” Borrowing from the biblical narrative, 
he also recommended that “On the basis that Jesus Christ himself was baptized at age 30, 
starting in 1959, as a general rule people younger than 30 years of age will not be allowed to 
                                                          
8 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 144–45. 
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engage in religious rites.”9 Given that baptism was customarily pursued by adolescents, this 
threat may only have been tongue-in-cheek to make the standard age of eighteen seem like a 
concession to believers. State officials also advocated paying attention to children of active 
Protestant believers outside of church:  
Children and youth from among believers who study in educational institutions 
ought to be surrounded by attention in our public schools and institutions of 
higher education in order that, above all, they receive knowledge according to 
the curriculum, also conduct with them individual work—educating them in the 
spirit of atheism […], attracting them to [state-sponsored] societies. Children 
and youth from sectarian families love music, to play on various instruments. 
[We should] show interest in their lives beyond the walls of educational 
institutions, and so on.10  
 
But it was not going to be easy. Baptists integrated their world of faith into the larger 
Soviet world around them. They were living the Soviet life, the exception being their faith. As 
the commissioner in Kiev put it, “unfortunately it remains a fact that the sectarians have so 
adapted to the level of our life, that when we conduct major political work among the masses, 
still somehow very, very little is directly affecting their activity […].”11 The commissioner was 
correct in that Evangelical-Baptist communities were growing despite government-sponsored 
political work. They were still petitioning for approvals for prayer houses in order to obtain legal 
authorization.  
Although Karpov remained the head of CROCA during 1959, a 1960 decree from the 
Supreme Soviet had him retired,12 and the semblance of normalized relations with the Orthodox 
Church seemed to disappear.13 His removal appears to have stemmed from having relations 
with the Orthodox Church that hardliners against religion deemed too cozy. Metropolitan 
Nikolai was soon put under house arrest (and died not long after in dubious circumstances).14 
Churches and seminaries began to close, officials stripped priests of authorization, and so on. 
Yet officials never made public any resolutions adopting a harsher line, as historian Tatiana 
Chumachenko puts it, “in Soviet society as a whole the boundaries had ‘dissolved’ between 
                                                          
9 GARF, f. 6991, op. 3, d. 1160, 21. 
10 Ibid., 23–24. 
11 Ibid., 71. 
12 Daniel H Shubin, A History of Russian Christianity, Volume IV: The Orthodox Church 1894 to 1990, Tsar 
Nicholas II to Gorbachev’s Edict on the Freedom of Conscience (New York: Algora Pub., 2006), 165. 
13 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 164. This is Chumachenko’s theory, and I agree with 
her argument. 
14 Sawatsky, Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II, 139. 
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laws, resolutions, orders, and instructions.”15 In general, utterances by state officials focused on 
a return to Leninist principles and existing legislation, framing the situation as churches running 
amok, wantonly violating the legislation without repercussions. State discourse suggested 
officials felt it time to simply enforce the existing laws out of deferential respect for the 
Constitution, but in reality, it appears the Constitution was just a piece of paper when 
inconvenient, but the law when it buoyed present desires.  
Also subject to attacks were the monasteries and convents, which state agents targeted 
for being the centers of spirituality and destinations for pilgrims. At the Pochaev Monastery in 
Ukraine, for example, in 1961 state agents took possessions, forbade visitors, harassed monks 
and demanded they leave, and when they did not, they were dragged out, beaten and 
arrested.16 Historian Dmitry Pospielovsky argues that whereas in ordinary parishes "real contact 
between laymen and priest outside the church services is highly circumscribed, not only by the 
extremely busy schedule of the priests but also by the laws banning religious instruction and 
'propaganda' outside the church walls,” in monasteries, there was less control. People 
sometimes spent holidays at monasteries, allowing for interactions of longer duration. It was 
also a scene for exchange of information among pilgrims, priests, and monks, a situation 
"distasteful to the Soviet regime, with its attempts to atomize society in general and the Church 
in particular as much as possible."17 Historian Scott Kenworthy notes that monasteries operated 
in a sort of legal loophole, as their establishment and operation were not subject to the same 
terms of registration as churches.18 This top-down anti-religious campaign was a process of 
stricter delimitations between acceptable and unacceptable religious practice. 
New Line on the Orthodox Church Revealed in Moscow 
To get a closer look at what this looked like at a local level in the Orthodox Church, the 
reports of Moscow Commissioner of CROCA A.A. Trushin are illuminative. Now sending his 
reports to the new head of CROCA, Vladimir A. Kuroedov—who as a regional party official was 
an outsider to religious affairs—(as well as to A.S. Pankratov of the Moscow Oblast Committee 
of the CPSU and to N.V. Petukhov, secretary of the executive committee of the Moscow Oblast 
                                                          
15 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 186. 
16 Michael Bourdeaux, Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church Today (New 
York: Praeger, 1970), 97–118. 
17 Dimitry Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, vol. II (Crestwood, N.Y: 
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984), 345–46. 
18 Kenworthy, “The Revival of Monastic Life,” 144. 
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Soviet), his work reflected the turn in religious attitudes. He started his report in 1960 by 
acknowledging that he was “directed” in a recent meeting toward a “deeper study of the 
position and activities of the church, as well as its limits.” From this directive followed these 
“events”:  
“1. Via the leadership of the bishopric administration, churches were forbidden: 
a) To be occupied with charity work; 
b) For ministers of religion to attract people under 18 years of age for serving in the 
churches; 
c) In churches the position of warden [zavkhoz] is abolished, which has allowed the ridding 
of some people who were the most active workers in the direction of activating the 
activities of the church.”19 
These restrictions were very significant for communal life of the church. Officials considered 
charity both as theoretically unnecessary in socialist society and practically undesirable since it 
expanded the public role of the churches. These initiatives also mitigated against cross-
generational participation and the self-organization and self-management of church life. It 
appears that the position of warden was not abolished as Trushin wrote here, but that wardens 
now had to receive local authorities’ authorization before being approved for the position. 
Many authorities were not interested in churches’ criteria of good wardens, but in citizens who 
would be loyal in carrying out authorities’ wishes. Trushin noted other steps “undertaken,” 
including a reduction of the total number of ministers, and the closing of churches. Automobile 
use, church renovation, and church building construction was further “bureaucratized,” 
something that “deterred churchmen to a certain extent.” Last, “the most stringent measures” 
were being taken against those violating laws on religion.20 
In another report, Trushin also made mention of three other prohibitions: religious 
institutions could not accept persons who have not done military service to prevent avoidance; 
clergymen were forbidden from holding services, baptisms, consecrations of residences and 
other rites at a home of believers without having consent from all members of the family to limit 
the power of singular religious believers; and monasteries were forbidden from receiving 
persons younger than 30 in hopes that young people would establish themselves in careers.21 
The Council was, in essence, getting tough: no more easy paths, no more unpunished violations, 
                                                          
19 Keston Archive, “Council for Religious Affairs of Moscow Oblast, Report,” 1960, Archive file <KGB 57>, p. 
2. Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 1, Del. 50. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 1960, Archive file <KGB 27>, p. 25-26. Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 5, Del. 
29. 
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and only the most bureaucratized of relations and services providing for the barest religious 
necessities would be permitted. 
Churches all across the USSR now came under scrutiny, and those that the state 
regarded as “superfluous” were closed. Oblast by oblast, local inspectors appraised the state of 
the churches and decided that some were no longer in need of registration, taking into account 
their history, date of registration (most registered just after World War II), and some basic 
statistics on their size or clergy. Those church communities most likely to lose registration were 
the smaller ones in village settings. From 1959-1961 in Kiev and Moscow Oblasts, only churches 
in outlying regions tended to be stripped of registration. It seems officials had to respect the fact 
that churches in the city were too crowded and would affect too many people to close them, as 
demand had outstripped supply since the War. The power of remote rural churches to mobilize 
people was much less than popular urban ones. 
Typical state justifications for revoking registration included lack of attendance, no 
priest in residence, or a dilapidated place of worship beyond reasonable repair. There were 
sometimes photographs of the buildings as evidence, and they were certainly not all 
architectural landmarks or picturesque onion-domed mini-cathedrals, even looking makeshift or 
barn-like in some instances. In their reports, inspectors assessed the possibility that stripping 
registration would cause local backlash. The answer was formulaic: “Believers of [TOWN A] may 
satisfy their religious needs in the religious community in [TOWN B], located at a distance of [X] 
kilometers from [TOWN A].” Sometimes, they would add some details as to the availability of 
bus, automobile, or local trains for transport. In rural settings, the closest churches were often 
far beyond walking distance, and the convenience of transport was exaggerated by the officials. 
While scrutinizing the religious landscape, commissioners needed to shape perceptions 
of the religious situation. Moscow commissioner Trushin contended that the impression that all 
churches had a large attendance was “incorrect”; rather, some only served a few elderly 
women, a fact that was self-evident to Trushin of the harmlessness of closing a church. He saw 
churches, especially village ones with small attendance and no extra services as destined for 
“self-liquidation,” only to be kept open by getting a new priest every year due to the fact that 
the “executive organs are basically absent” in monitoring church life, although he did not make 
clear what role he thought they should play in this.22  
                                                          
22 Ibid., 1960, Archive file <KGB 57>, p. 15-16. Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 1, Del. 
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Trushin felt that poorly-attended churches also existed by “artificial means” of the 
patriarch’s support, whose “excess priests feed” on these churches like “swine at the trough.” 
Rather than serving a viable spiritual function since attendance was weak, such churches only 
served “mercenary goals.” Elsewhere, he had indicated that such villages contributed too little 
to support priests well, making them want to leave as soon as possible, only for their duties to 
be carried on by new appointees. He reminded readers that closing these “feeding troughs” 
would to “a certain extent” restrict “the spread of religious propaganda among the surrounding 
population.” In his analysis, Trushin simply grabbed at any criticism he could, not noticing the 
contradictions. On the one hand, religious propaganda would decline, but on the other, an 
insignificant number was attending. Likewise, churches served the mercenary appetites of 
clergy, but the small ones had too few parishioners to even support priests adequately.  
In Trushin’s scan for superfluous churches, for example, he found one in a village where 
fewer and fewer were reportedly attending, and the income was too little to support a priest. 
Another reportedly had only five to seven participants on Sundays and fifteen-twenty on 
holidays, plus the building was “dilapidated.”23 When analyzing another poorly attended church, 
one official noted: “The nominal members of this religious community mainly consist of people 
who live in the neighboring (Podol’sk) district (raion). From residents of the local village there 
are only two people in the community.”24 For officials, churches should only reflect the 
immediately surrounding population; one’s parish was supposed to suffice for “satisfying 
religious needs.” 
One of “many” Trushin discovered, in a village in Narofominsk district, was a church that 
reportedly only held services on Sundays and holidays, and attendance “already does not 
exceed 3-5 people.” Even during winter or on holidays, when there was nothing else to do, no 
more than 20-30 were said to gather, and correspondingly, the income was very low. They were 
on their fourth priest, each of whom had been banished there for misconduct of some sort 
(“drunkenness, immoral behavior, and so forth”). Its core participants were kolkhozniks and 
homemakers but it had visitors from neighboring villages to prop it up. The nearest church was, 
according to Trushin, some seven and a half miles away—close enough.25 The policy of closing 
small rural churches attended by older women also contradicted officials’ view that such 
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churches were the most benign and threatened the state the least. Officials like Trushin were 
really only able to make statistical gains on lessening religion by closing such churches, not great 
victories against religion’s ability to mobilize people. 
That the power of churches to mobilize was a concern to officials is revealed when 
Trushin looked for churches located in close proximity so that “whose [church] closing would 
not need to cause the mass discontent of believers” as they could point believers to a nearby 
option. He argued that it would be “expedient” to have local authorities “study such 
opportunities” and “make their own suggestions to the highest authorities,” but without 
generating the impression of “some kind of campaign to close churches.”26 Officials were 
concerned about public backlash. An example was in the Balashikhinskii district, where one 
church had good attendance at around 400, but with fourteen other functioning churches and 
two larger ones in the nearby vicinity, he slated this one to close, as there would be sufficient 
options to still “fully satisfy the needs of all believers” in the region.27 Trushin wanted to 
maximize statistical victories while minimizing vociferous public reactions. 
But then, there remained the problem of some very active churches, whose activity 
Trushin usually blamed on younger priests. Due to deaths, loss of registration, and a reduction in 
approvals for ordination or theological training, the total number of priests was declining, yet 
the Council intended to reduce the number of priests further; there were simply too many. The 
number of newly ordained priests in the oblast up to 1959 had been averaging around twenty, 
but was only nine in 1960.28 Furthermore, Trushin and other officials felt that certain churches 
employed too many priests, as with the case of one in Podol’sk which had five serving, and the 
two lead priests were attracting new people; Trushin even listed eleven recently “activated” 
participants. They held morning and evening services every weekday, and around 200 attended 
regularly, and on Sundays and holidays more than 3,000 were attending. The priests were very 
busy, having baptized two to three thousand each year and having conducted around 60 
weddings. This concern suggests that officials’ philosophy was that it would be better if priests 
were so busy fulfilling the basic requirements of their job (services, rituals) that they lacked time 
or energy to encourage any additional religious activities.29 
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Trushin’s department noted services where informants reported children in attendance, 
and in response to these “abnormalities” he made then-Metropolitan Nikolai aware, who sent 
letters to church leaders reminding them that it was forbidden to attract children under 18 to 
services.30 Due to the other big change, the forbidding churches from picking their own wardens 
(whose job was to ensure that everything was managed, working, and supplied) and requiring 
their authorization, Trushin perceived an overall drop in church activity. Now only people who 
were members of the church council—the lay governing body of each church that had to be 
officially approved and registered by local organs—could undertake such activity, making it 
much easier to control or monitor.31  
Getting tough on enforcement meant there were many violations that Trushin had to 
pursue. He conducted an “inquiry” into “the violations of soviet legislation” committed by clergy 
and churchmen in 1959. There were many renovations undertaken without proper 
authorizations, and many building materials were acquired “illegally.” This happened because 
bureaucracy was extensive, materials were hard to obtain by official means, and local executive 
committees often overlooked such incidents. Some parishes had acquired automobiles and 
received authorization from the police and traffic division, but the Council was supposed to 
authorize automobiles for religious organizations.32 At a minimum, church activity was to be 
bogged down in as many layers of Council bureaucracy as possible. 
Trushin was able to find cause to unregister several priests. A certain Priest Petrov, as 
part of his being too active, was doing special "exorcisms" for "'tainted" persons, doing special 
prayers over certain people. He led recruitment of young women for the church choir and for 
young men to serve during services. He also procured two automobiles without consent and 
two houses for the parish. Another priest put additions on to church buildings without consent 
and hired somebody without authorization. On the holiday of Christ’s Baptism, Priest Orlov of 
Pokrovskoe showed up uninvited at the house of a collective farm-woman (kolkhoznitsa), 
where, at a gathering of kolkhozniks and "without permission," he began to make a prayer. 
When asked to leave, "he did not obey and sprinkled the gathering with holy water." 
Hierdeacon Markov of Serpukhov, was stripped of registration because a complaint was 
submitted by two concerned parents who wanted protection for their sons "from the activities 
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of the hierdeacon, who was engaged in corrupting" (razvrashenie – poisoning their minds).33 
When there were tensions within families or communities, officials advocated for those wanting 
a religion-free life. 
Alongside stricter church control, state officials increased propaganda and agitation. The 
recent emergence of the anti-religious magazine Science and Religion (Nauka i Religiia) was one 
effort, but Trushin was concerned about the propaganda being ineffective. One priest was 
overheard saying that whereas they used to fear prison and a life of begging, now they're 
concerned about “feuilletons” (i.e. critical essays or articles). One informant noted that the 
Rector of Il'inskaya Church in Serpukhov was "sometimes unscrupulously referring to the state 
and delivering denunciatory sermons concerning morality in our capital. In addition he often 
comes out in sermons refuting anti-religious articles and feuilletons, where he allows for sharp 
attacks on the authors.” Another priest was bold enough to tell the congregants not to believe 
that "paradise on earth" was being built, and that the five- and seven-year plans were of the 
antichrist.34 Perhaps articles from Science and Religion were only galvanizing opinions into two 
dichotomous camps, atheism vs. religion, something that could animate religious fervor. 
In his quest to follow the government line, Trushin looked for what he thought were the 
easiest pickings to unregister or unauthorized. In doing so, however, he selected the two 
extremes: either he removed from authorization those churches that were smallest and most 
benign, or he found priests to unregister who most visibly contradicted state propaganda or 
broke the law. In doing so, however, he still defined normal, acceptable religiosity between the 
two. 
ECB Churches Face New Situation  
In the ECB churches, believers had petitioned consistently to register their church 
communities, as probably around two-thirds of them had failed to gain registration. Registration 
had only been granted between 1947 and 1948, although officials from CARC nevertheless 
claimed that all religious societies had to register per the law.35 But the new line was that CARC 
and other state organs no longer insist that “illegal groups” (i.e. groups that were unregistered, 
for whatever reason) register, but “to fight with them” using the legal measures of state organs 
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in order to “liquidate” the existing illegal houses of worship and "not allow their revival."36 State 
officials had long prevented more churches, but it was now definitive that instead of providing a 
path toward legal operation, they would rather take measures toward eliminating ECB activity 
altogether by the punishment of its participants. 
What some believers considered “attacks” on religion, the All-Union Church of 
Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB) leaders euphemistically framed as ensuring legality and 
reorganization. In the summer of 1960 AUCECB leaders, in response to either direct or indirect 
pressure from state agents, issued changes to church statutes supposedly to conform to the 
1929 legislation. They essentially admitted that state representatives were taking seriously laws 
that had otherwise been only periodically enforced. These changes were circulated to church 
elders to inform them of the need to end such violations which had previously occurred due to 
“’insufficient knowledge’” of the legislation. The changes included an end to children attending 
services, mission activity and proselytizing, baptizing someone under eighteen, charity work, 
meetings outside of regular church services, poetry reading, and youth trips.37 In addition, the 
statutes relegated even more power to the AUCECB, whose leaders were to be elected at 
“special conferences of responsible representatives” instead of democratically at a Congress. 
These leaders were also given the power to appoint senior presbyters, who were given power 
over churches to appoint ministers.38 Traditionally, these were positions decided democratically 
by laypersons, not appointed. These measures clearly aimed at more concentration of power in 
Moscow in the ECB Church “center.” State and church representatives also increasingly 
referenced the recently passed Article 227 of the Penal Code, which stipulated up to five years 
in prison or exile for leading any religious activity or teaching in such a way that "harm[s] the 
health of citizens," "encroach[es]" on the "rights of individuals," "prompt[s] citizens to refuse to 
participate in social activity or fulfill their civil obligations," or "enticing minors" to participate.39  
1961 in the Orthodox Church: the Process Continues 
In 1961 Trushin’s efforts toward “limiting illegality” continued. He was “guided” by a 
resolution of the Central Committee from January 13, 1960, and by “recommendations given at 
the All-Union conference of Commissioners of the Council [of the Affairs of the ROC] in April of 
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the same year” to work toward “the liquidation of violations by clergy and churchmen of the 
legislation on cults, the deep study of the activities of churches, as well as [efforts toward] their 
restriction.”40 As the Moscow Oblispolkom (Oblast Executive Committee) put it to Trushin in 
1962, at the heart of the new approach to religion was the goal of creating an environment free 
of “religious prejudices and superstitions that still prevent some Soviet people from fully 
expressing their creative energies.” The “concrete tasks of scientific-atheistic education of 
workers” (not “attacks on religion”) aimed simply at the “liquidation of violations of Soviet 
legislation on cults” and “strengthening of monitoring the implementation of legislation on 
cults.” Officials knew these were euphemisms for trying to minimize religiosity without calling it 
that.41 Trushin’s plan in 1961 was to begin with concrete problems, like bureaucratizing 
automobiles and church renovations, and then to move toward “reducing the activities of 
churches and ‘total composition’ of clergy.” Trying to posit his actions as a process shared with 
church leaders, he mentioned the “prohibition by the eparchate organs” of charity work, of 
attracting anyone under eighteen years of age, and of employing a warden.42 
Trushin worked on “establishing staffing levels of clergy,” as some churches, like All-
Saints Church in Moscow (featured below), had as many as seven serving, a situation which 
“should not be tolerated.” With so many priests, each one would hold services a few times 
during the week, but the rest of the time priests were free to “‘work among believers,’ serving 
their various needs.” Trushin asserted that “From the patriarch we must achieve the 
establishment of staff at such levels so that in certain churches it would be reduced by 2-3 
clergy.” Again, the Church’s own center would appear to “voluntarily” reduce its own staff. 
Officials calculated that priests’ numbers would diminish when seminaries were restricted, 
certain priests’ registrations were removed, and priests retired or died. Nevertheless, there 
remained the problem of young priests and those who would graduate from the Theological 
Seminary.43 
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Trushin noted that some priests “were warned for attempted violations” and “excessive 
activity,” although he did not name who warned them. Some were warned for “the 
performance of religious rites in the homes of believers,” others for attempting to buy a car 
without proper authorizations, and one Priest Kostiuk was “warned for attempting to establish a 
new ‘order’ in the church, expressed in the conducting of additional services and the artificial 
lengthening of the duration of church services.” “Former deans” Orlov, Fedorov, and Stefanko 
were warned for “the excessive practice of visits” in churches under their jurisdiction with the 
purpose of doing services, as well as encouraging other “excesses” Trushin did not specify.44 
Trushin reported that it was the citizens who reported these “excesses,” as nearly 50% of 
complaints and declarations from the past year had information about the activities of clergy 
and other churchmen, and perhaps these helped inspectors identify cases warranting their 
attention.45 Trushin’s activity focused on narrowing the limits of Church practices to priests 
conducting the liturgy and rites in a perfunctory manner. 
Orthodox Church Leaders Conform to New Line 
Although we do not know exactly what transpired behind closed doors in meetings 
between state officials and leaders from the Orthodox Church, Church leaders were evidently 
compelled to respond. As a result, in July 1961 the Patriarch’s office invited the Bishops to St. 
Sergius Monastery, where they discovered they were convening for a most unusual Council 
[Sobor] of Bishops with no pre-knowledge of the purpose of the gathering.46 At the meeting, the 
membership of the Holy Synod was expanded to include Chief Administrator of the Moscow 
Patriarchate and Chairman of the Department of Foreign Relations, both positions whose 
occupants state organs scrutinized heavily for evidence of loyalty to state wishes, Archbishop 
Pimen (future Patriarch) and Archbishop Nikodim. With three positions held in Moscow, this 
effectively reduced the influence of the Metropolitans of Kiev, Krutitsy and Kolomna, and 
Leningrad. At the Patriarch’s invitation to not deliberate on his proposals, all present agreed. 
The next curious agenda item was to fundamentally rework parish administration by 
granting fewer powers to priests and more to the local laity. The Patriarch mentioned numerous 
“’complaints’” submitted by “people” against clergy who were insinuated in the “’full decline’” 
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of church life, but he said nothing about the role of bishops in shepherding the clergy. Then, as a 
samizdat chronicler in attendance sardonically noted, the Patriarch concluded parishes could 
“only be saved by… the laity!” The Patriarch did not comment on the strangeness of the 
situation whereby complaints to state officials justified more power to untrained laypersons. 
Whereas for ages, bishops and those they appointed oversaw parishes, now, the Parish Councils 
of Twenty (dvadtsatki) were given the power to make decisions about priests’ and others’ 
employment, and church buildings.47 Since the 1920s, the law indicated that if people desired to 
have a religious society of some sort, they were to form what was called a “dvadtsatka,” or 
“twenty.”48 This “twenty” was not only the number needed to form a religious society, but as 
decided by the Bishop’s Sobor in 1961, according to state wishes, this group would now hold the 
powers for the parish and elect an executive committee with a warden, assistant, and treasurer, 
to whom the priests would answer.49 Significantly, members of the executive committee had to 
have CROCA approval.  
The bishops also defined the limit to acceptable religious practice for priests: “’The 
senior priest of a church is responsible for spiritual leadership of parishioners, for overseeing the 
grandeur and conduct of the liturgy, and for satisfying the religious needs of parishioners in a 
timely and conscientious manner.’” As Chumachenko argues, the idea was that the priest should 
be merely a “hired hand” of his parish.50 The way that officials and church leaders dealt with 
priests demonstrated that “spiritual leadership” meant precisely conducting the liturgy and rites 
in proper form without embellishment or efforts at attracting or energizing believers.  
Instructions to 1963 Commissions Reveal Acceptable Religiosity  
Even in this anti-religion campaign, religion was granted a place in society. Even when 
state agents wished to further limit religion, unacceptable religiosity had the corollary of 
acceptable religiosity. Particularly illustrative of the dominant attitudes among representatives 
of state during the attacks on religions were the instructions for certain new “Commissions” that 
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were set up to help track religious activity.51 The tasks assigned to these “Commissions for 
Assisting District Soviets and their Executive Committees, in Supervising the Observance of 
Legislation on Cults” differed little from the duties of the Commissioners of CROCA and CARC. 
Evidently officials intended the Commissions to expand the work of surveillance over religious 
associations. These commissions were supposed to determine the extent of all religious activity, 
their “degree of influence” on people, degree of participation in religious baptisms, weddings, 
and funerals, the efforts by clergy to have influence—including “adaptation to new 
conditions”—, youth participation, the effect of religious holidays on work production, and the 
“composition” of “the most active members” in churches. Only listed after these was the charge 
for the commissions to watch for any violations of Soviet laws. That it was mentioned this late 
and separately indicates that the law—in the eyes of these state representatives—was 
inadequate to prohibit the spectrum of religious activity they deemed undesirable; ensuring 
legal compliance was only one aspect of state surveillance. In short, officials created the 
Commission to “make concrete suggestions for limiting and weakening the activity of religious 
societies and servants of the cult (within the framework of the law).”52 
One major aspect of state meddling in church affairs was trying to ensure that the parish 
committee have people on it who would respond reliably to state wishes. The executive 
committee of the dvadtsatka, whose head was the warden, had to be approved by the local city 
or county soviets, who were encouraged to deny registration to a certain dvadtsatka if it was 
composed mostly of “elderly people, illiterate fanatics to whom we cannot entrust State 
property.” Local state bodies were dissuaded from allowing “employees of the church, priests, 
precentors [i.e. choir director], watchmen, cleaners, grooms, stokers, drivers, those who make 
the communion bread, bell-ringers” as members of the twenty. In short, they should have no 
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obvious interest in church life and were scrutinized for age, education, and profession. Although 
the parish was to elect the executive body, the local commissioners “should participate in the 
selection of the executive organ’s members, and choose people who carry out our line.”53 
Clearly, the goal of these commissions and instructions was to have religious 
associations headed by people whose primary unassailable loyalty was to state wishes. Church 
functioning should be led not by people who might naturally care the most, but by people who 
might be indifferent or even antagonistic toward the religious association. Although the 
commissions may not have been as active as state agents desired, the instructions and 
emphases outlined here correlate directly with that of CROCA, the CRA, and religiously 
antagonistic state agents more broadly.  
State agents wanted their meddling in local church affairs to harmonize with meddling 
at the level of Orthodox Church leadership. Already in 1960-1961, observers recognized that 
Metropolitan Pimen (later Patriarch) and Archimandrite Nikodim (later Metropolitan and 
astonishingly only thirty-one when appointed head of the church’s foreign affairs) seemed to fall 
most in line with state directives. Later research did identify them, and Patriarch Aleksei, as KGB 
agents with code-names—a feature state leaders clearly required for holding such positions.54 
These three presented no obstacles to the anti-religion campaign, touted religious freedom to 
foreigners and abroad, and allowed zealous bishops, priests, and wardens to be replaced by 
others with histories of drunkenness or of involvement in other scandals. As one example, a 
“protégé” of Nikodim and Pimen, Bishop Ioann, helped close churches, replaced devout priests 
with drunkards, and offended believers on several occasions in the Kirov region. Believers’ 
complaints to the Patriarch were never answered.55 It is true that the KGB pressured nearly 
every clergyman to inform. Deputy chairman of the KGB Anatolii Oleinikov said in 1990 that 14-
20 % of priests whom agents requested to work for the KGB refused, and for this reason were 
not promoted. The higher up in the hierarchy, the more willing or beneficial the participant had 
been to state agenda.56 
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The Consequences of the Attacks 
The basic result of the state’s anti-religious campaign was the decrease in churches and 
clergy. Across the Soviet Union, the total number of Orthodox Churches and clergy was reduced 
by more than half, and nearly 200 Baptists had been imprisoned for so-called “violations” of 
Soviet legislation.57 The two Orthodox Theological Academies remained, but instead of eight 
seminaries, there were now three. The 63 monasteries and convents in 1958 were reduced to 
nineteen.58  
In Moscow Oblast in 1961, another twelve churches were closed, leaving 192 active 
churches.59 Trushin commented that church closings led to “the departure of believers” and the 
“streamlining of the church network.” In some locations, supposedly there “were no complaints, 
protesting about the closing of their church.” But in most cases, there were complaints and 
petitions, “but only in the first days,” and after “relevant work in the locations, the complaints 
ceased.” With only four requests to open churches in the previous year, people must have 
understood the religious trend of their times.60 A chronicler of events from the Kirov Oblast, 
Boris Talantov, noted examples where local officials or groups of people barged into churches, 
drank sacramental wine, destroyed property, offended believers, had priests and wardens de-
registered, and closed churches. Complaints by believers were met by threats from various state 
agents or officials.61 
But rather than instilling fear, these acts mostly instilled resentment among the people, 
harming the trust and loyalty of otherwise dutiful citizens.62 Khrushchev’s anti-religious 
campaign also produced unintended consequences in the Churches, first in the Evangelical 
Christians-Baptists Church, and later within a segment of the Orthodox Church. In fact, as 
Catherine Wanner argues, Khrushchev’s efforts “inadvertently revitalized evangelical 
communities,” a situation that compelled state agents to adopt a new approach under Leonid 
Brezhnev (see Chapter VIII).63 A belligerent group of believers, says Sawatsky, “turned this 
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second big assault on religion into an embarrassing failure for the state.”64 The state had not 
anticipated such a refusal of believers to comply with their own church leaders. They had 
underestimated the independent ethos of ECB believers and congregations, whose model was 
less one of submission to leaders and unerring continuation of tradition as in the Orthodox 
Church, but of leader-servants and the democratization of the interpretation of truth. 
AUCECB Response to Attacks Divides Baptists 
In the Evangelical Christians-Baptists Church, around 300 churches (most were probably 
not registered) were closed in the first half of 1961 alone, and dozens of believers had been 
arrested.65 In terms of religiosity, AUCECB leaders reminded believers and church leaders that 
“’the chief goal of religious services at the present time is not the attraction of new members 
but satisfaction of the spiritual needs of believers.”66 Religion should not whet new spiritual 
appetites, but soothe individual adults’ private convictions. As part of this tougher line, the staff 
of the Council was purged, and people like AUCECB typist Aleksandra Ivanovna Mozgova, who 
had worked on the Council staff since its inception in 1944 and belonged to the same central 
Baptist Church in Moscow as the AUCECB leaders, were asked to retire or leave.67  
But the pruning that the leaders did in response to state initiatives only encouraged new 
off-shoots to grow, as two tendencies within the same Church clashed due to Khrushchev’s anti-
religion campaign. One tendency within the Church was centralization. When the Soviet Union 
helped form the AUCECB in 1944 (See Chapter II), this creation of a leadership structure favored 
centralization (positively seen as “paternal,” negatively as “authoritarian”68), but this structure 
was built on top of what traditionally was a decentralized movement with lay-organized 
churches based on people’s trust in local pastors’ and elders’ ability to interpret the Bible. In 
contrast with the Orthodox Church, religious authority was more democratized, creating 
additional potential for leadership clashes. What’s more, the leaders Iakov Zhidkov, Aleksandr 
Karev, and others were relatively old—in their 60s and 70s during the campaign—whereas those 
who would object to the declarations of the AUCECB in 1961 were generally younger, in their 
30s and 40s. Younger believers had received educations shaped by idealistic communist thinking 
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while coming of age in churches with less oversight after World War II, whereas the leadership 
knew more intimately the bleak realities of the 1930s under Stalin.69  
Two church leaders, Aleksei Prokofiev of Kharkov and Gennadii Kriuchkov of Tula Oblast, 
backed by supportive groups of believers, spearheaded a protest to the new statutes 
promulgated by the AUCECB leadership, and word of this movement spread. In August 1961, a 
delegation delivered a letter to the AUCECB leadership condemning the new restrictions, and 
this “initiative group” (initsiativniki) called on them to “repent” of their sins. Shortly thereafter, 
participants in the initiative group distributed a letter as widely as possible to all ECB 
congregations, asking them to reconsider the AUCECB statutes and repent. Indeed, the decision 
of the AUECECB leaders to simply comply with the new state guidelines stimulated some to 
respond with abhorrence; after all, some believers felt that certain stipulations—like forbidding 
evangelism, baptisms of those under eighteen, and the participation of children—were contrary 
enough to their practices and beliefs that they simply had to reject them, and they tried to 
convince their leaders of the same. Calling the new instructions highly "'antievangelical'" (which 
they indisputably were), the initiative group tried to rally others to their side in rejection of the 
new measures. They used samizdat to inform and give instructions to their followers.70 What 
was brewing was their own “schism,” not unlike the Sergiite schism in the Orthodox Church in 
1927. Both schisms were characterized by a rejection of certain church authority due to 
compliance with state authorities, followed by underground activity. Whereas the decisions by 
the Orthodox Bishops in 1961 were accepted by priests and believers (for the moment, or at 
least tacitly) with little or unobservable protest, a sizeable number of Evangelical-Baptists were 
determined to change things, even if it embarrassed the AUCECB leaders or divided the 
Council.71 
At the church in Dedovsk in Moscow Oblast, where officials had long denied them 
registration, the leaders of this church decided not to accept the new guidelines stipulated by 
the AUCECB leadership, creating a new degree of problems. During the anti-religious campaign, 
this community was forbidden to meet because they did not have a legal right and were fined 
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and threatened.72 In 1961, the main leaders of the church, Vasiliy Smirnov, Aleksei Iskovskikh, 
and Peter Rumachik were arrested and given five years exile in Siberia. It was a difficult time for 
this local church, as some forty believers switched allegiances to the AUCECB out of fear of 
potential repercussions. Also, because officials determined the use of the dwelling for religious 
gatherings to be illegal, the Smirnovs had their house taken away from them. They were 
permitted to rent the smaller half from the state, while the larger side became a library. 
Smirnov’s wife received some wages for keeping the library heated, enough to pay the house 
rent.73 
With their leaders in exile, the believers in Dedovsk had to be even more secretive. The 
community often met in the forest, but state agents frequently discovered these meetings too. 
It even happened that police collected the believers in trucks and dumped them somewhere far 
away, forcing them to find their way back.74 Baptisms were secretive as well. Baptism as a rite is 
very important to Christians in general, but since Baptists practice a “believer’s baptism,” they 
customarily immerse youth or young adults. Baptists in the Soviet Union customarily did so in a 
body of water, and with the new stipulations regarding age limits and overall increased state 
vigilance, baptisms were now increasingly done at night or in remote locations.75 They had to 
employ a “secret language” to spread the word. In 1961 a group connected to the Dedovsk 
church was going to be baptized, and they agreed to meet at a certain pond during the night. 
But information found its way to the police, who arrived at the scene. The women formed a line 
to block the police’s way to the men, who were regarded as the instigators and leaders of such 
events, and the men tried to escape. Despite dangers, the Baptist believers of Dedovsk were 
gathering several times a week, and people were routinely “repenting” (i.e., confessing need for 
salvation and committing to the Baptist faith). That they’d have to travel or meet in new and 
changing locations did not deter this community, but even excited its participants as they felt a 
sense of purpose and belonging.76 Fear or obligation did not compel them to comply with new 
guidelines. 
In 1961 in Kiev, the parents of Natasha Vins and her younger brother Peter told them 
one evening that they could not accompany their parents to church any more, no longer 
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allowed due to the recently stipulated rules about youth attendance. Yet not long after, they 
were once again going to church, but not in the city. The two hours of riding buses, trams, and 
trains ended at a station in the woods, with some 30 others exiting as well. They came to a 
clearing where blankets were spread, and then they had church: singing, preaching, and 
praying—with her father, Georgii Vins, now one of the ministers.77  
Although initially exciting, this decision marked a new path for the Vins family, and 
Natasha Vins noticed the transition from what had been a relatively “carefree” religious life to 
the beginnings of “a harsh period of persecution that was to last several decades." Her parents 
explained that they had decided not to yield to "pressure from the atheistic authorities" and to 
"unbiblical demands." By having such meetings, joining what they called "the persecuted 
church," her father's arrest was likely.78 With Prokofiev arrested in August 1962 and Kriuchkov in 
hiding, Vins was also in danger.  
The Baptists who did not back the decisions of the AUCECB differed from average Soviet 
citizens in a fundamental way. Alexei Yurchak and Wanner have argued that most people 
related to the Soviet regime with “a certain compliance that might not have risen to the level of 
active endorsement but was at least an acquiescence to the system and its rituals of 
affirmation.”79 These “breakaway” Baptists generally would not affirm the regime in such a 
perfunctory manner, but instead engaged in discussions of ideology and “the truth.” When they 
criticized the leaders, the reformists preferred to accuse the AUCECB of "deviating from the 
truth."80 They tried to fashion the battle as one for truth, upon which church principles were 
based. The AUCECB leadership made it less a battle of truth, though, than a supposed desire by 
trouble-makers to create a schism. They questioned who was at fault for undoing the unity 
founded in 1944. To them, unity was predicated upon submission. The legitimacy of their 
leadership was not in need of proof; it was an unassailable given.81 
The Reformists who were breaking away from the AUCECB drew a strict line and 
threatened to excommunicate those who did not rescind the 1960 statutes. They formed an 
“Orgkomitet,” or Organizing Committee in efforts to bring about changes to the AUCECB 
statutes and, having only been accused by AUCECB leaders of doing the work of “Satan,” they 
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then wrote a list of twenty-seven persons to be excommunicated from the Church and 
unworthy to be its ministers or representatives.82 The Reformists based their authority on the 
widespread support they received from congregations, showing the democratized nature of ECB 
power and truth.83  
State representatives were alarmed at the activities of the initiative group, and 
Commissioner Trushin did not wish for a breakaway church. Trushin “more than once 
recommended to the leaders of the religious community in Moscow to call to order the raging 
[разбушевавшихся] sectarians,” but the AUCECB leaders had not responded as he wished by 
1963: “At first the leadership of the society did not give serious attention to the behavior of the 
young sectarians and reasoned thusly: ‘the young Baptists are full of spiritual enthusiasm and by 
their own activity want to resemble their older brothers [i.e., “us”]; all of them are eager to be 
preaching the word of god. It goes without saying that we will call them out for a conversation 
and over a cup of tea will put them on the right path.’”84 Arrests and harassment against 
Reformist leaders increased, and informants against them were often other believers who aided 
the state in identifying breakaway churchmen.85 Soviet journalism depicted these men as 
obscurantists, fanatics, parasites, peddling anti-soviet messages, enticing youth, and promoting 
separation from society,86 essentially describing them as cult-like rather than legitimate religious 
expressions (such views of evangelical Protestantism had antecedents from the Orthodox 
Church). 
But these “young Baptists” were stubborn and insisted their demands be met. State 
organs continued to pressure the renegade churchmen. Georgii Vins was demoted in his job, his 
wife was let go from her job, and even young Natasha Vins was shamed in front of her 
classmates and required to see the principal and her assistant twice a week for "atheistic 
instruction." She felt completely alienated from her classmates.87 As she would not change her 
views, the harassment increased, her mother was criticized in a private meeting, and a court 
case was opened to deprive her parents of parental rights for their children, to put them in a 
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state orphanage.88 Although the move was not carried out, agents of the state were clearly not 
threatening lightly.  
Although those belonging to unregistered churches had the disadvantage of threats, 
harassment, or arrest, they had the advantage of offering programs for children and youth, like 
choirs, musical ensembles, poetry reading, and group gatherings.89 As Catherine Wanner argues, 
ECB religious gatherings offered the benefit of providing community and leisure, offering free 
participation in singing or ensembles and “regular face-to-face meetings” when they studied the 
Bible. “In this way,” Wanner writes, the church or home-as-church “not only became a sacred 
place, but it also functioned as something of a total institution, the hub of social, leisure, often 
professional, and of course, spiritual needs.”90 Occasions for celebrations also afforded 
opportunities for Baptists to hold religious gatherings, and the woods also added an aura to 
events that bonded people together. Many believers found spouses at such events. Natasha 
Vins had a community of youth to which she belonged: "At school I always felt so different from 
the rest of the kids since I was the only Christian in my class. But here […] everywhere I turned 
there were Christian kids!"91 She began to attend a "Sunday school" class on Tuesday evenings 
in another's home. Children had to arrive and leave individually so as to not attract attention. 
Here, the kids shared their struggles at school, and they prayed for each other, something that 
she felt lifted her spirits.92 Their rejection in wider society made it possible to find an intimate 
community of fellow travelers outside it. In 1963, probably around one-third of Baptist 
communities rejected the new rules, and their daring position not only did not dissuade people 
from joining them, they were evidently flourishing in the freedom of making their own rules.93 
In spring of 1963 the forest service that the Vins family attended was finishing when 
policemen arrived, shouting for the "illegal meeting" to cease. When the people surrounded the 
choir members and preachers in an attempt to block their arrest, the police used violence to 
take some of them. After this, more care was used for planning services. Only a couple of people 
would know the time and place, and others would meet them at a bus stop and be given further 
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instructions. But within a couple months another service was interrupted - some 150 were 
there. The police forcefully made their way in and detained nineteen, including Georgii Vins. He 
was threatened and his employer demanded that he resign.94 
These acts by state agents reflect the concerted effort of officials to deflate this 
movement, starting with its leaders. Around 200 would be arrested from across the Soviet 
Union between 1961 and 1964, especially among active members of Orgkomitet. In response, 
believers formed a “Council of Prisoners’ Relatives” to address the needs of their loved ones in 
prison and the families left behind. Samizdat increased considerably, as in the 1964 Council of 
Prisoners' Relatives began issuing publications documenting news of arrests, trials, and 
treatment in prison.95 
AUCECB leaders presented a façade of normalcy and did not readily address the great 
divide, while the Reformists’ demands were ignored, hardening the division. That the reform 
group was able to command considerable following also meant the evangelical tradition of 
authority being scrutinized according to scriptural interpretations of the Truth was stronger than 
the tradition of humbly submitting to a supposed authority. When AUCECB authorities did 
nothing to uphold the causes of churches trying to legally register, preach, evangelize, baptize, 
or welcome youth, they became extremely vulnerable to attack and disloyalty.96 
Although the leaders of the respective groups were at complete odds, the registered 
and unregistered groups had some degree of cross-fertilization, as there were some who were 
members of registered congregations but were allied with acquaintances from unregistered 
communities. There were many who continued attending the Central Baptist Church in Moscow 
but did not agree with the choices of the denominational “center” and signed their names to 
letters opposing the decisions of the church and Council leadership.97 But the Central Baptist 
Church in Moscow, whose ministers also were the main leaders of the AUCECB, remained with 
the Council. The AUCECB remained intact as an institution. 
The KGB went to great lengths to place its people within breakaway groups, but 
believers used their own devices to assess others’ trustworthiness (they did not trust leaders of 
the Council, for example). When a certain visitor from Moldavia visited Natasha Vins’ church, 
wanting to join, the congregants listened with skepticism to his stories of getting permission to 
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study in England. After an initial meeting, they later “plied the newcomer with questions,” and 
when they found “he could not answer the simplest question about his faith,” they concluded 
he “was not a believer at all." Many assumed he was a KGB agent.98 
As one of the most active and vocal leaders of the initsiativniki, Georgii Vins was a 
wanted man. The congregation of Vins’ church had proposed that he live in others' homes and 
then helped support the Vins family. He visited other churches around the country. Pressure 
remained on young Natasha Vins as well. Her teacher tried to turn her classmates against her by 
saying that she was ruining the reputation of the class and harming the cause of the state. Often 
shunned, she was even beaten up by some boys from her class.99 The Reform Baptists were 
transgressing the norms of religiosity officials desired, and in response, state representatives 
were trying to get them to conform using isolation and exclusion. Such techniques served to 
increase the importance of the local church community. 
Trushin Deals with Persistent Orthodox Religiosity  
In the Orthodox Church—as in the Evangelical Christians-Baptists Church—the increased 
state-directed antagonism toward religiosity and religious participation did not necessarily 
dissuade people from continuing to engage in religious activity. Rather, Trushin’s reports are 
dominated by the state’s continuing role in religious management. The campaign did, however, 
put heavier burdens on Trushin to present the religious situation in ways consistent with the 
intended trajectory of the campaign and to become more specific in delimiting acceptable from 
unacceptable practices in priests’ activities. 
Even during this anti-religion campaign, Trushin read petitions regarding inner-church 
disputes that asked for his mediation. Many of these “inner-church” problems fell under the 
jurisdiction of the patriarchate, but Trushin had to follow up with such petitions to make sure 
they were not causing major disturbances in churches. The Council also continued its onerous 
work of reporting church finances, a duty which always involved investigating irregularities that 
had to be reported to the finance minister (for instance, one priest's income tax was being paid 
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by the church which allowed him "to live very much at ease and keep three servants").100 In fact, 
the cumbersome work of dealing with petitions, complaints, or declarations was one way in 
which state agents kept apprised of the religious landscape. Hundreds of such notes passed 
Trushin’s desk every year. In 1962, he wrote that “2,060 priests, churchmen, and believers were 
taken in for various issues, which gave the opportunity to receive details that deserve our 
attention toward monitoring the activities of the churches.”101 This implies that issues were 
opportunities for discovering the situation on the ground, and that Council oversight or 
believers’ interactions with party members, police, or KGB agents allowed for information 
gathering. 
The state also used police to help control religion in efforts to maintain a reputation of 
order and legality. They often wished to avoid ugly incidents provoked by antagonistic youth and 
maintain order, and church representatives called on state personnel to protect them in their 
religious observances. During Easter in 1960 one churchwarden complained that during Easter 
bread (kulich) consecration at the church located on Kalitnikovskoe Cemetery, a group of 
schoolchildren with communist party armbands and cameras took photos of schoolchildren who 
had come with Easter breads and polled them regarding “what school they studied at.” 
Supposedly during such a poll one girl "fell and started to cry hysterically, whereas the boy 
threw the bread and ran off, so that among the believers indignation arose after which [the 
visiting youth] were forced to withdraw." The same warden reported that at night a group of 
around a dozen young men came in and started to "raise a commotion, laughing, and trying to 
sing songs," but they were removed by nearby police "at the request of the believers." 
"Moreover, at the time of the 'procession of the cross' teenagers who had climbed the roof of 
the cemetery office were shooting slingshots and throwing eggs." The commissioner did not 
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receive confirmation of these events from the local head of police, except the case inside the 
church, which the police chief claimed was only five young men, not ten to fifteen.102 State 
officials did not like the persistent spectacle of mass church attendance on holy days, but nor 
did they desire confrontations, as these tended to reflect negatively on the anti-religion 
belligerents. 
State Agents Combat Continued “Excessive” Religiosity 
State agents were confronted not only by the persistence of religiosity, but more 
troublingly, by its revitalization as well. In 1960, Easter in Orthodox Churches in Moscow was still 
a major public event, however the commissioner might have wished to present it. On the eve 
and day of Easter, 16-17 April, 36 churches were in operation in Moscow. Easter services began 
near midnight on the 16th and lasted (with short breaks) until around noon on the 17th. Before 
the services, priests had consecrated Easter breads all day Saturday, from around ten in the 
morning until nine at night in the busiest parishes. Although such an event took place "within 
the fences of the church" and, the commissioner noted, with some efficiency (for minimal 
spectacle), by afternoon there were large queues around some churches. Bishop Pimen’s church 
had hundreds in line at six in the evening. Trushin nevertheless asserted that "The total number 
of people 'consecrating' Easter breads this year was significantly fewer than Easter of last year,” 
a situation “apparently explained by the fact that last Easter’s 'consecration' of Easter breads 
coincided with a holiday (the 2nd of May).” Trushin was seemingly trying to console his readers 
by noting that among those in the queues, the "vast majority were women of elderly and middle 
age,” the most acceptable profile of religious participants in the minds of state agents. There 
were reports of “people of younger age as well as children of school age who independently 
came,” but these were “fundamentally a few," whereas others of school age came, but "were 
dragged by their grandmothers and parents." On Saturday around 10-11 o'clock at night "all 
churches in the city of Moscow were filled to capacity with worshippers," and Trushin named 
some churches that had several thousand worshippers at this time. Although it was very difficult 
to determine the number who passed through churches, Trushin said we "need to assume" it 
was somewhere around 300,000 people, and that some churches saw as many as 6 - 18,000 
people.103  
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Trushin also expressed concern that around many churches there was a "big congestion 
of people (numbering in the thousands) primarily of the curious, and basically it was youth 
(young women and young men) coming in large groups who were talking animatedly among 
themselves, laughing.” Although informants did not notice such groups attending an Easter 
service, the fact that believers were filling up the enclosures of the churches, "standing with lit 
candles, praying to god and singing 'christ is risen,'" the possibility of influencing the young was 
present. Also, some 200 foreigners participated, including ambassadors from England and Japan, 
charges d'affairs from Greece and Denmark, a bishop from the Anglican Church, tourists, 
correspondents from foreign newspapers, and foreign students.104 State agents wanted 
foreigners to witness the existence of religious “freedom,” but they did not want such public 
religious displays to draw new participants. 
In 1962 Trushin noted that people were still earnestly engaging in religious rites 
(baptism, burial, marriage). He saw rites as the part of religion that was “preserved foremost in 
people’s way of life,” that people attending church were “more interested in the formal 
fulfillment of the service, the theatricality of the divine service.” Also, the singing appealed to 
some; the priests were what drew others. But noting that even some adults were being 
baptized, he wrote that “All of these facts should trouble us and we should lead a wide 
explanatory-educational work among the youth, explaining to them, that by such behavior they 
degrade the Soviet people and contribute to the propaganda of an ideology hostile to 
communism.”105 
State agents struggled against the visual appeal of churches, represented by the beauty 
of the building, the interior, the service, or the throng of worshippers. They also chafed at its 
audible call to worship. One report referenced the supposed desire of workers for “quiet in the 
city,” an effort which had been successful by limiting honking horns, loud singing, and factory 
whistles, but apparently "only the clanging of the church bells continues early in the morning 
and late in the evening." Officials supposedly had been receiving complaints from workers about 
this which caused them to notice that bell ringing was permitted by government regulation in 
1945. Given the change in religious sentiment, Trushin mused, “it may be supposed quite timely 
for a proposal by the Moscow City Council (MosSovet) and Moscow Oblast Council to go to the 
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Council of Ministers of the USSR regarding a ban of churchbell ringing along with the abolition of 
horns from automobiles and locomotives, and factories."106 
While state agents grasped at acts which might lessen the visibility and audibility of 
religion, “the state” was harmed in this operation by its own divisions and entanglements with 
the churches. “The state” lacked the unanimity in motivation to resolve the “religious problem.” 
One official happened to notice that “certain comrades of ours in consequence of complacency 
and carelessness wittingly or unwittingly by their own activities create the conditions conducive 
for churchmen for the revival of religious belief, celebration of religious holidays.” One 
seemingly benign example of this was that store owners were selling church candles and Easter 
breads (“under the guise of ‘spring muffins’”), a situation that they felt was fostering religious 
practice. Trushin did not wish to “dwell” on “careless comrades” making space for the 
“strengthening of churches” since the “leadership” was already informed, but he did bring up 
one example from the past year. “[T]hanks to careless comrades” from one district council 
(raisovet) the buildings of two churches that had been closed somehow “remained under the 
jurisdiction of churchmen,” a situation that made it possible for them to submit new petitions to 
reopen them for church activities. Elsewhere, district council employees had provided believers 
with the necessary certificate to reopen a church. Trushin was also frustrated that locals did not 
block the possibility of the churches reactivating by closing churches that were decaying or 
lacking a priest and not holding services.107 Local initiative in closing churches was lacking, and 
even some local officials acted diffidently at times. In 1962, churches were still being closed with 
regularity,108 and applications to open them were very few after 1959 as opposed to hundreds 
in most years of the 1950s. This was a sign to Trushin that the “’need’ has almost been 
eliminated.” One of the applications to open a church in a town west of Moscow, Pavlovskii 
Posad, had 208 signatures on it, but Trushin dismissed it by saying the names were “almost all 
written by one and the same hand.”109 Because of the state-sponsored ideological claims about 
the natural decline of religion, state agents did not readily suggest that good Soviet citizens—
other than old women, for whom an exception was made—would pursue an active religious life.  
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Commissioners like Trushin were caught in a dilemma – they had to support the 
assertion that religiosity was declining, while explaining its persistence. According to official 
tabulations in the Oblast, there were only 300,000 belonging to an Orthodox religious 
organization in 136 churches, and of these, some 800 were on the “leadership teams” [aktivy] of 
churches, the members of committees or those somehow particularly involved. Trushin felt that 
the “center of atheist work must focus mainly on this category,” but the fact that 80-90% of the 
active ones were women who were homemakers or retired meant that they did not have 
employers to pressure them.110 Officials did not devise strategies to deal with this gendered 
situation, and Trushin’s reports wavered between assurances that only old women participated 
to concerns for religion’s growing popularity among youth. At the holiday of the Baptism of 
Christ in 1960 one young woman was discovered disseminating some printed religious 
material.111 Officials also kept note of the participation of intelligentsia in the choirs. They had a 
mental hierarchy of people, with old retired women the least consequential. Evidently if youth, 
intellectuals, or workers became interested in religion, this was a very troubling prospect for 
state power, especially if some of “their own” were the ones propping up religious activity:  
We cannot put up with the fact that our cadres, having received education at 
the Government’s expense, cooperated ‘for pieces of silver’ [Judas reference] 
with popy [somewhat derogatory term for priests], with people whose ideology 
is alien to us. Aren’t these facts able to worry us, when many pensioners—in 
their own day awarded by orders and medals of the Soviet Union—participate in 
church choirs, in ‘dvadtsatki’, are active in church and receive for this from it the 
corresponding bribe, thereby selling their good past for ‘a mess of pottage’ [an 
idiom originally referring to Esau hungrily selling his birthright for Jacob’s lentil 
stew]. We, of course, in these situations would prefer to prohibit them, but isn’t 
it our duty, the duty of party, soviet, and other societal organizations to 
convince these people that they are doing not-good things, that by such 
behavior they degrade the Soviet people and contribute to the propaganda of 
an ideology hostile to communism[?]112  
 
Interestingly, Trushin and other state officials saw people as betraying “us,” the Soviet Union, 
when they supported the “alien” ideology of religion, even if their participation was for 
supposedly mercenary reasons, like singing in the choir for pay. But it was unlikely to be only for 
mercenary reasons that intellectuals or “good workers” went to church in the religiously 
antagonistic Soviet Union. 
                                                          
110 Ibid., 1961, Archive file <KGB 28>, p. 247. Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 5, Del. 30. 
111 Ibid., 1960, Archive file <KGB 27>, p. 6. Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 5, Del. 29. 
112 Ibid., 1960, Archive file <KGB 28>, p. 246-247. Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 5, Del. 
30. Trushin’s familiarity with religious idioms is striking in this passage. 
135 
 
Evidence which conflicted with the fundamentals of Soviet ideology did not typically 
lead to officials’ reassessment of their ideology. Trushin was perplexed, for example, to find that 
in the tiny village of Tatarintsevo southeast of Moscow, the church was made “active” by 
believers from the village of Ryblovo around seven kilometers away, despite the fact that the 
“material and cultural level” of Ryblovo was higher, boasting one of the most successful 
kolkhozes of the oblast. Associating religiosity with a lack of development, Trushin remarked 
that "It would seem the religiosity in Tatarintsevo should be higher. Yet in actuality the situation 
is the opposite.”113 He had no explanation for the conflict that evidence presented, as his 
working ideological framework did not suggest people could be interested in religion for reasons 
independent of their socio-economic reality. 
Trushin Further Defines the Limits to Acceptable Priestly Activity 
As was customary throughout the Soviet period, during the anti-religious campaign too 
state agents especially blamed priests for instances of revitalized religiosity. One official 
reported that Orthodox priests were bordering on being “Jesuits” by the “sneaky” ways in which 
they were getting extra income. Priests were working at making choirs more “active” and were 
continuing to draw people into them.114 Trushin unwittingly admitted that believers had agency, 
saying “The more effectively the priest executes his role, the more success he enjoys,” but he 
still laid the blame on priests. As an example, a certain young priest “performed the divine 
service well,” but then when he was replaced, the new one “satisfie[d] the parishioners less”: 
“They complain that he is old, small in stature, has a weak voice, i.e. he is not able to arrange 
such an effective show as his predecessor did. Parishioners started to visit church less, in 
connection with which, as a church warden informed officials, church income decreased.”115 
This “fact” led Trushin to conclude that young clergy were more active and better able to 
animate the people, and that this group was a cause of increased religiosity. This belief about 
younger priests was certainly connected to the state-driven closure of five seminaries. Trushin 
and other officials refused to acknowledge that parishioners had their own preferences or 
power as audiences.  
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In contrast to priests whom officials found religiously acceptable, “active” priests paid 
“special attention” to “preaching, fulfilling religious duties and conducting individual work with 
believers.” For state agents, to put extra energy into religion was to cross the line of 
acceptability. Trushin claimed that some such priests became “so enthralled with this work” that 
they “stepped over their own borders and violated soviet legislation.” Although we see here 
how Trushin admitted the existence of a line between acceptable and unacceptable religiosity, it 
is clear that “soviet legislation” existed as ready recourse any time priests got religiously 
“enthralled.” Indeed, Trushin bragged, “their actions were stopped in time” thanks to 
intervention by officials. As a result, five priests were stripped of their registration and an 
additional fifteen “trying to violate the legislation (while performing rites), were strictly 
warned.”116 
The content of sermons was one area in which priests might transgress the line of 
acceptable religiosity. Although Orthodox priests often preached from texts distributed by the 
hierarchy, Trushin reported that “some of them have more often begun to speak out with 
different sermons,” whose content was “not limited only to interpretations of so-called ‘holy 
writings’ and the gospels” but were “trying to address issues of morality, raising children, and so 
on.” One priest, Fadeev, was stripped of registration for these reasons. Fadeev was connecting 
the problem of “hooligan acts” of youth to “people forgetting god” and not “raising them in a 
religious spirit.” Priests were also “taking measures such that rites performed in the church 
(baptism, wedding, confession) [we]re accompanied by explanations of their ‘divine meaning.’” 
One village priest, way on the far east edge of Moscow Oblast reportedly “tried to address 
political questions” when the primary message of one of his sermons was that “all of life went 
‘according to the precepts of Christ, that Christ has long wanted an abundance of blessings for 
mankind.’” How was this priest political? Life was to go according to the “precepts of Lenin” – 
not Christ.117 The above examples ran contrary to the tame, private, ritualistic religion officials 
desired, as topics escaped the boundaries of abstract expansions on “holy” texts. 
If the above messages were posited as too oppositional, messages which too intimately 
framed religion and communism together were also discouraged, since the point was not a 
happy coexistence of the two in the future. Some priests were “attracting the attention and 
trust of believers” by “affirming their loyalty” to the Soviet state and even saying that “religion 
                                                          
116 Ibid., 42. 
117 Ibid., 42–43. 
137 
 
not only didn’t interfere with the building of communism, but the opposite – it helps it.” The 
problem with building a picture of compatibility was that then people were no longer deterred 
from attending; there were no ideological barriers.118 This is a contrast with the case in 
Romania, where a symbiosis of the Church and State was much more commonly accepted, even 
if official ideology did not harmonize materialist and religious worldviews. 
Addressing Problem Priests  
In open churches, priests still conducted the liturgy and delivered homilies, and people 
attended the services and took part in church rites. The cases of Mikhail Trukhanov and 
Aleksandr Men’ demonstrate that even during the anti-religious campaign, remote rural 
parishes and churches in central Moscow nevertheless afforded opportunities for religious 
“activation,” as officials put it, but that such activity quickly brought such priests under negative 
scrutiny from church and state representatives. 
The Case of Fr Trukhanov 
The church of Besevo in Moscow Oblast needed a new priest in 1960, and Mikhail 
Trukhanov was appointed as its rector. The outgoing rector told Trukhanov that "it's a village 
church, there is no congregation, people don't go. So somehow to have contact with people, 
you sometimes need both to drink, but maybe, to smoke with them too. Then somehow a 
conversation ties in, and I could say a little something then about faith or the Christian life." 
Trukhanov did not take this advice. After Trukhanov had been priest for a half year, his church—
to the visiting former Rector’s surprise—was "almost full of people."  
Trukhanov animated religious life in Besevo, mainly by his fervor. He emphasized that all 
read the gospels and learn certain prayers. One woman recalls that his way of praying, 
conducting of services, and delivering sermons at every service “drew parishioners to him from 
nearby areas.” When believers of the nearby towns of Kashira, Stupin, and Ozyory heard from 
one another “that in the village of Besevo an unusual priest is serving,” many came from there 
too. Several people became his spiritual children at this time.119 
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In August of 1962, Fr. Mikhail was called upon to serve in the church of All Saints in 
Moscow because three of its priests were either on sick-leave or holiday. He did there what he 
did in Besevo, preaching at the service whether it was a morning, evening, or weekday service. 
He tried to make his sermons full of “unpretentious explanations.” He did not strive for 
something “special,” but “just wanted the people to have at least something they 
comprehended.” Perhaps for this reason even young people started attending or requesting 
time to meet with him.120 V.A. Zvonkova was in her twenties and sang in the choir of All Saints in 
the early 1960s. At that time, she recalls, "mainly older people" went to church. When 
Trukhanov appeared at All Saints, coincidentally during the height of the anti-religious 
campaign, she noticed that he “served zealously” and that “youth came to him.” People would 
go to him or call him with requests for prayer for personal or health matters. They would go to 
his house for important spiritual discussions and decisions.121 
Predictably, this "rubbed the commissioner for religious affairs the wrong way." He 
likely directed the Rector and the Dean to “reprimand” Trukhanov for the fact that his preaching 
was “attracting young people.” Trukhanov’s impression was that it was “criminal” to attract 
youth at this time,122 and in fact although it was illegal to try to attract youth under eighteen, 
state agents considered attracting even young people over eighteen unacceptable, as good as 
illegal. Nobody questioned why youth might be attracted to good preaching, only that attractive 
preaching should simply not be available.  
But the commissioner was not the only one upset by Trukhanov; it appears jealousy also 
played a role among his fellow clergy. One believer had rather liked the Rector of All Saints, 
recalling how “he was quite beautiful in appearance, had long hair, which in those days was a 
rarity; second, he was a good singer, frequently sang solo with the choir […], served beautifully 
and gave a sermon. Everything about him was good.” But when the Rector and others were on 
leave and Fr. Mikhail came in to serve, this believer liked that Trukhanov invited people to linger 
as he explained aspects of the service to them and simply talked with them. As the days passed, 
word spread, and more people came, and "by the end of his three-month service in this church, 
people started to come on weekdays as for the great feast days." The chapel was full, and, as 
one believer recalls, "you kept hearing, 'And when will the father serve next?'"123 
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Then, the rector returned from holiday. The Sunday evening service was full—not a 
normal occurrence. The service ended, but the people did not disperse immediately (also 
unusual), but stood there as though waiting for something. When the rector passed through, 
most got out of his way, and only a few stayed in his path to request a blessing from him. And 
still the people stayed. Fr. Mikhail was very long in coming out, probably hoping to avoid an 
uncomfortable scene, but eventually, as the people were clearly waiting for him, he did come 
out, only to have the people throng to him for a blessing. Zvonkova felt at that moment that it 
was like “a betrayal on the part of the worshipers,” and that the Rector “could not endure” it. 
Already Monday the Rector had called with a denunciation of Trukhanov, saying that he 
was “’rowdy, serves in a drunken state, distorts the Canon'” and so on.124 The latter was called 
in to the Patriarch's office, and Bishop Kiprian (Zernov) "pounced" on him:  
You failed in the priesthood! You can't even do the service, but you aspire to 
preaching! You don't even have one class of seminary! [...] And then you 
still permit such an impudence that you even distort the Eucharistic Canon 
during the service! [...] You're always drunk! There's not a single day, as they 
write me, not a single day that you were sober! You incite fights at the altar! 
You scandalize!  
It was true that he had not yet completed his theological training, but in the Orthodox Church, it 
was possible to be ordained as a priest or deacon prior to theological training.  
The Bishop admitted that he received the accusations from the Rector and Dean, with 
the signature of the warden, showing the collusion of the church leaders against him. The 
Bishop was displeased that Trukhanov made an enemy of the Rector, and Trukhanov tried to 
argue that he merely tried to “speak from the soul […] to the souls of the listeners,” and the 
people “feel” this and become “attracted” to him, leading the Rector to feel “envy and hatred.” 
The bishop scoffed at the idea that people could love him “after two-and-a-half months of 
service,” calling it instead “satanic charm,” “putative fervor, pharisaical performance of fasts” 
and overly dramatic “deep bows.” The Bishop faulted him for wanting to be “unlike other 
priests,” as this was evidence of “satanic pride.” He also heard from the rector that Trukhanov 
was adding “some kind of prayers,” but tweaking the liturgy was prohibited, warranting 
"investigation." The Bishop said that by "allowing himself all kinds of liberties," Trukhanov 
proved that he did "not know how to serve."125 Here, the Bishop signaled that a good clergyman 
was first and foremost concerned with conformity, not serving any particular desires of the 
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parishioners. Yet Bishops indeed needed to ensure that priests were not distorting Orthodox 
beliefs and practices. 
Despite having served at All Saints and Besevo alone, the Bishop noted to him that 
"Everywhere you serve you make scandals with your colleagues."126 Without a doubt informers 
were relaying some of the details of Trukhanov’s service, and leaders had to explain his 
popularity as resulting from dubious activity on his part, not on the coincidence of a priest and a 
congregation wanting the same things. At All Saints, the Rector insisted Trukhanov no longer set 
foot in his church. He likely did not want Trukhanov’s admirers asking about him any longer. 
Some of Trukhanov’s supporters tried to advocate on his behalf and clear up the accusations. A 
few believers tried to get an audience with Archbishop Kiprian (Zernov) to explain that 
Trukhanov's removal from All Saints was because "he was unfairly slandered." The bishop’s 
secretary would not admit them (instead they were kept waiting in a dark room until long after 
reception hours ended), and then warned them not to come back, “otherwise it would be 
bad.”127  
But just as Trukhanov’s downfall had come from above, surprisingly, so did his 
redemption. At the end of the year as Patriarch Aleksii was reviewing the situation of the 
priests, he investigated the curious situation of Trukhanov, found he had been unjustly 
slandered, interviewed him, and offered him a position under the Patriarch.128 By March of 
1963, Trukhanov had received an appointment in the church of Transfiguration in Peredelkino. 
His relationship with his colleagues there was better, and the Patriarch gave him his blessing to 
get theological education, and the Rector of Peredelkino wrote his character recommendation 
for him.129 Although Trukhanov's popularity led to church and state authorities’ demanding his 
removal from All Saints, he gained life-long spiritual children during those three months and was 
saved by the lack of unanimity in the Church leadership. But as we will discover in Chapter VI, 
state agents now identified Trukhanov as a suspect priest, and they would continue to try to 
rein in his religious zeal and ability to animate believers. 
The Case of Aleksandr Men’ 
At the time of the anti-religion campaign, young Aleksandr Men’ had just finished his 
degree at the Agricultural Institute in Irkutsk, but he was keen to pursue a career in the Church. 
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He served as a deacon for a priest he knew and began to study at the seminary. Two years later, 
he was ordained as a priest, and in September of 1960 he became priest in Alabino and was 
named rector there a year later. The parish there was in bad shape, as previous priests had lost 
believers’ trust due to alcoholism and other scandals.130 He served under a new Rector, who 
soon after transferred to another parish, and then so did the successive Rector. Men’ became 
Rector in 1961, age 26.  
Men’ worked toward the restoration of the parish, physically and morally. Assisted 
greatly by the efforts of his assistant priest, the warden, and other volunteers, he organized the 
restoration of the church, painting of icons, and new ornamentations of the church façade. The 
work was made possible by the fact that state agents did not take the parish car away, and two 
drivers from the parish were often aiding Men’ in the efforts of restoration. Despite the closing 
of churches under Khrushchev, news of the “excellent” restoration of the Alabino church made 
the local paper.131  
In addition to appreciating the quality of his services, believers stayed after Vespers on 
Saturday evenings as Men’ would explain the faith, its symbols and meanings. People would 
come from neighboring villages and summer dachas, since it was the only church open for 
several villages, but people even drove out from the relatively distant city of Naro-Fominsk. 
Men’ also managed to attract young people to the faith in such a way that they began to 
become more active in the Church.  
Men’ reportedly had good relations with the local authorities in his district. In addition 
to continued permission for use of a parish car, he received approval to conduct memorial 
services outside of the church in cemeteries, supposedly forbidden in the Soviet Union, and he 
used these as opportunities to preach or explain the faith. When the commissioner questioned 
him about this activity, he had a stack of some 200 authorizations from the local executive 
committee for each service. He even helped local authorities with “economic issues” 
[khoziaistvennye voprosy], something for which they appreciated him.132 By just having a drink 
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with a policeman, for example, he found they could "simply and easily" talk and come to an 
agreement.133 
He did his work deliberately, aware of the “particularities” of his society—namely that 
religion had at best only a begrudged place, subject to antagonism from many directions. 
Influenced by Mechev and the Mechevites (see Chapter II on Pestov and Sokolova), he too 
wanted “from the very beginning” to adopt this way, which Men’ says was characterized by 
“openness to the world and its problems.” Thus, he endeavored in Alabino and thereafter to 
“break the ice” with parishioners in his sermons, to find “new language” that would connect to 
“issues that concerned people of today.”134 Men’ used the gatherings at church services as 
opportunities for people to notice one another. He wanted to “unite the parish, to make from it 
a community, and not a random compound of people […].” He also encouraged the flock to 
“help one another, pray together, study Scripture together, partake of communion together.”135 
As rector, Men’ impressed this upon the priest under him, Sergei Khokhlov, encouraging him to 
give sermons and talk with the people.136 
But as the decisions from the 1961 Council of Bishops to limit priests’ power in the 
parish in favor of the laity became clear to Men’ and several other young friends and priests, 
they were outraged. They felt they could not trust the bishops any longer as their spiritual 
guides.137 Men' had been meeting regularly with other figures featured in this study, including 
priests Dimitrii Dudko, Nikolai Eshliman, Gleb Yakunin, essayist Anatolii Levitin-Krasnov, and 
others to discuss the state of Church. They kept coming back to the Sobor of 1961, "the 
connivance of the bishops," and that their superiors had put power in the hands of the warden 
as a fairly direct way for state bodies to manage church affairs. They perceived that at the 
whims of the raispolkom or Council for Religious Affairs, state representatives could dictate their 
wishes, forcing the warden to find a suitable excuse for anti-church actions.138 They contacted 
Archbishop Ermogen of Kaluga, whom they witnessed dissenting from the decisions, to be 
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“their” bishop, and he visited Alabino and “warmly” met with them and listened to the priests’ 
concerns.139 
Men’s trust of the Patriarchate was further shaken after he published a theological 
article in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. The response of the Patriarchate to his article 
was that “we petty theologians” should “hold firmly to the patristic interpretation” and not 
engage in any “imitation” of the “rationalists-protestants.” In essence, the reply suggested that 
although his interpretation of the passage may have been correct, it was better that all things 
demonstrate an unwavering consistency with the Tradition of Orthodoxy, even if Men’s 
message might have been intended to edify believers. 
Although it is unclear whether this journal article or the priestly meetings influenced 
Trushin’s demand that Men’ leave his parish, he reported that he found the religiosity of Men’ 
and his activated parish unacceptable in 1964. He identified Men’s parish among a few that 
clashed with CROCA’s goal of “strengthening control of observance of religious legislation.” In 
other words, the Council’s goal was not strengthening control of religions, but adherence to the 
law. In Men’s parish the Council “uncovered broad charity work,” where the church “was being 
used like a ‘feeding trough’” for the warden, the treasurer, the chauffeur, priest Aleksandr Men’, 
and a “few others.” Apparently the warden and one other parishioner admitted that they used 
the church “for selfish and acquisitive goals,” and they were warned about the “violations of 
soviet legislation.” Trushin stripped the executive organ and renovation committee of 
registration.140 Men’s home was also searched by police, and he was temporarily accused of 
stealing certain historical valuables, but this problem eventually disappeared. 
Trushin demanded that Men’ quit Alabino, and the warden there was also removed. 
Men’ found an opening in Taraskovo, and signed a contract to go there. With Men’ gone and the 
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warden removed, the religious effervescence came to an end in Alabino.141 And never again 
would Men’ have as favorable of conditions in which to conduct his work as he did in Alabino 
during the anti-religious campaign, as will be revealed later;142 his unacceptable religiosity had 
made him a marked priest. 
Anti-religious pressure eases 
Although pressure on problematic priests persisted, the centrally-directed anti-religious 
campaign subsided somewhat in 1963. On March 25, 1963, CROCA head Kuroedov, sent a letter 
to commissioners about “gross violations” by local authorities and certain commissioners in 
carrying out the resolution passed by the Ministers on March 16, 1961. He attacked them for 
not “considering the presence of believers” and “arbitrarily closing churches and prayer houses” 
during their “fight with religious prejudices.” He claimed that many closures were accomplished 
“on the pretext” that certain communities had stopped their activities, or that the dvadtsatki or 
executive committees disbanded or resigned, when this was not the case. He then offered some 
negative examples, even naming commissioners.143 Kuroedov was not afraid to throw his own 
team under the bus when the orders came from above to change policies. 
Of course he defended his leadership and the Council’s respect for religious freedom, 
noting that “more than once” the Council told them that the “closing churches and prayer 
houses should only be, first of all, as a result of major educational work with believers along 
with separating them from religion and the church.” The “duty of a commissioner” was to 
ensure “no infringement of freedom of conscience, that insulting the feelings of believers is not 
allowed, that stripping registration from religious societies is carried out in exact accordance 
with instructions on the application of the soviet legislation on cults.” His ministry was 
“stressing” that the “here and there” closing of churches “is nothing but a perversion of the 
politics of our party and of the Soviet Government on relations to religion and the church and 
greatly harms the issue of communist education of laborers.” Using the schism that was forming 
among the Evangelical Christians-Baptists as a warning, Kuroedov reminded his commissioners 
that “any incidence of arbitrariness and of administration on relations to the church which 
insults the feelings of believers are used by churchmen for igniting religious fanaticism, the 
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mobilization of believers, and the strengthening of their own influence on the backward part of 
the population.” He reminded them that only when the believers stop going to the church and 
supporting it materially are they allowed to cease granting it registration. If the building must be 
taken for reasons of city reconstruction, then believers must be provided another place “in 
actuality, and not fictitiously.”144 Evidently, top officials were taking more seriously the 
drawbacks of state authorities not complying with existing legislation, particularly in terms of 
the state’s domestic and international reputation. Tighter controls were not only not having the 
effect of reducing religious fervor as top officials desired, but leading to aggressive responses by 
believers. 
Trushin was not among those specifically named in this un-reflexive critique of 
Kuroedov’s. The latter did not blame state antagonistic discourse for zealous acts by local 
authorities, nor did he take responsibility for unclear instructions or vague references to 
published laws, a scenario that could only guarantee battles. Rather, Kuroedov’s letter was an 
example of directing by shaming those under authority. Perhaps duly cautious, Trushin had not 
caused any widespread backlash by citizens in his closure of Orthodox Churches. But in the 
Orthodox Church, backlash from disagreeing clergy was yet to come (as successive chapters will 
reveal), and it would be directed primarily against the leadership of the Church and later the 
State, just as it was in the Evangelical-Baptist Church. Although overly zealous representatives of 
the government (whether commissioners or members of local executive committees) 
contributed to plenty of localized complaining and petitioning, by far the greatest unwanted 
spillover in the Orthodox Church was generated by the complicity of church representatives in 
deliberately limiting existing religious freedoms, as will be demonstrated later. 
These utterances of Kuroedov’s probably also aimed at lessening the major debacle 
caused in the ECB Church. In September 1963, the AUCECB was suddenly permitted a congress 
(the only previous one permitted was the first, in 1944) with some 250 delegates representing 
the non-dissenting faction (most reformist leaders were in prison already), and the 1960 
changes were relegated to “proposals,” with new statutes no longer conforming to the law of 
1929 and reflecting many of the demands of the initsiativniki, but never referencing them.145 
Bourdeaux argues that the "many concessions" show the "extreme pressure" that reformists 
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exerted.146 This, evidently, was a strategy permitted with state backing to try to keep as many 
churches above-ground and registered as possible by conforming to most evangelicals’ wishes. 
Despite this move, the Orgkomitet—not invited to the congress—was not appeased by this 
implicit admission of guilt but still considered the congress invalid, since its representatives 
could not have a chance to deliver their statements.147 For Reformists, AUCECB leaders would 
apparently not only need to imply that they were wrong, but to give the Reformists a voice in 
the denomination as well.  
 As for ordinary believers who were sympathetic to the claims of the Reformists, it 
would take time for them to trust the AUCECB again. Its leaders noted after the Congress in its 
publication, the Bratskii Vestnik (Fraternal Herald), that such a Congress represented "'a balm of 
consolation and peace for our churches, for there are no further reasons for arguments and 
mutual recriminations,'" and they also sent out a "fraternal letter" and promised to help 
churches register. Then, leaders traveled to visit churches, even in Siberia. Holdouts were cast as 
disappointments for obstructing a path to reunification. Still, officials did not yet allow ECB 
communities to register new churches, offering little with which AUCECB leaders could entice 
breakaway communities.148 Plus, state agents decided to get stricter with groups who did not 
accept the AUCECB after the 1963 changes, since the amendments were supposed to appease 
the criticisms. When ECB churches continued to distrust the AUCECB’s leadership or criticize it, 
there was no grace period for them.149  
Imprisonments for leaders of renegade ECB churches continued in 1964. And, still in 
1964, an article appeared in Kommunist by Leonid Il’ichev, one of Khrushchev's chief ideologists, 
who wrote that no "rapprochement" between Christianity and Communism was possible, and 
he complained about the privileges granted during WWII, ones which were essentially illegal.150 
Another wave of anti-religious action was still possible in such a climate, but Khrushchev’s 
removal in favor of Leonid Brezhnev meant a change in emphasis was likely. The anti-religious 
campaign had become another debacle that likely contributed to Khrushchev’s demise in the 
eyes of other top officials. 
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Conclusion 
As historian Mikhail V. Shkarovskii points out, the 13,400 churches, 12,000 priests, and 
56 monasteries in 1958 were down to 7,500, 7,400 priests, and 19, respectively. But, Shkarovskii 
writes, “the populace was more religious than ever.”151 When Khrushchev aimed to limit 
religion, he did so in response to a society that had an increasing number of people interested 
or active in religion since before the war. Yet at the same time, he also wished to maintain a 
certain domestic and international reputation that depended on how state agents treated 
ordinary religious citizens. State agents claimed to protect freedom of religious conscience, but 
they had to try to maintain a façade of such while attacking communally dynamic religiosity. 
They did so largely by targeting specific priests or active believers as violating the law that was 
couched as existing to protect the freedoms of the people. In short, they tried to isolate them 
and make them the “others” in a society that otherwise practiced religion quite acceptably: 
individualistically, privately, ritualistically, or traditionally, and always in submission to the 
established authorities—in this case, church hierarchs supported by state officials. As before, 
officials did not express the concern that even such “acceptable” religion could provide powerful 
means for people to find alternative identities, belonging, or ideologies.  
Khrushchev and others who advocated aggressive anti-religious policies did not 
anticipate the force of the reactions from certain religionists. In the ECB Churches, the 
declarations of the AUCECB leadership brought about an embarrassing and worse situation than 
before Khrushchev’s attacks, as now he unwittingly created a large clandestine ECB Church 
animated by the most religiously zealous and using underground techniques. Clandestine and 
unregistered church services were problems that Brezhnev would have to address directly. 
Negative reactions within the Orthodox Church to its leaders’ agenda further limiting priests’ 
scope of activity were muted at first, but younger, more idealistic priests would find their voice 
increasingly after Khrushchev once it became evident that nothing was changing under 
Brezhnev.  
The anti-religion campaign had made obvious certain unresolved tensions in Soviet 
society and the churches. From the state side, the campaign illuminated the tension of state-
sponsored atheism and the incompatibility of religion with communism alongside a state 
authority dependent on having a contented populace, something that required a degree of 
normalization of religious practice. From the church side, the campaign exposed the spectrum of 
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opinion churchmen and churchwomen had regarding the best way of responding to the state’s 
anti-church measures. 
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V. Romania and the Establishment of Religious Reliability, 1956 – 1964 
Since the state agents’ initial attempts to ensure the reliability of religious personnel 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s, state dealings with the religions were more focused on 
normalization. But the furor in Poland and Hungary in particular in 1956 caused Romanian 
officials to reconsider their level of trust of participants in religious-based associations.  
The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and State Crackdown on Associational Life 
On October 23, 1956, a group of students demonstrating in Budapest sparked a revolt 
against the communist authorities, causing a collapse of the communist government in Hungary. 
They made many demands, including the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact that 
kept it firmly within the sphere of Soviet influence. When it seemed that the revolution just 
might be successful, a formidable Soviet force, including tanks, crossed into Hungary and fought 
to retake control, which it did by November 10. Many died fighting; others were subsequently 
tried and executed. 
There were many sympathizers with the revolutionaries among the Hungarian minority 
in Transylvania. While some may have seen the struggle as one featuring Hungarians for a free 
Hungary against Soviet-backed stooges, other Hungarians in Romania were simply concerned for 
the situation due to having relatives or acquaintances in Hungary. Romanian officials were 
monitoring the situation, and they kept sensitive ears toward the Hungarians living in Romania. 
There were a few public acts and demonstrations of sympathy, but more commonly, people 
privately listened to foreign broadcasts and discussed the situation among themselves. Some 
groups, more or less formal, had been occupied with “the Transylvanian question” (the problem 
of Hungarian minorities and the desire to re-join Hungary), so the events in Hungary and the 
possibility of a freer society only heightened the importance of this issue for them. Some 
students in Cluj even demonstrated in solidarity with the rebels in Hungary. To preempt further 
acts or even displays of disloyalty, Romanian officials brought to trial as many of those who 
 
 
150 
 
made public utterances or demonstrations in favor of the revolutionaries in Hungary as they 
could.1 
But arrests, trials, and imprisonments were not limited to public displays of solidarity 
with Hungary. In fact, just a lack of outward displays of loyalty toward the Romanian communist 
regime became grounds for suspicion, and Ministry of Religion representatives had been 
keeping track of less-than-reliable elements within the churches as well. Two Hungarian officials 
from the Department of Religions in Târgu Mureş wrote a special report to Bucharest dated 10 
December 1956 about the responses by members of the Reformed, Roman Catholic, and 
(former) Greek-Catholic churches to the events in Hungary. As for the latter two, they did not 
have much to report of concern, but the officials found strong evidence of disloyalty in the 
Reformed Church.  
Describing the events in Hungary as perpetrated by the imperialists who were not afraid 
of World War Three and who wanted to “subjugate the population,” the officials contended that 
people from their district, the Autonomous Hungarian Region, did not publicly express support 
on the street, but “quietly they were in agreement” with the goings-on there, and “this 
solidarity” was witnessed most prominently “along church lines.” Certain pastors prayed for the 
victims there, for example. But the problem of such misguided solidarity could be traced even 
earlier, they wrote, as visits by current and former Bishops from Hungary elicited certain 
unsavory opinions from the Reformed clergy and leadership in Romania. When the Hungarian 
Bishop Berecki visited some local church representatives in Romania, some of them privately 
“condemned” the bishops of Hungary, criticizing them as having “sold the church to the 
communists.” Also, a letter signed by pre-communist Bishop in Hungary László Ravasz circulated. 
In it, he supposedly called for “the intensification of actions of faith, and to hurry the 
resurrection of bethanism and called to action all priests, being that the most opportune time 
                                                          
 
1 Gyula Dávid, ed., 1956 Erdélyben: politikai elítéltek életrajzi adattára, 1956-1965 [1956 in Transylvania: a 
Biographical Database of Political Prisoners, 1956-1965] (Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyesület Polis, 
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151 
 
had arrived.” Two Reformed Deans in Romania were also overheard praising Ravasz while 
condemning current Bishops’ pandering to the communist government in Hungary.2 
It was in this “atmosphere,” officials wrote, that the Cluj Bishopric of the Reformed 
Church convened a general assembly. Those attending the conference “did not come out openly 
[and discuss] the problems with regard to the events in Hungary, but in the corridor the 
problems were discussed in an intense and open way.” Moreover, the conference “created a 
psychological atmosphere” when “they held a church service of mourning” for the victims of the 
events in Hungary. The inspector also noticed that at a recent inter-confessional conference the 
Reformed clergy and dean did “not even say a word” and “not even half of the reformed clergy 
were present.” The dean who organized the conference did not prepare anything specific and 
only read a declaration made by professors at the seminary pertaining to these events. These 
“facts” made it clear that “with this attitude they do not serve the population but the enemies 
of the construction of socialism.”3 Clergy were supposed to make obvious their loyalties by 
defaming those engaged in “counter-revolutionary” activities in Budapest as enemies. 
Based on this report, the Ministry of Religions in Bucharest wrote their own report, 
summarizing the situation. They expressed concern for some dubious utterances by Reformed 
Bishop Vásárhelyi, in addition to conveying the findings of the local inspectors from Târgu 
Mureş. “In conclusion,” they wrote, “from the few manifestations which were able to be 
collected, it becomes clear that the Hungarian Reformed clergy is dominated by a reactionary 
and chauvinist sentiment. This obliges the organs of the Ministry of Religions to a particular 
attention and vigilance pertaining to further training in a much greater measure of these priests 
toward action in supporting our regime of popular democracy.”4 The Ministry saw it as less of a 
religious problem, than one of political allegiances, and members of the Hungarian Reformed 
Church displayed their disloyalties by their ethnic “chauvinism.” 
                                                          
 
2 Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Fond “Minsterul Cultelor şi Artelor – Direcţia Studii (1945-1963)," Dos. 
87, 1956, 3–4. 
3 Ibid., 4–5. 
4 Ibid., 15–16. 
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Instead of seeing the uprising in Budapest as violence perpetrated by “imperialists” 
against the legitimate government in Hungary in an attempt to “subjugate” the population, as 
was the party line, agents from the Ministry of Religions perceived that too many clergy reacted 
sympathetically with the failed rebels in Hungary. That a sizeable sector of the Reformed Church 
were ambivalent in their loyalties worried the authorities, since an uprising in Romania might 
find sympathy or even active support from within the ranks of the Reformed Church. Thus soon 
after the failed revolution of 1956 in Hungary, the state preemptively moved against any 
potentially disloyal elements within the Hungarian community, many of whom were members 
of the Reformed Church. There were around 60 separate trials of groups of people, all arrested 
and found guilty of some sort of crime, with the number of those sentenced beyond 1,200.5 
 The “Bethanist” pastors and believers might have continued their pseudo-clandestine 
gatherings, but the events of 1956 led to new threats. It was not a good time to be a Hungarian 
nor an intellectual, and it certainly was not good to participate in a pseudo-clandestine 
organization or network, even if the meetings had no political agenda. Although threats and 
pressures were present since 1948, these pastors had not been categorically imprisoned in the 
earliest waves that swept up Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, and Catholic leadership, priests, and 
laity who were regarded as threatening communist power.  
                                                          
 
5 Dávid, 1956 Erdélyben; Ferenc Gazda, Elrabolt Esztendők: 1956-1964 [Stolen Years: 1956-1964] 
(Kolozsvár: Polis, 2006); Zoltán Tófalvi, 1956 Erdélyi Mártírjai [The 1956 Transylvanian Martyrs] 
(Marosvásárhely: Mentor, 2009); Dezső Buzogány and Csongor Jánosi, A Református Egyház Romániában 
a Kommunista Rendszer Első Felében: Tanulmányok és Dokumentumok [The Reformed Church in Romania 
in the First Half of the Communist Regime: Essays and Documents] (Budapest: L’Harmattan Kiadó, 2011). 
As a not atypical example, Dezső László, who was Dean in Kolozsvár (Cluj) and had been jailed for two 
years previously for unspecified reasons, was rearrested in 1957. This time, he was arrested and 
sentenced as part of the Dobai group (an association of people linked to István Dobai, a lawyer who 
concerned himself with the “problem” of Hungarians living in Transylvania), as some letter was found in 
his possession connected to the others. The prosecution did not manage to produce witnesses, and even 
though the prosecution asked to give him 25 years, he got five. He was released after three years when 
advocates on his behalf managed to get his previous two-year time counted into his five. This time, when 
released, he was deprived of work and not allowed to preach. He was temporarily given a job at the 
church archive, and was only allowed to preach in 1963. See Miklós, 135. He was one of many pastors 
who were jailed for their connections with other intellectuals or who made public displays of solidarity 
with the 1956ers in Budapest. 
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By the spring of 1957, the rhetoric of their church leaders and arrests of Hungarians 
caused these renewalist pastors to recognize that state agents were charting a new course. 
Church leaders now forbade pastors from visiting families, having Bible studies, or providing 
religious education beyond strictly prescribed catechism. Thus only by word of mouth could 
clandestine gatherings become known. Despite secrecy, the gatherings were still popular and 
even attractive to those who felt like they offered something that the generically acceptable 
religious practice did not. Even a non-believer like lawyer Kálmán Széplaki was attracted to the 
authenticity and intimacy of such gatherings that could not happen in church.6 Széplaki was 
soon arrested and imprisoned for some private writings of his, but later in prison he 
encountered these “Bethanists” again and continued his questioning with them.  
With “sometimes one hundred or even several hundred” of those interested in revival 
from the Reformed Church gathering for baptisms, weddings, or name days during the months 
following the revolutionary attempt in Hungary, a religious affairs inspector warned one of the 
“Bethanist” pastors: “If you don’t realize that this is not advisable now, we will give the matter 
to internal affairs and they’ll take care of you.”7 One of the deans of the Church, Sándor Fekete, 
wrote articles which applied such epithets to the CE-Bethanist movement as “anti-state, anti-
peace, anti-culture, against the people, its members are reactionary, counter-revolutionaries 
betraying the sacred cause of socialism.”8 Since the church’s prohibition and criticism of such 
extra-curricular church activities was still not being heeded, toward the end of 1957 and 
beginning of 1958, the "church leaders wanted to get the bethanist pastors to see reason," 
urging them for "personal, family, as well as church interests" that they discontinue their 
meetings, and – remarks Visky sardonically – “express thanks” for the "complete freedom of 
                                                          
 
6 Kálmán Széplaki, A Gáncs Nélküli Lovag [The Knight without Blemish] (Kolozsvár [Cluj-Napoca, Romania]: 
Koinónia, 2012), 32–33, 49. Széplaki did not consider himself a believer but was experiencing something 
of an existential crisis that year. He felt he “needed to speak with someone who had a genuine faith” and 
to “experience what a genuine state of belief [hívőseg] means, and how it’s possible to live in this 
world.”His sister-in-law, who knew of his desire, happened to live with a certain Aunt Ilonka “from the 
Bethanist circle” and at whose home this group sometimes met, and she encouraged Széplaki to talk to 
Sándor Szilágyi, who was still traveling around for these gatherings of believers. 
7 Ferenc Visky, ed., Bilincseket És Börtönt Is: Dokumentum-Kötet [Chains and Even Prison: Document-
Collection] (Marosvásárhely: Kóinónia, 1996), 110–11. 
8 Ibid., 213. 
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religion" ensured by the state. Their reply to their fellow churchmen, however, was equally 
determined: spreading the gospel was "their work", and part of this work included children, 
youth, prayer and Bible times, and concern for spiritual welfare.9 State pressures brought to 
light the Reformed Church’s internal struggle over the definition of what it meant to practice the 
faith. 
Farmer and “Bethanist” Antal Papp had also been warned. The party secretary once said 
to him: "Uncle Anti, don't argue with us, for you'll see, they'll pin you as wanting to sabotage.” 
Papp had not been respecting the proper—and now more aggressively enforced—boundaries 
for religiosity, so the inspector outlined them for him: “‘You can do what you want at home; it 
doesn't worry us how many are going to your house for bible study because we know that 
you're not our enemy. But these people [other officials] don't know that. Nor do they know that 
in Bucharest, and believe me [...] they will break your neck.’” But Papp remained firm in his 
convictions.10 Even though Papp and the local inspector respected each other and had an 
acceptable working relationship, the inspector knew that those who were rounding up 
potentially disloyal Hungarians would not value Papp’s agricultural contributions as a successful 
and respected head of the village collective. Papp had publicly identified himself on the wrong 
side of religious acceptability, and state representatives saw it as a provocation. 
The warnings were not empty. After church and local Party authorities had done their 
part to warn the “Bethanists,” in the fall of 1958 the secret service gathered up those whom 
they could broad-stroke as guilty, even arresting some who only had weak ties to the CE Society. 
On May 26, 1958, in Oradea, Sergeant Vasile Stănculescu ordered a criminal suit to begin against 
a “forbidden sect,” in which reformed clergy participate and “stir up the inhabitants against the 
people’s democratic system and carry out anticommunist propaganda. [ . . . ] they arouse the 
dissatisfaction of the inhabitants with regard to the law [ . . . ]. This subversive organization, 
                                                          
 
9 Ibid., 13. 
10 Ferenc Visky, Anti (Kolozsvár: Koinónia, 2005), 55–56. “Resolved, Anti replied: ‘You, Feri, are you a 
communist?’  He answered, ‘I am, and I was when it was illegal too.’ ‘What’s your opinion,’ I ask him, 
since he said that I should pray but not be active, ‘if you’re a communist, what’s your opinion about the 
communist who’s not active?’  ‘That’s not a communist.’  ‘Na, I’ll have you know that the Christian who 
does not dare bear witness to his Lord is not a Christian’.” 
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under the mask of mysticism, recruits new cells, and the organization spreads with the 
emergence of new groups.”11 Stănculescu had found the words he needed to frame the 
“Bethanists” as political dangers. Their religiosity was supposedly merely a guise for 
conspiratorial political activity. Visky and Karczagi were interrogated the next day, and Papp a 
few days later. Others were questioned over the succeeding weeks and months. 
The state did not encounter church opposition to their arrest of the “Bethanists,” who 
had no advocates beyond their families and one another. While they were being held in prison 
and being interrogated, their fellow churchmen discussed them during their regular pastoral 
conferences. Shortly after their arrest in June, in Visky’s region of Oradea, there were three 
pastoral conferences. At the first, on June 11, the main theological topic was “the history of 
Pietism and its role in the life of the denomination,” a clear jab at the current pietistic 
movement, “Bethanism.” After the reading of the topic, certain colleagues “began to talk about 
the pastor Ferenc Visky,” but some colleagues defended him, saying “we shouldn’t speak about 
a man who isn’t in front of us, seeing as how it’s not nice.” Another pastor in turn “combated 
bethanism,” but then another followed who “sympathized,” saying that “believers should be 
attached as much as possible to the church.” Bishop Arday was present at this meeting, and he 
felt it time to speak up. He had worked with Visky as fellow pastors in Salonta. He brought up 
the fact that “he had many times called the pastors’ and pastor Visky’s attention to [his] having 
received complaints from many ranks of [state] organs, and he had called on him many times to 
make a turn in his church work but he did not conform and now he bears the consequences.” He 
suggested that all present “do their duty honestly because then nothing will happen.”12 At a 
neighboring conference, after the opening Bible study, during their discussion of “historical 
problems of the Reformed Church,” a group of priests joined by Dean Kornel Szablyár “in turn 
condemned bethanism,” after which they moved on to discuss “atomic energy in the service of 
peace.”13 At the other nearby conference they discussed “the problem of bethanism as a tool of 
                                                          
 
11 Buzogány and Jánosi, A Református Egyház Romániában, 113. 
12 Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Fond “Minsterul Cultelor şi Artelor – Direcţia Studii (1945-1963), Dos. 
47bis, 1958, 8. Italics mine. 
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division within the denomination.” The Dean, Adalbert Fodor, “pointed out that bethanism is a 
stage of passing from the denomination to a sectarian movement.” Those there apparently “all 
condemned bethanism and a type of decision was made that they will work for unity within the 
denomination.”14  
The usual conference of Reformed ministers in the Arad area, where “Bethanists” 
Szilágyi, Karczagi, and Dézsi were from, was held on September 23, 1958, and here too the topic 
was “pietism” in the Reformed Church. These pastors were missing this time, on account of their 
recent arrest. An inspector from the Dept. of Religions observed that the conference was well-
organized, there were no “negative manifestations and attitudes,” and thus there was not cause 
for him to speak. Yet he wrote that the “mood” was a bit off: the attending clergy “were very 
surprised at the conviction which the three bethanist priests belonging to the deanery of Arad 
received, showing compassion especially toward the families.”15 Even if they were not to show 
sympathy for such “pietistic” movements as “bethanism,” it was hard for these fellow priests to 
rejoice in the sufferings brought upon their colleagues and their families. 
Many ordinary pastors did not know quite how to respond to the situation, since to 
many of them, the problem was far above them. In Câmpeniță (Mezőfele) in the Mureș (Maros) 
region, a locality where cobbler Jenő Nagy had done evangelism events, Pastor Ödön Nagy got a 
position in January 1958, not long before the arrest of the “Bethanists.” Upon his arrival there 
he found a small CE-renewalist group meeting there, and he had not known about them 
previously. The rest of the community and church-goers referred to this group as the 
"believers," since they met regularly for Bible study and prayer, and contributed tithes for 
helping the poor or sick. They were also distinctive for not smoking or going to the bars.  
Soon after Nagy’s arrival, the leaders of CE were imprisoned, and so the local group 
meetings in his town came into question. While other pastors insisted that these meetings stop, 
he advocated them because he felt their presence among the "increasingly worldly" 
congregation was helpful, and in fact soon "soon I myself stood among them in heart and soul." 
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But because he allied himself with these “believers,” other pastors and the flock turned against 
him, regarding him as an outsider.16 Thus, “Bethanism” was one of the lines demarking 
unacceptable from acceptable religiosity in the eyes of state agents, but what’s more, Reformed 
believers were also split over its place in the Church. 
Political Trials of the Non-political Religious Groups 
Bethanists 
Although most others who were arrested following the 1956 revolution had some sort 
of connection (however flimsy) to alternative politics in Hungary or Transylvania, these 
belonging to the CE or “Bethanist” movement had made no political statements or any 
utterances about other possible socio-political formations. What they had done was transgress 
the boundaries of acceptable religiosity and engage in unapproved religious activities, like Bible 
studies in homes.  Although such transgressions were punishable within church processes or by 
the Department of Religions revoking permits, this did not happen – the “Bethanists” were tried 
and sentenced as political criminals. 
Before their sentence, some eight months of interrogation and searches were 
conducted, during which nothing incriminating was found since they were plotting nothing and 
belonged to nothing of a conspiratorial nature. Members of the regime did not fear an imminent 
uprising by the “Bethanists,” but that they populated the all-too numerous category of 
untrustworthy subjects, an undesirable state in general and a threat to a regime that saw itself 
as insecure in its authority. Yet these believers were precisely charged with conspiratorial 
activity in mimicry of the 1956 uprising in Budapest, Hungary. They were not extant enemies, 
but potential ones. In Visky’s parish Cheţ (Magyarkéc), the scenario did not look good in his 
village, as Cheţ was still resisting collectivization.17 The regime wanted to further the reliability 
of society, and certain Christians were not aiding the process.  
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The interrogators pressed the “Bethanists” for contacts, especially foreign ones, as well 
as for the content and purposes of their gatherings (and they were never satisfied with “Bible 
study” or “prayer” as replies). The interrogator wanted to know “what political questions were 
discussed” at a couple of specific “leadership” meetings, but Visky replied that “we did not 
discuss any political questions.”18 Pastor Szőke of Târgu Mureș (Vásárhely) remembers the 
following questions:  
Why do we gather to pray in houses? Why aren’t we satisfied with just the 
church gatherings and the word preached there? Why do we give 10% of our 
income for missionary aims without church supervision? How is it possible to 
have fun at a baptism or wedding without consuming alcoholic drinks? During 
free time why do we turn to visiting the sick or solitary people, and not instead 
go to the cinema or other cultural events? Why do we not accept the dogma of 
materialist doctrine? Why do we encourage our children to participate in 
religion classes and preparation for confirmation instead of sending them to 
sporting and other entertainment events, or to Pioneer meetings? How is ‘lay’ 
preaching of the word permissible, when they don’t have theological training?19  
All of these questions tended toward uncovering just why they would be crossing the lines of 
religious and social norms, which the officials clearly saw as tied together. To violate religious 
norms was to violate social norms, which implied political unreliability and disloyalty. By not 
confining their religiosity to a circumscribed, ritualistic or individualistic Sunday-morning activity, 
the “Bethanists” demonstrated that they were animated by goals and norms other than those 
state and church leaders had agreed upon and tried to enforce. 
Visky was interrogated the most, as he was regarded as the de-facto leader and had 
moved from Hungary, thereby having potentially problematic foreign contacts. He was 
questioned in detail about the three Bethany leadership gatherings which took place in 
Romania, in March and September of 1949 and January of 1958: who organized them, what was 
discussed, what decisions were made. When asked what was discussed at the September 1949 
session, Visky replied, “We talked about spiritual unity, that is to say, for pastors who feel the 
need to live in community with others, they need to establish relationships with one another. 
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19 Visky, Bilincseket És Börtönt Is, 200. 
 
 
159 
 
We talked about our condition relating to the Reformed Church too, in connection with which 
we pointed out that we wanted to work within the framework of the church, and it’s important 
that the pastors stay in brotherly connection with each other.” The interrogator wanted to know 
“what political questions were discussed” at this session, Visky replied that “we did not discuss 
any political questions at this session.”20 Visky made mention of that which state agents tried to 
eliminate, a communal-dynamic component to religious gatherings, but the interrogator wanted 
something more tangibly suspicious or illegal to work with for his sentencing. 
The fact that not only pastors, but laypersons also attended this meeting was a concern 
to the interrogator, but Visky’s reply that “pastors learn a lot from them” did not assuage his 
interrogators, as it posed a threatening view of authority and discipline that democratized 
religious truths instead of having them defined strictly by those in leadership positions. One of 
the laypersons had suggested that the organization collect money to distribute to the poor or 
sick, and they agreed. They also raised some money to help one present pay off some debts that 
he owed to the church.21 They had agreed to contribute their own money to aid others in need, 
but Pastor Lőrincz recalls how the officials framed the monetary issue, how “the donations and 
material support of each other was equal to societal membership dues,”22 something 
interrogators could use as evidence of a society, which was illegal. Erzsébet Patócs was an 
official at the tax office and a party member in the early stages of the regime, but she was 
converted through the influence of Visky. She, too, was hauled in with the others. Her 
accusation was “religious activity subverting the socialist order and the preparation in Romania 
of an uprising similar to the Hungarian 1956 revolution.” Her sibling remembers one exchange 
clearly at the trial: “Did you often help the poor, the needy?” “Yes, often.” “How much money 
did you give at such times?” “5, 10, 15 lei.” Apparently the lawyer turned to the writer of the 
minutes: “Write it down. A monthly membership fee of 30 lei.”23 She got eighteen years in 
prison.  
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The prosecution thought it most effective to focus on material support as evidence of 
conspiracy. When farmer Sándor Jakab was brought in and questioned by his interrogator about 
the “conspiracy,” he replied that “our organization consisted of Bible reading, prayer, and 
visiting the sick.” The interrogator mentioned the Bethany Society of Hungary, which supposedly 
planned the destruction of the state order, and claimed that Jakab was a member. When he 
refused to sign his name under these accusations, a bell was wrung, and a trained boxer was 
brought in to help “soften” him. Many of the “Bethanists” experienced psychological and 
physical torture, evidently an experience common to prisoners under the Romanian communist 
regime.24 During his hearing, a single question was raised, one intended to frame him as one of 
the “conspirators”: “With what did I help the poor?” Jakab felt his response (with “one or two 
lei, flour, bread, potatoes”) came off “slightly humorous,” since the nature of their “activity” was 
so clearly un-conspiratorial.25 His eighteen-year sentence was a serious price for those potatoes, 
though it was not foodstuffs or charity, but Bethanists’ unwillingness to submit to the 
authorities that caused the latter to fabricate the necessary charges. 
The wife of Pastor János Fekete recalls the entire process as a “show trial,” with her 
husband’s real crime being his "activities involving the Bible" which were "classified as anti-state 
organization."26 Although a cobbler, Jenő Nagy was very active in the church, even becoming a 
member of the synod. They came for him too in April 1958, taking all Bibles, songbooks, and 
evangelical writings. Left behind were his wife, who was ill, and their eight children. He too was 
found to belong to the CE Society, which was declared to be an “anti-state” organization that at 
the same time drew youth into “mysticism.” Nagy was accused of traveling about trying to 
create “new lawless groups in order to keep people in darkness.” In short, he was guilty of 
“obstructing the cultural revolution.”27 
Pastor Lőrincz “never dreamed that they would judge the Bethanist (CE Society) such a 
danger to the system.” During his interrogation, his interrogator always tried to direct things 
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toward making them out to be a conspiratorial society, posturing them as a danger to the 
peaceful order. Things like a repentant or converted soul were framed by the interrogator as 
“recruitment” methods, and baptisms, weddings, etc. were the covers for their “underground 
meetings.”28 At the questioning of multiple interrogators as to when he became a “Bethanist,” 
pastor Laszló Szőke replied that he never was one, but just “Reformed.” But the interrogator 
pressed: “When were you born again?” “Easter of 1948.” “And whom did God use for your 
rebirth?” “Ferenc Visky.” “See! You became a Bethanist then, when you were reborn, and Visky 
recruited you into the Bethanists.”29 Father and son stonemasons Miklós Püsök, Sr. and Jr. were 
arrested and questioned about being members of the “Bethanist” group, but they were not 
members, nor were they familiar with that name. They were Reformed believers and active in 
renewalist circles, but the fact that they were converted in the early 1950s and affiliated with 
the more active Christians of their region caused them to be lumped with the suspect group.30 
Indeed, Karczagi says that it was clear that their interrogator believed that they planned 
nothing against the regime, but another captain intimated that the real reason for their arrest 
was preemptive: that such "religious cliques" could become a "powder keg." It was fear, 
therefore, that had these “mystics” on trial. Karczagi reflects on the problem raised by the 
nature of their religious activity: 
They soon made sure that our spiritual revival - similar to other gatherings - 
could not pose a threat to the regime. Why then were there the maniacally 
repeated slogans: éberség – vigilenţă [vigilance]? Because they sensed the 
other. We were different from the others. We weren't afraid, we didn't abase 
ourselves, didn't fawn on them, didn't hate them. We didn't break under the 
weight of the threats. They sensed in us the inner freedom, which next to our 
great humility also gave human dignity.31  
Those who were afraid would act and speak loyally to ensure their future, but the "Bethanists” 
were not afraid, putting their loyalty into question. Lőrincz also sensed that his interrogator 
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“easily believed” that he was not actually a part of a conspiracy: “It could only have been for his 
part a mere formality.”32 
What’s surprising is that those questioned were quite frank in their responses. They 
named fellow participants and discussed openly what they did during meetings, never believing 
that honesty would incriminate them in a trumped-up charge of conspiracy. Their responses 
were uniform, that they gathered together on holidays or for special occasions, read the Bible, 
discussed it, talked about personal life, and prayed. They felt they had no reason to hide their 
activities, which were purely religious. Indeed, it was not the “text” – the religious words or 
practices – that got them condemned, but the “subtext”: their audacity, their non-compliance 
and non-conformance. 
The problem with these believers was that they had crossed the line that state and 
church authorities had drawn between acceptable and unacceptable religious practice. The 
dynamic, communal manner in which they practiced their faith had become unacceptable in the 
eyes of the authorities. Püsök Jr. was told where this line was during his last interrogation, and 
he was given a chance to mend his ways. They wanted him to “pray at home and go to church, 
just don’t speak about it to others.” He replied that he did not want to be like the servant in one 
of Jesus’ parables who is given money to invest but simply buries it.33 At one point during the 
interrogation of Lőrincz, his interrogator showed him that he too had a Bible, pulling it from his 
cupboard. The pastor, longing to read it again, asked him to “give it to me for half an hour, or at 
least for 10 minutes.” The response was: “How can you think such a thing? After all, it’s for this 
reason we brought you here, to forget the Bible!’”34 The Bible would have remained acceptable 
had it largely remained on the shelf, but “Bethanists” like Lőrincz gave it central importance in 
their everyday life. In short, they were at loggerheads about what constituted acceptable 
religiosity. 
Those arrested, interrogated, and tried in 1958 were judged very harshly, by most 
accounts. Some nineteen affiliated with CE, Visky, or this network of people interested in 
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renewal received sentences, with five years the minimum, but with most of them receiving over 
ten years imprisonment and hard labor. Farmers Jakab and Kiss received eighteen years; farmer 
Papp received twenty years, as did pastors Dézsi, Szilágyi, and Karczagi; and the “ringleader,” 
Visky, received twenty-two years. 
Pastor Zoltán Dézsi, accused of being a leader of a “Bethanist” sub-group, against 
Marxist ideology and against projects of the state, could not believe his ears: “Did I hear that 
right? I’m not mistaken? It can’t be true! Since before the judgment I speculated to myself that 
for what I ‘did’ I’d get at most 3-4 years. But this many? Yes – this many.” He was arrested, he 
believes,  
because I firmly preached the hatred of sin and its elimination: the need for 
repentance, rebirth, the decision for Jesus, the sanctified life, both in my 
congregation, as elsewhere, wherever I turned, and there were those who took 
this seriously and did it.  Because together with those pastors and non-pastor 
brothers who confessed and did the same things in their places of residence and 
work, taking different opportunities (evangelism, baptism, marriage, name-day) 
we met to rejoice in God's word, to confess sins, to be purified, glorify and 
magnify Jesus, and to strengthen in faith. " [...] This is why I was a fanatic before 
the authorities, a transgressor of the permissible framework, dangerous. 
Because of Jesus! And this is why severe punishment came.35 
Dézsi’s faith was so communally prominent that he was considered a threat to the community 
state agents were trying to build. But given that even those who had committed murder did not 
always receive as many as twenty years, why did this seemingly politically benign group of 
religious “fanatics” get such harsh sentences? Apparently state agents considered their 
brazenness in their religious activity more threatening than common crime. Even though they 
did not pursue political ends, because they pursued a social and communal life without 
subordinating themselves or their activity to their superiors (church or state), they were feared 
as destabilizing power structures and social norms. 
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Lord’s Army 
As with the “Bethanists,” Lord’s Army activities continued during this time, but since 
they were mostly Romanians, authorities did not actively identify them with revolutionary 
events in Hungary. Their own charismatic leaders were traveling about the country and meeting 
for various Lord’s Army events. Although Traian Dorz had emerged as the most central leader, 
there were several other leaders with significant notoriety – some more locally, others 
nationally as well –, including the increasingly famous composer of Lord’s Army songs, Nicolae 
Moldoveanu of the Sibiu region, the intellectual Sergiu Grossu of Bucharest, and numerous 
locally-known leaders like Alexandru Pop of Feleacu (near Cluj). 
With Traian Dorz imprisoned since 1952, local leaders felt it prudent to meet away from 
the more populated locale of Simeria. Recent Army convert and enthusiast Valer Mîndroni lived 
in the remote village of Ciula Mare, and he had gained local fame because of his recent 
supernatural experience in which over the course of several days in May, 1953, an angel met 
him and called him to repent and join the Lord’s Army.36 At a gathering in his home, he shared 
his testimony with other Army followers and some of the locally curious. Some of his family then 
joined in his tears of guilt and repentance, as well as in Bible-reading and Army song-singing.37 
Mîndroni did construction work on his house to build a place suitable for Army meetings, and 
eventually more and more gatherings were held there.38 Large gatherings at his home became a 
place where a few villagers "covenanted" to the Lord's Army. They met in all seasons, at home 
or at the church, on a Sunday or sometimes for periods of a couple of days. It became an "army 
center" for the region.39 
But as the change in Mîndroni’s personal life produced public effects, from gatherings to 
testimonies to visits from other Army members, tension arose. Some actively resented the 
increase in piety in the village and were more than happy to assist local authorities keep track of 
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the movement.40 Members of a nearby Baptist congregation were reportedly excited about the 
increase in religiosity, but when they tried to encourage Mîndroni and others to join them, his 
determined reply was that he was following the angel’s instructions, who was quite specific 
about the name, the Lord’s Army.41 
Yet the Lord’s Army at once existed and did not. Lord’s Army gatherings were not 
necessarily called as such, despite featuring what were obviously Army practices, content, and 
personnel. Around the time of the “counterrevolution” in Hungary in November 1956, there was 
a big meeting in Arad, not officially as the Lord’s Army but somehow as a “Sunday school,” and it 
received approval from the Bishop Andrei Magieru of Arad. But was it “Sunday school” with 
Traian Dorz and other former Soldiers having traveled from other cities, the singing of Army 
songs, and speeches by laypeople? When questioned by the commissioners, the vicar from the 
local bishopric played ignorant of the whole affair, stubbornly reaffirming it as a Sunday school. 
The commissioners contacted the Metropolitan of Timisoara, and asked that the Patriarch be 
notified of the dealings by the bishopric of Arad. Had it been an isolated event, then it might 
have been more easily overlooked, but the commissioners also felt that LA activity had been on 
the rise in the bishopric in general, and that nothing was being done.42  
When the Department wrote a general report on LA activity across the country, they 
referenced this kind of activity in the Timisoara region, where Dorz was active and priests were 
letting people meet in the churches on weekend afternoons. LA “followers” were “camouflaged 
under a form of religious mission and through so-called ‘Sunday schools’ which are supported by 
the leadership of the bishopric itself from Arad.” Bishop Magieru was evidently sympathetic to 
the Army, not just allowing meetings to occur but meeting privately with some of the leaders as 
well; he even dined at the home of Army leader Valer Mîndroni of Ciula after rededicating a 
church in his small village.43 In Mediaş, a group was meeting in the evening after vespers, but 
called these “Church Committee Meetings” and would have some sermons, a reading from the 
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Psalms and from a saint’s life, and singing of Army songs. The local archpriest supported these 
“meetings.”44 
Like Dorz, Alexandru Pop of Cluj had also been traveling about the country. He had 
traveled over the Carpathians to Suceava for a big LA meeting on July 15, 1956. Apparently Pop 
declared at this meeting that the Soldiers were meeting in Sibiu and Cluj with hundreds 
participating and priests too, audaciously declaring “nobody says anything” against it. In 
addition to urging them to continue meeting in Suceava, he had some Soldiers read the Bible, 
and they discussed it.45 Pop also attended an August gathering at a monastery in the Timisoara 
region, but the commissioners and local Orthodox clergy had come up with a plan in order to 
limit LA influence. They had priests take turns staying “in the middle of the believers all night 
and speaking to them, singing to them church songs and even doing services for them at night, 
thus: they neutralized the preachers who waited for the priests to fall asleep and to start their 
activity, preaching and singing Army songs.”46 
The battle lines were drawn within the church, with commissioners teaming up with 
anti-Army Orthodox clergy against Lord’s Army adherents like Dorz and the few sympathetic 
Orthodox clergy. Dorz was doing his best to sway influential hierarchs. Just after Christmas of 
1956, Dorz implored the Patriarch of Romania to consider their case. He argued that the former 
members of the Army were simply believers who want to be more Orthodox, to follow its holy 
writs more faithfully. He made the case that the Army discouraged the transferring of allegiance 
to other “sects,” but only if allowed to operate freely: if the Lord’s Army were heavily controlled 
and sanctioned for meeting, why shouldn’t adherents join up with the neoprotestants, who are 
not sanctioned for doing the same activities in their own churches? Dorz implored the Patriarch 
to bring a happy resolution to the problem, saying the people will be able to love the Church 
and direct their spiritual energies toward its enrichment.47 
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Prior to the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, Dorz felt as though there was an 
"atmosphere of general relaxation in the country," as more meetings and events passed without 
significant harassment. He and other Army leaders began to consider producing a publication 
and holding religious conferences in the cities. He did not realize that they were being "followed 
everywhere with complete care and attention." They held several leaders’ meetings following 
his release from prison and move to Simeria in the summer of 1956. The “brothers” were 
discussing big issues like their status and relationship with the Orthodox Church, in addition to 
thoughts on how to best continue their work of encouraging “spiritual rebirth” while 
“maintaining unity of belief.”48 During the revolutionary events, on November 6, 1956, 
Alexandru Pop organized a leaders’ meeting at his home in Feleacu, outside of Cluj, where Pop, 
Dorz, Moldoveanu, Grossu, and several others gathered to discuss future ideas.  
Soon after, on November 25, 1956, in Vulcana-Pandele, Grossu and Dorz organized a 
major gathering where they expected some 2,000 participants, including many youth, but the 
night before – when some 400 believers were already there –, they were woken and questioned 
by Securitate agents, who then told everyone to go home.49 Dorz and Grossu were apprehended 
and detained overnight. In a surprising turn, however, the next morning they were ordered to 
work with the Patriarchate and Department of Religions toward legalization, and until then they 
should not take part in any more Army activity.50 They were told to inform everyone to 
completely cease activity, otherwise immediate arrest would result because their activity was, 
technically, illegal. The agents meanwhile blamed them for not trying earlier for legalization, 
saying that other groups (implied neoprotestants) operated legally. Dorz was to keep his 
personal Securitate agent abreast of his progress regularly. 
Dorz and Grossu discussed their dilemma: not to try to obtain legalization would open 
the door for mass arrest in case of further activity and would land blame on them for not finding 
a legal path, but to really trust that this was possible seemed so unlikely given how they had 
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been treated and the complete absence of positive developments and feedback until now.51 But 
they also recognized that the status quo was not acceptable for the State, and perhaps Church 
and State officials wanted something more regulated. They agonized over the means and terms 
by which the Army could be legalized, given the fact that the BOR as a whole had been against 
them and was likely to continue to be. 
Upon arrival at the Patriarchate, they were made to wait a long time until one of the 
staff priests finally inquired as to the purpose of their visit. They told him they'd like to have an 
audience with the Patriarch to discuss “the problem of the legalization of the Lord’s Army.”  
-‘What Lord’s Army, eh? That little nothing doesn’t exist in our country and 
never [did]… How is it that you just now are going after these castles in the sky?’  
-'We ask you insistently to grant us an audience with His Beatitude.'  
-'What for, do you think that someone would occupy himself with this silly 
thing? See to your own business! Go home and work up some [sort of 
statement]. Or do you not have anything else to do except waste your time?'  
-‘We were sent here by the Securitate. We absolutely must inform the Patriarch 
of this problem.'  
-'If it's so, make a written memorandum and send it to him by mail. Then wait at 
home for the response. You can't have an audience now. Such problems are not 
resolved by any other way than how I've told you. Besides, the patriarch is busy 
now with a delegation from Yugoslavia. That's how it is!'  
As instructed, they followed this meeting with one at the Securitate in which they were 
threatened and informed of all of the Army activities and meetings which had still proceeded 
over the past months. They realized they had an intimate informer among them who kept the 
Securitate in the know. Dorz was instructed to draw up the memorandum alone, and Grossu 
was warned about being active.52 
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Not wanting to sign it alone, Dorz wished to consult with Grossu as his best confidant for 
such an activity. He was called in September 1957 by one of the officials of his case, who 
berated him because there were still gatherings being planned for the coming Holiday season. 
The official accused him, saying that it was "clear now that you are all against any kind of 
legalization," and that the Lord's Army "likes anarchy and disorder, being that you are a bunch of 
insubordinates and enemies of social order," and that "you do not submit either to the State or 
the Church." He gave Dorz a "last chance" to write a memorandum for legalization over the next 
week. When Dorz wondered whether his statements would carry weight given he held no 
official legal title as a leader, the agent told him to do it in his own name and in that of those 
who "still think and believe like you." 
Dorz was in Bucharest soon after, and he gave a copy of the memorandum to the 
Securitate official, who told him to now go to the Patriarch. This time, when he arrived, the 
priest waived him in courteously and opened the door directly to His Beatitude, who in turn 
welcomed "'brother Dorz'" "with open arms."  The Patriarch expressed the strong desire to help 
resolve "the problem" but reminded Dorz that such things must be done according to the 
"existing statutes for the organization and functioning of the Orthodox Church." He handed Dorz 
a copy of these statutes and told him to read it, study it, and on this basis to try to find a legal 
way for the Lord's Army to operate. Dorz then wrote a new memorandum and got many other 
of the "brothers" to weigh in. He had found a strategy: to make use of the permitted branch of 
the Parish Committee whose concerns could be "spiritual problems of the parish... mission and 
moral activities necessary to the parishioners." But the problem was how to allow the Army – 
however it would be called – to operate even in the case of unsympathetic or uninterested 
priests, so that it did not depend on their direct support even though such activities still had to 
have the necessary authorization to be considered part of the Parish Committee and not a para-
church event.53 
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The debates and discussions among Lord’s Army leaders toward gaining some sort of 
recognition intensified. In October 1957, Dorz and some other leaders including Moldoveanu 
wrote again to the Patriarch, trying somehow to gain recognition or legalization for the LA. 
Referring to the rules passed by Synod in 1949, they argued that the Lord’s Army could fit into 
the existing framework of the Orthodox Church. They noted that these rulings referred to the 
provision for the creation within Parish Committees of “Missionary Circles,” which were 
intended for “helping the priests at catechism with a view toward strengthening faith and moral 
sense of the believers, equipping the church and supporting the works of Christian mercy.” They 
argued that the attributes of the Mission Circle corresponded precisely to the activity of the LA, 
and that the Army henceforth be called the Mission Circle. This left, according to Dorz and the 
others, only a few “details” to be clarified. The Circle’s character would be “exclusively moral 
and missional,” and its members would merely be “obliged to live a completely moral life to be a 
good example to all.” Mission Circle gatherings would be under parish leadership by a delegate 
or priest who was a member of the Circle, whose program would include prayers and readings 
from Scripture or other Church books, all of which would be set up by a member of the circle. 
Dorz and the others even proposed that to “protect” the missionary circles from “any kind of 
foreign and sectarian influences, which come mostly through borrowing religious songs,” they 
would keep to the church songs and songs of the Psalms that had already been introduced 
officially and printed (which did exclude most of the popular songs of the Lord’s Army), and the 
same would go for written material.54 Not long after the letter, Dorz met with the Patriarch and 
showed him a formal proposal about the Missionary Circle. He promised to show the Minister of 
Religions the text as well, and he had reasons to hope that the Patriarch was amenable.55 Dorz 
was trying to align the LA with state and Church notions of religious acceptability. 
As the process continued to drag on without concrete affirmative responses by church 
or state authorities, Dorz began to grow suspicious of this never-ending process. He eventually 
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consented to pressures from Army participants to meet, even while continuing to play the 
legalization game. There were reports of youth gatherings in the Oradea region, and 
Department of Religions officials in Bucharest wanted to know more: the exact localities, a 
profile of those attending (age, gender), names of the local leaders, whether they are supported 
by any local priests, the names of any other church staff who support, in what buildings 
meetings are held and when, whether they travel in groups to other localities for events of any 
kind, measures taken by the commissioners for stopping their activity, and actions taken by 
church authorities.56 Department officials felt their should-be partners, clergymen of the 
Orthodox Church, were frustratingly passive. Clergy had their own excuses: in one town, Beiuş, 
the local Church was tolerating and even encouraging LA activity in order to “counterbalance 
the activity of the Pentecostal Church which in this location wreaks havoc.”57 
But did evidence show that allowing Army activities countered neoprotestant growth? A 
commissioner from another part of Oradea wrote in December 1957 that although the LA had 
started as a “counter-balance” to the neoprotestants in his area, it turned out to be nothing 
more than a “breeding ground” for them. Despite being illegal, it remained active “wrongfully 
and insistently,” being “supported by priests hostile to the regime.” It was not a benign 
problem: 
From a political point of view this anarchic group presents a permanent danger 
for the state, attracting and even punishing those who participate in the social 
and political life of our state. At the same time, the attracting of a large number 
of believers and youth away from their preoccupations as citizens as well as 
exaggeration in praying and in spreading an unhealthy exaggerated mysticism 
represents a lack in both the cultural life of our villagers and the realization of 
socialist transformation of our country.   
Their activities were “fouling up adherents with an unhealthy ideology diametrically opposed to 
Leninist ideology's rules about the development of society.” Frankly, they were an annoyance: 
“this anarchic group, sustained by dishonest elements from among the clergy, puts us in the 
situation of taking measures to combat them;” they also “dig at the roots of the foundation of 
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our democratic people’s state.” Referring to some locales as “contaminated,” commissioners 
like this one regarded the LA as a social ailment.58 There is no evidence to back officials’ claims 
that Army participants punished others for participating in state activities. 
Department of Religions’ officials necessarily scrutinized the role of priests in whose 
parishes believers participated in Lord’s Army activities. In one region in Oradea two supposedly 
“fanatic” priests supported LA activity, one of whom had a very “dubious political past” and 
associations. These priests were holding what they called “Sunday School,” which featured an 
“intense religious program,” preaching, poems, and LA songs. Those at this gathering “also 
practice free interpretation of the bible which gives birth to misunderstandings and animosities, 
which leads to departure to other neoprotestant religions or founding of new groups […]” 
Officials regarded this kind of activity by priests as akin to taking the lid of control off, which only 
led to religious anarchy. When commissioners pursued counter measures, they ran into 
problems since the priests insisted that the gatherings were Sunday schools, not LA meetings, 
and the bishopric and archpriests sympathized and did not take action, agreeing that it was a 
Sunday school. If state agents ever considered such gatherings to be “pulling citizens from their 
daily preoccupations,” or “a plague for public and cultural activity,” local organs could have 
taken legal action, but since meetings were held with an acceptable name and at acceptable 
times, this inhibited “local organs” from taking measures “for their hindrance.”59 
But why did a few Orthodox priests support LA activities, beyond the possible 
explanation that the LA kept neoprotestant losses to a minimum? When one priest was 
questioned elsewhere about a big group meeting in which youth also participated, he replied 
that “these are the best believers and it would be a pity to forbid their activity.” Yet this 
seemingly innocent response was coming from a priest whom the commissioner did not trust, 
considering him overly passive toward social-political duties and far from reliable in 
representing state interests. His “Sunday school” was only a thin covering for the practice of 
“unhealthy exaggerated mysticism.” There was yet another group in the Oradea region, a 
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relatively large one supported by a priest with a history of imprisonment, who held “intense 
religious services, having a mania for doing confession and giving communion every Sunday and 
holiday.”60 Thus, state agents were suspicious of priests who supported Army activities because 
all too often they themselves were unacceptably religious. State agents wanted their religiosity 
to be the rote performance of religious duties, but since it was too public and pronounced, they 
called these priests “fanatic” or prone to “exaggerations.” 
In the region of Criş, “the activity of this movement has reached the peak, surpassing 
even the form of organization of the one who founded the Lord’s Army.” A group of 600 was 
meeting, carrying on activity “devoid of any scruples and defying any measures.” It apparently 
was “the only orthodox church in the country where laypersons preach alongside the priest,” 
meaning their practices “do not differ from those of the neoprotestant denominations." Priest 
Turicu (who had been previously “politically condemned”) was blamed for making this group 
active, another priest was too sick to do anything about it, and the latest priest to arrive 
“promised that he will try to channel the activity of this group toward the good.” But the 
commissioner had “doubt that he will succeed,” since he had tried many things so far “but 
without result.” The only thing the commissioner succeeded in doing was getting Turicu 
removed as priest, which was only “a step toward improving the situation.”  
“[Taking] measures against the clergy” who were overly supportive of Army activities 
was always the first obvious step for those wanting to combat the movement. The hope was 
that without support by legitimate church representatives, the movement would lose power, as 
some adherents would respond by “transferring to other denominations where they can be 
active in basically the same way, while others will be consoled and will come into line with the 
other believers of the Orthodox churches.”61 But the LA was not supported by a clergyman in 
most places but depended more on local and traveling lay leaders. Such groups would usually 
meet on weekend or Wednesday evenings in the church (if the priest was supportive) or at 
houses, singing LA songs and preaching from the Bible. In addition to regular meetings, LA 
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participants sometimes had the occasion to attend extra-regional gatherings that might feature 
guest speakers like Dorz. As further deterrence, commissioners suggested priests organize 
Sunday afternoon services “to not give [Army adherents] the occasion to gather,” and they 
encouraged local organs to hold cultural events on Sunday afternoons.62 
In his home region of Beiuş, Dorz had preached both at the church (with Soldiers 
attending) as well as at a wedding, speaking “in the open air.” Leaders from another city in 
Oradea County (Dioşig) invited him to their community, and he said he would come for an event 
on December 29, 1957. The Department likewise prepared for his arrival by coordinating the 
efforts of the local organs and local clergy, who were to hold services in order to keep the 
churches and believers well occupied. Because of these efforts, the service turned into a 
combination of a hastily organized Vespers and a gathering of some 400 Army enthusiasts from 
the surrounding region, who had been planning to come for some time. Those who traveled 
from outside all reported coming to the village to visit “relatives.” But Dorz never arrived, 
causing some “unrest” among those waiting, and the rumor spread that the police had detained 
him. Local authorities tried to combat the rumors, saying that they detained no one and had no 
reports of his whereabouts. The commissioner himself did not indicate whether he knew what 
happened to Dorz, as he may not have known.63 He may very well have been in Bucharest once 
again, reviewing another redaction of his legalization proposal, or he may have decided not to 
attend for fear of further jeopardizing the success of his proposals. 
Such spontaneous larger-scale gatherings worried the Department at its highest levels in 
Bucharest as they tracked Army activity across the country. Officials were perplexed about the 
growing strength of the LA and wondered why there were still so many “dissatisfied” believers 
joining them. At a minimum, they agreed with the following: 
1.’The Lord’s Army’ continues to represent a mass problem in the religious 
sector. 2. Both the neoprotestant denominations, as well as the forbidden sects, 
feed on the ‘Lord’s Army.’ 3. It is not in the interest of the order of the People’s 
Democratic State to foster the increase of the numbers in religious 
organizations [who are] net hostile toward the regime by the pushing of—due 
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to some dissatisfaction created artificially—a significant number of Orthodox 
Christians to neoprotestants and sectarians. 4. It is not in the interest of the 
regime that former ‘Soldiers’ continue to represent a mass for maneuvering, 
either for the Greek-Catholic resistance, for the mystic-anarchic movements 
[found in monasteries…], or for other formations which can appear, including 
for stylism.64   
Officials did have reason to suspect that there was an affinity between forbidden groups, 
included between the Army and Greek Catholics.65 The officials gave reason to support 
legalization as a solution: “By the eventual reactivation in an appropriate form of ‘the Lord’s 
Army,’ not only former ‘soldiers’ who had meanwhile integrated in the sects would be restored 
to them, but numerous other Christians as well; in addition, ‘the Army’ would be used both for 
the neutralization of the Greek-Catholic resistance, as well as for the consolidation of the return 
of Greek-Catholics to Orthodoxy.”66 With some officials advocating bringing the Lord’s Army into 
a publicly sanctioned status, surely Dorz’s legalization campaign was headed for success. 
But other opinions won the day. Just as with the “Bethanists,” state representatives 
responded to dynamic, communal religiosity by removing leaders in an attack on the charismatic 
centers. Romanian scholar George Spiridon aptly observes that the Securitate noticed the 
divergences among the LA leaders, including that of the traditionalist, Orthodox-leaning wing 
represented by Dorz and that of the neoprotestant-leaning wing of Moldoveanu. Agents deftly 
applied the “divide and conquer” technique.67  
                                                          
 
64 Ibid., 376. “[T]he way in which the outlawing of the activities of this religious association was done gave 
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Dorz made some ten trips to the capital in 1957 and worked on many redactions for 
legalization. He incorporated comments and suggestions, made changes as requested, had to 
endure long sessions with Securitate officials, and sometimes but not always gained an audience 
with the Patriarch, finding the Department of Religions official there on occasion. He believed 
the interest in resolving this twenty-year, pre-communist problem was "sincere" on all sides, but 
as this process wore on, his trust waned.68 Meanwhile, Securitate officials were informing him 
that instead of decreasing, LA activities had increased. Apparently, the excitement at the 
possibility of legalization had encouraged LA activity, and local leaders relaxed, thinking less 
vigilance was required. Yet the agents explained to Dorz “in the most severe way that the 
resolution of our problem is conditioned upon our submission to the provisions of the authority 
of the state." Dorz was told again that acceptance of his proposals was predicated on the 
ceasing of LA activity - all gatherings, even at baptisms, weddings, funerals, everywhere. He was 
told to write, visit, do whatever he could to get them to stop.69 
Optimistic about the chances of legalization, after Easter of 1958 he pleaded with others 
to cease meetings. They all seemed to agree with the gravity of the situation, except Alexandru 
Pop, who said that they should not submit to the state, but to God, and encouraged Dorz to not 
be afraid. Pop thence began to hold the largest gatherings he could all over the region, and 
Securitate officials blamed Dorz as leader for allowing them, wondering how Dorz could he be 
taken seriously with such "disorder" going on. They said that he had to stop Pop's meetings if he 
was going to get anywhere; they put all of the pressure on him and continued to haul him in for 
interrogations, long nights of questioning. They then responded to his latest proposal for 
legalization, replying that any "parallelism" to the state or Church would not be allowed - no 
autonomy could be permitted, and his proposal should be re-written.70 
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Although Dorz was not entirely sanguine about the quest for legalization, the big chance 
arrived in October 1958, when Synod was to vote on this possibility.71 But at the Synod meeting, 
a surprise happened—there were two proposals for legalization, as another member of Synod 
stood up with an alternative, longer proposal for the legalization of the Lord’s Army written by 
famous Lutheran pastor Richard Wurmbrand, a convert from Judaism who gained notoriety for 
speaking out at the 1945 congress gathered to approve the new government of Petru Groza and 
was imprisoned from 1948 to 1956. Wurmbrand’s proposal was presented as supposedly 
backed by other leaders, including Dorz. This proposal suggested the legalization of the Lord’s 
Army by forming "the Romanian Protestant Church," a suggestion which the Orthodox audience 
abhorred, that the Lord’s Army should split from the BOR. Anxiously awaiting the results 
outside, Dorz was given an audience with the Patriarch immediately afterward. The Patriarch 
queried Dorz about this other proposal, and Dorz was shocked and defeated as he had no 
knowledge of another proposal; he had been blindsided. The Patriarch told him there was 
nothing to do now except for Dorz and Wurmbrand to try to work it out. Dorz went directly to 
Wurmbrand and lambasted him for doing this without consulting Dorz (only Moldoveanu), 
despite Dorz’s discovering that Wurmbrand had done it at the behest of the Department of 
Religions.72 
                                                          
 
71 Several of the hierarchs may have had favorable opinions of the Lord’s Army and the Synod vote may 
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What’s more, Dorz arrived home to find that a Youth Conference was being put 
together by Pop, again without his prior knowledge. This was yet another example of anarchy, 
since such an incendiary event as a mass youth rally was the most brazen thing the Lord’s Army 
could organize at such a sensitive time. Dorz had tried to discourage people from attending 
Pop’s event, and a rift developed between them too. Not long after, Dorz was summoned to 
Bucharest where the Minister of the Interior Alexandru Drăghici himself asked him why such 
meetings like Youth Conferences continued and informed Dorz that legalization could not 
happen; Drăgichi would see to it that “they” would ''wipe out" the Lord's Army. 73 
Dorz’s efforts were defeated. It appears that Department of Religions’ officials and 
Securitate personnel colluded in making the Lord’s Army look anarchic by cleverly suggesting an 
alternative proposal be drawn up by Lord’s Army affiliates who had ideas opposed to Dorz’s. 
Although the Patriarch seemingly backed Dorz, the Lord’s Army supporters were divided by the 
multiple proposals, and they still had Lord’s Army opponents among the Orthodox hierarchy 
with whom to contend.  
The leaders of the Lord’s Army were soon united, however, by the state: in 1959 agents 
rounded up those leaders whom Dorz had listed (at their request) as those who might oversee 
the various districts of the future redaction of the Lord’s Army. People started to be arrested 
across the country, and Dorz heard about them and awaited his turn, which came in March, 
1959. From March to November he was interrogated, after which he was tried along with others 
from Cluj. Dorz was warned in his interrogations to not make any references to God or Christ, 
reminding him that he'd "spoken quite enough about that until now to others."74 Dorz received 
sixteen years, despite having endeavored to follow state instructions toward legalization. The 
vision-inspired convert and local enthusiast of Ciula, 57-year old Valer Mîndroni, received 
fourteen years for “crime of conspiracy against the social order.” The sentences ranged from 
three years to twenty, plus hard labor.75 
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Dorz believed that the leaders’ meeting at Pop’s home on November 6 and 7, 1956, was 
also pivotal. While Sergiu Grossu and some others were waxing eloquent about the future, the 
seeds of division had grown roots. Moldoveanu and a couple of others favored increased 
independence from the Orthodox Church, something Dorz dubbed "sectarianism," but they did 
not dwell on these tensions at this meeting. In the general "euphoria" in discussing future plans, 
they did not pay attention to Moldoveanu's “silence,” nor Pop's frequent exiting of the house to 
cars parked outside. Apparently Pop was missing a couple of hours during the nighttime hours of 
their discussion, but returned with the next day's newspaper with the latest news of the 
revolution in Hungary, inviting commentary. And the others, "naive and gullible," walked into 
the "sly trap" without suspicion (ostensibly voicing incautious opinions).76 Dorz came to believe 
that this meeting at Pop’s was held only through Pop being in some sort of collaborative 
relationship with the authorities; Pop was able to travel around and held meetings of all kinds at 
the behest of the authorities, and then informed on everyone involved. 
Dozens of Lord’s Army leaders and active members were arrested and sentenced in the 
fall of 1959. Even Pop had been arrested. Pop, according to Dorz’s account, seemed particularly 
upset, declaring that the authorities had made some sort of mistake since he had been 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
In Cluj, there were twenty-two Army leaders sentenced, including Dorz, Alexandru Pop, Nicolae 
Moldoveanu, Petru Popa, Constantin Tudose, Ioan Capătă, Valeriu Irinca, Cornel Rusu, Gheorghe 
Precupescu, Ioan Opriș, Gheorghe Condruț, Nicolae Marini, Cheorghe Chișu, Ioan Dan, Vasile Lavu, 
Gheorghe Munteanu, Gavril Mureșan, Arcadie Nistor, Lazăr Mortici, Tache Grădinaru, Gavril Giugiu, Alice 
Eugenia Panaiodor (who was not an Army participant but a helper to Wurmbrand in Bucharest and friend 
to the Grossu family). In Timişoara, thirteen were sentenced: Ștefan Necoară, Cornel Silaghi, Stelian Cună, 
Pavel Dragomir, Moise Dance, Ilie Stepănescu, Adam Magiar, Petru Terlai, Lucia Magiar, Irina Pîrvan, Silviu 
Văsuț, Gheorghe Neagu, Gheorghe Ionescu. This group was not condemned for conspiracy against the 
social order as with the other groups, but for “agitation toward disobedience of the laws” (47). Most of 
these received ten years, some nine, one eight, and two received five. The Deva group of eleven included 
Ioan Marcu, Ilie Marini, Ioan Mihu, Valer Mîndroni, Dan Cioarca, Ioan Jicăreanu, Ilie Floarea, Iuliu Bernat, 
Gheorghe Bregar, Ilie Hothazi, Dumitru Bolog. This trial made the Lord’s Army out to be a “subversive 
organization” with a dubious past and current activity, with “counterrevolutionary plans”. They were all 
accused of participating in the “conspiracy” (53). In their trials, the prosecution accused several of 
legionnaire activity as well, implicitly linking the Lord’s Army. Marcu and Mihu are examples, both of 
whom got the longest sentences at 18 and 20 years each. 
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cooperating with them.77 Perhaps state agents had made clever use of Pop in getting 
information and undermining unity, but his usefulness had come to an end. 
Monasteries and convents, although not part of this present research, were also 
witnessed major attacks in 1959. Historian Deletant estimates that some 2,500 Orthodox 
priests, monks, nuns, and laypersons were arrested between 1958 and 1963, and others have 
made the accusation that perhaps 75% of the 10,000 monks and nuns were required to leave for 
other work, being under 50 (women) or 55 (men). Apparently the police came and even hauled 
many of them away at night.78 Like the Lord’s Army, monastic life (though perhaps a sort of 
spiritual “core” to the Orthodox Church), was at the margins of social-public life and witnessed 
heavy scrutiny by a suspicious communist government, despite attempts by Patriarch Justinian 
to mitigate it.79 
It is difficult to assess the seriousness with which Church or State leaders considered the 
legalization question. Spiridon says that state agents rested on the argument that a “semi-
autonomous” status for the Army was insupportable, saying that a legal institution could not 
have such “parallelism.”80 Evidently they did not want to manage religious associations beyond 
the mainline denominations, where they had already taken great pains to consolidate and 
centralize power. Control and anarchy formed the state’s conceptual binary; there was no 
middle. 
Persistent Problems in Managing the Orthodox Church 
While the unacceptably religious were gathered in prisons, church and state leaders 
endeavored to define and create religious acceptability and normalcy. Because vigilance was the 
norm, the numbers participating in these “unauthorized cults” were relatively low. The numbers 
of those claiming religious affiliation, however, remained very high. In the heart of Transylvania, 
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for instance, its 1956 census had revealed that of the 1.3 million residents of Cluj County, 90% 
reported having a religious affiliation. Of the total population, 67% claimed Orthodoxy (Greek-
Catholic was not an option in the census, although the inspector estimated 77% of Orthodox 
believers derived from the Greek-Catholic unification in 1948), 17% Reformed, 4% Catholic, and 
others smaller numbers.81 Just as the existence of religious practice was “normal,” the fight to 
normalize religious practice remained constant and encompassed all of the denominations. The 
majority of religious institutions and believers were able to practice within the framework of the 
law and of the unwritten laws of expectations, of acceptability. 
One aspect of the routine duties of a religious affairs commissioner included monitoring 
religious holidays, especially the biggest ones like Christmas and Easter. These were expected to 
be big, and any voluntary large gathering of people held the potential for something 
problematic. A report from the local inspector of Dej to Cluj about Christmas celebrations, for 
example, indicated that participation was very high, but particularly among the old. Ostensibly 
the teenagers were occupied with dancing and chess competitions instead. Somewhat troubling, 
though, was that participation was “quite high” where a “returned” (former Greek-Catholic) 
church and old Orthodox Church decided to exchange choirs; such voluntary innovations always 
needed monitoring. At all of the churches, circulars of the hierarchy—which likely contained 
state-promoted wishes or notice of campaigns—were read, and every service and event 
occurred according to the predetermined schedule, without any people expressing 
“dissatisfaction.” The same went for the New Year’s events. State officials did not want big 
processions with crosses or icons leaving the church grounds, and although a few churches in 
the Dej region did procede out of the church, they did not travel a great distance.82 In short, the 
religious events in this commissioner’s region remained quite acceptable that year. 
Yet a commissioner from Hunedoara questioned how to respond when Epiphany was 
celebrated in his region. A traditional Orthodox celebration of Epiphany featured a priest’s going 
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from house to house, Christening with holy water (and sometimes receiving “donations” for 
services). Three priests in Hunedoara did so, carrying a cross, (“even in the worker’s district”), 
and evidently no one refused them entrance. Many joined the celebration at the river for the 
drawing of the holy water, but the archpriest, who had a parish with mixed “returned” and old 
Orthodox believers, did his drawing and blessing of the water at the bridge in the center of the 
city instead of at a more “isolated place” as the other Orthodox priests did. What’s more, the 
archpriest was reported to have used Greek-Catholic terminology with “former” Greek-
Catholics, and Orthodox terminology with Orthodox believers.83 Here, unacceptable practices 
were occurring, but the question remained as to the cost and benefit of trying to rein in such 
aberrations. The line between acceptable and unacceptable religiosity was sometimes blurry 
even to officials, who did not always pursue clarifying such issues or disciplining those engaged 
in activities on the borders of acceptability. What’s more, there were always other tasks and 
problems requiring the attention of inspectors. 
Greek-Catholic Problem 
Greek-Catholicism was unacceptable under the newly formed Communist government 
not for its style of religiosity, but for the disruption it caused to nationalistic notions of 
Romanian group belonging. It represented an obstacle to the idea of a historic, traditional, and 
nativist Romanian Church, given its relationship to the “foreign” Vatican and historic links to the 
more Catholic Hapsburg Monarchy. Now illegal, the Greek-Catholic (G-C) Church was 
problematic for state agents because it represented a site of clandestine communal belonging 
that could garner anti-regime and anti-Orthodox Church sympathies. A 1956 summary-list from 
the Department of Religions reported that “among the problems of the Christian orthodox 
religion, those which present more and more serious political aspects, but which at the same 
time held less attention of the Holy Synod and the Central Leaders of the B.O.R. in the last 4-5 
years, are the following: a) the problem of the former Greek-Catholics b) the stylist problem 
(problema stilistă) c) the problem of the Lord’s Army.” The leadership had not come up with a 
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“solution” yet or discussed it in the necessary detail. The patriarchate said these issues did not 
apply everywhere, and as diocese-specific problems, they did not merit a Synod-wide approach. 
The Ministry felt that the patriarch’s response had been too soft, and that he did not appreciate 
how each entailed “serious political aspects which oblige a response in a patriotic sense.” They 
also felt he should not be “indifferent” from a “religious point of view either,” arguing that 
believers, clergy, and hierarchs would lose confidence in him if he did not support combating 
these problems.84  
Even that which had been “resolved” still appeared unresolved. There was “frequent 
unrest” among those Greek-Catholics who “came back” to the Orthodox faith in 1948. An 
inspector of the Cluj region pointed out one particularly problematic incident in 1956 when 
certain “non-returned” priests, headed by priest Augustin Prundus of Cluj, made connections 
with former G-C bishop Alexandru Rusu. They met together and convinced other “returned” 
priests to participate, which was “an act of undermining the act of reunification of the BOR by 
provocations and agitation among believers.” The authorities “took measures in time, punishing 
the heads of this provocation.” The department was still tracking around 130 former G-C priests 
who had taken up work in other fields and did not currently engage in “negative” activity, as 
well as a dozen or so known to be holding clandestine services in their homes or attending 
Roman-Catholic churches. The inspectors knew their names and addresses. In the city of Dej, 
north of Cluj, “the catholic atmosphere” was “especially maintained” by some 34 Franciscan 
monks who kept visiting “former” G-C believers under various pretexts, and the department 
recommended to Bucharest that this community be moved to limit continued interaction.85 
Thus, the Orthodox Church in Cluj County demanded constant vigilance to protect its supposed 
unity. 
One way in which Orthodox hierarchs supported priests and parishes struggling with 
recalcitrant Greek-Catholics, Lord’s Army, or other “deviations” was by conducting “missions,” a 
term which basically meant the sending of some higher ranking or particularly skilled priests in 
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combating such manifestations during the sermon or at other gatherings. Officials from the 
Ministry of Religions supported such “mission work.” An archpriest in the Cluj region called a 
snap conference for his priests in 1956 relating to decisions by Synod to send missionary 
delegations to “consolidate” the BOR.  
Missions, however, usually had other target audiences. They served parishes “with 
many neoprotestant denominations, in parishes where the priest lost his prestige toward the 
believers, in parishes where the problem of returning is not yet quiet, where non-returned 
priests are still active against returning […].” The archpriest implored the priests to make a 
catechism plan for children, and that if they failed to do so, “they will be sanctioned.” He also 
told them to make “a plan for sermons,” to have “good sermons” in order to “win the sympathy 
of believers,” as preachers from neoprotestant denominations were making inroads. He then 
asked the priests whether they had problems with neoprotestants and needed “the help of 
missionaries.” Several priests described neoprotestant activity in their parishes, but one 
mentioned that a Lord’s Army group “arose” in his parish. The priests seemed to agree that 
missionary efforts were better suited toward “combating neoprotestant denominations and 
forbidden sects and for reinforcing the moral life in parishes where there are many hooligans, 
etc.” than for “consolidating unification” in the BOR. The inspector in attendance did not 
interject. He felt that the “attitude of the archpriest was good simply because he drew the 
attention of the priests in a serious way for each of them to get to work and to do catechism 
regularly and good sermons and to not be found out of order by the missionaries.” The 
archpriest promised to supply the missionary plan and schedule, and the inspector said he 
would forward it on to the “local organs so they don’t make difficulties, meaning the local 
organs should also be aware of this problem.” 86 State and church representatives were in 
agreement here about Orthodox “missionaries” promoting an agreed-upon line. 
The problem of consolidating the “return” of Greek-Catholics to the Orthodox Church 
had too many layers to lend itself to a simple missionary delegation. In the town of Luduş, 
constant “feuds” between the believers and clergies of the “returned” church and old Orthodox 
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church led some to consider the “returned” priest Romul Popa as the next archpriest to help 
“weld” these communities.87 A gathering of priests was to decide whether the current 
archpriest Macavei would remain in his post, or whether the priests would accept Popa as the 
new one. 
Evidently, the surface-level situation concealed murkier dealings. Once Popa had found 
out that he received official metropolitan approval to be a candidate for archpriest, he informed 
a “returned” local priest named Vasile Samoilă, who then began to agitate among believers and 
priests, even deriding Macavei, while promoting Popa. Apparently priest Samoilă organized 
groups to go throughout the city, promoting Popa, and there were even some quarrels that 
broke out due to some “drunk gypsies” whom he had supposedly hired for unclear 
machinations. Yet when the issue was put to a secret vote at the priestly gathering, only a small 
number voted for Popa.  
Priest Samoilă had not only exacerbated the “unhealthy environment between the 
returned believers and old orthodox in Luduş, but revealed himself to be a ‘hostile’ element.”88 
In retrospect, Ministry officials reflected that Popa “is not appropriate” and “would not have 
suited” the situation there. Eventually priest Samoilă in Luduş was sanctioned by the 
Metropolitan for continuing his support of the losing “returned” archpriest candidate. The local 
inspector reported that Samoilă also had been going from house to house telling them that he 
was not receiving his salary and that Macavei wanted to abolish their (“returned”) church, 
urging believers to stay on the side of the Greek-Catholics. The local inspector was going to 
make sure the metropolitan was aware of Samoilă’s activity and suggested he be transferred 
immediately to a region “far removed” from Luduş.89 The proffered olive branch (post of 
archpriest) to former Greek-Catholics turned out to be incendiary; tensions were clearly too high 
for such a simple “solution.”  
Even customary Orthodox practices like catechism were shaped by this struggle for 
“consolidation.” Catechism occupied an ambivalent place in state eyes, but also in Church 
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operations. State officials did permit catechism to be carried out at the times indicated by law 
and as long as it was based on pre-approved materials,90 but they also watched to make sure 
that catechism was not drawing in too many youth. The new archpriest of Luduş, Macavei, 
reported at one meeting of archpriests that every Sunday afternoon he held catechism for 
teenagers, and children came regularly to get “religion manuals.” The excuse for such zeal was 
implicit, based on the information he volunteered about his parish and deanery, which “are 
roamed by non-returned priests who spread the rumor about ‘the reestablishment’ of the 
former Greek-Catholic Church,” and that a “monk named Stef makes propaganda among former 
Greek-Catholics to return to the old church.” The monk even supposedly visited a “returned” 
priest in Iernuţ, where, as in Luduş, “the resistance of the non-returned is quite powerful, being 
supported by many intellectuals.” Not only that, but the Lord’s Army was “in full action” in 
certain communities, where followers “go in groups, do proselytism, and hold public 
gatherings.”91 
When the minutes of this gathering reached the desk of the Director of the Ministry of 
Religions, he requested the head commissioner of Cluj to have one of his regional inspectors 
verify these claims of Macavei, including his reference to “religion manuals.” A local inspector 
was given the task, and a few weeks later he provided a report of his own findings to his boss. 
After traveling to a number of different communities, he found that the Orthodox priests “do 
not do catechism with school-aged children at all,” and the only ones doing catechism are some 
“non-returned priests” who hold catechism for all believers together after the services, using 
the Bible as their material. In fact, the two archpriests and the Orthodox priests were merely 
claiming to do it “to be seen well by the new metropolitan, seeing as how he is a very severe 
man.”92 When relaying this information to Bucharest, the Cluj inspector likewise noted that 
“usually [archpriests] report to bishops that catechism is done regularly and as organized as 
possible in order to have their activity shown off before the bishops, whereas in reality, for the 
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most part, the priests do not put much effort toward catechizing teenagers.”93 (This was not 
necessary a new dynamic either, as in 1951 Ministry officials wrote that Orthodox priests 
demonstrated a “moderate attitude” with regard to catechism, even though “the church 
leadership sought to always impose new obligations in this regard.”94) Even though archpriest 
Macavei justified his active catechism (however fictional) based on the presence of less 
desirable religious groups, the Ministry separated the issues and dealt with the problem of 
“unification” separately, still wary that Orthodox catechism might actually attract youth. Thus, 
catechism had the potential to be a problem for state agents given a particularly zealous priest, 
but Orthodox priests did not carry out catechism religiously, though it seems that certain 
hierarchs expected them to at least pretend to do so. 
As the Luduş archpriest debacle showed, state authorities were keenly interested in and 
influential in helping the church select its leading hierarchs, and they heavily weighed the 
potential benefit of having a “returned” clergyman serve in some leadership capacity as a 
symbol of the completeness of the unification. In 1957, three major posts in the Orthodox 
Church needed filling. The first was Metropolitan of Moldova and Suceava, and Iustin Moisescu 
was tapped for that position. This left the position of Metropolitan of Transylvania and 
Archbishop of Sibiu open, and it seems that state organs and Church leaders agreed that Bishop 
Nicolae Colan of Cluj would fill that spot, then leaving his position open. For Colan’s 
replacement, the views were far from unanimous. Some voices favored a former Greek-Catholic 
because of the many G-C believers in that bishopric, but as the commissioner of Cluj noted, not 
just any former Greek-Catholic would inspire credibility among the priests; the position was too 
significant to be used only as a symbolic gesture. For instance, there were two such “returned” 
clergymen who had aspirations to such a position, but they were both divorced and therefore 
went against the Church’s stance and would not be well-esteemed by conservative clergy. The 
official also mentioned that it was very difficult “to cope with the delicate situation of the 
bishopric of Cluj” and that the person must be very adept. Bishop of Oradea Valerian was 
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considered, but they worried that he would not inspire trust either, as a rumor was spreading 
about him that he “had a hot temper, was a womanizer and that he might have tried to lure a 
young woman who was in the audience, but that she might have hit him with her shoe.” Such 
rumors would make it “very hard for him to find the necessary trust and authority in Cluj.”95 
A few weeks later, the opinion on Colan’s appointment in Sibiu was solidified, and the 
commissioner noted that “all priests, both the old orthodox as well as the returned ones,” 
agreed that Colan would be well suited to the post since he understood “the local problems.” 
Many “returned” priests had hopes that Colan’s departure would mean that they’d get a 
“returned” clergyman as bishop. The commissioners were scanning all of the circulating opinions 
and rumors, helping to identify and assess the potential reception that a particular priest or 
professor might receive if chosen.96 The position was eventually offered to a former Greek-
Catholic priest named Teofil Herineanu, who had not been part of the discussion earlier on. 
(Herineanu would hold the post until his death in 1992, and the position was even promoted to 
archbishopric.) Herineanu immediately caused concern among the inspectors during his initial 
tenure. He unfortunately “introduced a series of new innovations in the denomination which 
produced discontent among the priests,” who apparently bristled at changes, perceiving them 
as coming at the initiative of an outsider. He was actively promoting activities which worked to 
“strengthen mysticism among the priests,” such as encouraging increased times for meditation, 
even at orientation and administrative conferences.97 On March 5, 1961, when the nationwide 
elections for deputies to the Grand National Assembly and People’s Councils was to take place, 
Bishop Herineanu wanted to preach a sermon outdoors using a megaphone about the creation 
of the world (despite the commission’s recommendations to the contrary). Only “at the 
insistence” of other hierarchs (a vicar, adviser, and director) did he renounce his intentions, as 
they convinced him “that the subject was not suitable for such a big day.” Also, in a certain 
church “Ave Maria” was being sung with Herineanu’s knowledge, but he did not take decisive 
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action, forcing “the organs of the state to resolve it.”98 Whether state organs found it worth 
their time to find those responsible for singing a Catholic song is unknown, but this was the 
trade-off of the symbolic gesture of having Herineanu as Orthodox Bishop – he was likely to 
serve in his own way, perhaps introduce innovations, and unlikely to pursue stamping out 
Greek-Catholic vestiges with vigor. Yet he remained for the duration of the communist period. 
Indeed, the process of “consolidating” the unification was arduous, a constant up-hill 
battle. Fifteen years after the unification, parishes were still being found using former Greek-
Catholic “ritual books,” despite the fact that all former Greek-Catholic parishes were supplied in 
1951 with Orthodox equivalents at the order of the Patriarchate. With some 400 former Greek-
Catholic parishes in the region of Cluj alone, commissioners found it “very difficult to enumerate 
correctly” all those who were using the old liturgical book, for example, but they had a list of 
more than 80 known parishes and priests still using the forbidden materials.99 
In a report from the Department of Religions in 1963 summarizing the status of this 
unification, the writer noted that at first, certain “returned” priests were rewarded with 
advantageous posts and parishes (without exceeding the proportion of Orthodox priests, since 
they “contributed their assets as well to unification”). Yet certain Orthodox were guilty of 
“selfishness and envy,” and by “denunciations, instigations, defamations, etc.” were influencing 
the actions of their church and state authorities, who were not “realiz[ing] and analyz[ing] the 
specific situation.” As a result, the situation swung to the “other extreme,” as many “returned” 
priests were gradually removed from good parishes and put in weak ones, resulting in “massive 
downgrades” for “returned priests” in Sibiu, Oradea and Cluj. The report writer complained that 
many of them were “condemned and even arrested, which has been continuing with greater 
passion.” He named a couple of “personally well-known cases,” such as the sentencing of two 
former archbishops. Evidently only at the “intervention” of the Department of Religions were 
these sentences altered,100 perhaps to prevent worsening the process of “reintegration.” 
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The Department’s concern was that if measures were not taken immediately, the 
tendency for pro-Greek Catholic priests and believers to mistrust the Orthodox would cause 
them to “show solidarity,” resulting in “ruptures within these institutions” and a process that 
would be “difficult to restrain.” The unnamed report writer thought it possible to “normalize” 
and stabilize the situation. The author asserted that local state authorities had analyzed the 
situation “with complete discretion” when they gathered information from “unhappy” 
“returned” priests as well as from those Orthodox displaying “open envy” toward “returned” 
priests. Given this knowledge, the Department thought the coming fifteen-year anniversary of 
unification on October 21, 1963, would be a good opportunity to have conferences, discussions, 
and sermons on the “problems of unification,” but also to promote and support those who had 
contributed. He proposed a “letter of gratitude” from the Dept. of Religions to “the most 
representative collaborators” in this action (patriarch, metropolitans, bishops, eventually others 
as well), as well as letters of gratitude from bishoprics to protohierarchs, priests, and other 
“more representative” ones, to pursue the resolution of the “conflicts between returned and 
old orthodox.” He proposed that “pardon” should be sought at the “superior bodies” for 
“returned” but later arrested priests (36 of them). He also urged the Dept. of Religions to 
consider any other measures for “normalization and consolidation” in order to lessen 
“animosities” which were “gradually tightening, and perhaps even in an organized way,” 
because otherwise, it could lead to “grave consequences.”101 
Unauthorized Movements – the Specter of Neoprotestantism 
Church and state vigilance was also necessitated by constantly arising “aberrations,” 
“abnormalities,” and “violations” at the other margins of the Orthodox Church. Off-shoots and 
sects could and did emerge, and church and state representatives cooperated against such 
formations.102 The Lord’s Army was still operating on the margins. About 1000 people were still 
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estimated to be regularly participating across Cluj County (but there were certainly more), 
despite the imprisonment of its leaders. One of the reasons such gatherings persisted, 
authorities believed, was because Orthodox priests supported them “for fear that these 
believers would switch to neoprotestant cults.”103 Thus the problem was a complicated mess of 
priorities. The worst-case scenario was the growth of neoprotestant groups, meaning that the 
only redeeming quality of the Lord’s Army might be that at least the Orthodox believers would 
remain within the Orthodox Church, even if teetering on sectarianism.  
But the lines were blurry. Although the Lord’s Army gatherings were recognizable for 
singing particular songs (with supposedly “legionary melodies”), evidence also revealed that 
many who were interested in the Lord’s Army were also seen at prayer houses of Pentecostals, 
for example. Also disturbingly similar to neoprotestants, Lord’s Army participants were 
witnessed “doing proselytism, going in groups to orthodox churches from other parishes.” The 
inspectors were able to list the names and addresses of many Lord’s Army participants.104  
If the inspectors knew names and addresses, then the barrier to further limitations was 
not one of knowledge. Rather, the barriers to action were more material: they mentioned that 
due to the “drastic reductions in spending on travel,” the inspectors could not maintain watch 
over all the “harmful” religious activity in the region. They were especially concerned about 
their lack of resources to combat the growing neoprotestant menace: “Negative aspects of 
proselytism, baptism, travel from one location to another and other [aspects] from 
neoprotestant religious life and of forbidden religious groups are too frequent and these 
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[groups] profit from the situation that they cannot be watched by us.”105 Authorities had 
arrested the main leaders, but they simply did not have the resources to monitor and respond 
to every Army gathering across Romania. Every governmental action needed to be weighed in 
terms of priority, cost, personnel, and potential benefit. Authorities had no concrete plan to 
deal with this movement beyond continuing to gain information on existing enclaves, pressure 
priests and Orthodox hierarchs to inform and denounce the Army, and fine those they caught or 
imprison leaders who emerged. But these actions would not suffice to stop the movement, as 
we will discover further on. 
Religious Normalcy Mostly Achieved 
Although state officials wished for a unified Romanian Church, the Orthodox Church, 
and for church leaders of all denominations to present a unified front in their public utterances 
and attitudes both in Romania and abroad to foreigners, they were nevertheless wary of 
spontaneously organized ecumenical events. A commissioner reporting on Sibiu made mention 
of a case of “suspicious” religious activity there, namely a locally organized ecumenical church 
activity that included Orthodox (but former Lord’s Army participants), Baptists and Pentecostals. 
There was singing at these services, presumably including songs of Lord’s Army origin, and a 
gathering was held with “prayer for the unity of all Christians.” Such activity would need proper 
permissions, and somehow the organizing Orthodox priest had received permission from a 
retired archpriest (a questionable approach), and even after state and church representatives 
had debated the issue, they phoned Patriarch Justinian, who granted the organizing priest 
permission to continue. Later, inspectors found that this priest had had an audience with 
Justinian previously, revealing the complex layers of control and permission that enveloped such 
questions of acceptable religiosity.106 Such an episode, although rare for the time, is interesting 
in itself and as a harbinger of a problem that would resurface with more power in the last 
decade of the regime: although publicly praised and promoted within proscribed boundaries, 
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ecumenism was suspicious when grassroots in nature because it then it represented the 
potential for religion or Christianity to serve as an alternative communal identity or path to 
belonging, from which people could be mobilized toward actions or slogans that originated 
independently of the established state or religious powers. Ecumenism was intended to be 
organized in a top-down fashion to ensure that it had state belonging and identity as its 
gravitational center.  
Despite the myriad problems in the religious realm, most Orthodox and Reformed 
priests, most of the time, were not posing problems for the Department of Religions or for 
church leaders. In Cluj, for example, Orthodox priests were more of a help than a hindrance: 
“Orthodox priests at orientation conferences for the most part speak in the discussions and 
treat the problems of social interest with more loyalty than the other denominations. As a 
result, the priests in turn guide the believers of the parish, mobilizing them around actions of 
social interest. Likewise the believers of this cult also show themselves loyal toward the popular 
democratic regime, fitting within the laws of the state.”107 They fit into a particular socio-
political order and used their own status and influence to promote such an order. As mentioned 
above, the main “problems” with the Orthodox Church were not really with the Orthodox 
Church at all, but with foreign elements (so to speak) within the Church, namely the “non-
returned” Greek-Catholic believers and clergy, sectarian formations like the Lord’s Army, and 
those who were “crossing over” to neoprotestant denominations.  
The commissioner of Cluj did mention one imbalance, that there were a few 
“inadequate priests” in large urban parishes with dubious backgrounds (like Legionnaire), 
whereas there were some loyal priests in “weaker” parishes, and that efforts should be made to 
switch the places of the two, especially relocating the former to rural parishes.108 In the case of 
priest Gheorghe Ramba, the situation was as it should be. Ramba had been arrested for being 
involved in Legionnaire activity and served time in the first half of the 1950s. After release, he 
decided to pursue the priesthood and started seminary in Sibiu in 1957. But at the beginning of 
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his third year in 1959, the rector called him in, reporting that “the Securitate is pressuring me to 
kick you out” due to the undesirable links between Ramba's background and chosen profession. 
But the rector offered to recommend Ramba to the vicar of the Cluj episcopate so that he might 
get a parish there immediately and finish studies from a distance, thereby lessening the 
intermingling of negative influences. The plan worked: he was ordained at Bogata de Sus in the 
county of Cluj and received approval from the Department in Dec 1959.  
But this was far from a choice position. It was quite a remote, small, and poor village, 
and without public transport. So he picked up his bags and began the ten kilometer walk from 
the last stop. He had a walking companion for some of the journey who informed him that 
things were “going badly with the church, the people are not able to give their contributions.” 
His mood did not get a lift from this information, nor did his bags from his future fellow 
villager.109 
When he arrived, he found that in the village few homes had flooring and there was not 
electricity. The church in Bogata was made of wood and "very deteriorated." The same went for 
the parish house. There were about 200 families in his village and the neighboring Calna, also 
part of his service, and he switched locales of his service each Sunday. Having finished his 
distance learning, he then passed exams and received a license. He was also permitted by the 
local secretary of the Popular Council to build a new house, in part, he thought, because the 
secretary was a believer. All formalities were taken care of, and his house was even built with 
electrical capabilities in the event of its provision in the future. The next task was the church in 
Bogata, which was in very bad shape: it housed bats, rain came in, pigeons occupied the tower, 
and the Holy elements froze in the chalice due to no heating. He tried for several years to get 
approval to fix up the church, but responses were always delayed and negative. He traveled all 
the way to Bucharest, where they reported that they never saw any requests relating to his 
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parish, but by spending several days there, he got approval and returned to Cluj. The church was 
torn down, work on a new one began, while services were held in neighboring Calna.110 
Priest Ramba’s story is a fine example of religious normalcy. State agents kept an eye on 
problematic views and influences (like the stain of Ramba’s Legionnaire participation), and they 
accepted that such priests received placement in the worst parishes. Communist authorities 
even granted approval to renovations and construction of religious buildings (although perhaps 
lacking in motivation at times). Such religious activity did not threaten the status quo, the 
normalcy of religious practice in communist society. 
Most work involving the Orthodox and Reformed Churches had become routine. When 
the election of deputies was taking place in March 1963 in the Banat, a commissioner reported 
on the church role in supporting this governmental event. The church leaders circulated letters, 
and these were read at churches in anticipation of the elections. In sermons or at the end of the 
service, in Orthodox, Catholic, and Reformed Churches “religious servants reminded believers 
about elections,” about the candidates, and local plans, some even doing so several consecutive 
Sundays. Apparently each of the churches conformed to the service times indicated by the 
circulatory letter so as not to cause any interference with the elections, and several of the 
churches even agreed to postpone serving the Lord’s Supper to a week later so as to minimize 
the duration of the service on election Sunday. Many of those offering evening services shifted 
them later, when elections would be completed.  
There were just a few aberrations. A Romanian Orthodox priest decided not to have a 
service at all, since he thought “as such no one will come to church.” A Reformed Priest was 
guilty of not saying a thing about the elections. Evidently, both extremes were problematic in 
the eyes of the commissioner, not just the uncooperative Reformed pastor. It was best to 
“collaborate in a sincere way with the local organs,” which included maintaining religious 
normalcy and making religious and state events somehow complementary, not mutually 
exclusive. If the priests did that, then local authorities representing this atheist state would be 
satisfied enough to remark that “the work done by the religious servants connected to elections 
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was well appreciated.”111 Indeed, the Department of Religions wished for order, even the kind 
instituted by the churches. Department officials sometimes referenced church canon in disputed 
cases.112  The Department had no interest, apparently, in undermining the authority it had 
vested in the Church. 
In the Reformed Church, on the whole, the believers were considered “loyal” toward 
the issues of the state, not “fanatics” in their religious life, and satisfactory in their relations with 
Orthodox believers in mixed areas. Yet, there was still some cause for concern. Although the 
clergy attended their orientation conferences, “the social problems are treated superficially, and 
a greater accent is put on things of a religious character.” They sometimes neglected to invite 
the local organs to them, and unfortunately even the obligatory minutes of the conferences 
were believed to be partly “fictional,” not illustrating the actual discussions. Last, Reformed 
priests “consign[ed] more interest in religious education of the believers than the Orthodox 
priests,” especially in their catechism of children and preparation of teens for confirmation. This 
situation was regrettable for sure, but also too customary to change without significant struggle 
and backlash.  
In 1960 Department of Religions personnel still considered it worth recalling the effects 
of the “counterrevolution” of Hungary in 1956 when “certain” pastors, Seminary professors, and 
students displayed “hostility” toward the regime and “sympathy” to the counterrevolutionaries, 
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and had contacts with “reactionary elements” from Hungary. The situation did improve with the 
“restructuring of the teaching staff” at the Seminary in addition to the arrests, and the 
inspectors now considered the situation in the church to be “normal” without “displays of 
hostility.”113 
For the Lord’s Army, a new phase had begun, and local inspectors witnessed the 
immediate effects of the arrest of these leaders.114115 Mîndroni, who had risen to prominence in 
his region due to the story of his supernatural encounter, supposedly died of heart failure in 
prison in March of 1960, only a few months after his sentence. As for the meetings in his small 
town of Ciula, the "shock" caused by the many arrests and then death of Mîndroni sucked the 
momentum out of the movement. No new leader appeared in the village to replace him.116 
In Prison: Opportunities for New Christian Communities and Tensions Arise 
Although the Romanian state attempted to disrupt the influence of unacceptably 
religious leaders on ordinary believers by imprisoning them, what is remarkable is that they 
created an opportunity for the unacceptably religious from various denominations to meet. The 
Reformed “Bethanist” pastors and laymen imprisoned in 1958 almost universally mention the 
new relationships they made with Christians of other confessions and the mutual 
encouragement this sometimes provided. Most of those whose memoirs I studied mentioned a 
frequent and deep connection with fellow Christians across denominational lines, and the trust 
and mutual respect that these interactions taught them. This is not to say that all believers saw 
eye-to-eye with one another, as cross-denominational and even intra-denominational 
encounters sometimes meant a furthering of divisions. 
Nevertheless, the imprisoned Reformed believers were often placed in cells or assigned 
to work in divisions with acquaintances. After the sentence, Dézsi, Visky, Szilágyi, Papp, Karczagi, 
Sándor Jakab, and Sándor Kiss were placed together in the same cell. Dézsi – similarly to Szilágyi, 
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Karczagi, and Visky - recalls, "We spent an unforgettable eight months here together, 240 quiet 
days, the studying of the Word, rejoicing in the Lord, thanksgiving for the past, and in spiritual 
preparation for the years ahead of us.”117 They had a routine that included taking turns leading 
devotions, prayer, and discussing various topics. On Sunday mornings they would have a church 
service, which they would take turns leading. From time to time they would celebrate the 
Eucharist as well (by reserving small pieces of their rations). Once they were separated, this 
practice was continued to the degree that it could be. Sometimes they would discreetly worship 
together in the ward or standing in the courtyard. Some of the time this practice would be 
conducted with fellow Romanian Christians, in Romanian or Hungarian as befitted those 
present. At times Dézsi felt he truly did have the experience of "One Body."118 János Fekete 
relayed to his wife after his imprisonment that "the communal spirit was good - in secret we 
held church services and shared the Lord's Supper."119 
A large number of prisoners were sent to work on the canal for the Danube Delta near 
the Black Sea, a major excavation project that used forced labor in brutal (deadly) fashion into 
the early 1960s.120 But "in the folds of the delta slave-life [prison-life] there were opportunities 
for regularly held church services,” as during summer afternoon breaks, they “laid down on the 
grass, formed ourselves into smaller groups, and we could meet […]." They didn't have a Bible, 
couldn't sing, gather in large groups, or look like they were praying, but "Laying in the grass, 
propped up on our elbows, the sermon was spoken with the greatest naturalness. Truly deep 
explanations of the Word and testimonies were heard." These were their "Services in 
disguise."121 Not only “Bethanists” gathered, and not only pastors preached. Sometimes even 
“simple church members” such as farmer Sándor Jakab would preach.122  
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The lawyer Kálmán Széplaki, whose contacts with believers was minimal before he was 
imprisoned for his personal fictional writings in 1959, referred to the Danube Delta labor camp 
as his “theological university.” He found a group of believers by accident when he overheard 
them discussing the situation of Ferenc Visky, whose imprisonment and familial situation he had 
heard about while in freedom. There he enjoyed the sermons and teachings of Karczagi, Jakab, 
Szilágyi, and Dézsi.123 
The imprisoned Reformed believers found a particular affinity with imprisoned Lord’s 
Army believers. Karczagi met members of the Lord's Army while working on the Delta, one of 
the "other gifts" of his years there. As a Reformed Christian but also a participant in the CE 
movement, he found in them a kindred spirit. Karczagi felt that like the CE, the Lord’s Army did 
not promote breaking away from congregations while longing for renewal.124 Farmer Sándor 
Kiss likewise mentions, “We had especially deep connections with the members of the divisions 
faithfully remaining in the Orthodox Church – the Lord’s Army – since we too remained, like 
them, in the church even despite the persecution.”125  Dézsi was in the sick ward at one of the 
prisons with well-known composer and Lord’s Army member Nicolae Moldoveanu, as well as 
some other believers. Moldoveanu composed songs and verse, and he taught them.126 Several 
other Reformed believers mention the Lord’s Army with fondness.  
But some Reformed believers developed close relationships with believers from other 
faiths as well– Greek-Catholic, Catholic, mainline Orthodox, Baptist, and Lutheran. Reformed 
Pastor János Lőrincz mentions being with Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, 
Catholic, Reformed, Nazarene, Reform-Adventist, and Pentecostals at once in one cell.127 There 
were others there not for religious reasons, but it is a curiosity that the state was willing enough 
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(disorganized enough?) to place such a cohort together. Perhaps they expected to foster division 
this way, given the history of animosity between denominations. Once Dézsi was separated 
from his Reformed colleagues in his new prison in Gherla (Szamosújvár) he got to know "dear" 
believers like a Greek-Catholic monk and theological instructor "who really loved us,” two other 
reformed pastors, two evangelical pastors, a Roman Catholic priest, a Roman Catholic monk, 
and the assistant head of the national Franciscan Order (and others).128 Karczagi also mentioned 
interacting with and learning much from the Greek Catholic priests he met in prison.129 Visky 
shared a cell with the famous Lutheran pastor Richard Wurmbrand during the latter’s second 
sentence. 
During a certain period while at the Danube Delta, many prisoners were kept in the belly 
of a barge. There, on holidays, Széplaki recalls some “six kinds of wonderful liturgies” taking 
place, including “Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, and several kinds of Protestant liturgies.” On 
Christmas or at Easter, an Orthodox men’s chorus would sing and protestants would preach, and 
it was as though “everyone felt that something was happening here that needed quiet and to 
pay attention in reverence.” “Not even the guards dared intervene,” as the “barge became a 
cathedral.”130 But generally, if the relations among the prisoners became too friendly, those in 
charge would try to find new ways to divide them. 
Indeed, although the ecumenism was at times remarkable, it was not complete. Some 
pastors of various denominations kept their distance. Some even refused to jointly recite 
something as common as the Lord’s Prayer; the community depended on the personalities of 
those involved. In contrast to the recollections of Karczagi and Széplaki, Antal Papp recalls that 
although there were a number of Catholic and Unitarian priests, “unfortunately we did not have 
spiritual communion with them.”131 
For Reformed believers, there were denominations present that they decidedly did not 
agree with or find Christian brotherhood in, the Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
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and sometimes the Unitarians. Sándor Jakab said they “lived in community” with all kinds of 
believers, but they “could not accept the teachings of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 
Unitarians.”132 “Bethanists” Béla Balogh and Sámuel Boda once shared a cell with fifty Jehovah’s 
witnesses. Balogh recalls that "other than the Jehovah’s witnesses, with everyone, every 
denomination and nationality, God's Spirit worked unlimited, deep, true community."133   
Although the Reformed Believers above recalled quite warmly the religious-community 
life in prison, particularly mentioning feelings of unity with members of the Lord’s Army, it is 
interesting to discover that the head figure of the Lord’s Army, Traian Dorz, remembers 
interactions with fellow believers much more bitterly. Like the “Bethanists,” many LA 
participants found themselves in common cells. But unlike them, they seemed to carry the 
baggage of previous disagreements into the cells, despite their common chastisement from the 
state.134  
In fact, Dorz shared a cell with his enemy and supposed informer Alexandru Pop, when 
one day a Hungarian Reformed pastor, the “Bethanist” Sándor Szilágyi, was transferred to Dorz's 
cell, glowing from his experiences with his brethren as well as with LA leader Nicolae 
Moldoveanu and Richard Wurmbrand (whom Dorz decidedly did not consider brethren). Szilágyi 
was excited to share a cell with Dorz, whose name he recognized and who might be able to 
share something with them. But Dorz did not like what Szilágyi said, and he felt that Szilágyi took 
sides with his opponents within the Lord’s Army. According to Dorz, they had major arguments 
in prison and did not reconcile. For his part, Szilágyi recalls his time with Lord’s Army members 
glowingly, saying “our hearts beat together wonderfully, given we want one thing,” and that we 
are “true brothers to one another, in Christ completely one; neither language nor religious 
difference can separate us.”135 Dorz found not oneness, but difference. 
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Dorz later had a chance to be with many of his “brothers,” including Moldoveanu, whom 
he regarded as adhering to dangerous teachings.136 They remained deeply divided, with 
Moldoveanu accusing Dorz of pursuing a nationalist line, and Dorz accusing him of adhering to a 
"satanic theory" that would only lead to “chaos, disorder, anarchy, and mess.” Dorz endeavored 
to counter all of the "foreign" ideas which opposed "our doctrine and faith," and he considered 
Moldoveanu one of the greatest progenitors of this pseudo-protestantism (though at the same 
time considered him highly unoriginal, merely borrowing from Wurmbrand and others of his 
ilk).137 
Later, other “Bethanist” pastors joined the cell which contained Dorz and Moldoveanu. 
Dorz complains of suffering through tortuous days of hearing their thoughts and songs. The 
disputes between these “brothers” culminated in a heated debate, in which Dorz and 
Moldoveanu each accused and insulted the other, with dozens of other prisoners witness to the 
shouting.138 For Dorz, the cause of unity was hopeless with most of those whom he encountered 
in prison, as all he could see were differences, not common ground. His starting point of unity 
was agreement with him. 
Thus it would be wrong to suggest that prison was a place of complete fraternity among 
the peoples and religions; this was not the norm for all, whether believers or otherwise. Many 
believers experienced a hardening and isolation in prison, and some would declare that they did 
not want a God who would let them be imprisoned like that, away from wife or family. And yet, 
it does seem to be a striking aspect of the collective memories of the group of Reformed 
believers imprisoned in 1958 that they could find some spiritual strength in each other and in 
members of other faiths. When struggling, there were usually fellow believers to encourage 
them, Visky recalls.139 In many cases, state attempts to reeducate these believers toward 
acceptable religiosity were far from succeeding.  
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While these pastors and believers were in prison under various pretexts, their families, 
friends, and fellow believers made do as best they could. Visky’s wife and seven young children 
were among the least fortunate. They were exiled to a prison-village in the remote Bărăgan 
region where they lived in a hut. Survival was precarious at times. There were "priests from 
several denominations" in the village. Julia Visky recalls that "We tried to fellowship with them 
and share the Word of God, but this was only possible with one or two of them." Whereas some 
considered the family outsiders or “heretics”—a relatively common view of Orthodox adherents 
of Protestants—other fellow prisoners gave them aid.140 Upon her husband’s sentence, Janos 
Lőrincz’s wife was fired from her job, but when she tried to get new work, the stain of her 
husband’s criminality kept her from being accepted; she was advised to divorce her husband. 
Yet, she got lucky once when applying at a sewing operation and they failed to ask for the 
document which would have revealed her husband’s unsavory history. She also took packages 
all the way to the Bărăgan to help the Visky family in exile, even though she didn't even speak 
Romanian.141  
But then in 1964, to the great joy of the imprisoned believers and their families, the 
arrested “Bethanists,” Lord’s Army leaders, and many others were granted an amnesty at the 
behest of the new leader, Nicolae Ceauşescu, whose youth and act of amnesty seemed to 
promise a brighter future for targeted believers. Yet as prisoners were being released in July of 
1964, prison wardens asked them to sign a declaration, denouncing their previous behavior. 
Jakab and Szilágyi, for example, although torn by the decision, refused to sign, and so it was 
typed into their folders that they had “grown stronger in faith.”142 They were still let go. Over 
the course of the following decades, those who passed through the crucible with their faith and 
a community of believers intact continued their religious activities and communal activity. The 
links formed among Christian believers were significant because in many cases they laid 
                                                          
 
140 Julia Francis, The Orphans and the Raven: From a Mother’s Autobiography (Bartlesville, OK: Living 
Sacrifice Books, 1989), 62–63. 
141 Buzogány and Jánosi, A Református Egyház Romániában a Kommunista Rendszer Első Felében, 345. 
142 Visky, Bilincseket és Börtönt Is, 59. 
 
 
204 
 
groundwork for grassroots ecumenism not only for those who had been imprisoned, but also for 
subsequent generations of believers.  
Conclusion 
Communist officials took note of the uprisings in Poland and Hungary in particular and 
reacted by taking note of places in society where associations still seemed to have the power to 
mobilize people, and one of those forms of association was religious life. Officials scrutinized 
participants in religious activities that lacked political ambitions and considered those a threat 
who were acting independently of church leadership structures. This demonstrates that officials 
largely trusted church leaders and depended upon the religious custom of deference to leaders 
to help establish a greater reliability among clergy and believers. By 1960, although religious 
management still presented ongoing maintenance issues, officials did not seem to regard the 
Orthodox or Reformed Churches as politically threatening, and it appeared that they had, for 
the most part, established a religious normalcy that was acceptable to them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Ryan J. Voogt 2017 
205 
VI. Muscovite Intelligentsia, Late Socialism, and the Limits to Orthodox
Innovations: 1964-1987 
The Russian Orthodox Church in the time of the Soviet Union faced and adjusted to 
numerous changes in the society. Although efforts by churchmen from the 1920s until 1943 
would be best described as designed for survival, this does not characterize the periods 
following Stalin’s encouragement of the Orthodox Church during World War II (See Chapter II). 
Particularly under Leonid Brezhnev beginning in 1964 until Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of 
“glasnost” (openness) in 1987, state and church leaders cooperated in attempting to normalize 
religious life and practices in communist Soviet Union, against which abnormal and 
unacceptable religious life and practices were also defined. Because church and state leaders 
generally cooperated in defining and enforcing what was “normal” and “acceptable,” those 
within the Orthodox Church attempting renewal or innovation struggled against both bodies. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate how several Orthodox priests in the Moscow region made 
attempts to enliven or renew church life in their parishes and among wider circles of the 
intelligentsia, but how such dynamic activity always led to heavy scrutiny and punishment of 
those involved. This dynamic activity was regarded as problematic because it was essentially 
voluntary and communal in nature and ambition, rather than hierarchical and submissive. 
Church and state leaders seemed to agree that popular innovations were always potentially 
destabilizing for the existing socio-political order. Although all church services featured 
“religious propaganda,” authorities only deemed those religious leaders and communities 
“unacceptable” for their pursuit of activity marked by enthusiasm, mutual authenticity, and 
openness. They seemingly deemed acceptable the performance of rituals, as though they were 
banal acts by individuals done to satisfy their own consequences. Officials did not comprehend 
the power of Orthodox rituals in constructing alternative identities or creating the possibility for 
alternative imagined communities for adherents. But Soviet authorities did find effective ways 
to reduce communal strength in non-conformist Orthodox circles by attacking one of the 
pillars—the leaders (usually priests), showing the relative fragility of these particular religious 
communities. 
In 1964 Nikita Khrushchev was deposed by his rivals largely due to the capricious and 
aggressive nature of his reforms, and Leonid Brezhnev became the new General Secretary of the 
Communist Party. In the sphere of religion, the numerous church closings, imprisonments, and 
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state-led propagandistic attacks against religion—sometimes even accompanied by desecration 
of church property, getting drunk on sacramental wine, smashing and burning of icons and 
religious literature, and the sawing down of crosses—generated enough resentment that many 
considered Khrushchev’s attacks on religion another one of his so-called “hare-brained 
schemes.” The reputation of the state internationally and domestically suffered, as many 
believers and non-believers alike sympathized with the plight of the religious as victims. The 
attacks were in the name of replacing the darkness of religious superstition with the light of 
scientific truth, but they all too often resembled hooliganism. As Dmitrii Pospielovsky argues, 
these methods also harmed “civic and political loyalty,” as many believers had to now practice 
underground, and “concealed, uncontrolled religious practices were socially more dangerous 
than an overt and hence controllable Church.”1 Even before Khrushchev was deposed, on July 
27, 1964, Kuroedov communicated to his commissioners the problems that local authorities had 
been causing believers, who then distributed complaints abroad about “persecution” of the 
church by the state.2  
Khrushchev’s attacks were not only problematic for the reputation of the state, but for 
the representatives of the institutional churches as well. Even while acts that could be 
characterized as “hooligan” were occurring across the country (not to mention church closings 
and increased restrictions to religious practices), church leaders made no public condemnation 
but continued to tout religious freedom and the unmatched justice of the Soviet Union. Even 
while the state attempted to extinguish the flame of religion across the country, religious 
representatives were spreading the message abroad that all was well, and foreigners were 
invited to sample the Soviet Union’s religious beauty in well-choreographed tours.3 These 
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brazen acts of duplicity would make many more Soviet citizens—religious or not—sympathetic 
to the criticisms leveled by an increasing number of religious non-conformists, most notably 
Gleb Yakunin and Nikolai Eshliman in 1965.  
From the beginning of Brezhnev’s leadership until glasnost under Gorbachev, the 
features of the interactions among state and religious bodies and believers were fairly 
consistent: sporadic persecution of individuals and communities who were seen as too active or 
too dynamic in terms of participation; increasing interest in religion among intellectuals and 
youth; an overall decrease in violent or murderous acts by the state toward religious enemies; 
increasing religious dissent featuring appeals to the law and democratic values; increasing 
reliance by the state on intelligence and surveillance; and pressure on religious leaders to 
promote Soviet propaganda abroad. Although these features will be represented below, the 
main focus of the chapter will be to demonstrate that what made religiosity unacceptable in the 
eyes of state and church authorities was when clergy and believers pursued communal 
religiosity, as opposed to simple church attendance in the name of personal conscience. 
Changes in Soviet society created the conditions to make communal religiosity more 
desirable. The Brezhnev era and that of his successors Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko 
comprise the so-called period of the “gerontocracy.” Even their successor Gorbachev labeled 
the period as one of stagnancy. Scholars, including Julianne Furst, have come to call this the era 
of “mature socialism,” when revolutionary fervor gave way to enjoying the fruits of socialism,4 
while the system seemed to decline in vigor and in its ability to compete with the capitalism of 
the West.  
If the economy and state ideology had lost momentum, it does not mean that all areas 
of Soviet life had become stagnant. “Mature socialism” left room for nascent movements to 
flourish, including youth sub-cultures and political, environmental, and even religious 
movements, necessitating that one of the main arteries of Soviet authority – the surveillance of 
the secret police – kept pumping, with no signs of slowing down. Both the Orthodox and Baptist 
Churches witnessed an effervescence during this period – but not from the offices of the 
bishops or denominational leaders. While the institutional churches mirrored the “aging 
maturity” of the state leadership, the organism of the church received new life from among its 
clergy and laity. The response of the state and institutional church to dynamic religious life 
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remained constant: to alienate and marginalize those leading or participating in the 
bourgeoning and dynamic religious activity in service of the “greater” good. For the state, the 
greater good was the maintenance of control over the population by severing spontaneously 
created vertical and horizontal ties. For the institutional church, the greater good was 
maintenance of its legality and privileges (however circumscribed they may have been), which 
religious non-conformists threatened. 
One institutional change under Brezhnev was the reorganization of the Council for 
Russian Orthodox Church Affairs and the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults into the 
Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), although within the top leadership of the CRA, certain 
officials still focused on non-Orthodox religions. The exact prerogatives of the CRA were not 
officially made known.5 But evidence shows that CRA representatives had frequent interactions 
with church hierarchs, and the CRA functioned as the eyes and ears of state intelligence in 
religious affairs. They monitored religious activities and had a presence and relationship in every 
registered religious community. They made reports and distributed them to locally affected 
officials and agents.  
Under Brezhnev, state organs put more emphasis on penalizing church communities for 
not registering by fining leaders and participants (while still not providing a path to registration), 
youth involvement, proselytizing, and any religious activities beyond regularly scheduled 
services. The form persecution took in a world of “mature socialism” was largely bureaucratic. 
The CRA advocated church closures much more rarely, local representatives of the state almost 
never destroyed or defamed bell towers and icons, and when police arrested believers and 
clergymen, judicial organs typically gave them a trial before imprisonment and sentences were 
reduced compared to previous eras. Atheist propaganda continued. It appears that the state’s 
goal was not to create a column of enemies so much as provide as many obstacles and 
annoyances as possible in the way of religious dynamism while hoping to tarnish the appeal of 
religion. As Pospielovsky argues, under Brezhnev, persecution was not meant to end, “only to 
take more civilized forms.”6 
In addition, the state representatives continued to ensure that as far as possible, all 
church leadership positions be occupied by compliant persons. Bishops and clergy knew they 
should maintain good relations with CRA officials, as their operations depended on it. Common 
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courtesy and gifts were never a bad idea. If a local commissioner had a positive relationship with 
a clergyman, he might make certain allowances or overlook things, such as reporting declining 
participation even if it was going up.7  If there was to be defiance, it almost certainly had to 
come from the laity or the clergy. And when it did, the state attempted to isolate or imprison 
such figures quickly, always under the guise of legality – either by having church leaders relocate 
the priests as part of routine clergy management, or, more aggressively, finding the clergy 
member guilty of some sort of infraction of Soviet legislation.  
Because the state shifted its policies in favor of resorting to legalese and legal 
procedures, those inclined to public protest did as well. It is during this period that certain 
believers and clergymen gained notoriety (and were correspondingly harassed) for publicizing 
actions by the state or religious leadership deemed illegal, corrupt, or against the spirit of the 
Church or even the spirit of the state. This is the time of the Soviet dissidents Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn’s and Andrei Sakharov’s fame, and many religious figures likewise gained notoriety 
publicly and through underground (samizdat) documents. The first Orthodox figures to make 
major waves were priests Gleb Yakunin and Nikolai Eshliman, who wrote an open letter in 1965 
to heads of state about what they perceived to be wrongful involvement in church matters. 
Yakunin in particular continued to write numerous letters to various leaders both in the Soviet 
Union and around the world.8 
The number of such outspoken persons grew in the 1970s, as did the diversity of the 
groups and movements that such persons belonged to or participated in. Even underground 
ecumenical movements began to form, and there was considerable cross-fertilization with other 
movements, like the Helsinki Watch Group. Furthermore, the outspoken religious few gained in 
numbers as intellectuals became increasingly interested in religion. 
Policies changed minimally with the death of Brezhnev in 1982 and the subsequent rise 
of Andropov and then Chernenko. The head of the Council for Religious Affairs, Vladimir 
Kuroedov, retired in 1984 after nearly 20 years of service. His replacement, Konstantin 
Kharchev, showed no noticeable change in method or policy. Yet when one takes a long view of 
this period, one finds that the number of registered churches, number of priests, and the 
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number of those in monasteries declined steadily (yet not drastically). There were examples of 
growth, but on the whole, attendance and participation declined.  
Even in Gorbachev’s first years, no clear changes in the state-church relationship were 
made. It was not until Chernobyl’s meltdown and the subsequent opening (glasnost’) of the 
Soviet Union that the Church experienced any sort of remarkable improvements. By the late 
1980s, hundreds of new parishes had registered, youth ministries were permitted, monasteries 
and seminaries re-opened, and there was a basic freedom from molestation by state officials. 
This opening coincided with a general opening in the Soviet Union and says less about changes 
in the state-church dynamic specifically than about the state-society relationship. The state, by 
Gorbachev’s lead, was gradually taking a different approach toward its citizens and their 
activities, and the churches greatly benefitted from that.  
The attacks of Khrushchev did not disappear immediately with Brezhnev, even if the 
former’s religious policies were “hare-brained.” Brezhnev and those who followed simply 
applied coercion and violence differently, as their rationale and end goals differed from 
Khrushchev’s. Khrushchev attempted to act according to the dominant ideological narrative of 
socialism, namely that religion and socialism were incompatible, and that religion should 
disappear (either naturally or with “assistance”). The Brezhnev regime, somewhat like Stalin 
during World War II, wished to maintain stability via a compliant populace (whose religious 
“needs” were being satisfied), while religious actors simultaneously served foreign policy goals 
of demonstrating the freedom of conscience promised in the constitution. Brezhnev, in order to 
maintain stability and a façade of religious freedom, granted more freedoms to the compliant 
institutions and leaders and aggressively hunted the non-compliant, thereby meeting his goals. 
Church Services 
The church service continued to be a problematic gathering after the Khrushchev era, as 
the tension between personal freedom of conscience and open church services and the official 
desire for a religion-free public was not at all resolved. It appears that state officials in the 
Brezhnev era simply hoped that the “needs” of believers to satisfy their desire for communal 
religiosity would be done in as benign a way as possible and would naturally diminish without 
the state needing to formulate a specific strategy. Religiosity was at its most benign when 
participants were few in number, of advanced age, and were not animated beyond attending 
religious services. 
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As in the 1950s (See Chapters II and IV), large crowds were attending church on feast 
days, and if churches were demolished, that only increased the concentration of people at the 
remaining ones. The best Council of Religious Affairs Commissioner of Moscow Oblast A. A. 
Trushin could do was to claim that “although not very significantly, some changes have occurred 
which in essence boil down to a reduction in religiosity,” but nevertheless, “the church still ha[d] 
a marked influence over a certain part of the population.” For example, he noted that on 
Sundays and especially on holidays the churches in Moscow (more in the city than the oblast) 
were filled with believers.9 Trushin claimed that from 1963 to 1964, fewer children were 
christened, fewer dead received church burials, and fewer weddings occurred in churches. Yet, 
even if this was the case, the changes were very modest at best, plus the reality was that “the 
intelligentsia and even people belonging to the party and Komsomol celebrate religious 
rituals.”10 
Commissioners from the CRA pointed to several aspects of pronounced religious 
activity, including church choirs and monasteries. They noted that people who were 
“distinguished in the past,” like retired teachers, professors, doctors, and engineers, were active 
in the choir and even in the life of the church.11 The greatest religious hotbed in Moscow Oblast 
in Trushin’s opinion was the Troitse-Sergieva Lavra of Zagorsk (the Soviet name for Sergiev 
Posad), arguably the most prominent monastery in the Russian Orthodox Church, which Stalin 
had restored to the church in 1945. People, including youth, would visit there for religious 
inspiration or teachings. On the day honoring Saint Sergei, some 10,000 believers came from the 
regions of Zagorsk and Moscow. Moreover, at the nearby seminary in Zagorsk, seminarians were 
not only being influenced by its monks and making like-minded acquaintances, but some 
evidently had met their wives there in the social interaction that visiting the Lavra afforded.12 
While KGB agents were a visible presence at the Seminary and they ensured the cooperation of 
professors and students, the Lavra did not have the same and afforded all kinds of uncontrolled 
interactions. But these were not the main issue, despite the symbolic importance of the Lavra. 
The main problems were with priests “activating” congregations across Moscow and the oblast. 
                                                          
9 Keston Archive, “Council for Religious Affairs of Moscow Oblast, Report,” 1965. Archive file <KGB 54>, p. 
93. Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 1, Del. 71. 
10 Ibid., 100. 
11 Ibid., 72. 
12 Ibid., 76. 
 
 
212 
 
Trushin described the goal of the Council for Religious Affairs as “strengthening the 
control over observance of legislation on the cults,” not “strengthening control over the cults.” 
That is to say, it was supposedly their respect for law that drove them, not the desire to control. 
But divisions within the government impeded the elimination of violations. According to a 
report by Trushin in 1965, not all local organs of power were as vigilant as others. In some 
districts (raiony) in Moscow city and Oblast, clergy were baptizing children illegally, without 
anyone preventing this action. Plus, local governments were supposed to offer alternatives to 
religious holiday celebrations but not everywhere were “secular rituals and non-religious 
holidays” carried out with success. In 1964, representatives from the CRA delivered more than 
30 lectures and presentations about soviet legislation on cults and measures toward control to 
various local organs, but Trushin could not be sure what effect they were having.13 
Trushin also had to face the many complaints from citizens about what they considered 
the “unlawful” closing of churches. He admitted that “threats and intimidation” were used to 
close certain religious communities. He had identified examples of “straight meddling in internal 
affairs of churches” and of “rude” behavior by officials. One problematic consequence was that 
in certain cases complaints were distributed abroad, “which gave [foreigners] reason to 
strengthen slanderous propaganda in their own countries about persecution of the church and 
religion in our country.” To rectify the situation, the CRA took measures to “eliminate selected 
errors” and renew services in three different locations.14 Government representatives were far 
from being of one mind and spirit about managing religion, and normalcy and predictability was 
wanting.  
Priests and their unacceptable communal religiosity 
For those who regarded religion as a dying custom, more concerning than mass 
participation on feast days was that certain priests were attracting crowds for ordinary Sunday 
services, for Vespers, and even during the week. It was usually sermons that distinguished 
priests. “As is well-known,” CRA Commissioner Trushin remarked, “the church pulpit is the one 
place in our country for legal propaganda of ideology alien to us. And it needs to be noted that 
servants of cults of all religions very cleverly make use of this opportunity.”15 CRA 
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Commissioners kept a list of problematic priests and reported them to their rectors, and local 
officials and security organs worked together in keeping track of their activities. 
In January 1965, Trushin conducted an “on-the-ground study of the preaching activities 
of the clergy.” Summarizing the situation in Moscow Oblast, he was concerned about this 
“opportunistic activity” within the church, and he could “not claim that on this the issue the 
situation is more or less alright.”16 Trushin was disturbed at priests’ efforts toward 
“strengthening beliefs in god” (as though exceptional), the life of the church, and “ignit[ing] 
religious fanaticism.”17 Preaching was “igniting religious fanaticism,” for example, when priests 
urged people to take part in rites that strengthened the church.18 By definition, a priest was 
“fanatic” when he worked with energy toward enlivening church life or preaching with 
conviction. One priest was quoted as urging people to fast. Another encouraged them to draw 
closer to God. In 1964 during Lent in the city of Podol’sk, for example, the priest Kondratiuk said:  
Orthodox believers! When we already stand at the threshold of the Great Lent, - 
and feelings of being swept away and of fear appear in our heart, what does god 
see in our hearts, with what are we justified before him? We are weak and faint-
hearted  . . .  . . . / We wandered far from the lord, we hardly even thought 
about him. We need to look back and condemn the evil and dark sides of our 
lives.  Let’s look no further to the rear, but pray more diligently, but not pray 
just for ourselves, but also to remind neighbors about this, our children. And 
now let’s pray that the lord god will grant us the cleansing tears of repentance. 
To Trushin, this was an example of “adapting to modern conditions,” i.e. finding ways for their 
sermons to better engage audiences, and he was disturbed at this call for “strengthening of 
belief in god” and “call[ing] those in attendance to pray more and to attract ‘neighbors’ and 
children to this act.”19 That such kinds of sermons were considered exceptional is in and of itself 
revealing. “Good sermons,” by inference, were those that encouraged submission to church and 
state leaders, or were abstractions on purely religious topics that had little bearing on 
subsequent action. 
Trushin was not fabricating his concerns – the young priests who were born and raised 
in the Soviet Union were not acting in the same way as those who witnessed the brutalities of 
the 1920s and 1930s. He was concerned about the 185 priests who had finished seminary 
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between 1945 and 1965, most of whom were under 40 years of age. Such pastors had 
“replenished the clergy.” These comprised the “strongest ideological opponent” since young 
clergy was “significantly more active than the old.” Thus in statistics they used the age of 40 as 
an important factor, keeping close track of those under 40 with less concern for those over. 
They were also particularly concerned about new priests who had previous secular higher 
education. Among those was listed was Priest G. P. Yakunin, born in 1934, who finished Irkutsk 
Agricultural Institute.20  
 Trushin identified many priests from Moscow and the surrounding oblast as worth 
mentioning as negative examples. Vsevolod Shpiller (see Chapter II) had been one of the few 
priests routinely named as causing problems in the 1950s, and his name was mentioned in CRA 
reports only until 1968, and only with vague references to “illegal activities” at his church, or the 
presence of a few children and youth at the Easter Service at his Nikolo-Kuznetskaya Church.21 
But authorities’ concern for Shpiller declined as younger priests drew their gaze for the ways 
they were transgressing the lines of religious acceptability. Below, I consider in particular three 
well-known priests, Aleksandr Men’, Mikhail Trukhanov, and Dmitrii Dudko, who have already 
been the subject of biographies and articles,22 but I consider them in light of their pursuit of a 
particular kind of religious practice and how representatives from the Council for Religious 
Affairs and believers viewed their religiosity.  
Aleksandr Men’ 
Already in the 1960s in Alabino, Men’ had been doing the things that concerned state 
authorities. He recalled his early priesthood as a time when he wanted to “attract people” to the 
faith by “break[ing] the ice from the beginning, to find a new language for […] sermons, to tie 
them to issues which people [were] excited about.”23 He was “adapting to modern conditions,” 
in the words of state observers, and they were taking note of his sermons, and identifying him 
                                                          
20 Council for Religious Affairs of Moscow Oblast, Report, Archive file <KGB 54>, p. 69. Keston Archive and 
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as one of the priests problematically putting “emphasis on issues of morality.” In 1964 he was 
transferred to Tarasovka as a demotion for his activities as rector where he led the restoration 
of the church and enlivened the congregation. In Tarasovka he was one of three priests under a 
very rigid rector, with less pay and no access to a car. Perhaps not coincidentally, no lodging or 
office for receiving guests could be found for him in the parish, so he and his family (wife and 
two young children) had to dwell at his wife’s home in Semkhoz, over one hour away on the 
opposite side of Moscow.24 
In Tarasovka, Men’ still worked to enliven church life by his sermons and activities. His 
sermon note-taker focused on a line from one of his Eastertime sermons, when he linked 
individual spiritual vitality with that of the wider body of believers, saying “‘In order to 
transform oneself, we have to be guardians of our own heart and of the heart of the person 
nearest to us.’”25 In addition to preaching sermons on “modern” topics and trying to draw the 
congregants together, officials discovered Men’ to be “actively working among youth, cultivating 
in them a religious spirit.”26 Judith Kornblatt retells the story of one young man who had 
planned to attend a party and even had a bottle of vodka in his pocket, but decided 
spontaneously to attend an Easter service, having heard about Men's parish in Tarasovka:  
I was riding this train and didn't even know where the stop was. Then all of a 
sudden, when the train stopped at a particular station, I saw that the whole 
compartment got up and went out. I realized that they were probably going to 
this church service, so I followed the crowd. And it turned out that they walked 
through a field, and I saw this huge cathedral in the middle of nowhere. When I 
arrived, I saw it was full of people. I still had this bottle of vodka showing out of 
my pocket [...] I decided to turn away. But just as I decided to turn, all of a 
sudden I saw [an acquaintance]. He came out and said, “Oh, it's good you came. 
Let me take you to the choir loft. You'll see everything from there” [...], from 
where I observed the whole service.27 
Kornblatt argues that part of Men’s appeal was his attempts to draw people together, to give 
them a new universal way of belonging as an alternative to the Soviet one (which for many 
people lacked universal bonding power).28 Plus, Men’ offered intellectuality and transcendence 
at once, a combination people evidently found attractive. 
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Trushin characterized Men’s congregation in Alabino (and implicitly now in Tarasovka as 
well) not as an enthusiastic community of like-minded believers, but as something abnormal, 
complaining “In whatever ‘parishes’ made available for him to serve, he surrounded himself 
with hysterics, ignited religious fanaticism,  interfered in church affairs, for which he was 
repeatedly expelled by executive organs.”29 What a believer might have described as healthy 
church life, state representatives diagnosed as antisocial, irrational, and a social sickness. 
Evidently to pursue communal religiosity was abnormal religious practice, where normal 
religious practice was limited to one’s personal convictions and individualistic participation in a 
church service. 
Authorities also found Men’ suspect for his circle of friends. As introduced in Chapter IV, 
Men’ had been meeting with certain fellow priests with some regularity since 1962, an ad-hoc 
group which included at various times priests Nikolai Eshliman, Gleb Yakunin, Dmitrii Dudko, and 
Georgii Edel’shtein; writer Anatolii Levitin-Krasnov; and another half dozen or so. They had 
earnestly been discussing writing letters against the decisions of the 1961 Synod30 (which 
severely limited the power of priests; see Chapter IV), but when Khrushchev was replaced by 
Brezhnev, they waited to see if a new religious line would emerge. Not satisfied by any changes, 
Eshliman and Yakunin decided to proceed by sending an open letter of more than 40 pages in 
which they described in detail what they regarded as unacceptable government interference in 
church life and unacceptable submission by the church hierarchs, made most evident by the 
decisions of the Synod in 1961.31 Church hierarchs almost universally condemned the letter 
publicly, but many younger priests and active believers were “inspired,” and some even 
collected money in support of the courageous priests. The patriarch eventually demanded 
Eshliman and Yakunin rescind their views to continue serving, but they did not.32 
Because of his association with Eshliman and Yakunin, state authorities began to 
scrutinize Men’ more intently. In 1965 agents searched his parish in Tarasovka and his home 
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Semkhoz in 1965 for samizdat of Solzhenitsyn, but they did not find it (it was there, in fact), and 
he was not arrested.33 Illegal literature would have been a simple way to remove Men’, but now 
his influence among likeminded priests and laypersons would have to be dealt with through 
“normal” church avenues. The rector of his church in Tarasovka, priest Serafim Golubtsov, 
became increasingly “quarrelsome” and was constantly producing scandals and “absurd 
denunciations.”34 Finding the working relationship unbearable, Men’ cited “non-brotherly 
relations with the Rector” and requested that Metropolitan Pimen transfer him to a parish near 
his home in Semkhoz. The congregation protested his departure from Tarasovka with a petition 
to Pimen, but their demands were ignored.35 Men’s was transferred in 1970 to Novaia Derevnia, 
a very small parish some distance from Moscow.  
Mikhail Trukhanov 
If the fantasies of Khrushchev were replaced by the more “mature,” sober policies of 
Brezhnev, this transition clearly did not stop the appearance of “fanatic” religiosity. Trushin 
concluded based on a “comprehensive” study on “the state of the clergy” in 1968 that priests 
“of all religions” were mainly “loyal” to Soviet authority, but that “most of their ideological 
character and mindset [were being] formulated in a different light” than a scientific-materialist 
one. This “mindset” resulted in the situation where “they actively [were trying] to spread an 
anti-scientific religious worldview, and strengthen faith in god in the surrounding population, 
and ignite religious fanaticism.”36 Among those named were Men’, Mikhail Trukhanov, and 
seventeen others across the oblast, but there were “many others” whose names were not listed 
in the report. 
Although he had been serving for several years already, Father Mikhail Trukhanov 
finished seminary in 1967, and he was given a small parish outside Moscow in Pavshino. He had 
a black mark against him due to his imprisonment during WWII for organizing a bible study and 
in 1953 on false charges of conspiracy, and he attracted church and state leaders’ attention 
when he served temporarily at All Saints in Moscow several years prior (See Chapter IV). A small 
parish outside the city was probably the best he could hope for.  
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Yet here, too, Trukhanov did what he had done before: he preached with feeling, and he 
met with those who wanted to meet with him. A local woman heard about him not long after he 
had arrived, in 1968. A relative told her, “We have a new priest - Father Mikhail, and he’s quite 
good.  Come - you’ll like him.” Taking the recommendation, she attended the service. Trukhanov 
gave a sermon, and “from his service and his sermon [she] was just in heaven.”37 She eventually 
became one of his spiritual children. According to the custom within the Orthodox Church, 
believers may request a priest to take them under his tutelage for further teaching and study of 
Orthodox belief and practice, and a priest and believer in such a relationship refer to one 
another as “spiritual father” and “spiritual child.” Trukhanov became the “father” to many 
spiritual children. One spiritual child met him when she was a young teenager. She recalls that 
Fr. Mikhail had “a variety of spiritual children - people of different classes: teachers, professors, 
and the most simple of the poor.”38 Trushin painted a darker picture, saying Trukhanov skipped 
work often due to “illness” but then would be seen with “some kinds of women,” calling them 
his “slaves of god.” One of these happened to be a doctor who confirmed Trukhanov’s 
“sickness,” providing him with a note justifying his need to rest from work. Trushin saw 
Trukhanov’s monk-like asceticism as “pretending to be disinterested” in money, and officials 
claim he gave it to these “slaves of god.”39 According to Trushin, this explained his popularity. It 
was common for officials to slander priests as immoral, as using their position for sordid ends.  
After Trukhanov had served in Pavshino just two years, in 1969 the CRA instigated 
Trukhanov’s disciplinary transfer to Podol’sk for “violations of Soviet legislation on cults,” such 
as “gross interference in financial-economic activities of religious communities, blackmail, 
igniting fanaticism among parishioners,” and “excessive use” of alcoholic substances. As in 
Men’s case, Trushin found Trukhanov guilty of “igniting religious fanaticism” because he “often 
t[old] of the lives of different holy saints, summoning his listeners to renounce worldly things, 
remain more in prayer.” His sermons, Trushin said, “sometimes slipped into anti-Soviet 
fabrications,” and he passed along a report from local informants who noted that Trukhanov 
was “comparing the bible with literature,” and declared that “100% of truth is in the bible, but in 
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literature it is only fiction and its truth is just 1%.” In addition to expressing “anti-Soviet moods,” 
Trukhanov’s other problem (like Men’s), was that “youth and all kinds of hysterics concentrate 
around him, [and he was] closely linked with the group of [Orthodox intellectuals headed by 
critical writer] Krasnov (Levitin).”40  
In Podol’sk Trukhanov ran into trouble immediately. After only six months, the rector 
had asked him to leave due to bad relations between them. The protests of the people did not 
help. Trukhanov wrote to the Bishop, “Because of the virtual impossibility of properly 
conducting worship services in conditions of constant expressions of boyish rudeness and 
irritability on the part of the rector, I hereby request Your Eminence about defining me as 
temporarily on leave [za shtat].”41 Despite his very short stint in Podol’sk, he had already gained 
spiritual children, as well as further attention from state observers. Trushin reported on the 
situation from a different perspective. As he reported it, the bishopric “was forced” to place 
Trukhanov on leave in 1969 because the executive organ of the church in Podol’sk terminated 
the contract. His reason was that Trukhanov had “surround[ed] himself with different sorts of 
hysterics, ignited religious fanaticism in the parish,” the same complaint as in Pavshino. The 
“Commission for facilitating control of the Executive Committee of the Podol’sk City Soviet” 
provided information on his “illegal activities”:  
From the first days of service in Podol’sk church, Priest Trukhanov arrived in the 
city of Podol’sk with his numerous admirers, who together with him ignite 
religious fanaticism in the church and create disorder. Trukhanov delivers 
incomprehensible sermons, in which he often expresses that ‘the people do not 
have a leader and the people are like a herd without a shepherd’, ‘From all 
diseases only god heals’, and so on. 42 
Although his contract was not likely terminated due to the “incomprehensibility” of his sermons 
(more likely the opposite), it is true that his presence created “disorder,” even if the “order” 
that was disrupted was predictably banal services and no community dynamism. 
While on leave, Trukhanov applied yearly for positions from 1970 until 1976, but 
somehow he received the same reply each time from the Metropolitan: “There are currently no 
vacancies.”43 Finally in 1976 he was permitted to serve, for a measly few weeks. In April 1976 he 
received a temporary appointment that lasted nearly four months due to the rector’s illness. His 
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rector praised him for his service, reporting “of him it’s only possible to speak well.” But once 
the rector recovered, he had no more need for Trukhanov to serve there, though he 
recommended him as worthy to serve in another parish.44 In early August he was given a place 
in Ozyory, not far from one of his first parishes in the early 1960s. He only lasted a week. He 
immediately suffered verbal attacks in church from a woman who yelled that he was a “bandit 
and a Baptist,” repeating accusations she made of him years before when he was there, that he 
was a “sectarian” and “‘not from our faith.’” These scenes were enough to have him suspended 
and require him to give a report to the metropolitan.45 
In September, it was another parish for Trukhanov. Someone found out about his past in 
the Gulag and spread rumors that he was “mentally ill” and a “bandit capable of murder.”46 He 
served three days in November at another parish, and in another in late November, and another 
in January. He wrote to the secretary of the Patriarch, complaining that “assignments for one-
three days—this is not service.”47 Soon after, in March of 1977, he was given service in the 
village of Pushkino, his last place of service before retirement, where he served for two years. 
Even though he had influence here, the years of inactivity, short stints, and transfers had truly 
limited his reach. Once retired, he could do even less. State authorities had found Trukhanov’s 
tendency to enliven church life unacceptable for the way in which he heightened the 
importance of the supernatural in everyday and communal life. They found that keeping him 
from service limited the possibility of such a community forming. 
Dmitrii Dudko 
While Trukhanov’s influence was being contained by refusing him a job, priest Dmitrii 
Dudko’s influence was reaching across Moscow. When Brezhnev came to power in 1964, Dudko 
was in his second parish at the Church of Saint Nikolai, his first having been demolished due to 
Metro construction in Moscow. His preaching was attracting crowds. One evening he had 
decided to cut the sermon from an evening service, and a woman said to him sadly that she had 
even left her child at home and traveled across town so that she could properly listen. Thus he 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 2:129. 
46 Ibid., 2:130. 
47 Ibid., 2:133. 
 
 
221 
 
decided that at no service would he go without giving a sermon, despite having been advised by 
the bishop to be “a little less zealous.”48 
People heard about Dudko and came to see what the rumors were about. It was not 
uncommon for non-church goers to express something like the following about Orthodox 
Churches: “Those that operated were largely a formality, where old women attended sterile 
services rushed through by ignorant priests.”49 But in his quest for religious life, one student, 
Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, heard about a priest in Moscow who “was actually preaching to 
parishioners,” Father Dmitrii Dudko. Ogorodnikov decided to attend one of these services, and 
he kept coming back: “In his services, in these talks, it was like being alive […].” Ogorodnikov 
contrasted Dudko’s sermons with the usual ones: ‘Sermons were [generally] censored and had 
to be as abstract as possible. Priests had to talk in an incomprehensible language in the 
sermons. It was like they were not addressing the people….’”50 He, like many others, found 
themselves at Dudko’s church week after week. 
The church warden, which was a position that had to be approved by the CRA and not 
the rector since 1961, had complained to the commissioner of the CRA about Dudko, saying that 
he was the kind of priest “who gives a sermon every day.” To the warden’s surprise, the 
commissioner responded that the warden was “appealing to the wrong place,” and should 
discuss the problem with the rector of the church.51 Technically, this was an “inner-church 
issue,” and the general approach of state representatives was to try to keep it that way, 
encouraging superiors to discipline underlings within the church by sanctioned church avenues, 
without direct state involvement. The commissioner, in most cases, would have judged wisely. 
Usually, church staffs had discord aplenty, and most zealous priests simply yielded to their 
rectors when scolded or pressured. But Dudko was particularly determined. 
By October of 1969, CRA Commissioner of Moscow (city) Plekhanov and the KGB were 
tracking Dudko,52 but Dudko’s troubling religious activity was just beginning. By the 1970s, 
Dudko was even baptizing intellectuals who were known in broader circles, often doing so in 
private. Writer Zoya Krakhmal’nikova was the first of her circle to be baptized by Dudko in 1971, 
and her husband, writer Feliks Svetov, was also baptized by him not long after. 
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By 1971-1972, Dudko was already quite well known across Moscow, and the state had 
to be careful not to make itself look bad by martyring him. As usual, attacks on Dudko began 
with fellow clergy and believers, to make the problem seem internal to the church. Authorities 
pressured the warden and the rector to curb his influence.53 Relations deteriorated as the rector 
made a schedule to minimize Dudko’s influence by keeping him from interactive roles, thus 
putting more duties on other priests. He forbade Dudko from preaching, saying that his sermons 
were by nature “agitation,” but Dudko would stand up to preach when he served, counting on 
the fact that the people would support him in case the rector made a scene.54 
The warden also attempted to rein him in. Although she generally let him “do what he 
wanted” she complained, “Why do you give such sharp sermons, they [officials from the Council 
for Religious Affairs], well, call me in.” She was getting an earful from several directions, as 
sometimes an atheist “aktiv” would observe the service, asking her, “what are these sermons 
that this priest is giving?” State authorities pressured her in hopes that Dudko would be 
sensitive to her plight. He told her to tell them that her “job” was not “paying attention to 
sermons” but to “the housekeeping part of the church.”55 
When these avenues for pressuring Dudko did not bear fruit, authorities confronted him 
directly. CRA Commissioner Plekhanov sent a letter to the procurator about Dudko with 
accusations that Dudko might have officiated at an illegal wedding in his apartment and 
disseminated a “slanderous work” entitled “I believe, Lord” to a young woman whose mother 
filed a report.56 In July 1972 the procurator did summon him, and the main questions centered 
on Dudko’s interactions with youth. As Dudko defended his actions and told them that 
“everyone” was tired of atheistic literature and looking for something else, he touched more 
than one sensitive nerve.57 Not only was he asserting the value of religion to society, he also was 
insinuating that the official ideologies were losing attraction and that the next generation was 
looking for something else. Those in the procurator’s office brought up a complaint a mother 
submitted about her daughter’s growing interest in religion due to Dudko’s influence, but Dudko 
accused the mother of “antireligious obscurantism.”58 When he would not give information 
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about his wider network of people, the authorities warned him that they were tracking his 
activities.59  
Soon thereafter, the warden reported that “a complaint was submitted about you from 
the procurator; they’re ordering me to terminate your contract.” Dudko was determined to “tell 
everything from the pulpit” the following Sunday, “when there will be a lot of people” in order 
to expose state meddling in church affairs.60 He did so, and Commissioner Plekhanov 
interrogated him, saying “How dare you use a church platform for personal goals?” Dudko 
defended himself: “And how do you dare interfere in internal affairs of the church?” “We don’t 
interfere,” he replied, “we cannot order [priests to be removed,] we only requested.” Plekhanov 
brought up complaints by citizens and reports of baptisms and marriage ceremonies outside the 
walls of the church, and he suggested Dudko ask the Patriarchate for a new parish, but Dudko 
was determined to remain.61 Surprisingly, authorities allowed Dudko to continue to serve at the 
same church.  
Dudko’s defiance only increased his prestige among the risk-loving and religiously 
curious, and his popularity increased yet more when he attempted something entirely new. For 
some time he had preached on social issues like depression, alcoholism, abortion, violence, and 
the lack of trust between people.62 He decided to go beyond preaching about topics of concern 
to holding question-and-answer sessions, inviting people to submit questions that he would 
answer in public. 
The sessions began in December, 1973. The first question for his first talk dealt with the 
very people in the audience, where the questioner complained that old women “interfere with 
the young people coming to church,” and Dudko tried to reconcile generational differences.63 
Many questions centered on apologetics, like the existence of God. People invited others for the 
second talk.64 He read testimonies of recent converts to Christianity from atheism, generating 
excitement of a growing community.65 By the third talk, the church was “full to capacity.” There 
were many youth there, even many non-believers. Some of his acquaintances said that as they 
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were exiting the subway, “many asked how to get to our church.”66 Dudko commented to his 
audience, “The atheists maintain that questions of religion are already obsolete, of interest only 
to the elderly. Now here’s proof to them that religion is not something obsolete, but something 
always new, something vitally necessary for everyone - both young and old alike.”67 When one 
questioner expressed concern that the events were becoming political, he tried to maintain that 
“religion and politics are two different realms.” He was wrong about this, of course, and he must 
have known it: managing religious practice had long been the prerogative of the Soviet state.  
Speakers were installed outside for the hundreds attending, and typed transcripts were 
distributed, even abroad. The fourth, fifth, and sixth talks “had such a wide response that people 
came from everywhere: from Kiev, Leningrad, Gorky, Lithuania.”68 They were popular because 
they were different: participants found them genuine. His goal, he said, was not to answer all 
questions, since he knew his limitations, but to “arouse interest,” to get people to seek further. 
Also in contrast to Soviet propaganda, Dudko made it his goal to avoid giving a “stock answer,” 
as this would “dry up religion” and make it “seem boring and obsolete.”69 One submitted 
question stated, “Father Dmitrii, why engage in polemics with atheists? It’s a needless waste of 
time and energy because no one is interested in their doctrine. It’s antiquated and obsolete. 
Better, tell us about faith.”70 As Alexei Yurchak argues, Soviet propaganda had been losing 
traction and was repeated pro forma and taken lightly by many young and urban intellectuals.71 
The questions indicate, however, that although some people considered Soviet ideology empty, 
some were still very much interested in modes of thought and belief.  
The questions at Dudko’s sessions were far from the safe theological abstractions 
expected of religious gatherings. When Dudko answered questions usually never considered in 
public forums, it “astonished” youth like Ogorodnikov, who regarded the events as authentic 
since they lacked the predictability of other group gatherings—whether at church or state-
sponsored events. Plus it was thrilling to see “people you never saw in church,” like “serious 
intellectuals” and Western correspondents.72 People of various faiths came too, Protestant, 
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Catholic, Jewish, making the gathering feel as though it had universal appeal.73 Highly 
problematic for Soviet authorities, Dudko was attempting to forge a communal religious 
identity: “Our main object is to find a common language, to find a language of love and truth 
[...],” something he felt contrasted with the experiences at other parishes. A fellow priest had 
complained to him, saying, “‘we’ve lost our common language with our flock. Quick, perform 
the service—bang! bang! bang!—and home again as fast as possible!’”74 Even his introductions 
to his sessions were in terms of “we.” He observed the audience and described them; he made 
an “us” out of individuals, commenting that even if they do not think alike, they had unity 
because they were coming together.75 He believed that “these discussions are uniting us, that a 
kind of unwritten brotherhood is forming” among believers of various confessions and even 
non-believers. He tried “to emphasize that it’s not I who am holding a discussion, but we.”76  
But despite the numbers, Dudko was vulnerable. In his ninth speech, he made a slip-up: 
while trying not to condemn the patriarch as his questioner provoked, he did note that the 
patriarch was “surrounded by thousands of rows of informants,” which apparently was a 
“mistake” that authorities could “quibble” with.77 To the great disappointment of those who 
traveled from far away, he did not do the tenth session because the Patriarch had forbidden him 
from continuing his service as a priest and requested a meeting.78  
In Dudko’s defense, prominent mathematician Igor Shafarevich was angry not that 
Dudko would be summoned by state authorities, but that the church leadership would forbid 
religious activity which was attracting people to the faith and give him no support, even of “a 
moral kind.”79 At disciplinary meetings in the office of the patriarch, the first issue they 
mentioned was that it was “not church form” to conduct questions and answers. It was the 
form, not the content that church leaders emphasized.80 
Metropolitan Serafim justified Dudko’s suspension as a result of his “non-fulfillment of 
the requirements of obeying the hierarchy, violations of the Stavlenicheskaya confession, and 
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the ignoring of church discipline, in concurrence with the apostolic canons 36 and 51.” The 
confession includes the oath for priests to serve in “a spirit of humility and meekness,” and to 
not take part in any political movements or parties. That he did not readily submit to authority 
and that he dabbled in political discussions made him vulnerable to such accusations. Only 
“repentance” would lift his prohibition from the clergy. 
In a report to CRA Chief Kuroedov, Trushin noted that Dudko would no longer serve in 
Moscow, as a result of his “hostile activities, expressed in the systematic pronunciation of anti-
Soviet sermons in front of a large collection of believers, the constant surrounding of himself by 
extremist youth of Jewish nationality, as well as the violations of legislation on religious cults” 
(issue of Jewish nationality discussed below). Dudko evidently “repented” to Serafim and 
promised to only preach “’on Gospel themes.’” On the basis of this repentance, in September 
1974 Serafim gave Dudko another chance in the priesthood as assistant priest in the village of 
Kabanovo, boasting around 2,000 inhabitants and at the far eastern edge of the oblast, a 
minimum two hours’ travel from the heart of Moscow. 
But the local CRA commissioner for Kabanovo, when he heard about Dudko’s “anti-
Soviet activities,” refused to approve a contract for him. Only by certain “influence” of the CRA 
office in Moscow and the agreement of the “organs of State Security” (KGB) was his position 
there ratified.81 They wanted him to work there, even if the local representative did not want 
the problem on his plate. Upon arrival, he met with the local commissioner of the CRA, who 
grilled him about his past and threatened him with a “talk with Trushin.” The warden there tried 
to comfort him, saying, “‘Batyushka, don’t worry. It won’t be bad here with us. Certainly, he’s 
not pleased... Now just talk a little less with the people [than you did in Moscow].’”82In short, he 
was advised to mimic those priests who kept their head down and did just the minimum. To be 
acceptable was to not stand out. 
Parish Life 
Priests were not the only ones responsible for religious activity, however. Although state 
authorities preferred to view religious animation as the product of a priest “activating” a 
congregation, believers acted according to their own energy as well. As the case of Naro-
Fominsk shows below, there were still groups of people working together to get churches 
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opened, and as the case of Grebnevo demonstrates, parishioners had to negotiate to make the 
best of the congregations they had. Not everything depended on clergy. 
Naro-Fominsk 
When Father Men’ had been a priest in Alabino, many believers attended from Naro-
Fominsk,83 about 30 kilometers and at least 45 minutes of travel time away. There was no 
Orthodox Church in Naro-Fominsk, and after Men’s departure from Alabino, their efforts to get 
one reached a critical point. According to the law of 1929, if there were twenty or more who 
requested to form a religious association, they would be permitted registration. Of course, 
bureaucrats could make each step difficult. There had to be proper documentation, including 
local authorities’ approval to use an existing building or build a new one (which should meet all 
fire and sanitary requirements), and the appropriate representative of the Council for Religious 
Affairs should approve it as well. The group in Naro-Fominsk made all efforts to successfully 
register over the course of the late 1960s. Their application spent months being ignored, despite 
repeated attempts to discover the reason for non-response by local bodies. Finally, local 
authorities responded by telling them they did not have proper documentation of suitable 
“accommodations” for their religious association. When that was addressed, the problem was 
that they did not prove “dire need” for such a society. This, too, was addressed. There was a 
church that was not in use, but if they would be refused that one, they promised to build one 
“by their own strength” and money.  
When they still could not get local authorities to agree, in 1970 nearly 1,500 believers 
made an appeal to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, complaining that “local 
powers” had been using “any pretext” for refusing their applications, and that the city council 
“could not be but mistaken” in its assessment of the “measure and degree of [their] need,” 
concluding that their treatment was “nothing other than the display of brute force, flouting our 
right which is granted by the Constitution and Law.”84 
Trushin noticed that this process of trying to open a church resulted in the “activation of 
believers,” as the nearly 1,500 signatures made evident. He complained that this effort was 
instigated by 30 church “activists,” who went from “home to home, from apartment to 
apartment” to collect signatures. The commissioner found it “very surprising, that to such an 
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unlawful activity of churchmen in the city no one reacted in any way.” It was laypeople rather 
than clergy who usually undertook attempts to open churches, although customarily state 
representatives blamed clergy for any activation. Trushin felt that the proper reaction was for 
state representatives “to give corresponding guidance about strengthening ideological work 
among the population, as well as monitoring the activity of churchmen in the aforementioned 
regions.”85 Rather than recognizing this as a need for a church, Trushin saw it as a need for 
increased state presence. The local paper, the Banner of Ilich, called these activists “’charlatans 
on the fringes of religion.’” To want a church was one thing, but to be energized enough to try 
for one was cause to be ridiculed as a “fringe” movement perpetrated by deceivers.86 Their 
petition was not granted. 
“Normal” Parish - Grebnevo 
Church life in more “normal parishes” was not as animated as in the parishes of Dudko, 
Men’, or Trukhanov, and incidents like 1,500 signatures for a church were also rare. One can 
consider the village church of Grebnevo to be “typical,” insofar as typical is possible. Until 1976, 
it had nothing that would be considered out of the realm of the ordinary for parish churches in 
Moscow Oblast in the Brezhnev era. 
Parishioner and Orthodox believer Natalia Sokolova felt even in Grebnevo, there was 
little “separation of church and state,” as the regional commissioner for the CRA “meddled in all 
affairs of the church.” The churchwarden had to apply to the commissioner for everything, and 
he either refused them or attempted to take advantage in some fashion, such as by demanding 
excessive payments or bribery. By now, people learned to “keep quiet” and were “accustomed 
to all sorts of harassment.”87 
In the forty years Natalia Sokolova lived in Grebnevo, only twice did a priest serve more 
than a few years at her nearby Orthodox church, which had at least two priests at a time - one 
served for fourteen, another for nine, but otherwise one or two years was the norm. She felt it 
was not accidental: “Such was the policy, they didn’t let people get used to a spiritual father, 
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didn’t let a priest come to know his flock. How could there be a community there?”88 The one 
who served nine years, Father Dmitrii, was loved by the people. He did much to improve the 
conditions in the church, but this brought the ire of the district executive committee 
(raispolkom), who tried to “discredit” him with libel in the newspaper. He was eventually 
moved.89 
There were all kinds of factors that shaped church life, other than having a particularly 
zealous or talented priest. Much depended on personnel, from priests to the churchwarden to 
local authorities to the ability of parishioners to get along. Sokolova’s husband, Father Vladimir 
Sokolov, was a priest in nearby Losinoostrovskii raion on the edge of Moscow. Father Sokolov 
was fortunate because the churchwardens he worked with tended to be believers who 
cooperated well and did not work independently of the rector’s blessing. Even the local 
executive committee expressed surprise that members of the church staff weren’t all submitting 
complaints against each other. But in Grebnevo, the situation was otherwise, where an older 
woman ruled as warden somewhat tyrannically. Sokolova complained that her speech was 
barely intelligible, and the “church fell into decay.” In addition, “spirituality came to a standstill,” 
as people “made noise” during services, had conversations, “none of the priests dared give 
sermons,” and confession was rare - the priest would often just cover the “confessor’s” head 
with the stole in silence, after which he or she could receive communion. The combination of 
priests and warden made the church unsatisfactory for the kind of religious life Sokolova was 
seeking, and she avoided the church in Grebnevo for a couple of years altogether.90 For the time 
being, Sokolova made do with the company of some of the spiritual children of her husband, 
who would come to their home and help the family with their five children. 
Men’ at Novaia Derevnya 
If the parish at Grebnevo was on life support, Aleksandr Men’s parish in Novaia Derevnia 
was bustling with activity. He was trying to form a community out of his parish, not satisfied 
with having believers isolated from each other. As for his own community of priests and 
intellectuals, the pressure authorities put on it had effectively destroyed it. The Eshliman-
Yakunin group had been broken up, and writer Levitin-Krasnov had been arrested in 1969 and 
was in prison until he emigrated in 1974. Men’ found his friend Eshliman quite “transformed” 
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after the open letter affair, and relations became “superficial.”91 Yakunin had found his own 
place in the political-dissident movement. He and Men’ met from time to time and kept track of 
each other’s activities, but now their spheres no longer overlapped.92 Men’s friend and 
intellectual-priest Mikhail Meerson-Aksenov had also emigrated in 1972.  
Thus, Men’s pursuit of an intellectual community marked by meetings and discussions 
waned. He shifted his focus to his new parish, Novaia Derevnia. Moreover, there was no 
shortage of people coming to his parish, including local parishioners, locals curious about the 
new priest, and scores of Muscovite spiritual children.93 One such new attendee from Moscow, 
Olga Bukhina, recalls how “this little church, as many other churches of that time, had been 
pretty much filled with the local old ladies, but suddenly it was occupied by a bunch of young 
boys and girls in their early twenties.” It was awkward, especially at first, as the young people 
came without knowing the customs. “The old ladies” of the church looked at them, she felt, with 
“severe disapproval,” making the parish “clearly divided into two parts which had nothing to do 
with each other.” Men’, she says, was “in the middle of this.”94  
For Bukhina, as well as for many of those gathering, the awkwardness gradually 
diminished, as she found acceptance there. She felt that “Simple human relationships emerged 
from our being together in the church.” It was becoming more than an accidental gathering of 
disconnected individuals (which would have been an acceptable religious gathering in the state’s 
eyes), but “a place of tolerance and love, a place where people of different sorts could be 
together without killing each other, physically of morally.” To her, it was a clear contrast to the 
rest of social life: 
The situation in the 1970s was quite depressing, politically and socially. But for 
me and for many others, I believe, the little church in [Novaia Derevnia] was an 
oasis of joy. There [was] no other place in the world for which I would be ready 
to get up at 5 in the morning, in the Russian winter, awfully cold, pitch dark, 
take the subway to the commuter train, forty minutes in the train without heat, 
another twenty minutes in the bus, and eventually walk through the snow to 
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the church. It would still be totally dark, not yet dawn. Obviously, something 
very warm existed there if I was able to do all of that on a very regular basis.95 
For people like Bukhina, this was a community, a gathering of people that she chose voluntarily, 
and for which she sacrificed gladly and also told others about. Numerous people went to Men’ 
for counsel and prayer, sometimes waiting in line for confession as many as six hours, and 
others found somewhere to stay overnight in order to attend the early-morning confession 
slots.96  
Authorities were suspicious of Men’s influence, they questioned those close to him, and 
they even suspected him of being an agent of the Catholic Church. KGB agents cast his attempts 
at bridging denominational barriers as his participation in an “anti-Soviet organization,” 
according to KGB head Yuri Andropov in 1974.97 Men’ also drew a large number of people with 
Jewish ancestry to the church, probably due to his own heritage. Bukhina, herself a Jew, recalls 
that the gatherings at Men’s church “looked very strange” when compared to the “‘normal’ 
church crowd.” Bukhina felt that “in Russia everyone can quite easily tell who is Jewish and who 
is not. Russian Jews look very different from ethnically Russian people, and as a result, they are 
quite visible and easy to recognize in the crowd. The old ladies in the church unmistakably knew 
who we are.”98 The 1970s and 1980s was a time when being Jewish was a particularly marked 
issue, as Jewish life experienced something of a revival of interest in Jewish identity and religion. 
Interest in Zionism was on the rise, as were Jews’ requests to emigrate. They claimed the 
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existence of systemic anti-Semitism in Soviet society, but the scores denied emigration were 
labeled “refusenik.” Not only was the revival of Jewishness met with increased anti-Semitism, 
but Jews who desired to leave were sometimes branded as disloyal to the state. 
Men’ and one of his spiritual children (and biographer), Zoya Maslenikova, felt that the 
old congregation was effectively split in two: there were those who were “captivated by the 
kindness, openness and eagerness of a young priest,” and those who opposed him, often 
articulated with tones of “anti-Semitism.”99 In fact, it was not uncommon that if people noticed 
a particularly lively or active priest or believer, some might sneeringly suggest that he or she was 
likely a Jew, purporting that such a one was secretly trying to lure people away from “true [re: 
complacent?] orthodoxy.”100 
His diverse circle of friends, acquaintances, and parishioners made him an easy target 
for slander and epithets. Agents conducted a few searches, but there weren’t any “direct 
confrontations.” Those who only knew him a little, he says, used varying labels to describe him: 
“occultist, Zionist, Catholic, modernist, an agent of the authorities.”101 It did not much matter 
that these labels by definition preclude one another; such labels served to sow mistrust among 
the people, that such an “extremist” clearly is not one of “us.” As Judith Kornblatt argues, Men’s 
religiosity “was couched in the language of inclusiveness and universalism,” something 
attractive to an intelligentsia in search of ideals and universal values that many felt were missing 
from society. The problem was, however, that some saw his gatherings as a collection of 
‘outcasts,’ including dissidents, Zionists, and Christians.102 Certain representatives of these 
groups could easily clash, as the coincidental factor which brought them together (Men’) was 
not enough to erase all of the tensions and issues that separated them. 
Despite the efforts of a new rector in 1976 to reduce Men’s influence,103 Men’ was not 
deterred in his quest to build a religious community by the slander and pressures. Because he 
noticed how people waiting to go to confession “saw in each other undesired opponents costing 
the father valuable time” and that “connections among his spiritual children were accidental 
and chaotic,” he decided to “organize the unreasonably sprawling, loose parish.”104 The idea 
was to group seven to twelve people together for regular gatherings of prayer, study, and aid as 
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needed. Because such gatherings would certainly be more fodder for wild conspiracies, they 
adopted secretive practices: meeting places were constantly changed, and the timing of a 
gathering always corresponded with an alibi (state holidays, birthdays of a member or of a 
relative, etc.). They could not arrive in a group, nor could they leave as a group. Father Men’ 
assisted in picking group leaders and supplying topics for study as well as reading or visual 
material. Evidently, the idea “caught on” and the groups were “viable,” but the extent and 
duration is not known.105 Like participants in the Seminar, Men’ and his group of believers 
attempted to transform individual conscience into communal religious practice. 
“Extra-curricular” Religious Activities – The Christian Seminar 
Just as Men’ attempted to forge a religious community, elsewhere in the oblast, people 
were looking for more than just a church service. The 1970s were marked by new, ad-hoc 
religious gatherings, inspired by priests like Dudko and Men’. Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, who 
became a frequent participant where Dudko served, was raised an atheist but had gone on a 
hunt for “truth”—first rejecting ideology, adopting a hippie lifestyle, then believing that he 
found the truth in the teachings of the Orthodox Church. But finding a suitable religious 
community was not easy, as simply going to church did not satisfy him. In the words of Levitin-
Krasnov, seekers like Ogorodnikov, having no religious background, were “confused” by things 
like an unintelligible Church Slavonic and the many rituals. They “rarely” went to Church at first, 
preferring to read religious literature and have discussions with each other. 106 Ogorodnikov’s 
first attempts at church were full of mutual incomprehension:  
‘Before us the Church was all old people, old people, and we were the first 
swallows [of spring]. One time, I went into a church in one of the provinces, and 
the old women tried to force me out of the church. “We won’t let you close the 
church [...]” they said. In the understanding of these old women, a young man 
could go into a church with only one aim, to smash things up, to close the 
church. It was only when I went up at the end of the liturgy to receive 
communion that the old women understood. All the church was crying, they 
were crying. I was a new generation [...]’.107 
Admittedly struggling against the “intellectual pride” that kept him resistant to 
attending church, he also struggled against “the lack of a flourishing religious community life 
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within the Russian Orthodox Church, which deprived us of the opportunity to serve the Church 
actively, while the official hierarchy made no response to our appeals.”108 He found that “in the 
Russian Church the parish is not like a brotherly community where Christian love of one’s 
neighbor becomes a reality, the State persecutes every manifestation of church life, except for 
the performance of a ‘religious cult.’ Our thirst for spiritual communion, religious education and 
missionary service runs up against all the might of the State’s repressive machinery.”109 As 
Yakunin put it at the time, the Orthodox case was singularly problematic:  
In the present Orthodox parish, as in the communities of no other confession, 
the feeling of Christian brotherhood is weakened. Paradoxical cases are 
encountered in the large cities. People who have stood next to each other in 
prayer and have taken communion from the same chalice for decades, who 
have watched from the corner of their eyes how each other's children and 
grandchildren grow, how they themselves are aging, turn out to be personally 
unacquainted. 
As for priests, and their activities, Yakunin felt that the Orthodox Church as a whole was “turning 
more and more into a 'cult-performing' sect,“ and that “many priests do not even preach, as this 
is not encouraged by the Patriarch, and their performance of the sacraments has been reduced 
to pure ritualism.”110 
This was Ogorodnikov’s opinion too, and he looked for a new avenue. “Dissatisfied with 
the mere ‘performance of a religious cult,’ having no opportunity to receive a religious 
education, and in need of brotherly Christian relations,” he set up the Christian Seminar as a 
study group.111 In August 1974 Ogorodnikov was working as a janitor at a clinic, and he used the 
janitor’s small and poorly heated sleeping quarters as the rooms for the Seminar. Anyone could 
come, and there was a variety in age, lifestyle, education, and views.112 Those who traveled 
from great distances even spent the night there. Branches emerged elsewhere in Leningrad and 
Smolensk, and, as time went on, also in Ufa, Odessa, Christopol, Kazan, Minsk, Riga, Pskov, and 
Novosibirsk. The first meeting saw 25 people from Moscow and from other major cities, and 20-
40 people typically gathered in this janitor’s quarters, but as many as hundreds attended all the 
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branches combined. Word was spread by mouth among trusted acquaintances, and strangers 
were not accepted without the permission of trusted members.113 
The purpose was discussion of wide ranging topics, with a focus on Orthodox religious 
and philosophical thought, much in the style of Dudko’s talks. The Seminar was not a gathering 
of political “dissidents,” as they had no ambition to make or propose changes to politically 
empowered bodies. It was, says Ogorodnikov, “a self-organised, informal group of friends, who 
wanted to get together to learn.”114 The discussions were lively, and the energy from these 
meetings spread. In contrast to some church services characterized as “uninspired and 
wooden,” participants found this seminar to be fresh.115 Attendee Vladimir Poresh remarks, 
“Those conversations, that way of life, took hold of me completely; it was all so sound, so full of 
meaning and depth, so full of the warmth and genuine feeling which you cannot confuse with 
anything else.”116 One of the most regular attendees was a language teacher, Tatyana 
Shchipkova. The meetings gave her something she didn’t find elsewhere: “warm Christian 
fellowship, completely untrammeled thinking, and total immersion in the spiritual realm.” 
Rather than being a curiosity to “real” life, religion now took center stage. Shchipkova was 
satisfied to find that “Social questions were discussed only in connection with religious ones.”117 
Community and togetherness were so central to the themes and talks that one of the great 
conclusions that many of them came to was that “true freedom” was not pursuing one’s own 
desires, but “to bind together in ‘living forms of Christian community.’”118 They did not accept 
the Soviet view of faith as limited to individual conscience. 
The State Attacks Communal Religiosity 
State representatives had been doing their best to cast any dynamic religious 
communities as “marginal” or “fringe” and leaders as opposing “our” social norms. Thus, 
authorities could deal with them as though they were pursuing criminal activity. As Trushin put 
it in 1974, when summarizing the cases of priests and wardens stripped of registration, he 
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applied the blanket accusation that they were all “fanatics and extremists.”119 Fanatics and 
extremists are abnormal, undeserving of “normal” treatment and warranting discipline. 
Seminar participants as Psychiatrically Abnormal 
As part of its crackdown on burgeoning communal religiosity, state authorities acted 
aggressively against the Christian Seminar, which had been meeting for two years since 1974. 
Authorities labeled their meetings “anti-Soviet.” In addition to its principal leader, Ogorodnikov, 
the authorities began hounding the attendees as well. Detachments of police would often break 
in and demand evidence that they had permission to meet as well as their identification 
documents.  
Participants were being persecuted, as usual by the divide-and-conquer (or isolate-and-
alienate) strategy. In 1976 they searched participants for literature or other incriminating 
material, and some were interrogated, threatened, and mocked. One was failed in his exams. 
One member, Eduard Fedotov, was taken to a psychiatric hospital and diagnosed with 
“schizophrenia.” No visitors were permitted, but Ogorodnikov persisted and was eventually 
granted a meeting with a certain Dr. Levitsky, who reportedly told him, “‘I’m not against belief. 
Belief is a matter for a man’s conscience. But [...] for him [religion] is an obsessional idée fixe. 
Your Eduard is living in a world of illusions, and I want to bring him back to real life. [...] You can 
go into a church, pray, take communion - but why preach?’” Levitsky’s comments are telling: it 
was labeled a social disorder to have religion move beyond the limited and private realm of 
conscience. Authorities also interned another participant, Aleksandr Argentov, and he was given 
powerful drugs against his consent. He was told his religious enthusiasm was a “result of a 
mental illness.”120 
31 participants of the Christian Seminar were hauled in and interrogated between 
September 1976 and April 1977; one was expertly and cruelly beaten. One woman was followed 
across town, pushed, harassed. One young man was taken to a psychiatric institution where he 
was told by a psychiatrist that “‘We’ll beat your religion out of you.’” He was repeatedly 
drugged.121 The pressure worked on some, causing them to discontinue their attendance.122 
Meanwhile, state newspapers slandered public figures like Ogorodnikov and Dudko.123  
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The Seminar still tried to meet in 1976 and early 1977, even attempting to publish some 
essays in a new journal called Obshchina (Community), again highlighting its centrality to their 
existence. It was produced in samizdat form, but nearly all copies were confiscated by the 
authorities. A second issue was written and disseminated in 1978. Ogorodnikov was eventually 
fired and later arrested for “‘the leading of a parasitical and anti-social way of life.’” He was 
given a prison sentence, beaten, and harshly treated.124 Two friends, Aleksandr Kuzkin and 
Sergei Yermolaev, made public utterances protesting his arrest, and they were arrested. Kuzkin 
was sent to a psychiatric hospital, and Yermolaev and his friend Igor Polyakov were charged with 
“hooliganism.”125Many accusations were made against Ogorodnikov, including of rape 
(fabricated by a woman who later confessed that agents promised her a house).126 He was 
eventually charged with “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda” in May 1980.  
The Demise of the Dudko Gatherings 
After being dismissed from Moscow and placed in Kabanovo, Dudko did not accept the 
advice he had received from his new warden to avoid the limelight.127 He was not reluctant to 
bring up “sensitive” topics.128 Some ten or twenty friends, supporters, or “like-minded” people 
regularly came to his services in Kabanovo, carrying on “discussions,” and even staying overnight 
in the church lodgings. State agents noticed that “before long, here too” Dudko engaged in 
“anti-Soviet activities,” and that “according to tone and content” of his sermons, he was 
“malevolently adjusted in relation to Soviet society and the state system, being a slanderer and 
calumniator.” He was not only delivering such messages in sermons after the liturgy, but even 
after Vespers, contrary to Orthodox custom.129  
The warden tried to dissuade him, mentioning that she was sometimes summoned and 
questioned about Dudko, and that she was asked why he was preaching about “drunkenness 
and hooliganism” when he should stick to more biblical topics. When he defended his actions as 
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necessary considering the situation, the warden told him that it was her duty “to warn him” 
about his sermons and “their” concern that “too many people gather at your place.”130  
Then, in December 1975 the warden terminated Dudko’s contract since she had warned 
him of his “anti-Soviet sermons” and that he shouldn't “speak out against the state, but 
obey.”131 Some of his friends, including well-known writers and literary critics Feliks Svetov and 
Zoya Krakhmal’nikova and mathematician Igor Shafarevich, attempted to defend him, saying 
that the warden of the church was to blame. Her “behavior served as a constant and bitter 
seduction for the believers” to distrust him, and this behavior prevented the “flock” from 
drawing near to Dudko, even while he drew the “heart-felt love of thousands of believers” to 
Kabanovo.”132Yet some local believers were also upset, arguing his sermons were not “anti-
Soviet” but even helped some of the men leave behind their drinking problems. They made a 
petition on his behalf, but to no avail.133  
At this time, Trushin advocated to his boss Kuroedov that they ensure Dudko no longer 
serve in Moscow Oblast, or even better, to put the question to the Patriarch, “who ha[d] every 
reason to deprive Dudko of the priestly rank.”134 Kuroedov in January 1976 wrote an article in 
Izvestiia, claiming that the parishioners of the church in Kabanovo “refused the services” of 
Dudko, “dismissing him from the church for sermons of an anti-Soviet content” and that 
parishioners from his two previous churches had done the same for “the same reasons.” This 
“’pastor,’” Kuroedov noted, had the support of the “West,” who declared him a “’true fighter for 
the faith.’”135 The subtext of Kuroedov’s declaration was that “we” rejected Dudko, since he 
merely belonged to “them,” the Westerners. Though parishioners did support Dudko, 
Kuroedov’s assertions demonstrated that communal religiosity was not an acceptable path to 
belonging, and that Western sympathy was a path to marginalization in the Soviet Union.  
Yakunin was in the same situation as Dudko: jobless, but winning Western sympathy. 
“The West” was a double-edged conceptual sword. Gaining Western sympathy irritated Soviet 
authorities due to their concern for Soviet reputation, but anyone seen as “pro-Western” by 
definition could be labeled “anti-Soviet,” since the two were theoretically diametrically 
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opposed. Yakunin was trying to advocate on Dudko’s behalf, but both were seen as too pro-
Western.136 Had the situations of Yakunin and Dudko remained obscure, state or church agents 
would have had little motivation to resolve their jobless status. But news of their ordeals had 
reached sympathetic ears in “the West,” and Orthodox Church representatives were receiving 
an earful at international gatherings and by mail from people protesting that these two were 
denied employment. State and church representatives had an international reputation to 
maintain, and these two priests had become political footballs in a much larger “East-West” 
game of reputation. 
After Dudko’s termination in Kabanovo, a warden of another church approached him 
independently and asked him to be priest at his church. He signed a contract with her, and 
although the Metropolitan responded in anger, he nevertheless permitted the new 
appointment.137 The church was in Grebnevo, and when he arrived, he realized that this town 
was in a restricted part of Moscow Oblast, where no foreigners were permitted due to the 
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presence of certain “factories of particular importance.”138 With foreign broadcasts and 
samizdat discussing the plight of Dudko being “deprived” of a parish, perhaps state 
representatives considered this a pragmatic solution. 
Dudko’s position in Grebnevo began in April 1976. It was closer to Moscow, and overall 
a nicer parish than that of Kabanovo. Again people came, and in large numbers. Local believer 
Sokolova recalls that people, “starving (after a long silence),” gladly “stood for a long time and 
listened hard” to the words of Dudko. No one was in a hurry to leave, she recalls, and Dudko 
“was pelleted by questions.” Not just on holidays or Sundays, but even on weekday services the 
church was filled with people; youth were ubiquitous. In nice weather, tables were spread with 
samovars and food for a meal under the trees. During winter months, people gathered in 
Dudko’s lodge for a meal and the reading and discussion of Scripture. Many people of 
unchurched background came to faith. Thus, in the “normal” parish of Grebnevo, the local 
situation—in the words of Sokolova—“changed beyond recognition.” For those new to him, 
what they heard was “long, exciting, well-aimed preaching,” and they saw people from all over, 
from nearby towns, from Moscow, and from other more distant places as well.139 
The more authorities had tried to marginalize him, the greater his appeal became to 
disaffected youth. One such young man, “stultified by the official culture dished up to Soviet 
citizens like prison slop on a tray” had variously explored rock music, yoga, Buddhism, and so 
forth, but had heard about the renegade priest now in Grebnevo. This man remarked later that 
people who feared the system would go to him, since he seemed courageous: “‘They had heard 
of this priest that you could talk freely to.’”140 Another one remembered that Dudko’s parish 
was “‘like a place of pilgrimage. People would pray, eat, sleep, then stop for the night.’” Locals 
contributed food.141  
One man felt he was in a “family…, with people I could trust.” Since there were always 
sixty or more people, they would have to eat in shifts to fit at the table, which only fit 
seventeen. If they came before the services on Saturday, they would sleep there. He recalls that 
one morning Father Dmitrii “‘came out and laughed, there were so many of us. You could not 
even turn over in bed.’” Discussions would usually last the entire afternoon on Sundays.142 Even 
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though Dudko now lived inconveniently outside Moscow, the “discussions, and conversations, 
and meals’” were worth the effort for Ogorodnikov and others, who felt that there in Grebnevo, 
“‘we created an independent Christian society. It is not just that we had lunch or something, we 
lived the life [...]’”143 In addition to preaching on themes from the gospels and saints' lives, 
Dudko tried to preach on “modern life.” To accommodate the large numbers of his spiritual 
children and the spiritually curious, he again adopted a question-answer style. In short, he was 
way beyond the boundary of acceptable religiosity by the way he fostered a communal 
religiosity that was firmly situated in contemporary life, far from what state authorities regarded 
as safe religiosity, individual participation in rituals. 
Church and state authorities put significant pressure on this community, appointing and 
recalling three rectors in turn until they found one reliable or firm enough.144 The tension 
surrounding Dudko in Grebnevo only increased in 1978 and 1979. The KGB regularly planted 
agents, appearing as interested youth. Police raids and searches were common. Some of his 
followers were arrested and held for a time. The rector made the schedule such that Dudko 
never served on Sundays or feast days, when there would be more people expecting a 
sermon.145 Malicious or slanderous articles frequently appeared about Dudko or his followers, 
and one issue that became troublingly common was a Jewish-Russian tension.146 
With Ogorodnikov and Yakunin arrested by 1980, Dudko was the final outspoken high-
profile Orthodox figure standing. His followers began to break up and avoid him as fear and 
suspicion abounded. In January of 1980, Dudko was arrested. Agents searched his lodgings, 
many of his books were burned, his lodging was dismantled “brick by brick,” and they dug deep 
in his basement, the local Sokolova recalls, “looking for any sort of installations by which Father 
Dimitrii could have been linked with foreigners.” Nothing was found, “except a supply of 
potatoes for the winter.” A sad picture of the erstwhile dynamic community in Grebnevo 
remained: a broken-down lodging, burnt texts, and the still-unrepaired church building, which 
had been charred by a fire in its interior some four years ago.147 
After his arrest in 1980, Dudko was kept in the Lefortovo Prison of Moscow for some 
time, probably as authorities planned their moves or to give Dudko ample opportunity to fear 
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what fate might await him.148 Although it is unknown what precisely transpired within the walls 
of Lefortovo, the next time Dudko’s friends and fans saw him was on television, June 20, 1980. 
Millions of people watched him that evening as he denounced his previous activity and 
“admitted” his crimes, that he worked against the Soviet state by giving the West false 
information about the Soviet Union. 
His “confession” was devastating, as he had baptized thousands, and thousands had 
met him and heard him. To many, he was a solitary beacon of truth and resistance.149  Some of 
his followers despaired so much they contemplated suicide. Even before the TV appearance, 
some of the previous community members, like Ogorodnikov and Krakhmal’nikova, had broken 
ties with Dudko and lost faith in him due to his handling of the pressures put on their 
community.150 
Thus Dudko largely passed from the limelight of religion seekers, but the authorities 
continued to pay attention for a time. Since Dudko had “fully recognized” his anti-Soviet activity 
in print and on television in June, by September 1980, he was now second pastor in the village 
of Vinogradovo. Guests came there, too, for talks and discussions, but in fewer numbers.151 
Trushin still found Dudko engaging in “extremism” by his sermon content, preaching “with the 
goal of the excitation of religious fanaticism,” and by his talks, which were “full of malicious 
slander on the position of the church and of believers in our country, on our reality.” All of this 
was evidence that “as a matter of fact,” Dudko’s admission of “errors” last year did not mean he 
had changed.152  
But, the attractiveness of Dudko waned, and these were perhaps the glowing embers of 
a fire that was dying out. From information supplied by the Rector and members of the church’s 
executive committee, he was having many conflicts with his spiritual children.153 Yakunin and 
Ogorodnikov had broken with him for his failure to stand up for either of them at their trials. His 
community, his “spiritual family,” was crumbling around him. 
Writer Zoya Krakhmal’nikova had listened to Dudko’s sermons for about a decade, was 
baptized by him, and at one time considered him her spiritual father. She had been collecting 
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religious writings and finding ways to publish them abroad or in samizdat form in a journal 
called Nadezhda (Hope). She was arrested in 1982, but her relationship with Dudko had been 
faltering even before his arrest (which then fatally wounded it), and he gave false evidence 
against her in her trial. Her publication, Nadezhda, contained writings on Church Tradition, 
Biblical figures, miraculous icons, Saints’ Lives, sermons, letters from “New Martyrs” to their 
spiritual children, and some articles she wrote on “the need for Christian sermons in culture.” 
After her arrest, one of her interrogators reminded her,  
‘If you had only sat quietly and prayed,’ the chief of the Lefortovo prison 
admonished in a fatherly manner. ‘If you had only sat under your bed and 
prayed so that no one saw you. Or, if you had to, if you had simply gone to 
church. ‘Like my grandmother; she is a believer,’ said my interrogator. ‘My 
grandmother is a believer,’ said another official of the same department when 
he came to see me in exile. Apparently, they all, everyone has grandmothers 
who are believers. And they want us to believe the way their grandmothers do... 
[...] ‘Had you behaved, no one would have imprisoned you.’154 
The interrogator made clear the line between acceptable and unacceptable religious practice. 
Had she kept her religious practice confined to her personal conscience, she would have been 
left alone.  
The Divisions in Novaia Derevnia 
State authorities managed to all but extinguish the flame of religious community life 
among this assortment of Muscovite intellectuals. Krakhmal’nikova’s husband, writer Feliks 
Svetov, was also arrested, even in the surprisingly late year of 1986. Ogorodnikov and many 
others were finally released only in February 1987 in a general amnesty as part of Gorbachev’s 
glasnost. As for Men’, he had been awaiting his arrest. Like them, he was the subject of 
numerous rumors, near-scandals, and slanderous news articles. He was labeled a closet 
Catholic, a Jewish conspirator, and a foreign agent, among other things.155 The commissioner 
claimed that the “extremist” Men’s parishioners had complained about him “many times over 
the last year,” and if true, their complaints revealed a division in the community. They claimed 
that Men’ sided with his personal “adherents” against members of the church executive 
committee and other active believers.156  
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The factions undercutting the Orthodox community there even took on a sordid 
nationalistic tone. Not only was Men’ linked to “dissidents and extremists like Krasnov-Levitin, 
Eshliman, Yakunin, and others,” now he “carefully conspires” by way of “grouping around him 
youth and in particular of Jewish nationality, who systematically gather at the church on days of 
his service.”157 They were meeting after the service, usually in his home. Some believers 
supposedly wrote to the Council, saying, “’Our appeal to you is due to concern for the fate of 
our state. We, believers, often call attention to the suspicious behavior of pr. Men’, since visiting 
the church where he serves is a large collection of Jews, who arrive with their fat briefcases, 
surround Men’, and after the liturgy meet with him.’” 
The rector also wrote to the Metropolitan that Men’ was “occupied by feverish activity” 
in his reading, writing, and meeting with guests, such that “sometimes the altar looks like a work 
office.” He too, mentioned the guests with their “luggage and briefcases,” and these may have 
insinuated illegal merchandise or literature. The rector noted that with increasing frequency 
“adult Jews” were baptized, having been “converted by Men’.” In the next sentence, a seeming 
non-sequitur, but perhaps implying ill dealings, he noted that “three times” the church “was 
subjected to robbery.” The church’s executive committee forbade Men’ from holding gatherings 
in the lodging or enclosure, but he apparently “did not always” comply. The warden complained 
that on days of his service there tended to be “a stream of increasingly new unknown people.” 
She mentioned that those entering did “not always cross themselves.” She also found it 
“strange” that these “30-40-year old people visit our church during the week, when they should 
be at work.”158 
Men’ was searched and interrogated several times during the 1980s, but he managed to 
keep from arrest. Not only was his parish not a faction-free, safe community, but his community 
of like-minded friends or supporters was far from stable. Those who came to him were typically 
transient: they would come for a time, and then fade away.159 They were like spiritual tourists, 
luggage and all.  
With glasnost, much changed for Men’. He became an enormously popular speaker and 
appeared in all kinds of public settings and media. But it all came to an end, however, when he 
was brutally murdered by an unknown axe-wielding assailant in 1990 while he was walking 
through the woods on his way to church. All that has surfaced has been a litany of conspiracies: 
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that the murder was done by an anti-Semite, that conservatives within the Church instigated it, 
that the KGB ordered it, or some combination thereof. 
Community and Division in Grebnevo 
The crowds receded after Dudko’s dismissal from Grebnevo, but the charred church and 
dugout basement did not linger for long as a bitter symbol of a paralyzed church community. 
Father Ivan Zaitsev would eventually serve a six-year stint as rector (unlike the stints of his 
predecessors which were more commonly counted in months), and along with a new, “not yet 
old, and energetic” warden, they helped restore the church building. The warden also invited 
Sokolova’s daughter to help lead a choir. During the colder months, the choir rehearsed in the 
Sokolova home, had dinner together, and “discussed issues;” it seemed to Sokolova that “once 
again a Christian community was born.”160 
People, even the young, were once again attending church, Sokolova recalls, as a couple 
of the priests after Dudko were also preaching “excellent sermons.” One, Father Mikhail, had a 
long line of people waiting for confession with him and to talk to him after the service. Despite 
the fact that Rector Zaitsev had helped with a lot of the repairs, people were flocking toward the 
younger Father Mikhail and away from him. But “they took [Mikhail] away too,” another “blow 
on the souls of the parishioners,” until Father Arkadii arrived, whose “strong voice …, heartfelt 
words of his preaching, … and look in his deep eyes” ultimately “won the hearts of the 
congregation.” Once again, people began “to fill the church,” young people too, “who followed 
Father Arkadii everywhere, using every minute to meet with him.”161 
Suddenly, rector Zaitsev was replaced by another, but it is not clear whose idea this was. 
This time, the parishioners decided to speak out. Even though crowds had not surrounded 
Zaitsev as they did Fr. Arkadii, they appreciated what he had done. They did not like the 
replacement rector, so they protested, sent letters; when these went unanswered, every 
member of the “staff” – the warden, the cleaners, the watchman, the treasurer, the 
administrator, acolyte, altar boy, the choir, the baker of the communion bread, and the 
repairmen – quit, except the “fire stoker.” This did not impress the bishop, who told Father 
Arkadii simply to find others for the tasks.  
                                                          
160 Sokolova, Pod Krovom Vsevyshnego [Under the Blood of the Most High], 380. 
161 Ibid., 380–381. 
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On the advice of Sokolova’s husband, Father Vladimir, Father Arkadii called a meeting of 
the dvadtsatka.162 The problem, however, was that there was not much of a dvadtsatka in 
Grebnevo—some had died, others had moved away, and still others were sick or unable to get 
out of bed. With the help of Father Arkadii’s spiritual followers from nearby Fryazin, they 
elected new members to the dvadtsatka, whom locals claimed they “d[id] not trust,” since they 
were not “our own,” of the local village. In fact they were conspiring to keep the positions 
unfilled in hopes that the bishop would respond to their grievances. But, the new people filled 
the ranks of the dvadtsatka, including Sokolova. The new dvadtsatka then proceeded to 
nominate replacements for the positions, in the presence of “hissing old women.”163 
As can be seen in this “normal village,” the problems of church community life were not 
caused simply by meddlesome state officials. Church hierarchs, local leaders, and personal 
differences contributed problems of their own for the local church community, and individuals 
could do some things to change their situation, but not without significant negotiation. Although 
the parish was to elect the executive body (as was done in Grebnevo), the local commissioners, 
according to their instructions, “should participate in the selection of the executive organ’s 
members, and choose people who carry out our line.”164 It appears the state sometimes ignored 
this level of complexity and opted for the simpler, streamlined method of control, where 
commissioners and secret service agents, together with church hierarchs, simply moved 
dynamic leaders and found ways to get the appropriate level of submission. State authorities did 
not as a rule hound every incidence of communal religiosity the same, and they did not always 
identify a leader worthy of arrest. Dynamic religious communities could fall apart with a simple 
transfer of a priest, but religious communities also struggled to get along amongst themselves in 
the ordinary business of religious life. 
                                                          
162 As discussed in Chapter IV, if people desired to have a religious society of some sort, they were to form 
what was called a “dvadsatka,” or “twenty,” the number needed to form a religious society as well as the 
group who effectively held the powers for the parish. In theory, this group was elected locally, and a 
dvadsatka would in turn elect the chairman, assistant, and treasurer for the parish executive committee 
and approve other staff positions. 
163 Sokolova, Pod Krovom Vsevyshnego [Under the Blood of the Most High], 384. 
164 “Secret Instructions on the Supervision of Parish Life,” Religion in Communist Lands 1, no. 1 (1973): 33. 
Italics in original Russian text. See Chapter IV for more “secret instructions” which were disseminated in 
the early 1960s under Khrushchev. 
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Conclusion 
Dynamic communal religiosity was potentially problematic for the state in several ways. 
First, the spectacle of a crowded room or church weakened state claims that religion was 
disappearing. Second, the participation of youth weakened the claims that religious practice as 
it existed was nothing else but a dying vestige perpetuated by the elderly. Third, the 
participation of intellectuals weakened the claim that religion was reducible to superstition, and 
that any serious scholar would find it only fodder for mockery, or, at best, an object or topic of 
sociological or psychological inquiry. Fourth, the occurrence of large numbers of people 
gathering spontaneously and enthusiastically stood in uncomfortable contrast to mandatory and 
largely unenthusiastic state-sponsored gatherings. Last, grassroots gatherings represented a 
potential political threat, as alternative identities and ways of belonging could be mobilized in 
the future. 
The methods used by state and church officials to keep Orthodox gatherings 
comfortably predictable and small centered on isolation and alienation. They attempted to 
divide clergy from each other; publicize, permit, and even provoke church scandals; weaken the 
influence of clergy by poorly training, harassing, moving, or retiring them; or deter the 
participation of certain laity (especially youth and intellectuals) to limit religion’s communal 
appeal.  
Compared to the Baptists, for example (see Chapter VIII), community life among 
Orthodox believers was distinctive for the role of the priests, who had enormous influence in 
shaping communal religiosity by the way they conducted services, preached, and interacted 
with parishioners. Other than those parishioners who attended a particular parish church 
regardless of which priest was serving, Orthodox clergy influenced who came to church, how 
often, and from where. Priests could impact the degree of community among believers, but the 
community of non-conformist Orthodox intellectuals was centered on the charisma of the 
priest. Certain priests were so attractive, that not only would the church be filled by local 
parishioners, but veritable religious tourists would come too, to hear preaching, receive a 
blessing, confide in the priest, pursue him as a spiritual father, and so on.  
The custom of the Orthodox Church of “spiritual father” and “spiritual child” is one 
example of how Orthodox communities are configured. The relationship is often defined in 
terms of father-child, not only in terms of shepherd-flock. This style of relationship increases the 
relative importance of the priest, as a parishioner’s sense of belonging is more directly focused 
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on the priest (vertically) than on the flock (horizontally). The parish was not democratized as in 
the Baptist formulation, and like-mindedness was less essential. Baptists were members of a 
church, not children of a father. Ogorodnikov’s Seminar was an attempt at democratized 
religiosity, but there was ultimately little to hold the group together beyond a common interest 
in intellectual-religious debate. Their community was weak, in Craig Calhoun’s definition, as is 
common in most purely voluntary associations.165 On the other hand, Orthodox parishes do not 
depend on innovations or outward expressions of voluntary enthusiasm to endure as Protestant 
ones often do. The reliable attendance of parishioners kept church doors open and priests 
employed, even if some officials or youth might have considered such gatherings rote or 
impotent. Rituals can be powerful factors that allow group identities and ideologies to endure.  
One of the common threads among those persecuted was their pursuit of community – 
but not just in terms of a simple collection of people, but a pursuit of mutual authenticity and 
openness. The subjects studied here almost universally acknowledged the lack of these qualities 
around them and the need to hunt for and create them. One can sense the growing urgency the 
authorities felt in the face of religious gatherings. To them, it was mobilization. Priests and 
religious gatherings were sites of voluntary enthusiasm, and if youth were more enthusiastic 
about religious gatherings than state-sponsored ones, it could prove potentially disastrous. 
Comments by participants in Dudko’s question-and-answer sessions revealed that state 
ideologies and apologetic debates of atheism-vs.-religion had become tiresome. More exciting 
was the pursuit of something done in an “open” way, with authenticity, and the emergence of a 
voluntary, not predetermined, “us.” Theoretically, there was religious “propaganda” at every 
church service, but authorities only considered it propaganda under certain circumstances, 
namely when the profile of the participants changed from old women to youth and intellectuals, 
and when the affective nature of the gatherings changed from ritualistic to communally 
dynamic. In the era of “Mature Socialism,” church and state leaders were trying to keep things 
the “old” way, but they were having to fight to keep new life and innovations from emerging. 
Although Dmitrii Dudko and Aleksandr Men’ did play particularly large roles in the 
Muscovite religious-intellectual community, and although authorities chose to focus only on 
leaders as problematic, the agency of their audiences and congregations should not be ignored. 
The desires of audiences made particular priests popular. The state feared the formation of new 
                                                          
165 C. J Calhoun, “Community: Toward a Variable Conceptualization for Comparative Research,” Social 
History 5, no. 1 (1980): 105–29. See introduction for more on Calhoun’s concept for analyzing community 
strength. 
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horizontal and vertical relationships for the potential power they represented, and they usually 
managed to weaken the communities simply by removing or isolating the leaders, not by 
satisfying the desires of the people with alternatives. It is also clear that state organs, although 
they ultimately proved strong enough to cripple nascent attempts at creating church-
community life, had to be judicious when confronted with large crowds and popular events. 
They did not use mass violence, but wisely preferred church avenues as means of creating inner-
church problems first, and if necessary, using “legal” measures to make formal accusations. They 
were bound to a semblance of legality and order to remain legitimate in the public’s eyes.  
One way authorities isolated leaders was by labeling them as “anti-Soviet.” Authorities 
criticized Dudko, for example, for “delighting in any kinds of renegades [otshchepentsi] who are 
servile to the West,” naming Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn as examples.166 Thus, it was not just 
about words, but about allegiances, communities, belongings and identities. There was a Soviet 
“us” that one could belong to, or a “them,” and state representatives wanted the monopoly in 
defining those groups. 
Many have labeled the leaders of these formations “dissidents,” although this word 
connotes a political agenda (Yakunin emerged as the only clear dissident of the group, as he 
sought specifically political associations and activity). They are better called “non-conformists,” 
as their goals were often not political at all, but social and religious. The authorities politicized 
them. But, they overlap with more clearly identifiable dissidents like Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov in 
that these “non-conformist” religious figures likewise championed moral causes, like the value 
of morality and conscience in society.167 The communist project had begun as a moral one, of 
righting socio-economic and political wrongs, but it lost its moral focus. Universal values and 
morals remained part of the discourse, but cynicism toward them and the promised future took 
hold especially among urban intellectuals. It also seemed to some people as though the public 
was increasingly engaged in individualistic quests for comforts. In this context, Soviet ideologists 
struggled to maintain a moral imperative for rule.168  
Yet not all citizens had jettisoned morality for consumerism, and many still cared about 
truth-claims or ideology—and not only dissidents. Those who became dissidents had grown up 
                                                          
166 GARF f. 6991, op. 6, d. 989, 9. 
167 Philip Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 
222. Boobbyer writes that the post-Khrushchev era was marked by a “moral crisis,” where the ideology 
had lost its power (Alexei Yurchak likewise argues that ideology had become vacuous, but he does not 
assert a moral crisis). 
168 Ibid., 223. 
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in a morally framed and idealistic Soviet worldview, and they based their calls to change or 
reform on these principles. But they often failed to find a receptive audience among party 
members for reform (prior to Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost). Furthermore, as 
Pospielovsky notes, recent converts often lived with “an acute sensation of conflict between the 
teachings of Christ, on the one hand, and the policies of the Moscow Patriarchate and the 
behavior of its clergy, on the other.” Such neophytes had not grown up living with this particular 
tension, and their desire for coherence either led toward attempts to reform, acceptance of 
duplicity, or disappointment in the Church when calls to reform went unheeded.169 
Many others, when faced with the crumbling moral imperative that shaped the Soviet 
Utopia, did not fight for reform, but simply looked for alternative utopias or social worlds to 
inhabit and pursue. These wanted to avoid discussions of universal values and politics altogether 
and found in the religious realm an escape from the realm of universals and politics to 
something beyond. Judith Kornblatt suggests something similar, arguing that those who came to 
faith in the 1980s, did so more “as a response to the emptiness and confinement of the Soviet 
society in which they were raised,” as one of the possible “outlet[s] for escape” which also 
included Eastern religions like Buddhism and Hinduism.170 
Nicholas Ganson, in his article on Dudko, argues that priests like Dudko, Men’, Yakunin, 
and Eshliman were fighting “Soviet social atomization,” not just on a local level, but even a 
national and international one as well.171 This is a very apt assessment. Part of their appeal was 
their contribution to concepts of belonging that were local (the Parish), national (Russian 
Orthodox), and international (ecumenical-Christian). Individuals saw religion as an opportunity 
to belong on many levels, and intellectuals in particular were drawn to its universalism. Young 
intellectual Mikhail Ardov was baptized in 1964, and he considered it “as a kind of initiation into 
worldwide Christian culture, and not as a most important Church Sacrament.”172 Christianity 
became appealing as an alternative worldview and culture of belonging. Even while Orthodoxy 
awkwardly mingled with (Soviet) promotion of Russian nationality, this chapter shows that for 
Soviet authorities, Orthodoxy-as-identity was supposed to be limited to an icon of nationality; it 
                                                          
169 Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982, 379–380. 
170 Kornblatt, Doubly Chosen, 84–85. 
171 Ganson, “Orthodox Dissidence as De-Atomization,” 114. 
172 Mikhail Ardov, Vse k Luchshemu-- : Vospominaniia, Proza [All for the Better--: Memories, Prose] 
(Moscow: B.S.G. Press, 2006), 185. 
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was not supposed to be either ecumenically cosmopolitan or a primary locus of local community 
identity, belonging, or social mobilization.  
Whether one can characterize such religious-associational life as “proof” that society 
was not atomized or that civil society existed is less certain. These formations are best seen as 
loose affiliations of people who likely held a great diversity of views, yet came together for 
specific purposes. What united them was their coincidence in time and space, but not much 
beyond that. The popularity of the gatherings was itself of concern to the state, more so than 
the specific words that were said; it was certainly the sub-text (enthusiasm) more than the text 
that mattered to the state. Without a cross-sectional analysis of the participants, it cannot be 
determined what they thought the “text” was, but it was likely to have varied. Even if it might be 
difficult to provide a single label to describe what constituted the core for those participating in 
dynamic religious communities, the bottom line was that they could in no way be construed as 
state-sponsored or in harmony with the dominant state discourses. Even those acts which state 
authorities considered acceptable—traditional Orthodox rituals—were more powerful than 
officials credited them. The rituals themselves, by enduring alongside communist ideology, 
carried with them ideologies and ways of conceiving of the self and the group, providing ready 
alternatives to communist ones. Officials misconceived of submission to authority or to ancient 
rituals—especially when carried out by women—as weakness or impotence. In fact, by carrying 
on the customs, Orthodox adherents could offer an alternative way of conceiving the world 
once the pressure of coercion eased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Ryan J. Voogt 2017 
252 
VII. Maintaining Unity in the Romanian Orthodox Church, 1964 – 1989
At first the rise to power of Nicolae Ceauşescu suggested a sort of thaw. His youth 
seemed paired with generosity, and over the first several years of his rule he began to build a 
reputation as one favoring greater liberalization and reforms, a belief which garnered support 
from Western leaders. His first surprising act was his general amnesty in 1964 for political 
prisoners, and most who were in prison for religious infractions were set free. International 
ecumenical relations were restored in a limited and monitored fashion. But toward the late 
1970s and 1980s, Ceauşescu began to promote what Ioan-Marius Bucur describes as 
"neoStalinism, ideological orthodoxy and chauvinistic nationalism."1 Yet ideological orthodoxy, 
implying scientific materialism, conflicted with chauvinistic nationalism, as the former was 
atheist in content, whereas the latter was often intermingled awkwardly with the Romanian 
Orthodox heritage. Two groups—people not of Romanian ethnicity and Romanians of non-
Orthodox faith, such as neoprotestants (Baptists, Pentecostals, and Brethren)—were 
increasingly persecuted in connection with this new trajectory of Ceauşescu's.  
An observer of Romanian religious affairs, Miranda Villiers, claimed in 1973 that the 
relatively strong relationship between the state and Orthodox Church was possible due to the 
"intensely national [characteristic of the Romanian Orthodox] Church," which was amenable to 
any nationalistic leaders. Without difficulty one could argue that the Orthodox Church served a 
national agenda; the church was woven into conceptions of Romanian identity lore, and the 
presence of the patriarch or bishops at mass gatherings or cultural events communicated as 
much. When the ostensibly atheist Nicolae Ceauşescu attended the village funeral of his father 
in April 1972, it may have been more surprising to foreigners than to Romanians: "it is an 
example," wrote Miranda Villiers at the time, "of the recognition given by the Romanian leaders 
to the cohesive power of religion in the forging of a strong national state."2 As is the case with 
most nationalisms, state-promoted Romanian nationalism was defined against several “foreign” 
identities. The foreigners of the Romanian Orthodox Church included, first, the Greek-Catholic 
1 Ioan-Marius Bucur, “Church and State Relations under the Communist Regime: The Case of Romania,” in 
Religion and Political Change in Europe: Past and Present, ed. Ausma Cimdina (Pisa: PLUS, 2003), 169. 
2 Miranda Villiers, “The Romanian Church Today,” Religion in Communist Lands 1, no. 3 (1973): 4. Though 
the BOR was a force for national identity, this does not necessarily correlate with a force for spirituality. 
As Villiers also adeptly noted: “A Church may act as a preserver of the national identity to the detriment 
of its duties towards the spiritual needs of the faithful” (5-6). 
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Church, particularly its link with a foreign power, the Vatican; and second, neoprotestants, 
which were “foreign” from their roots in Western missions in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The BOR was not concerned with other historic churches with foreign aspects, like the 
largely Hungarian Churches, which included the Reformed (see Chapter IX), Unitarian, Synodo-
Presbyterian Lutheran, and Catholic Churches, the Saxon-based Lutheran Church, the Old-Rite 
Russian Orthodox Church, the Armenian-Gregorian Church, Islam, or Judaism, as these were not 
competitors for ethnic Romanians. 
Justinian had been Patriarch since 1948, and Villiers contended in 1973 that he helped 
foster growth: 118 priests were ordained in merely three dioceses in 1971 alone, there were 
1,400 full-time students in theological schools and seminaries, and some students and scholars 
were being allowed to travel abroad. The Patriarchate had two regular journals published with 
true scholarly work. Villiers claimed that by doing its secular duties, the Romanian Orthodox 
leadership made room for "real spiritual rebirth," made evident by active monastic life (there 
were 105 monasteries, 540 monks, and 1,443 nuns according to her records)3 
But an increase in the number of priests does little to describe the reality of church life 
in the parishes, especially keeping in mind that many parishes were lacking priests ever since the 
Greek-Catholic parishes had been incorporated into the Orthodox Church following their 
“reunion.” Indeed, even if a Romanian-nationalist line would awkwardly promote both the 
Romanian Orthodox Church and ideological Marxist-atheism, this fact still does little to 
illuminate the everyday religious world within that Church.  Romanian Orthodoxy occupied a 
position within the propagandistic self-advertisements of the regime and was expanding.  
However, rules of religious acceptability still applied to this supposedly favored Church, as state 
agents and Church authorities disciplined non-conformists as happened in the other faiths, a 
situation made most apparent by a younger generation of priests in the 1970s and 1980s who 
tested those boundaries.   
Problems Involving the Orthodox Church Nationally and Locally 
The regime change and Amnesty of 1964 did not change the religious landscape 
overnight, and most of the governmental functionaries remained the same. In a series of reports 
by the Department of Religions in the early years of Ceauşescu’s regime, officials almost never 
3 Ibid., 5–6. She does not note that the numbers were much higher prior to the late 1950s. 
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complained about clergy and parishioners subverting communist authority or clergy who were 
too religious or popular. These situations occurred infrequently and over a relatively discrete 
period of time, as will be discussed toward the end of the chapter. Rather, the surveys pointed 
to problems with marginalized groups and movements that threatened the Orthodox Church 
and the idea of its unity and oneness. As discussed in Chapters III and V, the primary threats 
were the lack of “consolidation” of the Orthodox Church (i.e. the persistence of aspects of 
Greek-Catholicism), losing members to actively proselytizing Baptists, Pentecostals, and other 
“neoprotestant” groups, and sectarian movements within the Church like the Lord’s Army and 
stylism (stilism). Chiefs of the Department of Religions at the national level monitored and 
discussed these problems with great interest. 
The above-named problems were faced by local inspectors from the Department of 
Religions who coordinated their efforts with church leaders and other local organs of state, and 
what follows is an exploration of how inspectors from the Sălaj County branch of the 
Department managed these problems.4 An inspector’s job was a busy one, given the hundreds 
of churches in each county. Amid the diversity of denominations found in Transylvania, an 
inspector needed to be familiar with differences in practices and customs and was in contact 
with representatives of church and state bodies alike. In Sălaj the largest denominations were 
the Orthodox Church, the Reformed Church, and the Catholic Church, but there were also 
increasing numbers of neoprotestants, and there were other unapproved religious movements 
like Jehovah’s Witnesses.5 The County, being newly formed in 1968 out of large counties as part 
of a territorial reorganization, needed its own apparatus for managing religious affairs. After a 
few years of transition, the local inspector of Sălaj had the reins of the Department’s county 
office. Stan Tudor was its first inspector until 1971, when Gheorghe David took over. David left 
for the same post in the neighboring and likewise newly created county of Bistriţa-Năsăud in 
spring of 1972, and Ioan Roman served until fall of 1977, when Simion Achim took over.  
Simply “keeping up” was the most inspectors could hope for, given the enormity of their 
tasks. As an example, in one month inspector Gheorghe David had some 48 agenda items to 
resolve: fourteen dealing with repairs and construction, ten reports that clergy or others 
                                                 
4 Sălaj County is one of the few counties in Romania that has made Department of Religions documents 
available for research, with files from 1968-1977 available. 
5 I did not encounter a census of this information. I note below that the Greek-Catholic Church was the 
dominant one prior to the “unification” of 1948. 
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submitted referring to issues or people, twenty-one pertaining to personnel moves, and three 
miscellaneous tasks, including writing his work plans. David visited churches for nearly two-
thirds of the month, reaching around 20 locations, but this was only a fraction of the county's 
hundreds of churches. Certain months would also require him to travel for church conferences 
or departmental meetings. All of these visits took time because of the slow, often mountainous 
Romanian roads. In addition, his regular visiting hours occupied several work days per month.6 If 
a big issue arose somewhere in the county (See Chapter IX for an example in the Reformed 
Church), inspectors would abandon visits and visitors. Inspectors often ignored outlying parishes 
due to such constraints, even in one of the least populous counties of Romania, Sălaj. Because 
inspectors’ goals were to create predictability and normalcy, they concentrated the bulk of their 
attention on places where they perceived these to be vulnerable. 
All inspectors across Romania shared the duties Sălaj County’s first inspector Stan Tudor 
named as “awareness of religious phenomena and taking measures corresponding to preventing 
the tendency of intensifying religious life,” watching out for the activity of unapproved religious 
groups and activity, overseeing the conferences—usually two per year for the Orthodox and 
Reformed Churches—aimed at training religious personnel, monitoring any overseas 
connections and influences, monitoring economic/financial aspects of the churches, verifying 
construction/repair work, and coordination with local authorities in regard to any religious 
problems or religious-legal issues.7  
Inspectors monitored the affective quality of religious activities and their participants. 
Tudor mentioned his duty of tracking “the attitude of religious servants and believers.” He also 
endeavored to “thoroughly” analyze “the causes which deepen religious sentiments, as well as 
methods and means used for the stimulation of this sentiment and the intensification of 
religious life in general, for each denomination in turn.” Inspectors did not readily distinguish 
between problems of procedure and of feeling in religious activities. As Tudor put it, his goal 
was to “control religious personnel’s compliance with regulations” as well as to “track the 
practices which, by their nature, harm morale or public health” and then to spearhead 
“combating them.”8 Thus, state agents expected church leaders to limit practices that were 
                                                 
6 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor,” 1971/8, 65, 82. 
7 Ibid., 1970/5, 1. 
8 Ibid., 3. One specific cause of “religious intensification” that Tudor hoped to counter was “the 
interference of some religious personnel among some believers belonging to other religions,” meaning 
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regarded as “harming morale,” other words for an increase in mysticism, charisma, mobilization, 
or proselytism, all unhealthy to society.  
What inspectors actually did was dependent not simply on the religious landscape or 
the formulation of their goals, but on the persons themselves. Sălaj County’s third inspector, 
Ioan Roman, wrote reports that were brief, using generic or default phrases, giving the 
impression that little problematic or important ever occurred. Although they shared basic 
responsibilities like “familiarity with religious phenomena” and preventing “the intensification of 
religious life,” to Roman, this merely meant that he needed to identify illegal religious groups 
and activity, verify financial and building matters, harmonize with local organs, and ensure that 
religious institutions conform to legislation.9 
Each county had a specific religious situation, and in Sălaj County the inspectors 
confronted three problems of the Orthodox Church frequently mentioned at the national level: 
the Greek-Catholic problem, the Lord’s Army, and neoprotestant activism. Early on Stan Tudor 
aimed to “track” Roman Catholic priests who were serving in former Greek-Catholic parishes or 
who had former Greek-Catholic believers as parishioners, and he aimed to “oversee” religious 
events of all cults, but “especially neoprotestant cults” and their “sustained proselytizing 
activity.” He also was following the activities of “forbidden sects,” Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 
Lord’s Army.10 We will look at how officials handled these complex issues, first at the national 
level and then at the local level of Sălaj County. 
“Consolidating Unification” in the BOR 
Although it had been nearly twenty years since the Greek-Catholic and Orthodox 
“reunion” of 1948, the on-the-ground reality remained complicated. In the late 1960s, the 
General Secretary of the Department of Religions in Bucharest Dumitru Dogaru reported on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
neoprotestants among Reformed and Orthodox believers, and Roman Catholic priests who encouraged 
the latent Catholicism among former Greek-Catholic believers and clergy. He also had to watch out for 
any locally-initiated ecumenical events, since state agents highly discouraged conversions from one faith 
to another since they were assumed to always trend away from the historical churches. He kept an eye 
out for any “obvious” actions of proselytism, and for any situations where “spiritual pressure” was applied 
to the consciences of believers, e.g. refusing someone sacraments for any reason, using prophecies to 
change people’s choices or behavior. All of these were typically accusations against neoprotestants and 
will be explored below. 
9 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor”, 1972/13, 81. David left for an 
inspectorate in a neighboring county also in its infancy, Bistriţa-Năsăud. 
10 Ibid., 10. 
257 
 
problem of “consolidating unification” of the BOR. The relics, the words, and the general 
appurtenances of the onetime Greek-Catholic churches had not yet disappeared, and to blame 
for this were the clergy, who were not active in combating it. Officials ignored the role that 
ordinary parishioners played. 
Informants reported that certain customs and relics had remained. In one town that had 
an old orthodox church and a “returned” one, although they were both now “Orthodox,” the 
former Greek-Catholics only went to the “returned” church, and there was no inter-mingling; 
the division remained. In another parish, some of the “returned” believers attended the Roman-
Catholic Easter.11  Such situations occurred across Transylvania. Many priests and believers were 
still using the Greek-Catholic word “spirit” instead of the Orthodox “duh” (both translate as 
spirit, with the former of Latin origin and the latter Slavic), priests or cantors still chose certain 
Catholic songs, specifically Catholic prayers like the rosary were being recited, and some 
churches still incorporated the stations of the cross, as a practice or as art in the church’s 
interior. Informants also reported on other remaining décor and iconography of Greek-Catholic 
style, the use of Greek-Catholic ritual books instead of the distributed Orthodox ones, and 
groups of women who belonged to groups with names like the “Mary Society.” 12 Some churches 
in the northwestern city of Arad still had pews, something Romanian Orthodox Churches did not 
have. Even after major repairs in one church, for example, all Catholic statuettes and the stages 
of the cross remained; during the services, four children assisted as is customary in Catholic 
churches; and during communion the people stood in a row as the Catholics do, not in a 
queue.13  
In the lattermost example, as was typical for officials, the state agent blamed the priest 
for such remnants. Yet the priests presiding over these under-consolidated churches were 
usually Orthodox priests, not “returned” Greek-Catholic ones, and they blamed believers, 
claiming they donated certain relics or absolutely insisted on having them or maintaining 
customs.14 Dogaru also blamed the existing hierarchs, claiming Metropolitan Colan was too sick 
to be active and that Bishop Zaharia of Oradea was active but “lacked the necessary tact” to 
                                                 
11 Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Fond “C.C. al P.C.R. - Sectia Administrativ-Politica”, Dos. 14, Vol. 1, 
1966-1969, 95–96. 
12 Ibid., 106. 
13 Ibid., 98. 
14 Ibid., 95–96. 
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improve the situation.15 Duguru believed that Metropolitan Corneanu was too considerate of 
the wishes of some “returned” believers who wanted to find a “returned” priest to fill the 
vacancy left by their former “returned” priest. The regional inspector boldly told Corneanu to 
"no longer give satisfaction to these former Greek-Catholic believers.”16 As for the “returned” 
clergyman who had been promoted bishop as a conciliatory gesture to “returned” priests and to 
those still uneasy about the “reunion,” Bishop of Cluj Herineanu, officials felt that he “d[id] not 
have sufficient prestige” nor “the qualities required” to attract “non-returned” priests.17 They 
also accused him of not showing any “initiative” in the Cluj region toward eliminating Greek-
Catholic relics or rites. He supposedly only gave a token “reprimand,” but did not take active 
measures to combat them.18  
Yet when clergy were “vigilant” about such problems, they merely galvanized Greek-
Catholic sensibilities and increased the likelihood of underground Greek-Catholic movements. 
Dogaru claimed that former Metropolitan Bălan and former bishop of Oradea Nicolae Popovici 
“had adopted an attitude of derision” toward former Greek-Catholics in the 1950s, a negative 
situation that influenced personnel decisions and the content of orientation courses, leading to 
a hardening of attitudes among the “non-returned” priests and a “more hesitant position” 
among those who had “returned.”19 
Of the 1700 Greek-Catholic priests—according to state accounting—717 did not join the 
Orthodox Church, not including hierarchs, canons, and professors. Dogaru confessed that 
“retrospectively analyzed, the carrying out of this act contained a few gaps, the consequences of 
which are being felt in the present as well.” Moreover, following the reunification, “a pause of a 
few years [marked by] optimism and carelessness followed,” in which little was done to 
influence those who “did not return” to the fold of Orthodoxy. In addition, Dogaru blamed 
machinations by the Vatican for the persistence of Greek-Catholicism in Romania.20 The 
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17 Ibid., 110. 
18 Ibid., 99–100. 
19 Ibid., 104–5. 
20 Dogaru argued the Vatican responded by increasing support for Catholics in Romania as well as 
ostensibly threatening to ex-communicate any priest who joined the Orthodox Church. Although most 
Catholics were Hungarians, they supposedly “received instructions [from the Vatican] to preach in 
Romanian for former Greek-Catholics.” For a more thorough treatment of the role of the Vatican, see 
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Department of Religions tried to prevent former Greek Catholic believers from attending Roman 
Catholic churches, but realistically it was “not possible” to prevent the “inter-mixing” of clergy 
or believers from the two Catholic Churches.21 Dogaru claimed that if the Department of 
Religions had not opposed preaching in Romanian at traditionally Hungarian-speaking Roman 
Catholic Churches, the number of Roman-Catholics would have been “much greater.”22  
 “Non-returned” priests had little incentive to join the Orthodox Church. Some who 
chose not to join had managed to find good paying positions in institutions or in state-run 
enterprises, often with the help of relations or co-religionists. Their pay was better than those 
who “returned” to orthodoxy. This could not have been avoided, Dogaru wrote, as it would have 
been worse for them to be isolated or without material means, which would cause them to 
pursue “clandestine religious activity.” Priests serving in “returned” parishes faced a weak 
financial situation due to insufficient parishioner support, as in the past the Greek-Catholic 
Church had received considerable material support from abroad and did not depend as heavily 
on the support of believers.23 
The situation seemed intractable. Perhaps because state and church agents were 
flagging in their desire to complete the unification and doubting the importance of this effort, 
Dogaru reminded his readers that the 1948 unification ended the undue pressure the Vatican 
had over Romanians, a “Habsburgian” legacy. This reunion meant “removing from under the 
direct influence of the Vatican a total of around 1,600,000 Greek-Catholic believers,” whom he 
claimed were willing participants in this reunion. He explained religious resistance as class 
resistance by the bourgeoisie, that it was those with a “connection with the old political regime” 
or those whose positions or prestige depended on a Church “subordinate to the Vatican.”24 His 
use of class to explain the complexity of this religious situation was highly reductive, at a 
minimum ignoring the possibility of working class believers having other opinions. He warned 
that if relics remained despite all of the “entreaties” by the state or Orthodox Church, they could 
be “signs of non-attachment of the respective masses to orthodoxy and could constitute a point 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kremlin: Biserica Greco-Catolică în Timpul Regimului Comunist [Between Vatican and Kremlin: The Greek-
Catholic Church in the time of the Communist Regime] (București: Curtea Veche, 2003). 
21 Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Fond “C.C. al P.C.R. - Sectia Administrativ-Politica”, Dos. 14, Vol. 1, 
1966-1969, 107. 
22 Ibid., 111. 
23 Ibid., 105. 
24 Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Fond “C.C. al P.C.R. - Sectia Administrativ-Politica”, Dos. 14, Vol. 1, 
1966-1969, 104, 181-182. 
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of support for a more organized attempt, about which the Vatican is thinking, to remake the 
former Greek-Catholic church.”25 “Non-returned” priests likewise “constituted a permanent 
danger” for the possibility of the “intensification” of religious life and as conduits for the 
Vatican, who by its many means of propaganda (press, radio, tourism, “ecumenism”), could 
provoke disturbances. Although the Vatican was surely concerned about the Greek-Catholic 
Church, he was likely exaggerating any tactical or conspiratorial maneuvers it was planning. 
Dogaru argued that despite “all the difficulties,” he considered “full consolidation of the 
unification of the Romanian Orthodox Church” possible, aided in part by the fact that the 
number of “non-returned” priests was diminishing due to the simple fact that they were aging.26 
He felt that they had made inroads by naming certain former Greek-Catholics as bishops or 
vicars, replacing Greek-Catholic liturgical books with orthodox ones, offering promotions in 
terms of position or location to certain former Greek-Catholic priests to “regain” Greek-Catholic 
priests who had not “returned,” and creating a central fund to support salaries and maintenance 
of churches at former Greek-Catholic parishes.27 Within the Orthodox Church a “permanent 
contact with intermediary organs” was established for eliminating Greek-Catholic remnants and 
urging priests to “return.”  
The Orthodox Church also worked to justify this act of “reunification” in publications, 
conferences, orientation courses, sermons, and commemorative services: “From year to year, 
starting in 1948, the publications of the Orthodox Church contained numerous articles which 
underlined the forced character of the act from 1700 [when the union with the Vatican occurred 
in Transylvania], the resistance of Transylvanian Romanians against Uniate-ism and the negative 
consequences of it for the Romanian population of Transylvania.” Dogaru emphasized the 
importance of disseminating historical narratives describing the Greek-Catholic Church as having 
a foreign allegiance instead of giving any “impression” that it had benefitted cultural or 
intellectual life in Transylvania in any way. The Orthodox Church also published statements by 
clergy and believers who “welcome[d] the return to orthodoxy.”28 
The Department’s continued response, Dogaru argued, was to be unafraid to use 
punishment and warnings to prove that they are “not wavering” and “not indifferent” to this 
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process of consolidation. He noted that there were “recent condemnations,” presumably to 
prison, of several particularly active “non-returned” clergy, measures which “had an extremely 
effective outcome” in terms of discouraging any attempts at re-forming the denomination.29 He 
felt that they must oppose attempts by the Vatican to enter into relations with the Orthodox 
Church, unless it would renounce any desire to have the Greek-Catholic Church reestablished.  
Dogaru failed to mention, however, one motivating factor why this process of 
unification was slow and partial. Although Orthodox clergy serving in former Greek-Catholic 
parishes may have wished to have everything be purely Orthodox, and although former Greek-
Catholic priests may have agreed to comply with directives to remove Greek-Catholic vestiges, 
both kinds of clergy depended on keeping parishioners satisfied enough to donate to the 
Church. 
Consolidating unification in Sălaj County 
When Sălaj County inspectors and Archpriest Marcel Andreescu came together to 
discuss problems of the Orthodox Church, “the consolidation of unification” was a common 
topic.30 “Consolidating unification” was no small undertaking in Sălaj County. Of the 147 official 
orthodox parishes, only seventeen were originally Orthodox, and of the 103 filial churches 
(smaller and dependent on outside priestly staffing), only two were originally orthodox; the rest 
were “returned” from the Greek-Catholic Church to the Orthodox. Of the 113 priests serving 
these, 30 were former Greek-Catholic priests serving Greek-Catholic parishes, and 67 orthodox 
priests served former Greek-Catholic parishes.31 Thus, the state and Church attempted to 
increase Orthodox presence by having a majority of always-Orthodox priests in a Greek-Catholic 
area, while maintaining a noticeable percentage of former Greek-Catholic priests. Yet four main 
problems remained: “non-returned” priests still at large, the material remnants of Greek-
Catholicism (icons, relics), a lack of effort by most priests to make Orthodox inroads in this 
Greek-Catholic territory, and obstinate believers. 
As noted above, some Greek-Catholic priests who chose not to “return” to the Orthodox 
Church found alternate occupations to the priesthood. Others carried on with priestly work 
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30 See, for example, Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor” 1971/8, 111. 
31 Ibid., 1973/23, 14. 
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underground (their activities are beyond the scope of this study).32 Generally speaking, such 
issues and activity were in the domain of the secret police, as such activity could be easily 
labeled as unauthorized and illegal, rendering an instigator of clandestine religious activity 
susceptible to sanction, often severe. 
Relics were easier to notice than clandestine priestly activity. In 1970 inspector Tudor 
verified a parish in Cehul Silvaniei, only to find Greek-Catholic relics had remained “almost 
intact.” At another Orthodox Church in the town of Ip he could tell that “the whole was Gr. 
Catholic, from the icons, the gospel, books in the pews, etc.” The priest was “a young element – 
28 years old – but he did not do anything to create an orthodox atmosphere at all.” He notified 
Archpriest Andreescu and asked that “he take measures to right the matters.”33 
In some locales, priests and churches complied in the removal of Catholic icons and 
images, only later to put them back in their place – perhaps done by certain believers, but with a 
priest who did not want to battle them. Inspectors kept a list of places where there were known 
remnants (e.g. imagery including stages of the cross, certain Catholic saints). They also made 
note if certain practices persisted, like the rosary, icons showing the heart of Jesus, stages of the 
cross, songs referring to Mary, etc. But people did not resist everywhere. Where construction 
was being done at one church served by a “returned priest,” “technical documentation” had 
been provided to them (probably by experts from the Orthodox Church) to be sure the result 
would be “pure orthodox painting.” Evidently, believers willingly donated money for these icons, 
                                                 
32 From time to time, rumors would arise concerning clandestine Greek-Catholic clergy and services being 
conducted in homes. At one point there were many rumors of a “clandestine bishop” (it could have been 
a Roman-Catholic Bishop, but more likely Greek-Catholic) in the town of Cehul Silvaniei, but the inspector 
believed that “he didn’t go through Cehul Silvaniei anymore” (Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivele 
Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor,” 1971/8, 81). Such a “bishop” would have been someone who had 
been ordained in secret by someone else (or, self-ordained), as most former bishops were deceased, well-
tracked, or commonly known. More common were reports of certain “non-returned” elements carrying 
on illegal activity, like a certain monk in Bocșa who reportedly was holding secret services in his house, or 
other “non-returned” priests who were perhaps holding services in homes or as guests in former Greek-
Catholic churches, using the old liturgy (1973/23, 18). For more, see Vasile, Între Vatican și Kremlin; 
Cristian Vasile, Istoria Bisericii Greco-Catolice sub regimul comunist 1945-1989: documente și mărturii [The 
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33 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor”, 1970/5, 14. 
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having “accepted this orthodox style without any reservation.”34 This may or may not have been 
true, as not all believers were gripped by such considerations.35  
In Lozna in 1974 inspector Roman found relics of a Greek-Catholic church that had not 
been replaced, “though they had something with which to replace them.” He brought it to the 
attention of Andreescu, who “promised that he will take urgent measures for replacing the 
respective relics.” In Porţ, he found the same thing, and the priest there assured him that the 
relics would be taken down “in the shortest amount of time without being discussed by the 
believers.”36 In 1975, Roman was still finding Greek-Catholic icons in two separate towns while 
doing verifications. The local priests both assured him they’d be taken down soon. In Porţ the 
Greek-Catholic relics had previously been taken away, but then “at the insistence of the 
believers” they were put back up again.37  
But why was this process so slow? The “unification” had happened more than two 
decades before. Inspector Tudor worked in Cluj and Sălaj, both places with major Greek-Catholic 
histories, and in his opinion, “consolidation of B.O.R. is unfolding at a snail’s pace because the 
priests do not have any interest to do this work, especially because former Gr. Cat. are in the 
majority.” The inspector did not dwell on the fact that priests had two parties to satisfy, the 
authorities and the people. Removing relics or icons was difficult because believers threatened 
to retaliate by not donating for the priest’s salary. But Tudor believed that the priests’ malaise 
was shared all the way up the hierarchical ladder, leading him to conclude that this was “the 
most acute problem” for the Orthodox Church in the region.38 
Later Roman argued that passivity was normal even among those priests who willingly 
had joined the Orthodox faith. These “returned” priests were passive in that they did their 
service “in complete silence/peace,” “[a]lmost mechanically, like a simple ordinary job.” They 
wanted to avoid accusations of having “a position of resistance toward unification of the 
B.O.R.,” but if they could get away with it, “they do not budge from doing anything” to help the 
process, proven, he believed, by how long it was taking to remove “vestiges” of the former 
Greek-Catholic churches.39 It was in fact rare for a former Greek-Catholic priest to publicly 
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express dissatisfaction.40 “The great majority” of “returned” believers, inspector Roman 
believed, had “indifferent” attitudes. His perspective was that they had “assimilated” to 
Orthodox rituals, without “an attitude of enmity” toward Orthodox services. On the whole, he 
felt that most had accepted that certain words were replaced with others (e.g., ”spirit” with 
“duh”), and while some still were not crossing themselves with three fingers in the orthodox 
way, but with their whole hand, such things “[did] not impede their listening with respect” to 
the liturgy.41 
Such were the tensions and dilemmas facing leaders, ordinary clergy, and believers in 
this problem of “consolidating the union” of the Orthodox Church. There were competing 
demands from opposing directions (leaders-believers), with clergy often in the middle, 
dependent on both for their livelihood. But erasing Greek-Catholicism was further mitigated by 
the sheer scale of the operation, the numbers of churches, the remoteness of villages, and the 
lack of state resources or energy to pursue a thorough-going campaign. 
The Neoprotestant Denominations as Menace to Settled Society 
Another problem that the Department of Religions considered a threat to a unified 
Romanian religiosity was neoprotestantism. The new, ostensibly more lenient Ceauşescu regime 
did not look any more lightly on sects, illegal or non-recognized movements, or even the 
officially approved but supposedly sectarian neoprotestants. Department head Dogaru 
characterized the neoprotestant “organizations” not just as religiously problematic, but 
essentially foreign, having “their centers” in the West and the U.S.A., who “influence[d] their 
political positions” and led them toward “their anti-state attitude in socialist countries.” Many 
state and church representatives saw them as threatening what was a supposed historically 
settled religious landscape. 
In his March 21, 1966 report, Dogaru characterized sectarianism, and by extension, 
neoprotestantism: what begins with adhering to religious precepts with extreme rigidity 
(bigotism), fanaticism, isolation, and intolerance of other religions or concepts of life leads 
inexorably toward “reluctance toward culture and progress,” and “distrust or even hostility 
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toward the state.” Dogaru characteristically blamed group leaders, whose “principal 
preoccupation” was imbuing religious associations with “a dynamic character, in the sense that 
every believer should become a capable missionary to attract proselytes, the problems of 
religious life becoming the primary factor of their lives.” That religion was central to 
neoprotestants was made evident by their proselytizing activities, which inspectors found 
evidence of them doing nearly everywhere, although inspectors labeled such activity as masking 
the true intent of “attracting” new members “to their organization.”42 Here the line between 
acceptable and unacceptable religiosity comes into focus. To state agents, one’s religiosity 
should never be primary in defining one’s activities or relations. Rather, a religious worldview or 
ideology should be marginal in defining one’s choices or relations with others. Normative 
religiosity for state agents was more like a cultural affiliation, where religion would be, at most, 
subsumed into a society that was defined mostly by political, economic, or national terms. 
Because they saw neoprotestantism as “foreign” and unacceptably religious, state 
agents wished to prevent Orthodox believers from changing denominations. The Department 
declared it “forbidden for these [neoprotestant] denominations to enroll new members who 
have come from other denominations, without strict compliance to the legal provisions 
corresponding to the forms of transition from one cult to another.” According to general 
religious legislation, a change in religious affiliation was supposed to occur officially through the 
People’s Councils (sfatul popular—local administrative body). People were supposed to submit 
change-of-religion forms to their local council, but according to actual administration, the 
councils no longer dealt with such matters, with the result that a permanent obstacle was in 
place. In fact, “such forms were not possible [to file] anymore except for some very isolated 
cases,” which meant that the People’s Council was “a brake on the actions of proselytism.” 43 
Although there was a bureaucratic obstacle to an official change in one’s religion, it did nothing 
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to impede people from defining their own affiliation, nor churches from holding their own 
private rolls of registration.  
Despite efforts by state agents to prevent foreign support or organized activities geared 
toward proselytism (beyond the Sunday service), “the mystical and proselytizing dynamism 
[was] still powerful.” A measure Dogaru proposed was to attempt to “liquidate” instances of 
“biblical instruction” that had “a character that is too pronounced.” But here, too, the 
Department was spread too thin and merely reactive, relying on “their own organs in the field” 
to pursue such cases and then “notify legal organs of state power to take measures.”44 Reactive 
discipline was the constant fallback since neoprotestant denominations had legal status to 
operate; the state relied upon its vast secret police apparatus to make judicious decisions about 
which religious personnel justified discipline for conducting proselytism. 
Anytime state organs took action against dynamic religious activity, they had to 
maintain the reputation of a regime that protected people’s right to a religious conscience, not 
as one that persecuted the religious. As such, Dogaru emphasized that any attempts at discipline 
should be made “with tact, without the character of a campaign,” and that it should not be done 
unilaterally in the name of state bodies, but “in conjunction and in collaboration with the 
leaders of the respective [legally approved] religions […] carrying them out in parallel with a 
continuous work of explanation and of persuasion as to the validity of that which we request.”45 
In other words, their actions had to be couched in legal terms; they had to present themselves 
as respecters of the law, not persecutors of religious practice. In turn, such “sectarians” would 
be framed as dis-respecters of the law, and anti-social, and they would be blamed for their own 
marginalization. State agents communicated, in essence, if other believers can find a way to 
practice their religion in a way that does not conflict with the laws of our country (religiously 
acceptable), they can too. The request was simple, to abide by “our” norms. 
To state agents, as well as to many other people, a “normal” social life in Socialist 
Romania presumed a privatized religious conscience, contained within proper boundaries. Thus, 
the Department of Religions hoped to present a united front with state and church organs by 
pursuing “integration of the sectarian or neoprotestant believers who remain with a sectarian 
mentality, in unity with the whole nation, through liquidation of the ‘sectarian’ tendencies of 
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isolation from society which characterizes them.” Dogaru believed that they would gain “good 
results” after “close observation of the sectarians, individual contact with them on subjects 
related to their work or on local public actions, and clear discussions about some deviations or 
calling them to order.” For such tasks, Dogaru believed trade union or administrative leaders, 
representatives from the Popular Councils, and other activists would suffice.46 Thus, Dogaru 
hoped that believers who demonstrated sectarian or proselytizing tendencies would learn social 
norms; they would learn the proper place and balance to their religiosity. Just as believers 
influenced one other, state representatives tried to use personal influence, but along a different 
trajectory. Dogaru advocated the state fight religious proselytism with its own proselytism. 
The neoprotestant problem touched the Orthodox Church directly. When Dogaru 
revisited the situation in a report a couple years later on December 17, 1969, he claimed a 
recent intensification of activity among legal neoprotestant groups and sects that disrupted 
religious life. When one denomination or group became active, it created “dissension” and 
“unrest among believers” by “inducing all cults to intensify activity.” “Intense” religious 
education of believers and “especially of teenagers” was equivalent to “imprinting on them an 
exaggerated mysticism,” which had as a consequence “a lack of receptivity and even 
indifference toward the acquiring of socialist ideology.”47 Dogaru and other officials regretted 
that the neoprotestants and sectarians ignored the religious norms desired by the state and 
other religious denominations. 
The proposed measures of Dogaru and the Department were nothing new or 
particularly inventive. They forbade construction or repairs of homes or churches without 
proper approval by state organs; meeting in houses without prior written authorization of a 
respective church leader who has been endorsed by the Dept. of Religions; conversion from one 
denomination to another through baptism alone, although further requirements were left 
unclear; proselytizing while visiting the sick in the hospital; preaching which would incite people 
toward disrespecting any state legislation; distribution of literature of foreign origin; 
unregistered priests performing priestly activities; orchestral fanfares during church-exiting (for 
their potential attractiveness to others), etc.48 These measures were not promising as obstacles 
since they did nothing to address the core question of what, in fact, made neoprotestant 
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associations compelling to ordinary people. The state and Orthodox Church were comparatively 
static and could only offer obstacles or reactive policies, whereas the neoprotestants were 
finding ways to animate others to joining them. Neoprotestantism was the epitome of 
unacceptable religiosity. 
Threat of neoprotestantism in Sălaj County 
When Stan Tudor helped establish the Department of Religions office in Sălaj County, he 
discovered that although the most common problems in need of resolution involved 
documenting church registration or going over the state of finances and bookkeeping, “the 
hardest work” was monitoring the “activities of the religions, and especially of the 
neoprotestant religions.” It was difficult to enforce the “religious regulations” and slow their 
evangelizing activities.49 He considered neoprotestantism the biggest overall religious problem 
“without exception.”  
This problem significantly affected the Orthodox Church in Sălaj County. When inspector 
Tudor met with the Orthodox archpriest to discuss pressing concerns in 1970, the “activity of 
neoprotestant religions interfering among the Orthodox religion” was the only one worth 
noting. Neoprotestants were going door-to-door, had musical groups and sometimes stereo and 
radio equipment, all of which served to attract youth and people of other faiths. In addition to 
expansion by conversions, Tudor was concerned that the families in these faiths tended to have 
twice as many children (or more) than those belonging to other faiths, something that also 
contributed to growth.50 
Inspectors were not the only ones concerned; priests were too. In one parish a priest 
notified his archpriest, who then transmitted the information to the inspector, that in his parish, 
Baptists had built a prayer house, hosted guest preachers from Cluj and Bucharest, and invited 
Orthodox believers to hear them. They were going from house to house, and according to the 
accusation, targeting females and the elderly to join them. Of course nearly everyone already 
belonged to one denomination or another, so any invitation would necessarily prey upon 
another denomination.51 
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Archpriest of Simleu Victor Tăut told the inspector about a case of proselytism 
discovered in Sumal in 1976. A priest had passed on information about preachers who had been 
visiting from different cities, preaching Saturday afternoon until nighttime. In anticipation of 
these visits, believers went from house to house “of our believers” to invite them. Some did 
attend, supposedly only due to “being relatives” or “from curiosity.” Tăut regarded “their” 
Orthodox believers as being preyed upon. According to his report, these believers expressed 
that they were “disturbed by what they hear[d] there and [we]re shaken in faith” especially 
since “all the preachers did not avoid speaking against the Church, her practices, the priests and 
certain weaknesses of theirs, and that priests make requests for money […].” The Archpriest 
asked rhetorically, but provocatively of the inspector, “Do these foreign [implying not local or 
not one of “us”] preachers have authorization to be able to go wherever and speak against 
whomever as they please?” He was able to provide the inspector with some names of local 
neoprotestants who were involved in preaching or inviting others to hear them.52 
Earlier, in 1971, inspector David conducted a study of people joining the neoprotestants 
from other faiths, since joining neoprotestants was basically the only movement from one 
denomination to another according to available information. He found that the Baptists and 
Pentecostals were “still seriously feasting” on the Orthodox Church, but that Baptists tended to 
profit at the expense of the Reformed Church (Hungarians), whereas Pentecostals were 
comprised almost exclusively of Romanians. Looking at data from 1967 to 1971 in his county, 
David found that despite having 120 priests, the Orthodox Church attracted only 55 people, 
many of whom were merely returning from a stint with neoprotestants. The neoprotestants 
attracted around 255 from the Orthodox Church with only 16 pastors, some of whom had no 
theological training. The Reformed Church’s situation was “just as sad,” as they lost 96 believers 
compared to 9 gains.  
With the advantage in numbers of clergy that the Reformed and Orthodox Churches 
had, he asked, “How is it possible that a few pastors compared to around 200 priests could have 
such success?” He blamed the result on the “disinterest” shown by certain priests regarding 
neoprotestant activity, “their lack of receptivity” as well as a “mercantile spirit which gives 
water to the mill of the neoprotestants.” Though he found priests’ inactivity blameworthy and 
wished they took classes in “sectology,” he also argued that combating neoprotestants was “a 
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duty of the Department and the organs of state” due to the fact that they “supposedly can stick 
those in prison who do proselytism.”53 
David had had some recent examples of a “mercantile spirit” in the Orthodox Church to 
justify his accusation. A few months prior he had received a request from Archpriest Andreescu 
to remove a certain village priest of Mineu Victor Varga for being “irresponsible.” He had a 
“weakness, that as soon as money is put in his hand he cannot bear to not spend it,” and 
thousands had gone missing. What made the situation worse was that Mineu had an active 
Baptist presence. David agreed with Andreescu, as “any deviation or lack of good conduct would 
be exploited [by the Baptists] to the maximum.” David and Andreescu agreed to Varga’s removal 
and to the priest who would replace him.54 In addition to such blatant misuse of funds, 
“mercantilism” could also have been referring to the more common accusations made against 
Orthodox Priests, that charging for the performance of rites (baptisms, christenings, weddings, 
and burials) smelled of greed, and lacked sympathy for parishioners’ hardships.55 Neoprotestant 
church leaders, on the other hand, did not collect money for performing rites. 
Church and state leaders urged Orthodox priests to serve in the front line of this 
neoprotestant struggle but there were still implied limits to Orthodox activity. In Marca, 
inspector Roman met with an Orthodox priest to discuss the “neoprotestant problem” there. He 
could happily report that “the local priest [was doing] pastoral work without exceeding limits 
and searching via various methods to combat the activities of the neoprotestant denominations 
in the town.”56 They wanted active priests who were among the people and engaged with the 
people, but without getting overly zealous. This was the difficult balance for those priests who 
did pursue religiously active service. 
But there was a deeper problem that the inspectors did not wish to address. People had 
their own opinions, desires, and tastes, and Orthodox leaders and the Department of Religions 
were frankly struggling against the ability of neoprotestants to mobilize Orthodox believers. 
State agents did not reflexively consider how close cooperation with Orthodox clergy would only 
elevate the status of neoprotestantism for those who did not trust the regime. 
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The Lord’s Army, with or without its Leaders 
The other “sectarian” movement that caused Department of Religions’ representatives 
nearly equal consternation was the Lord’s Army, despite the arrest of its leaders in 1959. The 
Lord’s Army occupied a particularly important place in state considerations because it had many 
of the characteristics of other neoprotestant denominations or sectarian groups, but claimed a 
certain affiliation with the so-called “people’s Church,” the Romanian Orthodox Church.  
Department of Religions officials described the Lord’s Army as problematic in two 
incompatible ways. First, as a Maramureş County inspector put it in his March 15, 1966, report, 
the Lord’s Army was founded “by the leadership of the church in the time of the bourgeois-
landlord regime” and Trifa, their front man, was a “legionary” and had transformed it into “a 
legionary organization.”57 It was convenient for officials to employ pejoratives like “bourgeois” 
or “fascist” as a way to easily dismiss this undesirable religious group, even if officials would 
have been hard-pressed to identify bourgeois or fascist aspects to the Lord’s Army activities in 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
On the other hand, officials described LA religiosity as akin to neoprotestantism. 
Common to adherents of these two associations was their “discontentment” with what officials 
saw as ordinary religiosity,  the inspector from Maramureş explained: “The adherents of the 
Lord’s Army are not satisfied with the religious services done by the priest and they also gather 
alone in their homes where they pray and certain groups sing army songs and some of them 
preach […]” To officials, LA adherents were not as bad as neoprotestant believers since they 
were “peaceful believers, [who] do not do proselytism but are more fanatic than the rest of the 
orthodox believers.” On the civic side, officials said, they participated properly in the 
cooperatives, but tended to avoid government-sponsored “public meetings,” and “cultural 
events.” Yet the religious similarities between the two movements made Army adherents “easily 
attracted to neoprotestant cults,” especially since it was legal to participate in neoprotestant 
services, but technically illegal to participate in Lord’s Army services. The inspector mentioned a 
recent case of 32 Army participants who as a group switched to the Pentecostal faith, showing 
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how participation in the Lord’s Army did not necessarily keep people attached to the Orthodox 
Church by giving them the additional religiosity they desired.58  
Dogaru echoed the findings of the Maramureş inspector, even claiming that by its 
original intent and nature the Lord’s Army tended toward separation from the Orthodox Church. 
He claimed that the Army’s leadership, “cultivating an excessive religious preoccupation” and 
employing “practices” that were “exceed[ing] the permissible limits of ordinary practice of the 
orthodox church,” the Lord’s Army “expanded” and “even sought to get out from under 
obedience to the orthodox hierarchy.” Instead of questioning why believers might be attracted, 
Dogaru blamed leaders for pushing the boundaries of religious acceptability, which inevitably 
led toward separation. Although Traian Dorz claimed the Lord’s Army supported the Orthodox 
Church, Dogaru saw it as “a breeding ground of various sects.”59 LA gatherings for singing, 
prayer, Bible reading, and testimonies were not innocent communal activities but “initiated by 
certain fanatics” and had a “subversive character.”60 
To combat the Lord’s Army, the authorities continued with periodic discipline in the 
1960s, such as the interruption of meetings by police, searches, and extremely large fines to 
those hosting meetings without having proper approval.61 From the perspective of the inspector 
in Maramureş, “The Orthodox priests have the duty to liquidate these groups” but their activity 
“weakened.”62 There were not any innovative approaches to reducing the appeal of the Lord’s 
Army. 
Ceauşescu’s ascension to power in 1964 included an amnesty to “political” prisoners, of 
which were religious figures like the LA leaders arrested in 1959. Upon his release in 1964, 
Traian Dorz considered the LA movement to be in a “state of anarchy,” although activities had 
continued while its most prominent figures were in prison.63 After release, Dorz worked in the 
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collective farm in the region of his upbringing, the only work permitted him. He was watched all 
day to be sure he did not leave the collective during work hours, but at night he wrote letters to 
fellow Army adherents.64 In writing and in meetings during days off, Dorz tried to sway Army 
adherents toward a "healthy orientation” from their attraction to "foreign teachings," meaning 
to neoprotestantism.65 For such attempts, Securitate agents periodically hauled him in to 
interrogate him or make threats, asking "Why do you meddle in the faith of others? Why do you 
not leave each to believe how he wants and to go how he likes?"66 Evidently Dorz was not 
satisfied with having just the Orthodox Church and its practices. 
Even though the Lord’s Army failed to gain a legal status in the 1950s, to Dorz and some 
other adherents, Orthodox hierarchs, and state officials, the question of its status remained, as 
the Army continued to flourish underground, particularly in villages. Starting in 1971, Dorz 
renewed his former, ill-fated attempts at legalizing the Lord’s Army for the good of the 
adherents, the Church, and the nation, as he saw it, but he pursued this strategy alone to avoid 
implicating and endangering others, as he had inadvertently done in the 1950s. He appealed 
directly to the Patriarch, whom he still regarded as a sympathizer, unlike most priests and 
bishops. His 70th birthday greetings to the Patriarch included a "memorandum" with a history of 
the Army, its struggles, and the desire for legal recognition.  
In response, Bishop Coman of Oradea called a meeting with Dorz and the local inspector 
to instruct him and the Lord’s Army generally to “’fit more completely within the life of our 
Church,’” and cease working “'separately from us, the priests.” The Bishop faulted them for their 
marginalization, but Dorz blamed the priests for marginalizing the Army, often the most reliable 
members of the parish. The local inspector took offense at this idea of LA participants as 
positive, saying, "'Hey, how much [trouble] you cause us!'” and accusing Dorz of constant 
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“’provocation’” and not being able to “’keep quiet.’” Bishop Coman echoed these sentiments, 
suggesting “’father-like’” that Army adherents “’do everything so that the church authority and 
that of the state will change the current view it has about you.’” He wanted Army adherents to 
prove their “’obedience,’” to “’[f]all nicely in line in the life of the parish,’” to “’be like the other 
believers from your village,’” since it’s “our” duty “’to give proof of support and obedience 
toward our rulers.'"67 Thus, Church and state leaders made Army dissolution the prerequisite for 
making requests. It is hard to imagine that humble submission would have opened any doors to 
change, as submission seemed more like a euphemism for unquestioned obedience and 
conformity.  
Dorz’s previously ill-fated attempt at legalization left him wary, but over the course of 
the 1970s, he endeavored to sway the Church’s leaders in meetings with various hierarchs.68 
Church and state leaders had an easier time marginalizing Droz than they did the Lord’s Army. 
At a later meeting in May 1972, Bishop Coman dismissed the requests Dorz made for the Army, 
arguing that since he wrote in his own name alone, the Synod had no reason to take up the 
cause of a lone individual. But had he worked with others, he would have been accused of 
conspiring with others in clandestine work. The simplicity of his proposals—which were for local 
churches to be given the power to grant (or not) permission to local Lord’s Army groups to 
gather and sing Army songs—were still not sufficient to woo the hierarchy. Bishop Coman’s 
office did agree to one compromise with Dorz, to review some 30 Army songs for official Church 
approval, but they never responded to him after he sent them.69 
Nevertheless, the Lord’s Army was not diminishing at all due to its voluntary and 
decentralized leadership, by word of mouth on a local level.  LA adherents were regularly 
gathering in homes on Wednesday, Friday, or Saturday nights or on Sunday afternoons, and 
they gathered en masse for other acceptable social occasions like baptism-parties, weddings, 
anniversaries, and dedications, while mixing in Army activities like singing and preaching. Local 
authorities could levy fines at such occasions, even at tiny gatherings of a few people reading 
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the Bible or praying, as they lacked proper “authorization” for what authorities could label as 
specifically religious gatherings.70  
Lord’s Army in Sălaj 
The Lord’s Army presented a dilemma to the inspectors and the Orthodox Church of 
Sălaj County. When Tudor was gaining familiarity with the situation there in 1970, he discovered 
that in the towns of Bălan and Chendrea, a group of believers had “broken away from” the 
Orthodox Church and passed over to the “forbidden Lord’s Army group.” A group was also 
known to exist in Chechiş, and there were also Pentecostal believers in some of these towns as 
well, making Lord’s Army affiliation more troubling because the two groups interacted with one 
another.71 What Tudor “discovered” would present a problem for each subsequent inspector. 
Yet Lord’s Army activities had been going on for some time in these small towns, prior 
to Tudor’s “discovery.” The Gherman family, with eight children, had been regular attenders of 
LA gatherings in Chechiş for years prior to the creation of Sălaj County and its Department of 
Religions. Often the gatherings would occur in the middle of the night, and one of the Gherman 
children, Filom, attended these meetings as a youth. He recalls how some time after midnight, 
in the pitch-darkness of the unlit roads and paths, he and others would walk by oil lamp to 
wherever the gathering might be. The older participants led the way for the younger ones. Even 
after Gherman left for Cluj for work in 1969, he frequently traveled back to his town for 
gatherings. The gatherings in Chechiş were scheduled on Saturday evenings and Sunday 
afternoons to accommodate those who worked out of town during the week. Those who 
remained in town customarily also gathered on Wednesdays.72  
Yet unaware of the history of the movement, Tudor then brought up the issue of the 
Lord’s Army with Archpriest Andreescu, and asked him to travel himself to Bălan, Chechiş, and 
Chendrea to conduct services and “preach, to combat their doctrine and erring in a biblical way 
given that they participate at the service in the orthodox church.”73 The inspector wished to 
believe that some moral pressure applied by the Archpriest would have a favorable result. In 
Chechiş at least, Lord’s Army believers did indeed attend church very dependably, and they 
would hear this call, but they were unlikely to simply halt their activity.  
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In 1971, Tudor’s successor David received word that, according to a letter to the Bishop 
from the parish priest in Chechiş, a Lord’s Army “nucleus had solidified” there, where previously 
there was no “evidence” of anything except believers who were “subordinate to the Church.” 
Either he was ignorant of the reality, or he wanted to keep his role unsullied. The supposed first 
evidence of insubordination came when the Lord’s Army held an event “provoked by a person 
foreign to the parish,” a wedding celebration that included Army activity like singing and 
testimonies. The priest claimed that neither the parents of the bride nor the one hosting the 
party, the former church cantor, were Army participants. The priest congratulated himself that 
the action was “nipped in the bud,” as local police arrived to break it up, and the next day the 
couple arrived at the Orthodox Church for the official Church ceremony, which proceeded 
without incident.74 Orthodox Church representatives like this priest attempted to manage their 
own image by purporting control over Lord’s Army activity until it was instigated by “foreigners” 
(non-locals) who influenced ordinary Orthodox believers. It would reflect badly on a local priest 
to admit that the movement was thriving in his parish and that he had little success in 
combatting it, which was the case in Chechiş. 
There was a danger of provoking Army adherents. At a verification in the village of 
Sîncraiul Almaş in 1972 inspector David discussed Army participation with a new priest, whom 
David feared was “not yet harnessing the problem well,”75 ignoring the fact that priests might 
need first to establish rapport. Soon after, the inspector discussed the problem of the Lord’s 
Army in the towns of Bălan, Chechiş, and Chendrea with Archpriest Andreescu. As Tudor did 
before him, David requested that Andreescu “travel there himself and conduct services to 
combat them.” Also, David traveled to Bălan to discuss with communist party deputy secretary 
the issue of believers who “broke from the orthodox church and switched to the forbidden 
group ‘Lord’s Army.’”76  Inspectors hoped that local authorities might know the means by which 
such LA adherents might be successfully dissuaded from Army activity.  
Having priests, archpriests, or state representatives try to pressure believers away from 
the Lord’s Army could backfire, as by the 1960s and 1970s, many adherents suspected priests of 
being entangled in the Securitate, even ones who appeared sympathetic to the cause of the 
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Lord’s Army. Army adherents feared priests’ knowledge of the location and participants in their 
gatherings, as priests might inform on them if pressured by state agents to do so. Ordinary 
believers decided for themselves whom to trust: the historical church, however entangled, or 
the revival movement, however disparaged by priests. Filom Ghermon contends that in his 
experience, Army participants were more likely to be seen as the most morally upright and 
trustworthy ones in a village, rather than the priests.77 
It was far from given that believers would trust state or church representatives and their 
opinions of the Lord’s Army. In Gîlgău Almaşului the local priest told inspector Roman about a 
group of fifteen women who were meeting as Lord’s Army members on Sundays in various 
houses and were singing “songs of Mary,” which suggests a Greek-Catholic link as well. (The 
“state organs” were notified to “follow this issue.”78) Chechiş, in addition to having a strong 
Lord’s Army contingent, happened to also be a “returned” Greek-Catholic parish, as most 
parishes were in Sălaj County. An inspector from Maramureş County had claimed that the Lord’s 
Army was gaining a foothold in former Greek-Catholic parishes, suggesting an affinity among the 
outlawed.79 Believers sympathetic to the Greek-Catholic Church would not uncritically accept 
church or state representatives’ account of the Army. 
The orientation conference in Sălaj County in 1972 was an occasion for church leaders 
to instruct local priests in combating the Lord’s Army. Priests were to “direct” members of the 
Army to not hold meetings “separately,” but only “within the church, under the leadership of a 
priest.” They did not say that priests had to accommodate meetings, however, just that priestly 
oversight was required. They discussed reinvigorating parish committees (which usually only 
existed on paper) as one alternative to Lord’s Army participation, but that idea was evidently 
not pursued, most likely because it depended on the eagerness of priests to initiate such 
additional work. Cantors were instructed to teach more songs to help lessen this particular 
attraction of the Lord’s Army.80  
Several priests described their local problems with the Lord’s Army. One priest 
complained that he had members of the Lord’s Army who were taught by Traian Dorz, and that 
these adherents “have the pretense to preach and to lead services in their meetings.” He was 
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offended that they pursued such activity despite being baptized and wed in the Orthodox 
Church. This priest tried “in many ways” to reach them—he had a choir, for example—but “they 
didn’t want to come.” He held vespers regularly, but the adherents supposedly did not like the 
texts printed by the Holy Synod, so he hoped soon to see a new book of songs as well as one for 
prayers. He hoped the Lord’s Army was a “passing phenomenon,” an optimistic perspective, to 
say the least. Another priest mentioned a recent occurrence where at a wedding of two Lord’s 
Army members, the godfather to one of the couple wished to preach there, but the priest did 
not give him permission. The godfather apparently tried to preach anyway at the groom’s 
house, but he was caught and fined by the local authorities. In closing, Bishop Coman “urged the 
priesthood to intense of pastoral work as possible.”81 In the view of Coman and others, an 
inactive priesthood caused people to go spiritually hungry and look elsewhere to satisfy their 
religious needs. 
At the same meeting, inspector Roman likewise put the onus on local clergy, instructing 
them that Lord’s Army participants “should be warned not to be wanderers, but to remain in 
their church.”82 When a priest told Roman about some people traveling to neighboring towns to 
participate in Army activities, all he could offer the local priest in terms of advice was to “have a 
word with them,” instructing them to “participate in the religious services in the orthodox 
churches in the towns where they’re from.” Priestly pleadings to “be content” with Orthodox 
services were paired with state fines. Later that year, a fine of 10,000 Lei, roughly four times the 
average monthly salary, was levied on a group of twenty-three people who participated in an 
Army meeting in Bălan in someone’s home.83  
Had the Lord’s Army been the only “sectarian” manifestation in towns like Bălan and 
Chechiş in Sălaj County, the concern of the Bishop or inspector might have been less. But 
Pentecostal believers there intermingled with LA adherents. When the priest of Bălan 
complained about Pentecostal proselytism among (his) Orthodox believers, he also mentioned 
Army members meeting in houses. Inspector Roman could only note that the issue was 
“brought to the attention of the organs of the police who are following this issue.” The 
“Orthodox Church,” while struggling against these “sectarian” groups in Bălan, was struggling to 
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even be the Orthodox Church: it had once been a Greek-Catholic parish and inspectors found 
the “consolidation of the BOR” to be weak there.84  
In summary, the religiosity on the margins of the Orthodox Church was far from being 
controlled to the extent that Orthodox Church and state representatives desired, and threats 
and force of police were the usual fallback for those concerned about such manifestations. 
Although religious formations like the unconsolidated Greek-Catholic Church, the 
neoprotestants, and Lord’s Army did not threaten the dominance of the Orthodox Church or 
state power, by their presence they were a constant reminder to church and state leaders of the 
unconsolidated or incomplete nature of citizens’ conformity to a narrowly imagined Romanian 
nation that should be unified, among other things, religiously as well.  
The Orthodox Church: The First among the Equal Religions 
What made Orthodox practice generally acceptable to state agents is revealed in the 
reports of inspectors from Sălaj County in the 1970s. They reveal that in the minds of state 
officials, acceptable Orthodox religiosity was balanced: active but not zealous and having a 
political and social orientation marked by collaboration in public efforts and visible displays of 
political loyalty. How well believers and clergy conformed to these standards led to either 
punishment or rewards, which helped solidify the norms of religiosity further. When 
Department of Religions officials conducted “verifications,” in which they observed religious 
services—often on religious holidays but even on ordinary Sundays—and met with the head 
priest, their concluding statements like “I did not ascertain negative aspects” or “I did not 
observe anything particular” indicated they found nothing problematic. 
As in the Soviet Union, attendance at services—even in mass numbers—was generally 
acceptable for officials if the participants were older, particularly women, and not youth. This 
was the case in Sălaj from 1968 to 1978. When discussing or statistically tracking church 
attendance, inspectors would routinely remark on the age or gender profile of the participants, 
making remarks like “the majority [were] older women.”85 At larger events like Easter services, 
they noted the increased numbers along with the gender and age profile. After Easter of 1973 
inspector Roman reported to Bucharest that this year, like last year, at the main Orthodox 
Church in Zalău, some 1,300 attended, approximately 850 women, 250 men, and 200 youth and 
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that the service lasted several hours, and communion (the Eucharist) took another hour. In 
Jibou, where Archpriest Andreescu served, 600 came for midnight mass (400 women, 150 men, 
50 youth). The next day 250 attended, then 200 the following day. To Roman, there was nothing 
of “peculiar character compared to other years.”86 Roman found “no particular problems” at 
other big events like the consecration of a church in the village of Noţig in 1975, when some 
3,000 attended, including the Bishop, a few others from his office, and several other priests.87 
A primary factor determining whether religion was being practiced appropriately was 
the behavior of the priest. State officials agreed with church leaders that it was better for priests 
to be active rather than inactive, as long as they were not overly zealous. At an orientation 
conference in 1972, Bishop Coman urged his clergy on, telling them  
the thirst of believers is great, there are many who demand more of us, if we do 
not satisfy them they go elsewhere. We are obligated to make pastoral activity 
more dynamic [a dinamiza], because among the causes that generate such 
shortcomings is the fact that it appears that we are too static, we are not close 
enough to the believers. 
Coman advised that priests “be active every day,” be “permanently in the midst of believers,” 
not leave the parish without permission, and not reduce services: “We need attentive 
[conştienţi – lit. conscious] priests who know their flock.”88 That Coman would urge more 
activity suggests that he perceived priests’ passivity to be a problem in the County. The 
inspector did not object to Coman’s call for more active priests because, in theory, a more 
dynamic Orthodox Church was better than people joining less desirable religious associations. 
Unsurprisingly, state officials considered it proper for priests to deliver sermons that 
advocated loyalty to the state, but they did not condemn as religious propaganda sermons that 
combated other religions or were “purely religious.” Inspector Roman had no objections to the 
clergy’s discussion at a conference in 1974 where the theme was “Preaching in our day.” Two 
points arose in the discussions. First, a few priests—plus, notably, the archpriest—emphasized 
the special opportunity sermons presented for discussing issues touching “both the Church as 
well as the Fatherland.” As one priest commented, in sermons “the believers should be urged to 
keep in view the cooperation [colaborarea] which exists between the Church and society.” 
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Second, this same priest also noted that sermons must be very solid and thorough [temeinic] so 
as to combat any “sectarian” tendencies, a point echoed by several other priests. One warned 
that local neoprotestants also emphasized preaching, were well-prepared with something from 
Scripture, and even included elements of apologetics.89 When inspector Achim observed 
services in Zalău, he wrote to Bucharest that all three priests who served presented “social 
content” in their sermons, trying to “attract the attention of the believers toward becoming 
good citizens and patriots of socialist Romania.” He concluded from his observations that “It 
could be said that all [Orthodox] priests [in Sălaj County] give evidence of much loyalty toward 
the state.”90 
Inspectors frequently noted during verifications that the sermon they heard was 
acceptable even if it was “purely religious,” meaning deemed religiously abstract and 
disconnected from concrete issues of everyday life. On a Sunday in May of 1971, David traveled 
out to a small town where he “supervised the religious service” of an Orthodox Church in which 
some 120 people took part. David remarked that “the sermon heard was purely religious and 
without manifestations [of anything problematic].”91 In his 1973 verification of Easter services, 
Roman had no problem with the many sermons “about the resurrection.”92 In the “atheist” 
state of Romania, large numbers were attending Easter and listening to sermons about the core 
of Christian belief – that the Son of God came to Earth, died, and resurrected from the dead. Yet 
evidently it was “purely religious” enough to be unthreatening. 
Even catechism—the practice of teaching religion to youth—was acceptable to officials 
if few participated and if it was done according to regulated times. Although in Romania 
catechism was not officially forbidden as it was in the Soviet Union, state representatives did 
not prefer that subsequent generations be exposed to religious belief and practice. In a report 
on catechism practices across the county, inspector David noted that in the Reformed Church, 
religious education of youth was a “permanent preoccupation” of the ministers, and that to 
“attract teenagers they use disguised methods – discussions with parents, candy, pictures, etc.” 
But “across the county, catechism is not held in the Orthodox Church; guidance was not applied 
by the Archbishop of Sibiu referring to this activity.” That the Bishop had not specifically 
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provided “any guidance” must have signaled to priests that it was not an essential practice.93 In 
Sălaj, as across the country, Orthodox priests were by and large not troubling inspectors with 
catechism activities. Either they skipped this practice altogether, or practiced it in a way that 
generally avoided arousing inspectors’ concern. Preferring to focus on top-down influence, 
inspector Roman noted that “in general in the orthodox parishes priests do not carry out 
religious activities with youth within Sălaj County” and did not “cause any particular problems 
regarding religious life among teenagers […].”94Roman did not reflect on believers’ role in 
catechism, as clergy who did not serve the parishioners well would be poorly supported. It may 
be that parishioners did not complain about a lack of catechism, and the dissatisfied ones may 
have been compelled to look to other religious groups to find what they desired.  
In short, state officials liked it when priests refrained from “putting moral pressure on 
believers or on youth”95 but they did want to have a “well prepared priest” who managed the 
parish well, and had a “harmonious family life, being a good example for believers.” It was even 
acceptable for a priest to be “loved and appreciated by the believers” as long as he was not 
“obsessively religious” (habotnic).96 
Priests could gain favor with state officials by demonstrating political loyalty and 
cooperation in projects initiated by the state. They demonstrated loyalty by their participation 
at orientation conferences, comments to parishioners, encouraging parishioners to participate 
in state initiatives, and readiness to cooperate with local officials, including the Department of 
Religions inspector. David praised Archpriest Andreescu for being “an example of how to 
collaborate with the local organs,” that he was in “constant contact” with the inspector and 
“defer[red] to him, seeing in the Department of Religions a real support.”97 Roman reported 
that “returned” Priest Gîlgău of Zalău was respected by the “local organs,” because he was 
“mobilizing the believers in all occasions” for state initiatives.98 Roman lauded Priest Ioan Gudea 
for urging believers “in all cases” to heed the authorities and to be “honest” and “to defend the 
common good.” Gudea also helped the local bodies in any situation asked, mobilizing believers 
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for local efforts. He participated in conferences, approached issues of the day “correctly,” and 
kept his financial matters in order.99 To Roman, Gudea was a model priest. Inspectors also 
praised priests for their efforts toward “consolidation” of the unification of the BOR. 
Officials rewarded good practices by writing positive evaluations for clergy when 
promotions were in consideration and by minimizing bureaucracy for the Church. When 
inspectors reviewed candidates the Church proposed for positions, they typically approved the 
recommendations of the Bishop’s office and only rarely scrutinized candidates more heavily.100 
Inspector David overlooked bureaucratic obstacles in one instance when he met a delegation of 
believers who were defending the construction of two Orthodox houses of prayer that had been 
stalled by local organs for some ten years because it had been started without official approval. 
Yet the local inspector was not predisposed to punish; rather, he recommended they receive 
approval for completion since there were not any Orthodox Churches in either of the valleys in 
question, forgiving the village for its “mentality lagging quite behind.”101 The people of another 
small town requested to build a new church in 1973, as the current one was in a non-repairable 
state, even unsafe. With the bishopric in agreement, inspector Roman forwarded the request to 
Bucharest, saying that he and the other local powers were not opposed. The people were 
planning to fund the project themselves; all it would cost the state would be a stamp of 
approval, which it gave.102 
One of the other “rewards” state agents offered the Church was that they tried to 
protect the Church’s reputation. State agents fought the Church’s loss of rapport vis-à-vis 
ordinary citizens.  Inspectors may have done so due to personal sympathy, but it is also clear 
that inspectors considered it best to not give believers reason to look elsewhere for their 
religious needs. At an orientation conference, inspector Roman brought to light some negative 
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behaviors of Orthodox priests and the corresponding measures that were taken. One priest was 
transferred for “drunkenness and fights with various believers and citizens;” another had 
problems with drunkenness and a “scandal with his wife,” and two others had similar 
“irregularities.” “These negative examples” were regarded as causing believers “to get away 
from the Orthodox Church and to frequent the neoprotestant faiths and even the forbidden 
sects where they receive an education incomparably more retrograde, against culture, the 
traditions of our people, and in the end, against the state.”103 This again highlights that to 
Roman, the Orthodox Church—though ideologically incompatible with Marxism—was relatively 
compatible with what he regarded as the education and culture of the nation.  
In conclusion, it appears that the Orthodox Church was first among the equal Cults. 
According to official rhetoric, there was no “state” church; the state did not play favorites. Yet 
when compared to the other denominations, the Orthodox Church occupied a position much 
like the one that Russia did amid the other Republics of the Soviet Union, what Stalin called “the 
first among equals.” This is an obvious contradiction in terms that Stalin employed to subtly 
imply that Russia was equal in theory to the others, but first in actuality. The paradoxical 
position of the Church in Romanian society was reflected in a state publication in 1987. If the 
Orthodox Church was once historically favored, the publication declared, "today such a status 
no longer exists. Each denomination has the same rights and the same obligations."104 But a few 
pages later, it stated, "It is almost a postulate to say that whenever one speaks about religion in 
Romania one must first and foremost think of the Orthodox Church. It was and is the Romanian 
people's church."105 Even Ceauşescu displayed a "vacillating and at times contradictory" 
approach to the Orthodox Church.106 He was often vehemently atheistic and anti-Christian in his 
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rhetoric, yet in 1972 he televised his attendance at his father's Orthodox funeral, “with the full 
rites of the Church conducted by a bishop and thirteen priests.”107  
Ceauşescu was not alone in his ambiguous behavior. Orthodox hierarchs were 
ubiquitous at all kinds of state-sponsored events. Observers might have wondered at the 
paradox of official state atheism and materialism while promoting an Orthodox-infused 
nationalism. Some might have found it perplexing that Securitate officials were invited to a 
Monastery to celebrate Easter and that a Metropolitan might personally serve the Eucharist to 
five Securitate generals and their wives. Given the ideological stance of the party, it could only 
be the Orthodox-infused nationalism of the Communist party that contributed to the situation 
where, as Securitate Genereal Nicolae Pleşiţă described, “communists were intimate with the 
church.”108  
Representatives of the state and Orthodox Church touted its unique place in society and 
history. Inspector David, using commonplace narratives, praised it for its role in the “spiritual 
unification of the Romanian population,” the “restoration of the unity of the Romanian 
Orthodox Church since 1948,” and creating a “local ecumenical atmosphere.”109 State and 
church agents lauded the disappearance of the Greek-Catholic Church. As the BOR said in its 
own publication, the regime change in 1947 “made possible the reestablishment of the unity of 
the Romanian Orthodox Church by the return to the traditional faith of the Orthodox Romanians 
of Transylvania […]. This act of reintegration means precisely the fulfilment [sic] of a legitimate 
desire by the Romanians of Transylvania.”110 Church leaders argued that the “unified” BOR was 
the answer to all believing Romanians’ prayers (whether or not they knew it or liked it). As was 
declared in an Orthodox journal article and innumerable utterances elsewhere, "'Through its 
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very presence, a permanence in the life of all Romanian lands, the [Orthodox] Church has 
contributed to preserving the nation's unity on the Romanian territory.'"111 
Inspectors did not expect Orthodox clergy to express the equality of all faiths. At a 
conference in 1973—the 25-years anniversary of the “unification” of the Romanian Church was 
a cause for “jubilee.” One priest emphasized how the “ancient belief” of “our Orthodox Church” 
was the “most accessible medium for gaining religious knowledge.” And through the Church, 
“the sentiment of spiritual unity can be grown among believers, making them stay tightly united 
within the ancient Church, averting at the same time foreign influence.”112 The inspector did not 
object to claims that the Orthodox Church helped forge unity among Romanians, something 
supposedly threatened by foreigners and their long arm of influence (e.g. neoprotestantism, the 
Vatican). At a conference whose theme was “pastoral methods for preserving right faith,” one 
priest delivered a paper arguing that for the Church to maintain its “superiority compared to the 
religions which slipped away from right faith,” it would benefit from priests maintaining a moral 
personal and family life and good deeds. A priest noted that he had been presenting the truths 
of the Church at advantageous events like burials to combat those attempting to “alienate” 
Orthodox believers from their Church, either toward neoprotestantism or “dissident” opinions. 
At the same time, he had been having a word with leaders of other faiths “in a local, practical 
ecumenical spirit,” notifying them of their “abuses” of existing legislation, such as trying to 
proselytize “our” believers. He also noted with pathos the tragedy of a “mixed” family, where 
the wife was attending a neoprotestant church, leaving the family confused about what to do.113 
In Sălaj County state agents made no attempts to stand up for the minority churches vis-à-vis 
the Orthodox Church. 
To officials from the Department of Religions, the Romanian Orthodox Church was first-
among-equals even in ecumenical events, the purpose of which was not to express the equality 
of all faiths. A 1979 Church publication declared that the Romanian Orthodox Church was not 
just any Christian denomination, but the very Orthodox faith of the apostles that had survived, a 
"genuine Romanian miracle," and that their Latin-derived language and Orthodox heritage 
positioned them equally between West and East, "confer[ring] on them a special oecumenic 
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vocation."114 A 1977 document disseminated for Orthodox orientation conferences declared 
that for an ecumenical spirit “reciprocal respect” between cults exemplified by “the exclusion of 
any forms of proselytism” was needed. The Orthodox Church was the paragon of this 
ecumenical spirit because as a custom it did not proselytize. Another practical way the Church 
established ecumenical relations was by showing support for “the fatherland,”115 signaling that 
what helped harmonize religions was having the state as their common head. Thus, the kind of 
ecumenism that state agents and Orthodox Church representatives praised was characterized 
by recognizing state leadership and discouraging proselytism. 
At conference in Sălaj on ecumenism, Bishop Vasile Coman made a special appearance 
and gave clergy guidance as to the proper way to foster ecumenism locally. He discouraged 
participating in common services, as the Church did not necessarily share the same beliefs with 
other denominations. He emphasized that in the case of neoprotestants the Church must keep 
“proper distance,” as these faiths tended to be “abductors” of believers from “our” church: 
“Sectarian proselytism is the greatest obstacle in the path to ecumenism.” He also reminded the 
priests to be “permeated with the idea of religious liberty,” in that they should never force or 
compel someone toward Orthodox beliefs. He also mentioned as exemplary of ecumenism, 
ironically, the unification in October of 1948, an act which shows that the Orthodox Church 
“was, is, and will always be with the people.”116 State and Orthodox Church representatives 
accepted the tension found in advocating respect of others’ consciences by forbidding 
proselytism while elevating the status of the Orthodox Church and faith as central to myths of a 
unified Romanian nation over and against other faiths. 
Priests Confront Religio-Political Status 
There were, however, Orthodox priests who aimed not at conforming to the norms of 
religiosity desired by Church or state leaders, but challenging them. Yet priests discussed in this 
section challenged political norms at the same time, suggesting that they saw religious norms 
and political norms as entangled. For some priests, their challenge of the status quo seemed to 
stem from skepticism of state myths, and they came to see church authorities as problematically 
implicated with state power. For others, what began as a desire to challenge the religious status 
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quo led to encounters with church authorities, which then led to encounters with state 
authorities, leading such priests to likewise see the two bodies as problematically linked and 
both in need of some sort of reform. In response, the Church punished them as disrupting 
religious norms, while the state pursued them as political opponents. 
Priest Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasă was one who began by challenging the religious 
status quo, inviting students into a deeper faith, but he blamed the philosophies of the regime 
for religious stagnation. Imprisoned for fourteen years without a trial beginning in 1948,117 he 
had good reason to be skeptical of state myths. While calling young people to deepen their 
faith, he also publicly criticized the destruction of churches in Bucharest and the Church’s 
silence. His name helped define the camps of establishment vs. anti-establishment.  
Father Calciu-Dumitreasă was professor of French and New Testament at the Orthodox 
Seminary in Bucharest in the 1970s. Calciu saw how incoming students "were so puzzled" that 
they had to take classes on Marxism and found Securitate personnel everywhere.118 He gained a 
following at the Seminary for his boldness in discussing issues and questions of a spiritual nature 
with an interest and conviction unusual among the other professors. He formed a prayer group, 
which lasted from 1972 until 1977, eventually reaching one hundred in attendance. Church and 
state representatives repeatedly threatened them and asked the meetings to stop, and even 
one of their meeting places was demolished, but people kept coming. In 1978 he delivered a 
lecture-sermon series during Lent on Wednesday evenings, calling them his “Seven Words to 
Youth.” In these sermons, he summoned young men to take faith seriously, but his religious 
passion mingled with criticisms of atheism, materialism, the “bondage” of “authoritarianism,” 
and the destruction of churches in Bucharest. Hundreds attended for seven consecutive weeks 
as he posited a vibrant, voluntary faith against “ready-made authoritarian statements” that 
were “imposed” on youth,119 until his superiors fired him from the seminary. Not a single 
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professor vouched for him, and the deputy from the Ministry of Cults, the bishop, and the 
seminary director all asked that he be fired. The local priests did not stand up for him either.120  
Shortly after, in June 1978 a group of students “disillusioned” by the Theological 
Seminary in Bucharest wrote to the Patriarch. It was not what they expected as idealistic youth: 
“We hoped to find here a haven of peace from this troubled world; of love instead of hatred; a 
place of virtue; of freedom from meanness; of real spiritual life.” They considered the Rector 
Archimandrite Veniamin Micle “corrupt, immoral, abusive,” doing what he could to “frustrate 
the professors in their lecture programmes and to reduce their function to a purely 
administrative one.” These students considered Calciu their “guide in all spiritual matters,” while 
Micle created an “atmosphere of terror,” and left “absolutely no spiritual atmosphere” at the 
school, rather “a kind of concentration-camp of the soul, in which liturgies and Christian 
performance have become simply formalities.” Micle’s idea of “spiritual activities” was 
obedience to “his inhuman sanctions,” as for the “slightest mistake” or “the least deviation from 
the norm, even for a look of disapproval” they could have been “shaven to the scalp like 
criminals.” Students particularly close to Calciu were shaved without explanation and barred 
from leaving the Seminary. Professors or state agents often addressed them crudely and 
pressured them to inform on each other such that “now we no longer believe in each other.” 
Some students were even “savagely beaten” by Micle and threatened should they tell. One 
fourth-year student “was fiercely thrashed” in the presence of other professors, who made “not 
the slightest effort to control the whip.” Other professors also used the whip regularly. They 
begged the Patriarch to look into the real state of affairs at the Seminary and reinstate Calciu.121 
But when the issue of Calciu found its way onto an international stage, his name was 
further politicized. Radio Free Europe, a U.S.-sponsored news agency broadcasting to Eastern 
Europe, began to spread news of Calciu’s treatment. Philip Potter, President of the World 
Council of Churches—an ecumenical international gathering of Churches started in 1948 in 
which Eastern Orthodox Churches participated and which sometimes served as a platform for 
church representatives to advocate their concerns—, wrote a letter in September of 1979 to the 
Patriarch with concern for Calciu. The Patriarchal office replied in November about the religious 
and political deviations of Calciu, that "The daily evening spiritual meditations, held by the 
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professors of the Seminary for the pupils, have been transformed by Gheorghe Calciu in political 
fascist speeches and slander against the Church hierarchy." Calciu was supposedly "urging the 
seminarians not to obey" Seminary leadership, "making defamatory afirmations about Church 
leaders," "refusing any cooperation with his colegues" and "propagating among the seminarians 
[fascist] political ideas repudiated by all the civilized world.” [sic all—original letter in English]. 
Thus Church representatives painted Calciu’s activity as deviating from religious norms and as 
promoting insubordination and “scorn for any Church authority.” Trying to get the ecumenical 
body to side with their perspective, the Patriarch asked, “Which Church would let the formation 
of her clergy in the hands of such an adventurerous [sic] person?”122  
The case of Calciu presented two irreconcilable narratives for people to choose from, 
but having two competing narratives was not something new. On one side, there were official 
Church declarations like:  
Both Constitution and the Law for the general regime of the Cults express the 
principles which are the basis of the relations between the religious cults and 
the state. These principles are characterized by: complete freedom of 
conscience for all citizens; the interdiction of any religious discrimination; the 
guarantee of free practice of worship to members of all Churches and religious 
communities; the assuring to all religious cults of the right to draw up laws and 
rules of organization and activity according to their own dogmas and canons, as 
well as the right to organize the theological institutions necessary for the 
training of the future clergy of the cults.123  
Such a declaration presented a completely uncomplicated and serene picture of religious life 
and mimicked state declarations. In 1972 Ceauşescu declared,  
The problem has arisen for our Communist Party to carry on such a policy as in 
no way to hurt anybody's religious feelings. We, as communists, naturally 
uphold a dialectical-materialistic world outlook, while we consider that we are 
bound to respect the beliefs of others as well. [...We have proposed] to ensure 
that people who share one belief or another may worship it without any 
hindrance . . . Naturally, to the extent to which one denomination or another 
does not carry on activities against the State's interests, against socialist 
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construction, we secure every condition for them freely to unfold their activity. I 
can confess we have no particular problem in this respect.124 
He also added that there is "no contradiction" between constructing socialism and "the 
existence of religious denominations, of the citizens' rights to take religion."125 In 1987, state 
publications declared falsely “No religious problems have ever existed in socialist Romania.” 
Instead of “problems,” there were merely “questions”: “The relationship between the state and 
the religious denominations is good, with current questions being settled by talks between the 
state bodies and the leadership of the denominations conducted in a spirit of understanding, 
and mutual accommodation and in good faith.”126  
On the other hand, ordinary citizens heard stories of loved ones who served times in 
prison, about the attempts at marginalizing the Lord’s Army, the attempted erasure of the 
Greek-Catholic Church, stories by neoprotestants of persecution, and Seminary students 
witnessed the presence of the secret police in seminaries and the murky relations of priests and 
professors with state agents. Indeed, for many people, these were not just “religious” problems 
but political ones. 
In the Banat, something of a phenomenon of challenging the religio-political status quo 
emerged. A group of priests aimed to promote animated religiosity as well as criticize state 
myths of the freedom of conscience in Romania. Much like other priests and pastors who came 
of age in the Soviet Union, these priests acted religiously and politically in a way that reflected 
their cultural upbringing and education that was infused with idealistic principles but 
disillusioned by the existing reality. 
Liviu Negoița, Doru Gaga, and Marian Ștefănescu were in Seminary in Sibiu, and they 
shared skepticism of state myths due to experiences of harassment by the Securitate. In 
Seminary, Negoița saw an atmosphere of surveillance, relationships very "cautious" and 
"hypocritical," theological topics "neutralized" without any "mysticism" (here, spiritual 
dimension), and priests acting as “as simple ritualists, limited only to a cultic, exterior 
dimension.”127  
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They trusted the viewpoints of those disseminated by sources like Radio Free Europe, 
Lord’s Army members, or clandestine Greek-Catholics.128 Having witnessed bishops and priests 
who openly praised or collaborated with the regime, they came to believe that the church was 
"subservient" to the state and in certain ways not "Christian" but even "satanic."129 Once priests 
in the Banat, they found like-minded priests in Cornel Avramescu, Viorel Dumitrescu (of Visag), 
Emil Ambruș Cernat (of Crivina de Jos) and Ioan Vinchici (of Paniova). Many of these also had 
upbringings or experiences with religion on the margins—participation or familiarity with the 
Lord’s Army in particular. When they heard about Gheorghe Calciu, they had a model for their 
religiosity and a known spokesperson for their political views, and they advocated on his behalf 
at priestly gatherings, and during church services they often prayed for him and left out the 
expected prayers for the People’s Republic of Romania or Ceauşescu.130 
This group of priests tried to enliven their parishes, thereby attracting the attention of 
church leaders and state organs.131 The next major act of five of these Orthodox priests was an 
open letter in April of 1981, a so-called "Confession of Faith" with fifteen demands, including no 
meddling by the state in church affairs, freeing Calciu, permitting catechism to teenagers, access 
of church to mass media, and the legalization of the Greek-Catholic Church and Lord's Army. 
Liviu Negoiţa, Viorel Dumitrescu, Cornel Avramescu, Emil Ambruș Cernat and Ioan Vinchici 
signed.132 
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Marian Ştefănescu, September 24, 2013 and September 28, 2015. While in Seminary, Ştefănescu 
frequented churches of other faiths to gain greater insight, met the famous composer of Lord’s Army 
songs, Nicolae Moldoveanu, and even began to meet with former bishops of the Greek-Catholic Church, 
Ioan Ploscaru and Alexandru Todea. 
129 Negoiţă, Biserica şi Puterea, 11. 
130 Ștefănescu, Drumul Spre Adevăr, 123. 
131 Letter from Comitetul Creştin Român A.L.R.C., dated September 10, 1980. Archive file <RO/Ort>, 
Keston Archive and Library, Baylor University. Cornel Avrămescu, unpublished letter “To leaders of 
Western countries”. Archive file <RO/Ort/LA 18s>, Keston Archive and Library, Baylor University. 
132 Gabriel Andreescu and Mihnea Berindei, eds., Ultimul Deceniu Comunist: Scrisori către Radio Europa 
Liberă [The Last Communist Decade: Letters to Radio Free Europe], vol. I (Iaşi: Polirom, 2010), 294. In April 
1981 the testimony of faith appeared for the first time, written by Negoiţa and sent to the Patriarch, 
signed by Dumitrescu and Cernat. It’s the first document to contest “the abuses of the church hierarchy 
and the total subservience of the church authorities toward the State.” The Church didn’t respond, only 
Securitate agents. Then in the fall, it was sent to Radio Free Europe, signed by them plus Vinchici, 
Avramescu, and Ioan Teodosiu, spokesman for Romanian Christian Committee for the Defense of 
Religious Liberty and Conscience (Comitetul Creştin Român pentru Apărarea Libertăţii Religioase şi de 
Conştiinţă, or ALRC) and friends with Dumitrescu and Negoiţa. 
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To disrupt their mobilizing power, state authorities allowed church leaders to punish 
them as religiously problematic so as to deflate the potency of the priests’ message that the 
state meddled in church affairs. After broad-brushing them as religiously erring, the Church 
isolated them from their communities to lessen the latter’s mobilization in support of the 
priests. Their prestige depended on their status within the church, not on their status as 
“dissidents” trying to take down the regime (although Calciu may have obtained sufficient 
notoriety to have achieved such “dissident” status).   
The Church used the cases of these priests to reassert the lines of religious acceptability. 
The Metropolitan’s magazine published articles denouncing these priests’ activity, saying they 
tried to introduce “foreign” ideas and not submit properly to church authorities.133 At a 
disciplinary proceeding of the Orthodox Church in January 1982, they charged Negoiţa with 
"disobedience with regard to church authority," since he had not heeded the guidance of 
leadership or the advice of colleagues. He was said to have had "inappropriate behavior, [work 
performance] below expectations, not accommodating to local requirements, which created a 
state of animosity between priest and parishioners." He also lacked "pastoral tact" and 
demonstrated "deficiencies of liturgical order" (e.g. omitting the part of the liturgy which prays 
for the state). He was accused of not conducting catechism134 and for saying the Church was "in 
a state of decadence, characterized by ritualism and servility." Fellow clergy made him out to be 
abnormal, saying his behavior "revolted his colleagues” and in his parish "provoked the reaction 
of the parishioners who requested another to do what a priest ought to be doing.”135 The 
president of the judicial committee remarked that "if every priest would draw up his own 
confession of belief, we would end up worse than the neoprotestants." Negoiţa also made a 
"mistake" in how he regarded the Lord's Army, as the correct view of it was as a "neoprotestant 
association" that had been dissolved. He also did not take the proper approach to the issue of 
BOR unity, since he sympathized with the plight of Greek-Catholics.136 Negoiţa was defrocked.137 
                                                 
133 “Romanian Orthodox Priests Criticise Hierarchy,” dated as November 5, 1981 for Keston News Service. 
Archive file <RO/Ort 6>, Keston Archive and Library, Baylor University. 
134 I’m not certain the details of Negoiţă’s catechism activities. Grossu says he did display “too much zeal 
in his sermons, in his pastoral instruction, and in his catechism activities done among children” (Grossu, 
Calvarul României Creștine, 297). Regardless, it’s an interesting accusation since not doing catechism was 
a commonplace lacuna among Orthodox priests. 
135 Negoiţă, Biserica şi Puterea, 83. 
136 Ibid., 85–87. 
137 Ibid., 90. 
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Dumitrescu had been barred from the priesthood in August 1981, and he too had been shamed 
and condemned in front of his colleagues.138 Vinchici was barred from the priesthood in August 
1982. Gaga and Cernat faced the same fate, and all of the above were offered exile, given that 
they would not be able to find suitable employment with stained records.139  
Prompted by an inspector from the Department of Religions, Cornel Avramescu faced 
threats from the bishopric, a trial in 1982, and a prison sentence in 1983; but he was eventually 
reprieved.  Meanwhile, church and state authorities advised his parishioners to keep away from 
him. The Orthodox Church tried to transfer him to Arad, but the state organs there would not 
accept him based on his background. Some of his flock "inundated" the Bishop with letters of 
support while authorities attempted to isolate him or rally the community against him. He 
accepted exile to the United States in 1985, finalizing his isolation.140 Around the same time as 
Avramescu, Father Calciu—after years of brutal treatment, imprisonment, and house arrest (and 
appeals by sympathizers in the West)—was also exiled to the United States in 1985. 
Although some priests and dissidents saw the religious world of Romania as a clash 
between two incompatible narratives, one of Truth and the other of Lies, one of Courage and 
the other of Collaboration, a dichotomous view was not necessarily the only way of approaching 
the religious landscape. The case of Andrei Andreicuţ, now Metropolitan of Cluj, presents the 
situation of someone who constantly pushed the boundaries of acceptable religiosity but did not 
face imprisonment or exile. He is of the same generation as the exiled Banat priests, attended 
the same seminary, had many similar life experiences and heard many tales of the horrors of the 
Securitate, but did not come to the same conclusions as they. 
Despite growing up under the communist regime, Andreicuţ did not feel deprived of a 
religious upbringing. In his village of Oarţa de Sus in Transylvania where he grew up, "an 
authentic orthodox life [trăire] reigned." This was the case, despite what some might consider a 
dark past: his village of upbringing had been Greek-Catholic. Yet the case of Andreicuţ family 
suggests that not all saw the “reunion” tragically, as in his family, “there wasn’t any nostalgia for 
uniatism, on the contrary.” The change, apparently, was unequivocal: his parents “came back” 
                                                 
138 Sergiu Grossu, Calvarul României Creștine [The Calvary of Christian Romania] (Bucureşti [Romania]: 
Editura Vremea, 2006), 296–97. 
139 Andreescu and Berindei, Ultimul Deceniu Comunist, 2010, I:295. Vinchici did find residence and 
unskilled work in a “gypsy colony,” but eventually accepted exile. 
140 “Romanian Orthodox Priests under Pressure,” Keston News Service, no. 249 (May 1, 1986): 9; Grossu, 
Calvarul României Creștine, 298, 327. 
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to orthodoxy, and “died orthodox.” His mother had come from an Orthodox village originally, 
and perhaps his father simply did not have strong objections.141 
Despite the presence of “atheist propaganda” in society, Andreicuţ believes that he and 
others experienced spiritual things “perhaps more intensely” than today. He recalls the 
pilgrimages they made on foot, 90 kilometer walks to Bixad or Rohia, and he says that some of 
their religious holidays were unforgettable. These intermingled sometimes with dances. To him, 
the times were filled with “happiness and optimism.”142 He therefore grew up attracted to the 
Church, and eventually pursued it as a career after studying engineering. 
Andreicuţ started Seminary in Sibiu in 1976 with the encouragement and sponsorship of 
Bishop Herineanu. Unlike some of the Banat clergy, Andreicuţ found his professors to be 
inspiring and liked them. While there, agents followed his activity closely.  They noted little 
things like his singing an Army song, although he was not an adherent of the Lord’s Army but 
had learned some of its songs as many others did simply by its strong presence and influence in 
Sibiu.143 The agents were not terribly suspicious of him because, as they noted in his file, he was 
a good student and obedient, not exhibiting any tendencies contrary to those desired of a 
theological student, and that he was a “devoted citizen.”144 
After finishing in 1978, he received approval from the Department of Religions and was 
ordained by Bishop Herineanu for a parish in the city of Turda. Being located in an industrial 
sector, his parish was one primarily of factory workers. The numbers attending grew gradually 
during his service there, and good numbers attended not just Sunday services, but weekday 
ones as well, especially on Friday evenings. In his file, one informant noted that people liked his 
services and preaching very much, and that he had a “power of persuasion,” and that “the 
church is crowded with believers all the time.”145 One of Andreicuţ’ fellow priests was Gheorghe 
Ramba, mentioned in Chapter V as one of an older generation who had served time in prison for 
legionary activities but eventually received a post as priest in a very small, remote parish and 
who served with considerable energy. Andreicuţ and Ramba became colleagues and friends, 
                                                 
141 Andrei Andreicuț, “S-au Risipit Făcătorii de Basme”: Amintiri care Dor [The Makers of Fairytales were 
Scattered: Memories which Hurt] (Alba Iulia: Reîntregirea, 2001), 9–10. Note that Andreicuţ use of the 
term “uniatism” may have a slightly derogatory connotation, although his use of it may also have been for 
brevity. 
142 Ibid., 15. 
143 Ibid., 34–36. 
144 Ibid., 39. 
145 Ibid., 41–44. 
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sharing religious enthusiasm and the suspicion and surveillance of the secret police for their 
bourgeoning religious community.146 
In addition to performing his duties remarkably, Andreicuţ held regular catechism. His 
observation was that although other denominations organized catechism, in the Orthodox 
Church traditions were passed on by parents’ participation in the service; children and youth 
attended rarely. “Theoretically,” there existed a “provision” for doing catechism with all ages, 
but from Andreicuţ’s observation, the priests that did religion lessons were “rare,” all the more 
because it was not desired by “officials.” Yet like the dynamic Banat priests, he started 
catechism due to his convictions. The Securitate did ascertain that his catechism fell within the 
"legal norms" of the denomination, and they did attempt to make sure they had "identified" 
certain people as participant-informers. According to information, he was reportedly also 
inviting children to services, even offering them candy.147 He encouraged youth to attend 
church, apply to Seminary, and visit Monasteries. As he saw it, such visits and pilgrimages to 
particularly holy or spiritual sites "created among participants a strong spiritual connection," an 
obvious goal of his that was pushing the limits of religious acceptability.148 
Despite Andrecuţ having many relations which the Securitate classified as “hostile,”149 
agents’ basic characterization of Andreicuţ was "religious fanatic." They wrote that he appeared 
                                                 
146 Gheorghe Ramba, Memorii şi Învăţături de Credinţă Ortodoxă [Memories and Lessons from Orthodox 
Faith] (Făgăraş: Agaton, 2013), 35–36. At this remote parish, Ramba and the villagers had started building 
a new church to replace the dilapidated one, and many villagers got in on the project, either working as 
skilled tradesmen or doing whatever tasks they could. Despite frequent inspections and cross-
examinations about proper documentation and permissions, despite running out of money in 1969 once 
the edifice was constructed, they found the support and funds they needed to continue. During 
construction, he served in the neighboring village, where he helped undertake restoration of its several-
centuries old church too. He stayed there for fourteen years, never receiving the needed permissions to 
take up a post in other bigger parishes. Yet in 1973 he heard that there was an opening in Turda, a city 
south of Cluj, and this time he was granted permission. After a few more years he switched to another 
nearby parish, also in Turda (39). 
147 Andreicuț, S-au Risipit Făcătorii de Basme, 45–48. 
148 Ibid., 51–54. 
149 Ibid., 59–60. Agents kept track of all of his “hostile” relations: priest Vladimir Teodorescu (visited 
America and distributed mystical books), Ramba (“formerly condemned”), Bishop Herineanu (“former 
Greek-Catholic”), Ioan Mitrofan (Greek-Catholic in secret), famous theologian Dumitru Stăniloae (“former 
legionary”), Nicolae Steinhardt (“formerly condemned, hostile element, exercises negative influence”), 
and other “former legionaries,” formerly detained, or Catholic-connections. In 1983, while he was away 
his home was searched and they found a copy of Calciu’s Seven Words for Youth, the problematic sermon 
series that prompted Calciu’s dismissal (91). He also had some Lord’s Army adherents among his 
congregation, and agents also monitored his connections with them, but he passed the acceptability test 
because he did not advocate their separate meetings. He felt that “we sing corporately quite enough” in 
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to be "a good Romanian, a good patriot, although he isn't in favor of a socialist or communist 
fatherland since he is determined, even to the point of sacrifice, to be active in the direction of 
getting citizens out from under the influence of the ideology of our socialist state."150 He was 
called in to a meeting with the Securitate in 1979, where he was advised to "soften" his 
catechism, to be "more mild in missions," to cease relations with enemy persons (people with 
dubious labels).151 His mysticism and relations with potential “hostiles” prevented him from 
finding an open door for advanced study in Sibiu or Bucharest, or a parish in Cluj. He kept being 
failed for the necessary entrance exam, and the Department of Religions looked "negatively" on 
his proposed transfer to the Theological Institute in Cluj.152  
In 1985 he received a transfer to Alba Iulia, though his parishioners in Turda were sad to 
see him go. Although he resumed his dynamic service, including catechism, it seems that agents 
did not install microphones in his home as they did in Turda.153 Evidently state agents 
considered his religiosity, though far from safely within the boundaries they desired, to not be 
problematic enough to warrant aggressive interventions but only an occasional warning and the 
prevention of his pursuit of advanced study or certain promotions. Yet by not proselytizing, 
avoiding political stances or pursuits, not dabbling in forbidden groups, and yielding to 
authority, Andreicuţ found a pathway to promoting religious activity and dynamism without 
forceful discipline in communist Romania. 
The other place religiosity remained to challenge church and state norms was on the 
margins, including among the neoprotestants, sectarian groups, the underground Greek-
Catholics, and the Lord’s Army. Though church and state restrictions alongside the ordinary 
duties of priestly service obstructed priests’ opportunities to form close ties or develop 
communal life among parishioners, participating in such non-conforming groups could afford 
these dimensions. Although marginalized and even disbanded, the Greek-Catholic Church and 
the Lord’s Army were able to garner deep sympathy and respect among certain sectors of the 
population. Many came to side with these groups’ stories of persecution, including young 
people skeptical of authorities, and people who had suffered or whose family or friends suffered 
                                                                                                                                                 
the regular services, and he provided religious education in the form of catechism. In essence, he felt his 
religious fervor made the Lord’s Army superfluous (75). 
150 Ibid., 74. 
151 Ibid., 83. 
152 Ibid., 87, 107. 
153 Ibid., 109. 
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either at the hands of state or church agents, such as neoprotestant believers. In 1977 six 
neoprotestant pastors and laymen in Romania put together and disseminated a document 
demanding freedom of conscience and condemning the persecution in Romania. In 1978, a 
larger group of mainly (though not exclusively) neopotestant believers established the 
Romanian Christian Committee for the Defense of Religious Liberty and Conscience (Comitetul 
Creştin Român pentru Apărarea Libertăţii Religioase şi de Conştiinţă, or ALRC). Consistently 
among the demands of this group was the legalization of the Greek-Catholic Church and Lord’s 
Army.154  
By the 1980s, the Lord’s Army was in its heyday, having large gatherings and being left 
relatively alone. The number of active, regular participants in the Lord’s Army was at least half a 
million people by the 1980s, with much higher numbers when occasional participants or the 
curious joined in. Sporadic repression did not stop the Lord’s Army so much as fuel belonging 
and interdependence. Sympathetic Baptists of the ALRC observed that “the repressive 
measures—searches, discrimination, confiscation of Bibles, printed matter, literature and 
manuscripts—allow it to develop continually.” Although repression created “apparent 
limitations” and increased “tension,” it also led to the “efficacy” of “real spiritual activity.”155 In 
Cluj in the 1980s, a group of Lord's Army participants would routinely set up a "large tent in 
public areas for weekly worship" on Sunday afternoons, often with hundreds in attendance in 
order to evangelize. Word of mouth was the sole means for advertisement.156 The Lord’s Army 
persisted without a coherent leadership core, but that did not mean that strife and divisions had 
ceased amongst its longtime figureheads.157 The authorities seemed to regard Traian Dorz not 
so much a catalyst of the movement anymore as much as a relic and a lone warrior, fighting for 
                                                 
154 Grossu, Calvarul României Creștine, 126–28. Grossu has details about ALRC and their 24 demands, 
written by a group of 27 believers (mostly Baptist) in the fall of 1977.  
155 Christian Committee for the Defence of Religious Rights in Romania, ed., “The Lord’s Army Movement 
in the Romanian Orthodox Church,” Religion in Communist Lands 8, no. 4 (1980): 316. 
156 Christian Herald, "Selfless attitude of Romanian Christians," March 28, 1987, p. 16. <RO/Oastea 
Domnului>, Keston Archive and Library, Baylor University. 
157 Composer Nicolae Moldoveanu had broken with the Lord’s Army in prison in the early 1960s, and Dorz 
remained estranged from him. Sergiu Grossu had managed to resettle in France in 1969, and 
reconciliation between him and Dorz only happened late in the 1980s. As for Alexandru Pop, the other 
former needle in Dorz’s side, Dorz managed to convince Pop to publicly repent for what Dorz identified as 
his sins and role in Army divisions at a wedding-gathering in 1981. Dorz himself suffered a loss of 
reputation in the face of some LA participants, who did not quite consider him to be “the core” of the 
Lord’s Army as Dorz did of himself. 
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an ideal.158 In Dorz’s recollections about this era, he focused less and less on the “brotherhood” 
found in the Lord’s Army and more and more on conflicts with other adherents, with church 
hierarchs, and state officials. Meanwhile, the movement made its advances at the initiative of 
everyday participants. 
As for the Greek-Catholic Church, it had its increasingly vocal advocates, even if the 
number of advocates was not necessarily growing. Well-known Romanian dissident Doina 
Cornea championed the Greek-Catholic cause, and many not of Greek-Catholic heritage like 
Marian Ştefănescu became sympathetic to its restoration as a human-religious rights issue. For 
such as these, the supposed narrative of the re-union of 1948 had not succeeded in displacing 
the narrative of coercion.159 
Conclusion 
This chapter argues that for officials, Romanian religious normativity was to be the 
historical Orthodox Church and a religiosity that was bounded and predictable. The Orthodox 
Church, represented by millions of believers across Romania, hierarchs, and clergy, did not 
trouble the status quo of the state’s management of religion, but defined it. By these groups 
practicing the faith largely as before the communist regime, they contributed to the stability of 
communist society and helped generate normative state-church relationships and religiosity.  
State officials successfully isolated Orthodox Clergy just as they did Lord’s Army leaders 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s (see Chapter V). The nascent movement among Orthodox 
clergy threatened to popularize alternative narratives to those disseminated in official venues 
about things like complete religious freedom, the “voluntary” “return” of the Greek-Catholic 
Church, the irrelevancy of the Lord’s Army, and the unquestionable harmony of the goals of the 
                                                 
158 Dorz was arrested in 1982, but as I see it, more due to coincidental factors than to state fear of his 
power. As he rode back from the yearly Iosif Trifa memorial ceremony with two active Army participants 
from Cluj—two brothers who happened to be transporting religious books—they were searched, 
detained, and imprisoned. Dorz took blame upon himself for their transportation. Dorz, Hristos - Mărturia 
Mea, 514–15; “Romanian Christians under Threat of Imprisonment,” Keston News Service, no. 154 (July 
29, 1982): 5; “Further News of Lord’s Army Leader,” Keston News Service, no. 155 (August 12, 1982): 6. 
159 Gabriel Andreescu and Mihnea Berindei, eds., Ultimul Deceniu Comunist: Scrisori către Radio Europa 
Liberă [The Last Communist Decade: Letters to Radio Free Europe], vol. II (Iaşi: Polirom, 2014), 120–23. 
This is one example among a countless many in which narratives became disputed, when an unnamed 
priest in 1986 responded to a historical work from 1985 about the 1940-44 Horthyist occupation, and how 
the work referred only to the “Romanian Church,” as though the G-C Church did not exist. It did not even 
distinguish the bishops of the time as belonging specifically to the G-C church, just named them as though 
there was no distinction from BOR bishops. 
300 
 
state and the Church. By radio, word of mouth, and samizdat, voices like Calciu that criticized 
Seminary training, lamented the destruction of cathedrals in Bucharest, advocated on behalf of 
marginalized religious groups, and promoted a deepening of faith and spirituality were gaining 
hearers and adherents. 
But before this trend spread beyond a handful of passionate younger priests to large 
numbers of citizens, state officials shrewdly exiled every “discontented” priest who would go. 
The movement did not gain new visible heroes to replace them. People kept going to church as 
before, but movements like the Lord’s Army and neoprotestant denominations profited from an 
Orthodox Church which was heavily surrounded by state officials and led by amenable church 
hierarchs who proclaimed that such “malcontents” as those from the Banat served neither 
church nor state. It is clear that the Securitate considered the Church a very useful partner in 
social control.160 
The enormous pressure on everyday clergy to submit to their leaders and to conform 
should not be underestimated. The theological culture of Orthodoxy itself stresses humility and 
submission to elders and leaders, as well as the doctrine of “Tradition,” which says that the 
Tradition of the Church itself is true and binding. In the words of scholar of Orthodoxy Kallistos 
Ware, “The Orthodox Christian of today sees himself as heir and guardian to a great inheritance 
received from the past, and he believes that it is his duty to transmit this inheritance unimpaired 
to the future.”161 The Orthodox Church sees itself as the One True Church—others broke away 
from it,162 and that the Church is being guided across history into “all truth.”163 Although the 
                                                 
160 Pleșiță and Patrichi, Ochii și Urechile Poporului, 136–37. Securitate General Pleșiță recalls in a meeting 
with Patriarch Justin Moisescu asking why the Church “does not combat sectarian proselytism,” since on 
this matter, “the Securitate came together with the Church.” He also mentions that the “bishops of the 
frontier” were very important to the Interior, and their appointments demanded careful consideration, 
even consultation with the Central Committee. 
161 Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Church (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), 204. This inheritance, or 
Tradition, includes the following “outward expressions”: 1] The Bible, 2) The seven ecumenical councils 
and the creed, 3] Later (national] councils or writings of Bishops, 4) Fathers of the church, 5] Worship, 6) 
The Canon Law of the Church (church organization), and 7] Iconography (203-215]. 
162 Ibid., 249–51. 
163 Georges Florovsky, Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View, vol. 1, Collected Works of 
Georges Florovsky (Belmont, MA: Büchervertriebsanstalt; Notable & Academic Books [distributor], 1987), 
106. Florovsky writes that “The true tradition is only the tradition of truth” and that “Ultimately, tradition 
is a continuity of the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church, a continuity of Divine guidance and 
illumination. The Church is not bound by the ‘letter.’ Rather, she is constantly moved forth by the ‘Spirit.’ 
The same Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, which ‘spake through the Prophets,’ which guided the Apostles, is still 
continuously guiding the Church into the fuller comprehension and understanding of the Divine truth, 
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doctrine is too complex to explore at length here, it is worth remembering the force that custom 
(doctrine and culture) carries, and that the leaders of the Orthodox Church wield and transmit 
the power of these customs to subsequent generations. Consider the implicit (and sometimes 
explicit) threat that Orthodox believers and clergy face, that to go against “Tradition” is to leave 
the “One True Church,” to be a schismatic, and to be steered away from the “Truth.” It would 
take a great deal of self-confidence (or more negatively, hubris) to refuse to submit to one’s 
superiors, as to break from the Orthodox Church would be a break from orthodoxy itself (a 
situation shared with Orthodox clergy in the Soviet Union; see Chapter VI). In this context, 
“Truth” is less decentralized and democratized than wielded, as is the case in all scenarios where 
power is heavily centralized. With such a perspective, “Truth” is too vulnerable to leave to a 
common priest (much less lay-person) for debate or discussion; it would only lead, ostensibly, to 
anarchy, sectarianism, and disunity. It was a struggle against these threats that largely united 
representatives of the state and the Orthodox Church. 
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from glory to glory.” Scholars reference John 16:13 – “But when he, the Spirit of truth, comes, he will 
guide you into all truth.” And, relying upon scripture which calls the Church Christ’s body, it is therefore 
infallible as Christ’s body is now infallible; and, for the same reason, the unity between God and His 
church cannot be broken. See Ephesians 5:23 – “For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the 
head of the church, his body, of which he is the Savior” and Colossians 1:24 – “Now I rejoice in what was 
suffered for you, and I fill up in my flesh what is still lacking in regard to Christ’s afflictions, for the sake of 
his body, which is the church.” That is to say, since Pentecost the Church has been guided into all truth. 
Individuals are fallible, but the Church, which is guided by ecumenical councils, is infallible (Ware, 252). 
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VIII. Legal Limits and Youth Religiosity: Soviet Baptists and Religious
Normalization, 1964-1989 
When Nikita Khrushchev was dismissed by the Communist Party in 1964 in favor of 
Leonid Brezhnev, the latter inherited a troublesome religious problem that resulted directly 
from the anti-religion campaign. During this campaign, state officials pressured leaders of the 
All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB) to issue church statutes against 
evangelism and youth participation, as well as to centralize power more in the All-Union Council, 
thereby decreasing the power of laypersons and congregations in choosing leaders. But certain 
believers, in line with the evangelical custom of democratized access to scriptural truth, rejected 
AUCECB leaders’ newly enforced line and called upon them to repent, enjoining believers to 
agree with their view. Attempts by church and state leaders to reconcile these groups had not 
succeeded by 1964, and even 1963 AUCECB overtures in the form of rescinding some of the 
1961 changes did not appease the breakaway Baptists. 
In this chapter, we trace the state response from the time of Brezhnev roughly until 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of “glasnost” (openness) in 1986-1987. As the ECB Council fractured, 
churches that chose to align with the breakaway Baptists no longer registered with the state, 
remaining unregistered (essentially illegal) in order to more freely pursue religious activity 
according to their beliefs and to demonstrate that they were not unified with the AUCECB. State 
officials responded by offering certain concessions to the registered churches while arresting 
leaders and harassing participants of the unregistered churches. Breakaway Baptists faced the 
brunt of the state’s coercion: surveillance, fines, blackmail, harassment at places of 
employment, difficulties for children in schools, sometimes even the removal of children from 
parents.1 Breakaway Baptist leaders eventually switched the focus of their battle away from 
AUCECB leaders and toward state officials, as they began to disseminate petitions defending 
what they believed were their Constitutional rights to separation of church and state and 
freedom of conscience. They also disseminated bulletins across the Soviet Union and abroad, 
publicizing the imprisonment of leaders and state harassment of church activity.  
In addition to the problem of unregistered churches, however, state officials continued 
to encounter problems with representatives from the state-registered churches. The task of 
1 Walter Sawatsky, “Protestantism in the USSR,” in Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and 
Russia: The Communist and Postcommunist Eras, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1992), 247. 
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enforcing normative or acceptable religiosity in these churches never ceased in this period, 
however dominating the issue of the breakaway churches was. The Central Baptist Church in 
Moscow, whose lead pastors were also the heads of the AUCECB, was particularly important to 
state officials because foreign guests frequently attended its services. Officials wanted to show 
foreigners that there was indeed “religious freedom” in the conducting of Protestant church 
services.  
Council of Religious Affairs (CRA) official for Moscow Oblast A.A. Trushin’s struggle to 
normalize religious practice is a dominant theme in this chapter. His case demonstrates the 
many layers of bureaucracy included in the management of religious bodies and the numerous 
points of tension his office and other authorities encountered due to the dilemmas created by 
the conflicting desires of state representatives: to normalize religious practice toward its public 
restriction or decline while creating the perception of the state’s protection of this freedom for 
believers and foreigners. Because the Baptist Church was relatively small, officials’ effort toward 
keeping believers content had more to do with Soviet reputation than it did domestic threats to 
Soviet power. 
1965-1969: Brezhnev Inherits ECB Problem 
In early 1964 there were signals by Khrushchev and Leonid Il’ichev, one of Khrushchev's 
main ideologists, that the anti-religious campaign was to continue, but these two were gone in 
late 1964 and early 1965. Of course there was no public state-sponsored proclamation calling 
for reappraisal of religion, but after Khrushchev was ousted the tone in the journal Science and 
Religion was milder. Also, some prisoners who were active believers were released in 1965. 
Echoing the comments of Council of Religious Affairs (CRA) chief Kuroedov in 1963, an article in 
Science and Religion noted that closing churches was not the way to make people atheists, only 
to galvanize them. Force did not generate true conversions to atheism, but harmed the state’s 
image and endeared believers to the citizenry. The article highlighted that instead of 
“administrative measures,” the focus of state representatives would be on “personal work.”2 
But religious believers who defined themselves in large part by opposition to the state and the 
state-sponsored Baptist Church would view any kind of attention from such bodies with 
considerable suspicion. 
                                                          
2 Michael Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia: Protestant Opposition to Soviet Religious Policy 
(London; New York: Macmillan; St. Martin’s P., 1968), 93–97. 
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Before Khrushchev was deposed, on July 27, 1964, Kuroedov communicated to his 
commissioners the problems that local authorities had been causing believers, who then 
distributed complaints abroad about “persecution” of the church by the state. He warned them 
that “Any infringement of the rights of believers […] inevitably intensifies religious attitudes, 
leads to the igniting of religious fanaticism and complicates the work toward detaching believers 
from religion.”3 He reported on citizens’ complaints, saying believers wrote that no one was 
concerned about their complaints, but Kuroedov’s warning to the commissioners suggested that 
leading officials did take them into account. Officials had to track the mood of citizens since they 
sensed their power depended on their loyalty. Officials were not supposed to act like those local 
authorities who “didn’t listen, often bullied them, insulted them, and in certain situations even 
used measures of repression.”4 From now on, he wrote, commissioners and local authorities 
should only remove a church’s registration if there was “actually a departure of believers from 
the religion,” a situation made clear by the fact that the population stopped supporting the 
church. If the building was no longer suitable, then another needed to be found. He also 
stressed that authorities cannot interfere in “inner-church affairs,” including the conducting of 
rites and services, or dictating times and durations of services.5 Just after Khrushchev was 
deposed, on October 15, 1964 Kuroedov issued another letter to his commissioners. He did not 
change any of the emphases, but only gave the commissioners detailed instructions for writing 
their reports.6 Top officials evidently wanted to ensure they had more precise knowledge of the 
religious situation; any change in tactics was not obvious.  
1966-1969 Register the Legal; Punish the Sectarians 
Kuroedov’s points of emphases, although directed to the Orthodox Church, applied to 
the other religions as well, as in 1966 the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs was 
merged with the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults into the Council for Religious Affairs 
(CRA). Yet within the CRA, there were still officials who focused specifically on non-Orthodox 
                                                          
3 Keston Archive, “Council for Religious Affairs of Moscow Oblast, Report,” Archive file <KGB 187>, pp. 4-5. 
Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 1, Del. 65. 
4 Ibid., 9. 
5 Ibid., 11–12. 
6 Ibid., 20–24. The reports were to be divided into five parts, containing the following: general 
composition of churches; control over abiding by religious legislation; preaching activities and attitudes of 
clergy; religious rites and abiding by law that guards children from religious influence; analysis of financial 
situation. 
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affairs.7 The so-called “schismatics” (raskol’niki) of the Baptist Church, however, presented 
officials with a particularly thorny case that made for a difficult period of normalization over 
Brezhnev’s first five years. Getting believers to convert to atheism may have been the ultimate 
theoretical goal for many communist proponents, but for current and pragmatic purposes, state 
authorities still had to maintain the legal framework by which religious associations could 
operate. As it was, the variously named schismatics-initiativists were not in legal compliance, 
having rejected the legally-sanctioned AUCECB as well as registration with state organs.  
The impasse that had formed between breakaway Baptists and state officials was that 
the “schismatics” wanted a place to worship without harassment, but they refused registration. 
One CRA official from the City of Moscow characterized their attitude as one of defiance: “’We 
need a prayer house, yet your registration absolutely does not interest us. [If you] don’t give us 
the premises—then we will gather under the open skies!’” Even though two of its spokesmen, 
Gennadii Kriuchkov and Georgii Vins, were from other oblasts (Tula and Kiev, respectively), they 
were using Moscow and Podol’sk as frequent meeting places to organize their actions. The 
official noted that authorities could not register associations with such “stipulations” attached 
to registration, nor grant permission for a prayer house when the believers in question “do not 
recognize the Soviet legislation on cults.”8  
Yet of equal importance for breakaway Baptists in early 1965 were relations within the 
ECB church. While still battling the AUCECB leadership, the breakaways primarily referred to 
themselves as the “Organizing Committee” (OrgKomitet). In March 1965, the Organizing 
Committee responded to AUCECB requests for reconciliation by continuing to accuse it of 
serving the government's ends rather than God's and again called the AUCECB leadership and its 
followers to repent and change positions. Also, in their own publication, the Bratskii Listok 
(Brotherly Leaflet), OrgKomitet affiliates called all congregations to agree with their position.9 
Naturally, the AUCECB did not assent to such a pathway to reconciliation.  
With reconciliation within the Church at an impasse, the OrgKomitet increasingly 
addressed government officials, including Leonid Brezhnev, as president of the Constitution 
Commission. They quoted the existing public religious legislation to their addressees, 
referencing Lenin’s dictate in 1918 on the separation of church and state. They tried to define 
                                                          
7 Evlampii Alekseevich Tarasov was chief of the department overseeing the affairs of Catholic, Protestant, 
Armenian, Jewish, and sectarian faiths from 1968 until 1986. 
8 TsGA Moskvy, f. 3004, op. 1, d. 90, p. 21. 
9 Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia, 98–104. 
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“true freedom of conscience” as well as what the “needs” of believers actually were. They 
claimed that the constitution did indicate such a freedom “on paper,” but “in practice” they’ve 
been denied it by “various instructions, administrative pressure and repressions.” They claimed 
that when in 1929 the resolution gave authorities the right to refuse to register religious 
societies while making unregistered societies illegal, this act of requiring permission but 
meanwhile denying it violated the separation of church and state. Subsequent interpretations of 
religious law by state authorities said that children had the right to a religion-free upbringing, 
and the state upheld the presumption that all children, being under age to comply, would wish 
for such a thing. The reformists argued against the state’s right to claim ownership over 
children's worldviews. They also quoted UN human rights resolutions that conflicted with 
existing Soviet legislation. All of this was to persuade Brezhnev and others to pass legislation 
that would forbid state meddling in church leadership and services. They received no reply.10  
The OrgKomitet submitted several petitions to Presidium Chairman A.I. Mikoyan, to the 
Procuracy of the USSR, and to other government bodies. In September 1965 Mikoyan actually 
received a delegation, but in this meeting—as in all correspondence with OrgKomitet 
members—state representatives warned them about their “’anti-social and illegal activity.’” 
Acting illegally supposedly disqualified them from constructive conversation. Mikoyan and other 
officials also tried to claim that due to separation of church and state, state officials could not 
interfere in what they described as an internal church conflict of leadership, which it was on the 
surface, if one ignored state machinations behind the scenes of the AUCECB.11 
Reformists did not find an agreeable path to church reconciliation, legal operation, or 
reduced state meddling in church affairs. Their demands unmet, the OrgKomitet decided in 
September 1965 to hold a conference where attendees declared the establishment of their own 
denomination, the Council of Churches of the Evangelical Christians and Baptists (CCECB).12 
Their move to establish the CCECB did not mean that church or state authorities would 
recognize it, however. Leaders Kriuchkov and Vins were in hiding during this time, knowing that 
state agents had been tracking their activities and fearing immediate arrest. 
Unregistered churches were problems for both CCECB and AUCECB adherents, as 
officials had insisted that only registered groups could legally gather but had not registered any 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 105–13. 
11 Ibid., 116. 
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Protestant groups since the early 1950s. In response, believers from unregistered communities 
were meeting wherever they could. As Catherine Wanner has observed, because the state 
would not grant permissions for large public gatherings for rituals like baptisms or for additional 
meeting spaces or for new prayer houses, “a vast informal communicative network” was needed 
for such gatherings. As the size increased, so did the difficulty of arrangement without an 
informant notifying the police. This was an “ongoing confrontation” and “one that was 
increasingly tiresome for the Soviet state to wage.”13  
Under Brezhnev, officials changed their strategy. In the struggle to keep religious activity 
limited but in the open amid increasing memberships in ECB communities, religious affairs 
officials began to advocate for new registrations. In 1965 Authorities in Moscow Oblast 
registered the first ECB communities in the oblast to add to the Central Baptist Church in 
Moscow, one each in the towns of Dedovsk and Serpukhov and two in villages.14 In all these 
cases, religious affairs commissioner A.A. Trushin—who had been commissioner for Russian 
Orthodox Church Affairs since 1943—argued that the numbers and influence of the 
“initiativists” decreased due to formal registration.15 Nevertheless, Trushin labeled adherents to 
the ECB faith not as “Baptist” or “Evangelical” but simply “sectarian,” suggesting a negative 
opinion of the faith in general. Yet some 30 “nonregistered” groups remained in the oblast, of 
which 10 were described as belonging to the “initiativists.”16   
Despite advocating registration, religious affairs officials initiated stricter legislation on 
March 18, 1966, much of which seemed aimed at ECB church groups, but especially breakaway 
ones. The laws would punish those teaching minors or organizing any meetings outside of 
worship services.17 The legislation seemed directed toward the legally ambiguous “Sunday 
school classes,” although catechism had been expressly forbidden. The legislative clarifications 
heralded the next crackdown, and subsequently many leaders were arrested for violating such 
articles.18 
                                                          
13 Catherine Wanner, Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism, Culture and 
Society after Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 87–88. 
14 The other two churches were in the village of Ivanisovo in Noginskii raion, and in Vostriakovo in 
Podol’skii raion. 
15 Keston Archive, “Council for Religious Affairs of Moscow Oblast, Report”, Archive file <KGB 85>, p. 15. 
Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 3, Del. 55. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
17 Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia, 159. 
18 Ibid., 165. 
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CCECB leaders were equally determined to conduct religion as they saw fit. Frustrated 
by a lack of response to their petitions, supporters of the CCECB gathered for what might have 
been the largest protest demonstration in Moscow in Soviet history. On May 22, 1966, some 
500-600 believers gathered outside of the Central Committee building, insisting on meeting with 
Brezhnev himself. Their demands included recognition of the CCECB, an end to persecution, the 
release of current prisoners, true freedom of religious conscience and the right to religiously 
educate children. The foreign press even reported on it. The group remained unanswered until 
nightfall. Even more came the next morning until soldiers, police, and KGB agents came to 
disperse them, announcing that ten leaders could remain to be received. The crowd remained, 
encircled by police, saying they intended to wait outside for their “brothers” to return. 
Eventually, state security physically forced them into buses, even assaulting some of them with 
blows to their heads, and detained many in prison for a time. There were crowds of onlookers 
who witnessed these acts.19 
In the Kiev region on Sunday, May 22, while Georgii Vins was leading the demonstration 
in Moscow, several hundred were meeting in the woods near a certain rail station far outside 
the city, as they had been doing for some three years. But this group was also violently 
dispersed by a large contingent of state security, with reports of assaults on old women and 
children.20 Around this time the Vins family and congregation received word that Georgii was 
arrested in connection with the May demonstration. Other members of the congregation were 
also arrested and given short prison sentences.21 Georgii Vins was in prison six months before 
his trial in Moscow, after which he received three years in prison camps.22 
After this event, state organs increased negative stereotyping of the breakaway 
Baptists. In June 1966 Izvestiia painted them as "aggressive," provocative, and making "illegal 
demands" instead of requests. The article noted that the schism was because the “schismatics” 
saw AUCECB leaders as adhering to "earthly laws" whereas they held the "laws of God" to be 
ultimate. Thus, said the article, "these petitioners do not want to recognize the laws of the 
Soviet state and do not wish to take into account the fact that sectarians are not only believers, 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 117–20. 
20 Ibid., 120–22. 
21 Natasha Vins, Children of the Storm: The Autobiography of Natasha Vins. (Greenville, S.C.: JourneyForth, 
2002), 22. Kiev pastor Vasily Zhurilo was also imprisoned, as well as nine others from their church in 1966. 
One was Vera Shuportyak, a Sunday School teacher and nineteen years old, arrested for the May petition 
attempt (62). 
22 Ibid., 62. 
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but also Soviet citizens." The article characterized them as societal parasites, noting their 
preference only for laws like the right to pension and paid holidays. The leaders, the article 
claimed, were a "group of adventurers" wanting to "seize power" and the money of the church, 
and that the ordinary believers were being deceived by them.23 
After the “events in Moscow” “perpetrated” by the “initiativists,” Party Councils met 
across the oblast. Even Emilii Ivanovich Lisavtsev of the Ideological Department of the Central 
Committee of the Party gave a presentation on the subject. Trushin noted that even before the 
events there were several meetings to discuss the Baptists and the taking of measures to cease 
their illegal activity, perhaps wishing to suggest that he had not been ignoring the issue. He also 
reported that those who had “insolently refused” to stop illegal activities “were arrested and a 
criminal case was brought against them.” Six were arrested in connection with hosting 
gatherings.24 
Trushin reported that CCECB participants held “numerous” gatherings of late, “taking 
the shape of demonstrations against Soviet legislation on religions, having the goal of arousing 
believers against Soviet authorities.” Those leaders (whose names he had) who “still remained 
at large” met in homes and apartments, making plans for their next “illegal activities.” He also 
noted that the Council of Churches and Council of Prisoners’ Relatives had lodged complaints to 
“central and local party authorities.”25 The latter had formed in 1964 when a group of wives and 
mothers of imprisoned believers had met in Moscow and decided to form an association for 
their support. Like the reformist Baptist movement which began in 1961, those involved in this 
Council tried to navigate the constitutional-legal framework of the Soviet Union. Their agenda 
included keeping fellow adherents informed of instances of persecution and imprisonment and 
petitioning the Soviet government on behalf of their relatives’ rights. They also kept records of 
these instances and actions.26 The Council of Prisoners’ Relatives made the same “persistent” 
legal demands as the CCECB.27 They sometimes also sent such declarations in the name of “The 
                                                          
23 Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia, 114–15. 
24 Keston Archive, “Council for Religious Affairs of Moscow Oblast, Report”, Archive file <KGB 85>, p. 13. 
Original archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 3, Del. 55. 
25 Ibid., 24. 
26 Katharine Murray, “The Council of Baptist Prisoners’ Relatives: 1964-1972,” Religion in Communist 
Lands 1, no. 1 (1973): 12. 
27 Trushin was accurate in his description of the content of both groups’ petitions. They asked the 1929 
decree on religious associations and certain decrees from March 18, 1966 be revoked, saying they conflict 
with Lenin’s decree of 1918, international “norms”, and their “creeds.” They demanded the release of 
their relatives and co-believers from prisoners, imprisoned for “professing their faith.” Complete 
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Moscow Church ECB,” which was not the same as the City Church, but the name they had given 
to the collection of breakaway Baptists in Moscow oblast.28 
In July a seminar for district and regional level officials and CRA commissioners was 
dominated by the problem of the “initiativists” and “ceasing their unlawful activity.” Also there 
was much sorting out of the tasks of the “commissions” for tracking religious activity and 
ensuring they abide by legislation. Some of the district commissions had collected more precise 
data on the churches in their districts. Trushin noted some “insufficiencies” in the work of these 
commissions, due in large part to their “ignorance” of regulations pertaining to religion.29 This 
was a constant refrain in Trushin’s reporting, the inadequacies of other officials in dealing with 
religious problems.  
Still, the CRA now had a “detailed plan” to address the unlawful initiative group. The 
proposed measures included explaining legislation to unregistered ECB groups and initiative-
group supporters. District officials and officials overseeing propaganda and agitation all agreed 
to these measures, as well as to register more Baptist communities to take away at least one 
reason for Baptist discontent. Trushin anticipated that granting “legal rights” to Baptist believers 
would reduce illegal sectarian activity by getting believers “out from under the influence of 
Baptists-initiativists.”30 As another attempt at influencing Baptists, state-published documents, 
as Michael Bourdeaux notes, routinely described registered Baptists using positive terms like 
"quiet," "honest," and "hard-working."31 Accommodating conforming Baptists and praising them 
would help further marginalize breakaway Baptists, whom Trushin and other officials described 
as complaining, deceitful in describing the religious situation, parasitic, obscurantists, law-
breakers, and extremists.  
Trushin felt that discussions between officials and believers were having a “good 
influence.” He referenced a two-hour discussion with initiativists in Dedovsk at the end of 
August. After this meeting, he claimed, there developed “a rift and unrest in the group” as some 
started to argue on behalf of registration, others began to attend the already registered ECB 
church in Dedovsk, while others remained unmoved. The ECB church in the city of Serphukhov 
                                                                                                                                                                             
separation of church from state, to keep state bodies from meddling in church and believers’ affairs. The 
“freedom of religious propaganda,” without which there is not true “freedom of conscience.” 
28 Keston Archive, “Council for Religious Affairs of Moscow Oblast, Report”, Archive file <KGB 85>. Original 
archival source: TsGAMO, Fond 7383, Op. 3, Del. 55. 
29 Ibid., 5, 9. 
30 Ibid., 12–13. 
31 Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia, 154. 
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also coordinated efforts to sway people back toward the ECB fold. In general, said Trushin, ECB 
activities “increased considerably.”32  Here, the state and the AUCECB churches shared the same 
agenda, a situation similar to other instances in the Soviet Union and Romania when Church 
leaders supported state initiatives. The Orthodox Churches supported the disbanding of the 
Greek-Catholic Churches in Ukraine and Romania after World War II, framed as voluntary 
reunions with the Orthodox Churches.  
In 1966 there were around 30 unregistered ECB and Pentecostal communities in the 
oblast, encompassing around 700 people (see Appendix B for Population and Religion Statistics). 
Trushin claimed the “overwhelming majority” of such groups obeyed soviet laws pertaining to 
religious practice, but if the eight groups seeking registration faced rejection, this meant 
“favorable ground” for the initiative-Baptists, who were traveling to such places and “recruiting” 
believers to their side. Officials estimated the initiativists as ten groups of around 200 people, 
sixty of whom were in Dedovsk, the largest collection in the oblast.33  Trushin intended to have 
more groups registered to make all ECB activity in Moscow Oblast more controlled. 
Officials were not all pursuing the same agenda, however. Although Trushin argued that 
registration would “contribute to the ceasing of illegal activities of sectarian organizations, the 
departure of believers from under the influence of baptist ‘initiativists,’” district officials and 
Baptists had become quite accustomed to rejection. As an example, Trushin detailed efforts by 
believers in Klin to register. In 1955, they received the reply from the district council that “We 
do not have the possibility to satisfy your request.” In 1957, they replied that they “do not give 
consent to opening a prayer house and forbid gathering.” In 1961 they rejected the petition 
since “there should not be held any kind of group gatherings of citizens prior to registration of a 
community.” Despite the new religious affairs line promoting registration and the registration of 
two ECB communities in 1965, in 1965 the same body rejected a petition to open a prayer house 
again, this time because “the house was built for housing,” and therefore “cannot be used for 
conducting prayer gatherings.” At the beginning of 1966, the reply was that “there is no 
premises in Klin which can be used as a prayer gathering.” In the city of Ivanteevka, Trushin 
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wrote, officials similarly “rejected and rejected” requests, until it seemed the “issue of 
registration didn’t stir [believers].”34 
To further emphasize the importance of registration, on September 7, 1966, the CRA 
sent out a “clarification” to the executive committees of the district councils, about “the new 
order of registration and stripping religious societies of registration, about the opening and 
closing of prayer buildings and houses.” But “even now,” said Trushin, there were leading 
officials in places “where the registration of such groups [was] highly necessary,” who were 
“remaining with their opinions” that it was “better to let them operate in this way, than to 
register them in the 50th year of Soviet power.” To some communist adherents, registering 
Baptist churches was the opposite of progress. The city council of Klin had rejected a recent 
Baptist petition even after “several of our [CRA] written and verbal reminders.” The same 
happened in Odintsovskii city council, and other places. But rejections “were not quite 
convincing” to Trushin when they contained refusals based on the “technical condition” of the 
home as precluding it for use as a prayer house. Nor did he find those officials rejecting 
registration in Ivanteevka convincing when they told believers that soon there would be a 
“direct bus” to Moscow, and “they can travel there, since the distance is 27 km.” The Ramenskii 
council told the same to its petitioners. In contrast to the local officials, Trushin had decided in 
favor of each of these requests.35 Officials were clearly divided in their approaches to addressing 
the problem of ECB religion in the oblast. 
There were important links between the Central Moscow Church and these small church 
groups scattered across the oblast, even if officials tended to exaggerate the reliability of 
transportation between them. First, the church in Moscow was beyond its capacity because 
many in attendance came from the surrounding oblast, up to around 5,000 members by 1967. 
The church had grown by nearly 300 members from 1963-1967, and although officials could 
note that the majority came from the category of “over forty.” Perhaps officials considered that 
within a decade a natural decline in members would alleviate the problem. Yet at the same 
time, statistics of new members at Moscow church since 1967 often showed that around a 
quarter of new members were between ages nineteen and thirty.36 Second, it had become 
customary that those wishing to be baptized joined others in periodic group-baptism events. In 
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1966 the newly registered oblast churches had sent twenty-one believers to the “Moscow 
Church” to be baptized, and unregistered groups sent thirty-five.37 This church was further 
distinguished by the fact that in its recent history, they had had over 1,000 foreign visitors from 
28 countries and 26 different confessions.38 For the state, allowing foreign visitors to observe a 
Protestant service could help to demonstrate the existence of “religious freedom” in the Soviet 
Union and dispel reports of “religious persecution” that concerned audiences abroad may have 
read. What’s more, this church was well-represented in leadership, with five of its executive 
body also leaders of the AUCECB, and all fifteen members of the presidium of the AUCECB 
preachers and organizers of the services in Moscow.39 
The favored status of the Moscow Church was connected to the cooperation of AUCECB 
leaders with state initiatives. State actors felt comfortable enough with the leadership to allow 
an All-Union Congress in the fall of 1966 to which believers were elected from registered and 
unregistered congregations as delegates, although Trushin noted that initiativists from Moscow 
Oblast “refused” to participate.40 Perhaps to demonstrate to wavering believers the benefits of 
belonging to the AUCECB, leaders announced that the Council was now permitted to publish 
Bibles, song books, and its magazine in greater numbers. Trying to tarnish the CCECB reputation 
at the Congress, one AUCECB leader referred to them as practicing "intolerance" and looking to 
harm the "unity," but claimed that only an "insignificant number" joined the group, many of 
whom were already returning to the Council. There were even some present as 
"representatives" who expressed that they were breaking with the CCECB. Official reports 
indicated that “the congress” declared all of the CCECB’s claims “unfounded.”41 Yet more 
quietly, AUCECB leaders also changed some church ordinances in compliance with earlier 
OrgKomitet complaints about excessive centralization, now concurring that AUCECB-appointed 
senior presbyters must be approved by churches and elected by bodies of presbyters.42 
Concessions to AUCECB churches continued in 1967, as eight communities were 
registered in Moscow Oblast. Trushin wrote that ten other church groups in close proximity 
joined up with these, reducing the number of unregistered communities to around seven. 
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Probably with the help of informants, officials claimed that participation in CCECB groups 
decline to around 100 in the oblast, as activity had ceased in some locations and dwindled in 
others, without any notable increases.43 
To discourage CCECB activity, state agents also employed fines, the dispersal of 
gatherings, and arrests. Ahead of the 100-year anniversary of the Baptist Church in Russia, local 
officials were alerted to the jubilee and forewarned about preventing any “manifestations” in 
undesirable forms, like gatherings under the open air, demonstrations, and so on.44 Over 19-20 
August, 1967, CCECB groups held four jubilee gatherings with around 250 people, and in some 
instances, a large proportion of youth. Such problematic religiosity, alongside several 
“slanderous” statements CCECB representatives sent to central Soviet organs, increased the 
impasse between state and CCECB personnel. Listing local authorities by name, CCECB letters 
complained about the use of force and issuing fines (often without receipts). They persisted in 
their complaints about legislation, asked for the rehabilitation of those released from prison, 
and insisted on religious education for children.45  
But violent dispersions, arrests, and calumnious comments in newspapers were not 
having the effect everywhere that state representatives desired. The CCECB had gained the 
allegiance of roughly one-third of the ECB congregations from across the entire Soviet Union—if 
not in Moscow Oblast—, buoyed especially by their insistence on allowing children to attend 
services and have some measure of religious education of youth.46 These congregations 
experienced a kind of unity with one another, with traveling pastors and publications 
encouraging them to hold firm to their convictions. Their shared renegade and persecuted 
status afforded a kind of bond in the face of adversity.47 
Georgii Vins’ mother, Lydia Vins, spent considerable time away from Kiev in Moscow 
since she was retired by the time of her son's imprisonment and one of the main activists in the 
Council of Prisoners’ Relatives. While there, she met other female relatives of prisoners; long 
days of trying to negotiate the prosecutor’s office or prison parcel possibilities would conclude 
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with gatherings of fellow believers for food and mutual support.48 A community of breakaway 
Baptists was being created in shared adversity.  
In the summer of 1967, the Sunday school teachers of teenage Natasha Vins’ church 
organized a camping trip—three days in the woods—, an exciting prospect since school trips 
were rare. When it was time to sleep, they took turns on watch duty for discovery or break-up 
by authorities. They played games, sang songs, studied the Bible, read about "catacomb" 
Christians, and so on. Natasha Vins recalls staying up late into the night enjoying the company of 
fellow teenagers. But one day a group of "hunters" (without hunting equipment) came up to 
their fire and made inquiries as to their "camping trip." They decided to pack up and leave 
immediately, but they were stopped exiting the forest by a group of policemen, who told them 
they were under arrest, and a covered truck awaited them. They were all thoroughly searched, 
and the damning evidence of a "Christian camp" was found. Vins’ teacher went into hiding to 
avoid the criminal case opened against her.49 Vins says that she and other youth did not respond 
in fear, but sometimes very vocally protested their treatment as evidence of being 
“persecuted.” They struggled to be submissive and respectful to the authorities as their Sunday 
school teachers instructed them.50 
The defiance of CCECB representatives was, in the minds of Trushin and other CRA 
officials, to be overcome by “individual work,” but this often did not succeed. Baptist believer 
and “initiativist” N.P. Iakimenkova, who lived in a village outside Moscow, sent declarations in 
the name of “the Moscow Church ECB” to eleven addresses of local and central party 
authorities, declaring her intention to use her home for the gatherings of “initiativists.” Trushin 
eventually got her to meet with him. She was accompanied by two other women (who refused 
to give their last names, though subsequently they were identified) who were present “as 
witness” to be able to report back to “the brothers and sisters” about their conversation. 
Trushin told her he called her in because of her declarations, but she denied writing them. She 
said that “we don’t recognize any Council for Religious Affairs, which means that we do not wish 
to hear from you any kind of explanations.” She and her attendants got up and left the office. 
The Procurator of the district subsequently summoned her and likewise presented the 
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legislation pertaining to religion.51 “Individual work” came up against a community defined by its 
opposition to state authorities, and they expected state agents to try to intimidate or threaten 
them—which they would call evidence of persecution. CCECB participants had before them 
examples of family members willing to risk arrest, something that heightened the value of 
belonging to this group.  
The wave of arrests in 1966 became the impetus for the first CCECB conference, where 
those in attendance discussed how to help the prisoners and prisoners' families. They kept 
detailed files pertaining to the prisoner's arrest, published newsletters, petitioned the 
authorities, and tried to organize provisions for families. Lydia Vins’ home in Kiev became a 
guest house for other prisoner families, and "often the doorbell would ring in the middle of the 
night." Typical guests were mothers who left their young children behind at relatives while they 
sought to support husbands now in prison. A community of women formed as such wives stayed 
the night, when they would "pray and weep together." Vins would give practical advice on 
navigating the trial or prison system.52 Local churches would submit donations, and this way 
they could send packages to help supply basic needs and to offer special treats to brighten 
Christmas for children missing their fathers.53 
According to one of their newsletters in June 1968, the churches had helped provide 
support to around two thousand people, all relatives of the hundreds of prisoners. Periodic 
letters also encouraged fellow sufferers in whatever way they could. The Bulletin of the Council 
of Prisoners’ Relatives was published regularly from this time, helping forge the sense of a 
broader community of co-sufferers, which worked to keep people from feeling isolated or alone 
in their situation. The bulletins contained detailed information on the cases of those arrested, 
transcripts of trials, statements sent to the Soviet government, and more. These were 
distributed broadly, even reaching foreign audiences.54 Samizdat from religious actors joined the 
increasing dissemination of samizdat from across the political spectrum.  
Responses by state representatives to curb this “illegal” underground church activity did 
not dissuade participants, but it strengthened CCECB adherents’ notion of the CCECB as the 
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persecuted (and therefore, “true”) church and helped forge communal ties within.55 Plus, they 
were gaining sympathizers abroad from advocates for human and religious rights who saw them 
as people of integrity, harmed by a repressive regime. State officials like Trushin sensed that 
only when the new state line favored compromises that appealed to CCECB supporters would 
the organization lose some of its power. 
Although CRA officials often held up AUCECB churches and personnel as preferable to 
the CCECB and its followers, this does not mean AUCECB churches were unproblematic. The 
pastors and believers of the Moscow Central ECB Church (MoECB) frequently caused problems 
for CRA officials, especially beginning in the 1970s. One CRA official working in the City of 
Moscow believed fanaticism was a real possibility in MoECB, even if it was not the defining 
characteristic as it was for the CCECB as a whole. The official claimed that the church’s leaders 
“love to emphasize that the Christians of other confessions, for example, seventh day 
Adventists, Pentecostals and suchlike ignite fanaticism,” whereas members of their community 
engaged in culture—they “both read papers and listen to the radio, accept any kind of culture.” 
“But,” the official continued, “in reality it’s not so,” given that many of the “schismatics” had 
been “raised in the community.” Thus to become “imbued with fanaticism” remained a 
possibility for “the so-called clean baptists.”56  
As another example of this possibility, the official mentioned Val’ter Arturovich 
Mitskevich, the son of MoECB presbyter and deputy General Secretary of the AUCECB Artur 
Iosifovich. Although he had a “state job,” the young Mitskevich was taking more and more turns 
preaching, and his father was trying to turn him on this path. At a youth gathering that 
presumably was permitted by authorities, the younger Mitskevich called the attention of 
“Baptist youth” to the “atheist influences” around them and included “aspirations” which 
echoed “the wishes of the schismatics.” This official remarked, “And what can be expected from 
the young Mitskevich? He is just as fanatic as his father,” commenting that “among educated 
people fanatics are rarely found, but they nevertheless exist.”57 Some officials must have felt 
that even though the elder Mitskevich had been approved by official avenues to hold such a 
post, he was not completely reliable (something he proved later). In a similar vein, officials 
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mentioned AUCECB president (until 1966) Iakov Zhidkov, and how he had a major influence on 
youth by helping grow a youth choir and orchestra.58  
A 1966 CRA report highlighted what officials felt were some recent examples of 
problematic aspects to certain AUCECB pastors’ preaching. One pastor made those who did not 
bring anyone to church feel guilty, saying they should have done so. Another criticized the 
choice of a believer to marry an unbeliever, while another preached on moral topics.59 Officials 
found some of these customary aspects of the religious culture of the Baptists troubling; Baptist 
culture did not change completely even while Church leaders tried to abide by state 
stipulations.60 Mentioning unacceptable religiosity as well as large membership at MoECB as 
complaints, officials did not yet suggest a state response.  
On the positive side for the AUCECB, Trushin and other officials processed another 
application for registration in Kolomna, raising the number to thirteen ECB communities in the 
oblast by 1969.61 But as for the CCECB, more work had been done via district councils to make 
lists of all people who supported the CCECB in efforts toward “liquidating” their “illegal activity.” 
Also, “educational and especially individual work among ordinary supporters” of the CCECB was 
“strengthened.” In such work, officials “explained” to believers that “the Soviet state does not 
pursue believers for their religious convictions, but by repression exposes only violators of the 
legislation on cults.” As for leaders, “measures were taken” by “organs of the procurator, 
security for public order, and the court,” including the prosecution and sentencing of Dedovsk 
leaders P.V. Rumachik, A.F. Iskovskikh, and V. Ia. Smirnov. They were charged for their activities 
from 1961-1968 in conducting illegal activity and writing against Soviet legislation.62 To try to 
gain conformity, state agents persistently arrested the leaders of CCECB groups.  
While AUCECB groups appeared relatively stable at this moment,63 the only 
normalization occurring in CCECB-state relations was the impasse itself, made evident by 
rearrests of the leaders and continued fines of those hosting gatherings. Although Trushin 
claimed that work aimed at strengthening observance of laws and arrest of certain leaders 
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meant schismatics’ activity “declined somewhat,”64 the resolve among CCECB leaders showed 
no signs of decline. 
Trushin relied on having informants, including the crucial commissions “for monitoring 
adherence to Soviet legislation on religion” from fifty districts and cities across the oblast. In 
1969, they submitted reports, watching to ensure that “clergy and churchmen do not conduct 
religious propaganda outside the walls of prayer buildings,” do not baptize children without 
both parents’ consent, oversee finances, and track participation in civic ceremonies vs. religious 
rites. Some studied preaching activities.65 In these reports, commissions noted financial 
irregularities and failure to report earnings by Orthodox personnel, but ECB issues were largely 
neglected. Also, when reporting on preaching activities, Trushin and others only reported on 
Orthodox priests’ homilies, not ECB pastors’ sermons. This imbalance is not likely due to the 
Orthodox sermons being in some way more problematic, but some other factor, such as the 
considerably fewer number of Baptist communities or that perhaps the state network of 
information gathering was more developed among Orthodox ones. 
In its report, the commission in Istrinskii district (Dedovsk) said it frequented the places 
of worship and tracked religious activity, even of the “baptists-schismatics.” Supposedly as 
evidence of its efforts, the commission noted recent proceedings against Dedovsk CCECB 
leaders Rumachik, Iskovskikh, and Smirnov and that another was “subjected to administrative 
responsibility” for providing a premise for their gatherings. Rumachik followed his release from 
prison in 1969 with the same “illegal activities,” for which the city council summoned him twice 
and then rearrested him.66 The commission wished to present itself as vigilant. 
But Trushin had the work of several commissions “inspected,” including Istrinskii, 
looking for any “inadequacies.” Although he criticized the commissions without distinguishing 
them, his critiques of commissions’ handling of the problem of “schismatics” would have applied 
to Istrinskii especially: that its commission conducted “individual work” with schismatic Baptists 
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“weakly,” ignoring preaching activity, and hardly attending prayer houses.67 It was a convenient 
excuse for Trushin to blame local authorities for the persistence of unacceptable religiosity.  
To gain legal standing, two CCECB groups approached the Council for Religious Affairs 
and other district councils to register in 1969, one led by Gennadii Kriuchkov of “the Moscow 
persecuted church ECB,” and Liuba Rumachik (Peter’s wife), “of the Dedovsk group of 
breakaway baptists.” The simultaneity of registration requests suggested to Trushin that “an 
underground center” was instructing them to attempt to register at local authorities, while 
“remaining subject to the Council of Churches ECB.” Trushin considered these attempts to 
register disguises for the greater effort of gaining a legal standing for the CCECB and its 
approach to religious laws. Kriuchkov admitted that his church would not commit to observing 
the law, since their religion “requires training children in religion.”68 
CRA chief of the city of Moscow A.C. Plekhanov tried to steer Kriuchkov’s group toward 
the AUCECB. Plekhanov asked them why they were “attracting ordinary believers” to “unlawful 
gatherings,” since it could result in the organizers being “brought to justice.” To Plekhanov’s 
suggestion that they try to register to have their meetings at the existing ECB church in Moscow, 
the CCECB representatives reportedly replied, “We cannot go there” because “we do not wish to 
be together with [AUCECB leaders] Ivanov, Karev, or the others,” since they “violate the 
commandments of the Lord,” citing an example of one “brother” who was encouraged by a 
leader to use artificial means to not have children.69 Kriuchkov noted that although many of his 
fellow adherents had already been “brought to justice,” they still wanted to be “separate” from 
the AUCECB while legally registering. Plekhanov dismissed them, noting to them this was their 
“personal affair” and that “the state organs will not meddle in these relations.” To fellow 
officials, Plekhanov called their desire to be registered but independent of the Union a 
“maneuver” for “their selfish goals.”70 
Amid the continuing tension, in April 1969, leaders of the AUCECB and CCECB met.71 The 
supposed end goal behind this meeting was reunification, but CCECB leaders were ready to test 
the AUCECB representatives with incisive questions about the role of the state in shaping church 
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ordinances, as opposed to Biblical influences. To each question, AUCECB representatives 
presented equivocal responses, reflective of their difficult position of needing to manage the 
balance between state demands, traditional religious discourse, wanting to maintain their 
legitimacy as leaders by being in the right, and luring the CCECB back into the official fold. CCECB 
members asked, given the fact that the AUCECB documents and decisions back in 1960 issuing 
stricter limits to religious practice for the Church were the impetus for the schism, what they 
thought of these now. AUCECB responses varied from reciting subsequent motions passed in 
AUCECB Congresses to a few who “cautiously” admitted “’sinful error.’” CCECB representatives 
also asked whether the AUCECB still maintained that the work of the initiativists was “Satanic” 
as they asserted before, to which representatives claimed that this was the comment of one and 
not their official position. Last, they questioned whether their compatriots were in prison for 
their convictions or for foolishness. The AUCECB reply was that zeal was good but needed to be 
“’governed by reason’” and should not lead to clashes with authorities. In short, AUCECB 
representatives hinted that CCECB leaders were foolish in so fiercely holding to their 
convictions.72 Ultimately, the meeting did nothing to bring reconciliation between the 
leadership groups. State officials had thus far failed to normalize ECB religion in a way that 
unified ECB adherents across the spectrum. Neither state nor AUCECB church leaders had 
succeeded in gaining the trust of CCECB adherents. 
1970-1982: Maintaining the Status Quo in Moscow Oblast 
Disciplining Schismatics for Breaking the “Law” 
By 1970, state authorities felt that they had adequately met the demands of the ECB 
groups willing to conform by permitting registration and backing off somewhat on restrictions, 
which meant that those who refused registration had no excuse to pursue “illegal” unauthorized 
religious activity. But the main leaders of the CCECB remained unsatisfied. They wanted 
recognition of the CCECB and rights to youth participation before they would advocate any 
association with state authorities. There were still likely over 1,000 CCECB-supporting church 
communities across the USSR, representing more around 20,000-30,000 people.73  
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CCECB communities gained strength from their links with one another. Trushin observed 
that in Moscow Oblast, there did not appear to be distinctive independent groups of 
“schismatics,” and despite meetings being scattered across the oblast, they were “united into 
one group,” indicated by the name some consistently used, the “Moscow persecuted church 
ecb.” In one declaration, a CCECB adherent wrote on behalf of the “Council of Churches ECB of 
the Central Part of Russia,” representing five communities of twelve to sixty members each. 
Representatives from these five “put the question of their registration before authorities” since 
CCECB leader Gennadii Kriuchkov’s attempts to register a “Moscow Church ECB” were denied. 
He was quoted as saying that the alternative would be to “’register us in Dedovsk or 
Serpukhov,’” places where they already had more than twenty believers as residents.74 
Trushin wavered between two opposing characterizations of the breakaway Baptist 
situation, due to his awkward position of wanting to conform to other officials’ expectations 
(and Marx’s prediction) that religion was declining while needing to accurately report the 
existing religious problems. In some places, he suggested that authorities had such groups 
managed, claiming “schismatics’” numbers had dwindled, the number of illegal gatherings had 
declined, and some their believers began attending the nearest registered churches instead. 
One official said that in his district, the “schismatics” were of advanced age and hardly met. In 
another, officials fined a group for meeting and conducted “explanatory work” with participants. 
In Dedovsk, authorities fined Smirnov for leading an illegal gathering after recently returning 
from detention. In Serpukhov, the official there reported that “members of the commission at 
all times have control over the house in which they have the opportunity to gather.” Trushin felt 
there was a direct link between the decline of unregistered groups and the multiple educational 
and explanatory meetings officials held with leaders and believers of these groups.75  
But where one page of his report sounded optimistic, another complained of the 
intransigence of the situation. He wrote that breakaway Baptists had become more active of 
late, gathering not just for “prayer objectives,” but to organize as well. Authorities found groups 
had been doing hidden baptisms, and some members made mention of gathering twice a week, 
once in a large group, once in small groups.  The arrested pastor from Dedovsk, Iskovskikh, died 
in prison, and his body was returned to the community, after which a “large contingent of 
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schismatics” attended his burial. Trushin noted that the arrested Smirnov’s sons, brothers 
Nikolai, Genadii, and Viktor, ages ranging from 17-22, traveled “to a gathering of young baptists 
– ‘schismatics’” that had been planned in the village of Zanevka. He also said that recent 
attempts by CCECB groups to register maintained the “firm intention” of allegiance to the CCECB 
and to its concept of the “separation of church and state.”76 These facts suggest that Trushin’s 
department had not made noticeable progress in eliminating unacceptable religious practice. 
Trushin blamed the lack of progress on the fact that other authorities’ control over their 
activity “weakened significantly”; in many districts officials did not know when schismatics were 
gathering. The local organs of Istrinskii did not inform the oblast-level or Trushin’s department 
about a secret baptism in the summer of 1970. “Unknown” also was the funeral of Iskovskikh in 
Dedovsk on Nov. 1, even though a large number of schismatics went. When other local officials 
were questioned about their response to an unauthorized gathering, they responded as though 
they regarded it a mere “trifle.” In response, Trushin said he was taking measures to inform 
oblast-level executive committee and party members about more measures in combatting 
schismatics’ illegal activity. His reporting here communicated much greater concern as he 
continued to cite the inadequacies of the local commissions.77 It is unclear whether Trushin 
believed that they were really to blame, or whether he found it a convenient excuse to deflect 
any potential blame from himself. 
The reality was that in many locales, such as in Kiev oblast, CCECB activity was far from 
declining. Georgii Vins was released from prison in 1969 after serving three years. Upon arriving 
home, the next forest service provided an opportunity for him to preach and tell about this last 
three years.78 Authorities immediately noticed that Vins had not changed positions after his 
release, that he once again “was engaged in active underground work and evading socially 
useful labor.” He organized a meeting of some 60 leaders from various oblasts and republics, 
wrote three “slanderous documents,” detailing his time in prison or demanding more religious 
freedoms. His criticisms stressed that the state should follow Lenin’s principles of separation of 
church and state and cease to dictate what was acceptable in religious practice, that he and his 
fellow adherents could not accept laws that “contradict our christian morals.” Authorities 
threatened him with further prison for “parasitism” if he did not find work. That Vins was busy 
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meeting and visiting others in connection to the CCECB would not absolve him in officials’ eyes. 
Estimating some 50,000 adherents, he told them defiantly that when other believers decided 
they did not need him as a leader, he would stop. He also expressed his willingness “to suffer for 
the faith” and that he “didn’t fear the threats of the organs of power.”79  
Georgii Vins’ defiance was characteristic of CCECB activity. Over the May Day holidays in 
1970, Baptist churches organized a youth rally in a forest outside Kharkov, and thirty from Vins’ 
congregation attended and met other believers.80 Such events worked to continue to strengthen 
a sense of a special community among such ECB congregations, whether or not they were 
broken up by authorities. Natasha Vins had become involved in a variety of unauthorized youth 
activity, including orchestra rehearsals, Bible studies, and "evangelistic trips to small churches in 
remote villages."81 On June 3 1971, 30 Kiev Baptist youth were baptized in a small lake in a 
forest outside of Kiev (including Natahsa Vins). The entire congregation was there, as well as 
special guests for the occasion, "over four hundred people."82  
The high points and low points followed one another. On December 1, 1970, returning 
from a Bible study, Natsha Vins found KGB agents at her home, arresting her grandmother. They 
even had an ambulance ready due to her age and state.83 They sentenced Lydia Vins to three 
years in prison for "slandering the Soviet state" in the petitions she signed, wherein she 
described mistreatment of Christians in prison and in church services. The witnesses were the 
policemen and prison guards, but no "victims" were allowed to give testimony.84 
The Council of Churches community affiliated with Georgii Vins in Kiev was repeatedly 
harassed by state agents, but they continued to petition state officials about their rights as 
believers. In January 1971, 180 people signed a petition to heads of state Brezhnev, President of 
Ministers A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny, 
General Procurator R.A. Rudenko, and Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR T. Glukh. They 
complained that Georgii Vins was defamed in a Ukrainian newspaper article, and that their 
secret “illegal” gatherings were necessary since they were constantly denied registration. They 
also elected Vins their pastor, but his authorization was likewise denied. They also complained 
                                                          
79 GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d. 226, p. 103-107. 
80 Vins, Children of the Storm, 74. 
81 Ibid., 76. 
82 Ibid., 85. 
83 Ibid., 78. 
84 Ibid., 81. 
 
325 
 
against the arrest of Lydia Vins at the age of 64. They wrote that “one cannot get around [the] 
facts” that there are “prisoners for the Word of God in the USSR, there are suffering families, 
there are dispersals of assemblies with the beating of believers, searches, seizure of religious 
literature and destruction of it, [and] there are children taken away for religious education.” 
They also noted that for nine years they have applied to state representatives on these matters 
without a response, but only slander in the papers.85  
In another complaint to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Rudenko, believers focused on the 
breakup of wedding ceremonies, particularly on the one state organs recently broke up in Kiev 
oblast on June 11, 1971. Those involved had received permission to hold the wedding at the 
address where it took place, but even before the wedding, police had begun stopping cars and 
detaining people. Later, the wedding was broken up. The “Evening Kiev” newspaper wrote of 
the incident, that the wedding was bothering other citizens due to the music and singing, even 
though the hosts never received any complaints at the time, and the police even said they could 
carry on. The paper also claimed that in fact it was not a wedding since there was prayer, 
preaching, and singing, but that the wedding was just a foil for these activities. Believers claimed 
that these activities were part of the wedding custom, and that it was cruel to harass young 
people at such a special time. They also noted other weddings of believers in 1964, 1967, and 
1970 that authorities harassed. The believers asked these heads of state to “instruct local organs 
to cease the humiliation of human dignity, the insult of our religious feelings,” and to “give 
believers the possibility to freely, on equal footing with all other citizens, carry out their 
Christian wedding.”86 163 people signed this letter.87  
Georgii Vins was arrested again and indicted October 22, 1974, although he had been 
mostly in hiding during this time and running church affairs underground. At his second trial 
January 27-31, 1975, although only a few family members were permitted in the courtroom, 
nearly 200 people from the congregation had gathered outside for support and prayer, 
                                                          
85 Keston Archive, “1971 ECB church defends Vins family,” Archive file <Su/Ini/6/23/S>. 
86 Keston Archive, “1971 Protest at breakup of wedding Kiev,” Archive file <Su/Ini/6/3>. In 1964 fellow 
adherents were threatened verbally, and the wedding was broken up by physical force, dogs, and SWAT 
trucks. In 1967, hosts were fined at another wedding, and in 1970 police and soldiers appeared to break 
up another one. They also complained about a recent mass search of their community that was 
supposedly targeted at illegal literature, but state agents also took personal letters, notebooks, photo 
albums, tapes, bibles, songbooks, and copies of the journal “The Christian.” 
87 Samizdat Archive Association and Radio Liberty, Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata [Collection of 
Samizdat Documents] (Munich: Samizdat Archive Association, 1972), AS 1111 (Vol. 15, July 1971), “Letter 
to Brezhnev, Shelest and Rudenko from the Kiev Community of EKhB.” 
 
326 
 
demonstrating the tight-knit nature of this community.88 A witness at the trial described an 
event with hundreds of youth, “loud choral singing,” and Vins as the “preacher.” When police 
arrived, instructing him to stop “disturbing the peace,” Vins flouted Soviet authority by not 
complying but urging those in attendance to “stay on their knees.” Vins was also accused for 
proselytizing to hundreds of minors at various unauthorized events and distributing 
unauthorized publications.89 Vins was sentenced to five years in prison camps followed by five 
years of exile in Siberia. As he was escorted to the police car from the courtroom, "the whole 
crowd of Christians surged toward the police car." Policemen yelled at them to move aside to let 
the vehicle pass, but the crowd remained, singing hymns and weeping. After some time of 
holding the car in peaceful hostage, the crowd moved aside.90 Such an event demonstrated yet 
again why state agents were wary of the power of these tight communities. 
Communities elsewhere also suffered similar consequences as the group of CCECB 
believers in Kiev. An October 11, 1970, house meeting of CCECB believers was broken up in 
Liubuchany in Moscow Oblast, and many were fined. A cordon of militia, local Commissioner 
from the CRA Vasil’ev, and other plain clothes “vigilantes”—some of whom were evidently 
drunk—had surrounded the house and shouted that their praying should stop. They started 
pushing those gathered regardless of age or health. Some of those involved complained, “They 
insulted us in every way and threatened to beat us and do whatever they pleased.” Twenty-five 
petitioned against the unlawfulness of these acts, appealing to religious laws passed under 
Lenin, and not the more restrictive 1929 ones under Stalin. Trying to advocate for a certain kind 
of Soviet Union, they wrote, “The legitimization of such arbitrariness does not correspond to the 
humane and just law of our country” and asked the authorities to right this local abuse.91 
Although Trushin did not reference the gathering in Liubuchany and downplayed CCECB activity 
in his 1971 report, he noted that gatherings often focused on drawing up statements and that 
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their fines and criminal proceedings were deserved for unauthorized gatherings and “slanderous 
declarations.”92 
With the leaders arrested, officials tried to conduct “individual work” with believers, 
whom they assumed would be more easily influenced. In Dedovsk, Peter Rumachik’s wife Liuba 
Rumachik remained active despite her husband’s arrest. Trushin described her negatively, as 
having “secondary education, not working anywhere, having six children from ages 1 to 12, of 
fanatic attitude, conducts herself defiantly with representatives of local authorities and always 
offers resistance […].” Although mothers who had many children were in some cases recognized 
as heroes of the Soviet Union, officials feared the spread of undesirable religions due to above-
average reproduction. An official noted that during “a visit” by state representatives to a 
gathering, “all participants stopped the singing, but she demonstratively continued to sing and 
in a rude manner demanded that those present support her, to offer collective resistance.” The 
official also noted that she gave all of her children a religious education and “systematically 
[took] them to prayer gatherings.” Since she was CCECB leader V.Ia. Smirnov’s daughter as well 
as Rumachik’s wife, family ties were also at play.  
Local authorities’ attempts toward “exposing the view of life of Rumachik” among local 
schismatics in the Dedovsk area “brought no positive results,” since “all of them consider the 
Rumachik family ‘persecuted’ for faith in Christ.” Officials’ efforts to explain to Liuba Rumachik 
about ceasing illegal activity, about “not ‘dragging’ the children to gatherings” of breakaway 
Baptists, “got nowhere.” Many believers found threats about removing the children as the 
biggest factor mobilizing them to Rumachik’s defense. At a meeting with state agents, Liuba 
Rumachik told them, “You can’t frighten me, since I already heard these threats from local 
authorities. […] My husband is already doing time for faith in Christ, as are other brothers and 
sisters. If this is not enough for you, you can put me in too.” She then “demonstratively 
withdrew from the office.”93 
The community of Dedovsk, like the harassed community in Kiev and CCECB 
communities from all over the Soviet Union, submitted complaints and petitions to the highest 
organs of state about their treatment, and they also tried to get copies of their complaints sent 
abroad. In August 1972 28 believers signed the complaint about the “repressions which 
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members of the community have been undergoing for 10 years.” They framed harassment as 
resulting from the “illegal acts of organs of local authority” who since 1960 began to “exercise 
administrative interference” in their church services, “insulting the feelings of believers.” They 
mentioned five of their members who were sentenced by the decree against parasitism, V.Ya 
Smirnov, P.V. Rumachik, V.F. Ryzhuk, A.L. Kaiukov, and P.V. Aleksandrov, and some of these had 
been tried multiple times already. Believers tried to win sympathy by noting that as each 
accused received five years detention, “How much grief and tears was caused through this to 
the mothers and young children!” They noted how Smirnov lost half of his house because they 
had used it for services. Although they were released after three and a half years and even 
“rehabilitated” under Brezhnev, Smirnov’s half of the house was not returned, and in fact, the 
other half was also taken away. Many of them had been searched and religious literature taken 
away. They continued to suffer threats of imprisonment or fines for holding their meetings.94 
CCECB believers in Dedovsk asked fellow believers for prayer but also encouraged them to 
expect vindication one day—if only in the afterlife—when describing their searches, fines, 
arrests, imprisonments, and harassment.95 
A 1973 letter signed by 70 from Dedovsk and sent to Nikolai Podgorny was even more 
desperate, exclaiming that the “Believers of our Evangelical-baptist brotherhood are faced today 
with the fact of physical destruction. Violence and terror by atheists take on the most inhuman 
forms. There is no semblance of any kind of freedom of conscience.” They wrote about living for 
years under “incessant repression” and were “no longer surprised at constant fines, dispersal of 
prayer meetings, false charges, harassment [at work], hounding our children in schools […]” 
They felt that it was a question of “life and death” due to the recent death of a Baptist believer 
named Ivan Moiseev, who had apparently been mocked and eventually tortured to death in the 
army for his outspoken faith. Referring to their pastor Iskovskikh, the believers rhetorically 
asked “where the presbyter of the Dedovsk community was,” saying that “You gave his body 
back to us from the Lager prison camp in a coffin!”96 The believers asked “who, not experiencing 
it for himself, would believe that in the century of civilization and progress there are such wild 
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measures—a match for the rough middle ages—of fighting with believers?!” They complained 
that state organs prevented them from becoming legal, despite the last ten years of their 
“haunting the thresholds of all the government departments” in order to gain legal registration. 
Of course state agents denied them registration because they would not fall in line with state 
definitions of acceptable religiosity, which included no youth under eighteen participating and 
submission to established leaders. The only door left open to them was the one leading to 
“prison,” while state agents had one goal, they felt: “to destroy us physically.”97 A few months 
later in 1973 the Dedovsk community made a statement about another incident, when an April 
1st gathering was disrupted by police. Peter Rumachik was arrested soon after his signing of this 
document.98 In May, believers from the Moscow region composed yet another letter to some 
twenty state entities, including Brezhnev and Kosygin, but also Kuroedov and Trushin, various 
heads of local soviets, and even the newspaper Izvestiia. They summarized the same sorts of 
accusations, in generalized form. They mentioned one Dedovsk official by name as “especially 
zealous in lawless actions” in making “the infliction of evil on believers his own favorite 
profession.”99 
Officials read these declarations, but Trushin was unmoved. Referring to the letter 
addressed to Podgorny with their fear of “physical destruction,” Trushin called the allegations in 
the letter “knowingly false fabrications.” Agents also knew they kept meeting, even if they did 
not disperse every occasion. Trushin reported that this “Moscow Church” met in the woods, and 
that children attended these secret gatherings. As before, these were more than “prayer 
gatherings,” but also featured “underground” activities including writing declarations.100  
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State and CCECB church relations were trapped in a cycle. The arrests of leaders like 
Smirnov or Rumachik were becoming routine.101 The display of brute force and heavy sanctions 
against these Council of Churches communities demonstrated just how resilient they were in 
their stance against state bodies. It was a difficult and costly battle for both sides, however, as 
significant state personnel were drawn into managing these communities while the state’s 
religious reputation abroad was suffering, as believers distributed their own accounts were 
distributed to concerned humanitarian and religious organizations.   
Yet the position of the CRA still did not change. In 1973 Kuroedov sent an instructive 
letter about ensuring that religious organizations abide by the law. He mentioned specifically 
the Council of Churches, and he listed the arrests of various leaders across the USSR, including 
Lydia Vins, who worked for relatives of those imprisoned and wrote “slanderous” letters. He 
characterized the CCECB as run by leaders who called on adherents to ignore the legislation on 
cults and keep active within “unregistered religious society.”102 In his 1974 report, Trushin had 
no new directions for dealing with the community in Dedovsk, nor its “slanderous” letters 
claiming the “physical annihilation” of their community. He also mentioned Rumachik’s wife, 
Liuba Rumachik, and her constant “slanderous” efforts as a leader of the Council of Relatives of 
Prisoners of ECB.”  
Characteristically, Trushin thought it necessary to “take concrete measures aimed at 
ceasing the unlawful activities of each group of adherents of the so-called ‘Council of Churches 
ECB,’” but he was not very concrete in his suggestions. As usual, he blamed the leaders while 
characterizing ordinary believers as undiscerning followers, saying that “in the groups of 
sectarian underground the majority of believers are composed of honest, soviet people, trapped 
by their political immaturity and illiteracy under the influence of malicious religious fanatics.” 
Trushin and other officials always considered people to act in accordance with their socio-
economic reality, meaning that deviations from socialist behavior (religiosity) meant that 
someone else was to blame as a malignant force. Thus his primary suggestion was for 
“individual work with believers,” since he saw the battle as one between religious leaders and 
officials over influence over susceptible citizens. Beyond this, he called for an end to CCECB 
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publishing and the general coordination of efforts with other authorities.103 He also noted 
Rumachik’s third arrest as leader of illegal activity.104 
That the Soviet Union signed on to the Helsinki Accords in 1975, agreeing to 
internationally established standards pertaining to human rights, boded well for the CCECB, but 
in reality, little changed. Around the same time, in July of 1975, the Soviet Government made 
public some changes to the articles of the constitution pertaining to religion. In 1943, Stalin had 
not changed the 1929 articles, only state practice. In 1962, the government apparently issued 
decrees (ukazi) pertaining to changes in these articles, but they were never made public. 
Analysts have largely regarded the 1975 changes as partially revealing these decrees, but with 
some modifications. The main “change” was that previous decrees were made articles, and the 
actual responsibilities of the Council for Religious Affairs were now made public. Most de jure 
changes only reflected prior de facto ones.105  
The other significant change at this time was that CRA officials increasingly pushed 
CCECB-leaning congregations toward registration. Their best chance for legalization remained to 
register as an AUCECB community or join with an existing one, as in many places legal 
communities existed near underground ones. A new option, however, was autonomous 
registration. As a concession intended to limit clandestine religiosity, it appears that around 
1975 representatives of the Council for Religious Affairs began to permit and even encourage 
churches to register autonomously, overlooking any requirement of belonging to the officially 
recognized AUCECB.106 Despite the fact that CCECB-affiliated communities did not have 
“dogmatic differences” with AUCECB churches, in the largely accurate words of commissioner 
Trushin, “these groups and communities do not unite only because their leaders do not get 
along with each other, not all are equally authoritative for ordinary believers.” His impression 
was that AUCECB leadership and senior presbyters had lost interest in uniting with the CCECB 
altogether.107 
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Autonomous registration further weakened the cause of unity among church leaders, 
while granting the possibility of relief to those afraid of the repercussions of unauthorized 
church gatherings. The option of autonomous registration meant that the AUCECB was no 
longer the only legal path to legitimacy for protestant groups, thereby weakening its status. 
Also, autonomous registration was often predicated upon the applying church’s admission that 
it held no affiliation with any overarching organization, a requirement aimed particularly at the 
CCECB. Thus, state authorities now had to concede a church’s independence from the AUCECB, 
but they hoped that renegade churches would want to gather legally without fear of sanction, 
but at known times and locations. Some CCECB leaders and church members adopted an 
intransigent position against any kind of relationship with state authorities, especially since such 
congregations were still expected to abide by Soviet legislation in its entirety. Others felt that 
registration was acceptable under such terms of autonomy, as evangelical protestant 
movements had long histories of local church autonomy, and submission to centralized church 
leadership was only expected in the Soviet Union since WWII.108  
Gradually more unregistered ECB and Pentecostal churches gained registration without 
belonging to the AUCECB. Vins’ congregation in Kiev took this option in 1975 while Vins was in 
prison, but it managed to continue its activities and education with youth. It may have been one 
of the only openly functioning Sunday Schools in a registered church.109 Also, the number of 
those arrested for their affiliation with the CCECB had gradually declined since 1968. On 
average, the number of new arrests was less than those released.110 
In places where there were many CCECB churches, the pressure was on respective 
commissioners to convince them to register, especially as AUCECB congregations, but 
autonomously if needed. In Moscow Oblast, Trushin had fewer CCECB communities to be 
concerned about than did his counterparts in the Ukrainian Republic, although some of the 
CCECB leaders were active in his jurisdiction. Even in Dedovsk with its history of outspoken 
CCECB leaders like Rumachik, in 1975, a group of around 60-70 people registered a church there 
as an autonomous congregation, perhaps attracted to the possibility that they could be legally 
authorized to gather. But not all congregants accepted the registration. As one woman put it in 
an interview, she had been “baptized” into this group in 1961 when it was unregistered, and she 
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wanted to remain “loyal” to it. One pastor told them that “before God,” they did not have to 
register.111 As another interviewee noted, by registering, they “committed to the law entirely,” 
but by not doing so, they “were free.”112 As it would turn out, however, even those who sided 
with registering did not commit wholeheartedly to the law. 
At first, the move to autonomously register in Dedovsk served as a model for officials. 
With authorities still quite concerned about “the unlawful activities of schismatic baptists and 
Pentecostals,” on June 21, 1976, there was a meeting of several local and state authorities from 
Moscow Oblast and the city of Dedovsk, as well as representatives from the Procurator’s office, 
KGB, Moscow Committee of the Communist Party, and CRA. At this meeting, Trushin presented 
a report on the “activities of the unregistered sectarian groups and the measures taken to 
combat their unlawful activities in Moscow Oblast.”113 He defended his past approach, that 
registering twelve AUCECB churches from 1966 until 1976 “undermined the main base of the 
replenishment of the supporters of the schism.”114  
By the time of the meeting, Trushin estimated that more than 100 from among those 
formerly unregistered now attended the autonomously registered church. Those not joining this 
church, Trushin said, considered themselves the “persecuted ECB church of Moscow.” At the 
meeting, he wanted officials from the Dedovsk area—the Istrinskii and Krasnogorskii districts—
to “share experiences” of how things were now that this group had independently registered. 
Officials’ opinion was that although not all ties had been severed between this church’s leaders 
and the “underground” CCECB, people from these districts had not been seen at any of the 
underground gatherings, whereas before, they attended “nearly all of the gatherings.” Nor had 
they been signatories of any “slanderous declarations” which “schismatics” frequently sent to 
governmental bodies.115 
One lesson Trushin felt they learned was that punishment alone for “underground” 
groups was insufficient in combating “schismatic” activity. Moreover, local authorities made 
things worse when they fined people for attending unauthorized gatherings, as by law, only the 
hosts and organizers should be fined.116 For “ordinary believers,” Trushin argued, “explanatory 
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and educational” work was needed, but district authorities were blameworthy for not 
organizing it. As one example of the failure of merely “administrative measures,” Trushin told 
the story of a certain leader from Zhukovskii, who along with his wife, organized and attended 
many unauthorized gatherings. He was fined numerous times, but with no effect. Yet after 
officials of this region conducted “painstaking work of an educational character,” he stopped his 
unlawful activity, broke ties with the “schismatics,” and neither he nor his wife attended illegal 
gatherings. What such “educational work” entailed in this case, Trushin did not explain.117 Yet he 
did say that “experience shows” that “positive results” stemmed from carrying out such work 
with people at their places of work, where “their unlawful activity is condemned in workers 
collectives, professional organizations, at the councils of pensioners, at village gatherings, at 
councils of the general public, exposed through local press.” It is not clear whether authorities 
distinguished between educational work and social pressure or harassment.  Yet such measures 
happened rarely, Trushin reported, and efforts in the city lagged way behind those across the 
oblast. It was, Trushin claimed, the “educational work” with ordinary believers and “ringleaders” 
of the schismatics in the Istrinskii and Krasnogorskii districts that led to the autonomously 
registered church in Dedovsk in 1975. From this work, Trushin claimed, their “activeness” 
decreased “slightly,” the number of “grave” violations of legislation diminished, and around 
one-third of the initial number of schismatics eventually started attending gatherings of 
registered religious societies. If the state wanted to “put an end to the sectarian underground,” 
Trushin concluded, then the necessary step was increased personal educational work 
particularly with Muscovites who were active in the underground.118 The corollary was 
registering communities who agreed to abide by religious legislation, featured below. 
Muscovite CCECB adherents had persistently requested that the state grant it 
registration to meet in Moscow as a CCECB church.119 A group of 68 made the request in 1976, 
twelve of whom were residents of the city of Moscow. This group, according to Trushin’s 
information, was calling itself the Muscovite Church ECB and wanted to register as such in 
Moscow, although many of its participants were from places like Dedovsk and had not 
supported other registration attempts.120 Representatives from “Moscow” and Dedovsk also 
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continued to write letters to state officials with the same basic complaints, showing the 
persistent links among CCECB adherents across the oblast.121 
Trushin and other officials took note of the signatories to pursue “explanatory work” 
with them about the “untenable nature of the allegations they raised.”122 They also had no 
intention of granting their request for church registration, since this group was committed to its 
affiliation with the CCECB, which officials saw as a group of “schismatics” that had separated 
with the AUCECB and was characterized by more direct conflict with state and AUCECB 
representatives. The CRA agreed to reject their request due to their consistent practice of 
“violating religious legislation.”123 
When Rumachik was released from prison in April 1977, Moscow oblast authorities 
wanted to deny him a residence permit in Dedovsk. Trushin, however, insisted that he receive it 
due to the fact that his wife and six children lived there, and since he was an “’authoritative 
personality’ among the baptists-schismatics” across the country, his supporters would “for sure 
organize their movement to his defense, using this fact for their anti-Soviet goals.” He also 
noted that it was still unclear how Rumachik “will behave” upon release since in his absence the 
group in Dedovsk had registered according to autonomous status, without CCECB affiliation.124 
Trushin’s comments at the 1976 meeting indicate that he had reason to hope that this 
registration would take some force out of Rumachik’s more intransigent stance against any 
CCECB involvement with the state as well as reduce believers’ complaints (especially to foreign 
audiences) that the state was persecuting them by not allowing them to register. 
Despite gaining autonomous registration, the executive committee of the Istrinskii 
district Soviet would not approve this Baptist community’s purchase of a dwelling to be used as 
a prayer house. They had been meeting in various homes of participants while the district 
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executive committee rejected their requests with excuses, such as the district in question was 
“only for housing construction,” that the property in question was “already sold to a private 
person,” or that there already was an ECB prayer house, unconcerned about the distinctions 
between the AUCECB and the new autonomous one.  
The community appealed to Trushin about their situation. He found the “truth behind 
the rejection” by conversing with the secretary of the committee, who said that among the 
committee there was simply a “reluctance for this religious society to have a prayer house.” 
Trushin argued that it was the right of the Council for Religious Affairs to decide such a matter, 
not the local committee, and that to reject the purchase meant that “monitoring its activities on 
the part of the committees of Dedovsk and Istrinskii councils is almost absent.” He considered it 
“necessary” to grant them the purchase a dwelling to be used as a prayer house.125 The Council 
of Religious Affairs agreed with Trushin, as did the executive committee of the Moscow Oblast 
Council, allowing them to purchase 36b on Krasnoflotskaya Street in Dedovsk for their 
gatherings.126 They saved their money to make the purchase. Trushin and other CRA officials 
were committed to offering legal paths for religious groups to operate. 
But as for those CCECB members trying to register a church in Moscow, they had no 
advocate from among the state officials. By 1978, they were exasperated, complaining that they 
had received no response to their petition, but that they had been “subject to the severest 
repressions,” such as numerous heavy fines, dispersal during services, and humiliation before 
fellow employees at work gatherings. They demanded that the question of their registration be 
resolved immediately, and that they be allowed to meet. Representatives from the CRA, the 
executive committee of the City of Moscow, and the district executive committee in question 
were unanimous: to reject their request. Their reasons were many. They noted that this group 
acknowledged only the 1918 law of the separation of church and state but not the 1929 laws 
pertaining to the registration of religious organizations. This group insisted on belonging to the 
“illegal” CCECB, and to grant it registration on these terms would “de facto” give it recognition 
as an organization. The CCECB still supposedly encouraged believers to not abide by Soviet 
religious laws, were “denigrating the soviet way of life,” attracted “under-age” to gatherings, 
and its leaders were “constantly provoking ordinary believers to various kinds of antisocial 
activities.” Inspector A.A. Gurov of the CRA called its leaders N.P. Pozdniakov, N.P. Poliakov, and 
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V.F. Simakin “extremists.” One official complained that Pozdniakov “distorts and distributes 
malicious slanderous letters with regard to soviet organs about the alleged persecution of 
believers for religious convictions,” and another mentioned that such types of letters were also 
distributed abroad (which was in fact the case). A meeting between the above leaders and CRA 
Commissioner of Moscow Plekhanov did not result in any change in opinions on either side. 
In a 1978 letter Pozdniakov and the others mentioned they were coming to a “dead-
end.” Officials agreed with them; they did not find a compromise. As Plekhanov saw it, the 
“demands” of the “baptists-schismatics” precluded further consideration. Although CRA officials 
had compromised previously in their dealings with ECB believers and even CCECB believers with 
autonomous registration, in this case, they would not. They saw this attempt as a “ploy” to get 
the CCECB and “the illegality of its activity” recognized, as well as to gain “unlimited propaganda 
of religion.”127 
Yet not all in the CRA were convinced that granting autonomous registration to the 
breakaway Baptists in Dedovsk had been positive, and Trushin found himself the subject of 
blame for this case. CRA chief Kuroedov received information from certain officials who claimed 
“serious deficiencies” in managing the autonomously registered community in Dedovsk. 
Kuroedov wrote that since the 1975 registration, Trushin and other local authorities had “not 
provided effective control” over the community’s activities, but “acquiesced in the illegal 
activities of pastors and believers.” Their ties with “the illegal center CCECB” remained, and they 
did illegal things “inspired by their leaders.” Since Rumachik—whom they identified as the de-
facto leader of the CCECB after Vins was in prison—returned from his most recent incarceration, 
he, along with Smirnov, had been influencing the community, undeterred by its autonomously 
registered status. Officials blamed Trushin for not taking adequate measures in educating the 
believers about religious legislation. There were numerous aspects to the religious society that 
were legally murky, like their finances and the fact that their requests for state approval for a 
purchase of a premises for gatherings “were unreasonably rejected.” As a result, they’d been 
meeting in many different places, “essentially uncontrolled.”128 Although Trushin had helped 
foster approval for a purchase two years prior, in February 1978 the congregation found that its 
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savings for a church had been “confiscated.”129 State agents were far from unified in their 
approach to religious policy. 
 Judging by the May 30 date of Kuroedov’s letter, what likely caused officials’ strong 
reaction was that on May 1-2 of 1978 the Dedovsk community sponsored “a mass gathering of 
sectarians” from many regions of the Soviet Union, and it “bore an openly antisocial character.” 
The May gathering was held at the farmstead of Ryzhuk, “converted to a prayer building without 
the agreement of local authorities.” Around 1,000 “sectarians” gathered there, “the bulk 
comprised of youth” who stayed in the courtyard. With the help of speakers, they heard 
sermons and poems, “many of which bore a slanderous, antisocial character.” They heard about 
fighting “the machinations of satan,” about bringing the news of Christ to the people, ideological 
preparation for those heading to the army, encouraging support of “’prisoners’ and ‘martyrs’ of 
the faith,” and so on.130 
Although after this event authorities barricaded the place the autonomously registered 
Dedovsk community had been temporarily using as a church,131 Tarasov and others 
recommended that they work toward having a legal dwelling for the gatherings so that they 
could be observed closely. He instructed local authorities to “constant oversight” over prayer 
gatherings and any other gatherings of these people, and to clarify the “most active extremists-
members” of this group. Also, he recommended “prophylactic measures” at the places of work 
and worker-collectives of these members.132 Kuroedov asked that Trushin be shown his “serious 
deficiencies” in maintaining control, although Kuroedov did not mention the obstruction of 
other authorities as blameworthy. To help improve the situation, “painstaking explanatory 
work” with the church’s members would be needed. Kuroedov called on the Department of the 
Affairs of Catholic, Armenian, Protestant, Jewish, and sectarian faiths to “strengthen control 
over the formulation of oversight” of such autonomously registered communities by CRA 
officials and district authorities.133  
Although Trushin’s precise reaction is unknown, he was certainly accustomed to the 
practice of officials blaming other departments for problems. His and local officials’ reaction can 
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be deduced by how the church responded later. The community in Dedovsk returned all their 
registration papers, asking their registration to be rescinded. In July 1978, not long after the May 
gathering and the reproaches against Trushin, they declared that “we cannot observe [the 
legislation on religious cults] since its items contradict the word of god, the charter of ‘CCECB’ 
and our convictions.” In a declaration from October, they cited the arrests of their “brothers” as 
making further cooperation impossible. The Brotherly Leaflet from the end of 1978 featured a 
word from the Dedovsk church calling on believers not to register, saying that the “tactic of 
godlessness” was to observe all their activities and thereby “kill everything holy” in the church 
and deprive it of “the life of the spirit.”134 Trushin’s office and Dedovsk officials evidently had 
responded with action to Kuroedov’s admonition. 
During the late 1970s work in eliminating unregistered groups in Kiev oblast was not 
proceeding efficiently. Commissioner N.A. Mishenin had been struggling for years to convince 
CCECB communities to register. He had to overcome their suspicions, arguing that “no one is 
persecuted for their faith,” and that Vins—the local champion of the CCECB cause—had been 
imprisoned “for violating soviet laws as a parasite.” Oblast communities remained unconvinced 
and did not register.135 Officials also struggled to convince CCECB leaders to give up their work. 
Natasha Vins decided to follow in her father's footsteps - working underground in printing and 
distributing Christian literature, traveling all over the country to make such deliveries. To 
eliminate the problem altogether, Georgii Vins, along with his wife and children, were 
unexpectedly exiled in 1979 to the United States in a prisoner swap. By 1979, instead of 
hundreds of CCECB adherents in prison as there were a decade before, there were under forty. 
But the exile of Vins and others to the West indicated not the state’s relaxation toward the 
CCECB, but more a change in tactics, likely because imprisonment harmed Soviet reputation.136 
Still in 1980, despite commissioner Mishenin’s support, churches in Kiev oblast were very 
reluctant to register, and for those that would, bureaucratic obstacles did not disappear.137 
Despite the difficulties, some officials worked toward promoting above-ground and legally 
recognized religious practice, while others undermined such a policy. 
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With Vins gone, Rumachik was the most well-known CCECB leader besides Gennadii 
Kriuchkov, who was consistently in hiding and evading arrest. No longer registered, the Dedovsk 
community was holding meetings at various addresses as well as in the forest. In 1980 Rumachik 
was arrested again in connection with such activity, as was Smirnov and two others.138 Despite 
the arrests, in 1981, they again held “illegal gatherings” in forests and at various addresses, 
although its “ringleaders” Smirnov, Ryzhuk, and Kruchinin were gone. At “every such meeting,” 
wrote Trushin, there were “vicious lies about our country, our soviet state, and our social 
system.” Those joining this group were the “most extremist” people from around the oblast. As 
they had often done in the past before the period when they had autonomous registration, they 
had places and paths in the forest, even swampy areas, where they met for preaching, prayer, 
and singing. They did this in winter and summer, and there would even be older women with 
canes, standing the whole time, and usually without a meal. If they met secretly in an 
apartment, which they often did on Wednesday evenings for Bible Study, they generally did not 
sing, but if they met in a house, they sang more freely. Having as many as sixty gathering in a 
home could easily attract attention, however.139 
When leaders were arrested, new ones emerged. Officials claimed that Rumachik had 
previously “recruited” Vladimir Khomenko from a registered church in Kubinka, a son of two 
members of the ECB church there. He was arrested in February 1981.140 When Smirnov returned 
for the fourth time from prison in 1982, officials noted that he and his four sons were leading 
the congregation.141 
Thus toward the end of the Brezhnev era, a sort of normalcy had emerged even to 
unauthorized Baptist activity. Trushin continued to blame authorities for not taking any 
measures in response to “schismatics’” who illegally held gatherings in Elektrogorsk, 
representative of his routine disagreement with local officials who were either inactive or 
obstructionist.142 Agents also continued to monitor contact between the small groups of 
breakaway Baptists in contact with members of registered ECB churches. After the aborted 
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autonomous registration in Dedovsk, the oblast’s five smallish groups periodically met at various 
addresses, but they did not wish to have contact with officials and did not wish to pursue 
registration. They maintained the same grievances as before (separation of church-state), and 
police would fine them from time to time. The “Moscow Church ECB,” in which “schismatics” 
from all over the oblast and city participated, continued to meet in Moscow and in other locales. 
Local authorities were “inadequate” in stopping such illegal activity, and in their reports to the 
CRA they only mentioned a fraction of the gatherings for which Trushin’s office had 
information.143 
Problems Also Remain in Managing Registered Churches  
Over the same time period of 1970-1982, AUCECB churches and personnel presented 
their own problems, if a little less pressing or contentious ones. The early 1970s were relatively 
stable, and the number of registered churches remained basically constant. The Church grew 
steadily, but not aggressively, and the majority of participants and even new members were 
women over fifty, at least according to official reports.144 Yet officials remained wary of the 
AUCECB churches, as contacts between CCECB and AUCECB members never disappeared, and 
because the possibility for the AUCECB to become religiously dynamic remained. Both of these 
concerns were realized in the 1970s in Moscow Oblast, most particularly due to the youth of the 
Central Moscow Church (MoECB).  
Although CCECB and AUCECB leaders consistently failed in their attempts to reconcile, 
this does not mean that adherents to the groups maintained clear separation, nor does it mean 
that believers only sided with one group against the other. A CRA report in 1970 indicated that 
most registered Baptist churches had believers who “supported” the Council of Churches, and 
some advocates of the CCECB frequented registered Baptist churches for services and would 
read messages and statements on behalf of the organization.145 At the local level, there were 
significant contacts between adherents to both groups, as in many cases their acquaintance 
predated the 1961 initiative movement. Moreover, there were churches across the Soviet Union 
who changed allegiances between the AUCECB and CCECB more than once. Even some who 
disagreed with certain AUCECB leaders or their activities but remained within the All-Union 
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Council expressed concern for those from the Reformist movement who were imprisoned.146 As 
one interviewee noted, whereas church leaders from the two groups did not associate, young 
people would come together “as friends,” and certain gatherings attracted youth representative 
of both groups.147 Some youth were attracted to the initiativists and unregistered groups, 
admiring their courage and sympathizing with their roguish posture. Such sympathy concerned 
Church and state authorities.148 
Although some groups remained unregistered because they wished to freely include 
youth under eighteen in services, a striking feature of the 1970s was the emergence of above-
eighteen unofficial youth groups in ECB churches. In the late 1960s, there were few youth 
involved at MoECB, and there were no groups.149 Upon his return from the Army to MoECB in 
1967, Nikolai Il’ich Epishin was part of a new trend: young people chatting after the service. 
Initially church personnel requested them to leave after the service, but eventually they had to 
“simply drive them out of the building.” They couldn’t remain in the church for very long after 
the service, but they would walk together slowly toward the metro station as their “cover.” 
Before long three unofficial groups had emerged at MoECB, designated by leaders 
Epishin, Aleksandr Semchenko, and Aleksandr Fedichkin, and later a fourth emerged led by Vera 
Blinova. Each group had its characteristics – one tended to have children of intellectuals, 
another of proletarians, and another of people from other regions of the USSR. Each group had 
its own spontaneously-occurring gatherings, but eventually once a month they had a joint 
gathering on the balcony of the church. Many of them participated in a youth choir that was 
allowed to sing from time to time in the services.  
Finding places to meet was difficult. Often Muscovites opened their apartments for 
meetings. They employed all kinds of “tricks” to meet together, like almost anybody’s birthday, 
and at such parties they sometimes proselytized to unbelievers, who sometimes reported them 
to the police. They also went on excursions and hikes or gathered at Lenin Hills or in the forest. 
They would pray for each other, and sometimes young people “repented” (i.e., converted to the 
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faith). Gatherings—and police dispersals—became more common. But, Semchenko recalls, “it 
was hard to deter such energetic young people like us.”  
They also started to travel in groups, visiting the small Baptist churches in the oblast, 
where they’d meet other youth and be allowed to participate in the service, reciting poetry and 
even preaching. The MoECB leadership did not allow their participation. Some of them belonged 
to a youth orchestra group, and they visited other Baptist congregations to play and sing. When 
Epishin informed church leader Mikhail Zhidkov of their initial intention to do so, he replied 
“’[Travel] with an orchestra! They’ll immediately summon me to the KGB!’” Epishin defended 
their trip, saying it was too late to cancel since it had been planned.150 Energized by each other 
after services, they’d sing loudly on the trains or metro, and then enjoy trying to evade the 
police.151 
Trushin and other officials noted such activity. In a 1971 report, he described how one 
such “youth group” of the AUCECB toured with musical instruments, and how there were 
performances in various towns and villages with singing, poetry, vignettes, “all with a religious 
content.” Trushin described the character of much of this as “undesirable” (nepotrebnyi).152 The 
problem for officials was that such activity was new and not well-defined in religious legislation 
as the participants were over eighteen. After dispersals or comments by officials, elders 
reprimanded them or their parents. 
Another trend that concerned officials was the “unreliability” of leaders. When it came 
time for a new senior presbyter over Moscow Oblast, the AUCECB recommended A.L. Kaiukov, 
describing him as “politically reasonable” and “authoritative” among believers. In his 
assessment, Trushin dissented, noting that he had once been “detailed in informing” on ECB and 
“schismatics’” activities. He had earlier demonstrated his “loyalty” by “angrily” opposing the 
CCECB and by making “correct” comments about the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But 
lately, he “’closed up,’” consistently knew “nothing” about CCECB activity, and denied his 
attendance at Iskovskikh’s funeral in Dedovsk (when official information had him there with 
other “schismatics”). Where once he used to “on his own initiative” provide information, he 
now only came “for summons,” but to every question merely replied, “I don’t know” or “haven’t 
heard.” He was also “covering for people” who were preaching but came from unregistered 
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church groups.153 This was not the kind of person state agents wanted in such a position, as they 
expected complete trustworthiness toward state initiatives. Kaiukov was arrested not long after 
in connection with CCECB activities. 
Officials routinely watched certain pastors for what they preached, such as Aleksandr 
Karev, General Secretary of the AUCECB until his death in 1971. Churches were routinely filled 
on Thursdays and Sundays because Karev was preaching, and the youth of MoECB likewise 
recognized him as an exceptional preacher. After Karev’s death, church leaders suddenly 
publicly introduced Aleksei Bychkov, unknown to many of MoECB and likely hand-picked by 
state authorities. Although he did not seem to have theological training, Bychkov began to 
preach in the Central Church and soon after became the AUCECB General Secretary.154 
State authorities prized trustworthiness especially among the leadership of the AUCECB 
and at the Central Moscow Church, since they managed the visits of foreign guests who 
requested to attend a Protestant Church service and might participate in a Sunday morning 
service at MoECB. One especially important guest was President of the United States Richard 
Nixon, who planned to attend the church on May 28, 1972. Coordinating Nixon’s visit with the 
religious center of the Baptists was Bychkov. The plan was that Nixon would leave in the middle 
of the service, after only 45 minutes, perhaps due to Nixon’s busyness or to his reluctance to 
attend a long service featuring at least three sermons. Officials noted that he wrote in their 
comment book that “we could honestly pray with You in your church during the time of our stay 
in Moscow.” He also left 100 rubles. The choir, congregation, and address by Bychkov to the 
President “made an impression on Nixon,” who bowed three times.155 A positive, incident-free 
visit reinforced Soviet claims abroad about “religious freedom” there, justifying state concerns 
for MoECB reliability. 
An AUCECB Congress in December 1974 also demonstrated the reliability of the 
organization in state eyes. The fact alone that there had been Congresses in 1963, 1966, 1969, 
and now 1974 was remarkable for the Churches in the Soviet Union. Trushin’s report on the 
event indicated that the Congress passed “in a spirit of loyalty and support of internal and 
external politics of the Soviet state.” Delegates also “rejected the slanderous declarations of the 
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leaders of the so-called ‘council of churches ECB’” and “condemned their illegal activity.”156 
Foreign observers noted that one of the two delegations from the CCECB was not permitted to 
enter because they “had not come with good will.” They likewise noticed the prevailing spirit of 
optimism, and that any delegates’ suggestions were very modest and cautious at best. Even the 
illustrious Orthodox Metropolitan Nikodim attended the 1974 Congress, demonstrating an 
ecumenism that would have been unimaginable decades ago.157 
Yet state information indicated other currents afoot as well. There were some negative 
“tendencies” in sermons in the ECB and the need for more control. Also, delegates spread 
various anonymous statements urging others to not support the AUCECB, condemning their 
“’links with atheists,’” discouraging votes for “loyal” clergy to leadership positions, and 
encouraging others in “’the fight for the interests of the church.’” The CRA’s opinion was there 
was not enough “control” over the registered ECB communities, and a lack of educational work 
with pastors and active church-members. Too often “the worst offenders, extremists, and 
fanatics” were not removed from leadership positions.158 
Although in the commonplace religious life across the oblast, Trushin said that there 
were not “negative tendencies” among pastors, yet “periodically hidden attitudes” of church 
leaders necessitated “strengthening control” over their activity. Examples included public 
reading of the “Fraternal Herald” (Bratskii Vestnik, the officially approved publication of the 
AUCECB), attendance by the traveling youth orchestra, “inappropriate” sermons by head 
pastors, and use of pulpit by “unregistered” preachers.159 It is unclear precisely why state 
representatives allowed the publication but disapproved of its reading in public. As a result, 
Trushin intended to give instructions to district and city officials where Baptists were active, that 
they need to “decisively combat any attempts” by pastors to “circumvent the laws in their goals 
to activate religious life,” pay more attention toward educating them in “feelings of civic 
consciousness and respect toward soviet laws,” to “strictly follow” attempts to work with 
children and youth and forbid baptizing those underage, to stop youth choirs from forming, and 
other similar efforts.160 
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The most disturbing new manifestations of religious activity for state officials were 
occurring in the MoECB Church, however. Officials may have granted the MoECB a pseudo-
privileged status vis-à-vis other, especially unregistered, Evangelical churches, but they 
remained cautious in dealing with its personnel. Although registered, CRA official Plekhanov 
nevertheless still referred to the entire Evangelical Christians-Baptists Church as a “sectarian 
religious organization,”161 and its participants were never far from becoming “extremists” or 
fanatics to officials, or at a minimum, they always bordered on being excessively active in their 
religiosity. On January 14, 1974, 152 believers of the MoECB signed a petition for obtaining 
another house of worship in Moscow, since theirs was “too full.” The petitioners noted that 
other ECB religious communities in smaller cities with far fewer members had more than one 
prayer house to accommodate, suggesting a government-inflicted injustice.162 Commissioner 
Plekhanov wrote to the central CRA office to inform them that “a group of extremist-minded 
Baptists (ecb)” wanted to open another prayer house in Moscow, since the one could not hold 
all those who wished to attend and—ostensibly quoting the petitioners’ words—because “’the 
members of the community do not have the possibility of fully satisfying their spiritual 
necessities,’” showing their grasp of accepted state rhetoric pertaining to religion. Aware of the 
government’s use of the church for its own religious propaganda for foreigners, the petitioners 
suggested that “such a circumstance leads many visiting guests of our country, as well as of 
overseas, to an incorrect view if the authorities deliberately do not given consent to open a 
second prayer house.” Officials noted that believers named Semchenko and Epishin—the youth 
leaders—were “the leaders of the whole deal” and collected signatures after one of the 
services.163 
Plekhanov’s report indicates that the youth were doing more than spending time 
together—they were mobilizing around church issues. Some of the young people were 
discovering, as Semchenko put it, that “As in any church,” even in MoECB, there was the “façade 
life and the backstage [one].” Those things they considered most significant were “learned in 
the hallways, not from the pulpit.” Because the congregation hall—with an official capacity of 
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1,500—was routinely full, they met in the hallways, often encountering visitors who had not 
arrived in time to get a seat.164 
Like Plekhanov, the AUCECB and MoECB did not have a clear mode of addressing the 
problems of capacity or of youth. They wanted younger generations as current participants and 
a guarantee of the future of the church, but they did not want them being the cause of state 
reprimands. Bychkov largely ignored the youth and their ambitions to meet with him. His office 
limited access to people from the church who wished to speak with him. His reluctance to 
encourage youth work likely stemmed from the fact that officials chided him for the youth’s 
“excessive activity.”  
Not all leaders approached the issue of young people the same way. President of the 
AUCECB Andrei Klimenko showed some concern for their issues and requests, and looking back, 
Semchenko calls Klimenko’s presidency from 1974-1985 the “heyday” of the youth movement. 
Even if AUCECB staff continued to treat young people curtly, Klimenko would sometimes 
consider their petitions. Under him they even formed something they called The Russian Baptist 
Union of Youth, and Semchenko established more contacts with other “youth leaders” like him 
around the USSR and took the risk of trying to obtain resources from abroad, like literature. 
Although they did not trust Klimenko entirely, the youth noticed that he avoided meddling in 
their affairs, and that he was not an insider in the AUCECB. As for other leaders, they “of course, 
did not encourage our activity, but the nevertheless put up with it.” Elders would reprimand 
them, saying that “’by your actions you’re closing the church!’” The youth did not take such 
threats seriously.165 
In 1976 CRA commissioner of Moscow City Plekhanov noticed another leadership-youth 
problem. Even a veteran leader like Deputy General Secretary of the AUCECB and presbyter of 
MoECB A.I. Mitskevich needed correction. Plekhanov wrote to CRA chief Kuroedov about him, 
saying in December 1976 that he “made provocative-inflammatory attacks on the presbyteriat 
of MoECB” when he called for a “mass gathering of believers for discussing the activities of the 
ECB” instead of the perfunctory meeting of the dvadtsatka [the state-authorized executive 
body], the opening of another prayer house in Moscow, and the introduction of the practice of 
                                                          
164 Semchenko, “Vospominaniia Po Chetvergam  [Reminisciences on Thursdays].” 
165 Semchenko, “Vospominaniia Po Chetvergam  [Reminisciences on Thursdays].” 
 
348 
 
having “benches of repentance” as was done in the Salvation Army.166  Plekhanov was not 
sympathetic to Mitskevich’s efforts to represent believers’ wishes or church needs.  
According to Plekhanov’s information, at the meeting where Mitskevich made these 
demands, AUCECB President Klimenko and MoECB Executive Committee President Tkachenko 
“tried to restrain Mitskevich, to point out the absurdity and impropriety of his speech, but he 
did not let up and claimed that ‘our church is squeezed’ and ‘the presbytery conducts 
evangelism poorly.’” Mitskevich’s own written statement to AUCECB and MoECB leaders did not 
refer to evangelism, but it did mention that the church was overcrowded and another was 
needed, that church members should be active in meeting to help decide church issues, not just 
the dvadtsatka, as well two other issues Plekhanov did not highlight but would also have been of 
concern to officials: that more pastors were needed to meet the needs of MoECB, and that 
more young preachers should be trained.167 
Plekhanov also complained that Mitskevich’s “onslaught” (vylazka) was “picked up” by 
his son, V.A. Mitskevich (a presbyter of another church), as well as by “extremists” of MoECB 
Novikov and Semchenko, who “organized signatures among their supporters under a 
declaration of the same statement as the content of that of Mitskevich.”168 Their petition was 
signed by members of Moscow ECB and sent to the church’s presbytery and the AUCECB. 
Echoing Mitskevich, members of many years complained that, “not once” was there a members’ 
meeting, but the dvadtsatka made decisions and reports; they proposed such a meeting for that 
month.169 In his summary to Kuroedov, Plekhanov said this group mentioned that “‘in the 
leadership of the AUCECB there is no unity.’” For the CRA, who depended upon cooperative 
church leaders, having a group of believers democratically mobilizing behind one ECB Church 
leader against others threatened the established order. Though awaiting Kuroedov’s response, 
Plekhanov was meanwhile having the leadership of the AUCECB get Mitskevich to take back his 
words and meeting with Tkachenko about “taking measures,” such as conducting “explanatory 
work” with those who signed Semchenko’s document.170 
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Semchenko, whom officials were now routinely labeling an “extremist,” had made 
himself known to officials due to organizing the two abovementioned petitions and being an 
independent voice within MoECB. Although participating in the officially-approved MoECB 
church, he did not stay above-ground in all his religious activity. In 1977, officials discovered a 
secret recording studio he and some others had set up in a village outside Moscow in order to 
record broadcasts with Christian content and music from abroad to disseminate in the Soviet 
Union.171 
Semchenko was just one person whom officials identified by name, but increasingly 
officials began to recognize that there were more than just one or two “extremists” who had 
become active of late. In 1978 officials had received word and were following a group of 
“extremist elements and fanatic-sectarians” who were meeting and having gatherings in 
Moscow. They were spreading their “propaganda” among youth in particular.172 The official’s 
description could have referred to the so-called “schismatics” or “persecuted ECB church of 
Moscow,” but since there was no specific reference to schismatics (raskonl’niki) or the CCECB, it 
is possible that the complaint was directed at the MoECB. 
Yet such groups likely were not exclusively of AUCECB or CCECB extraction, but perhaps 
mixed. Semchenko says that the most “daring” thing they did was link up with CCECB adherents, 
whom they referred to as the “initiativists” (initsiativniki) or “unregistered brothers.” He even 
met the renegade Gennadii Kriuchkov. The youth learned about their experiences underground, 
on trial, and in prison, and they adopted some of their techniques in distributing literature and 
recordings. They admired their consistency and bravery in the face of reprisals. Semchenko took 
note of Rumachik’s many prison terms, and how the church in Dedovsk went from being 
registered (autonomously) back to unregistered.173 
Semchenko and others continued in their efforts to change things at MoECB. By the end 
of the 1970s, the membership remained about the same at the Central Church in Moscow, and 
officials still had no solution to the problem of overcrowding, while some Baptists were trying 
harder than ever to gain a second house of worship. Officials noted: “In connection with such 
crowdedness a big group of ‘young baptists’ is striving for separation into an independent 
community and for the opening of a second prayer house in Moscow. Extremist elements are 
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rousing these overtures, accusing the loyal leaders of the baptists of inaction before the 
authorities.” Evidently, it so happened that the local district government of the Kalininskii 
district approved a request for such a group to use the upper story of a house for housekeeping 
needs and the bottom for services. Yet as CRA officials ultimately had to approve each request 
for use of building space for religious purposes, the CRA official noted in a letter to the Secretary 
of the Moscow City Party Committee that the district level “does not decide this issue without 
corresponding instruction.”174 The CRA remained committed to maintaining the status quo in 
this situation, even if it was an issue that mobilized believers. 
The problem of mobilization continued at the 42nd AUCECB Congress in Moscow in 
December 1979. What co-religionists from abroad in attendance perceived as a “degree of 
democracy and openness,” church and state leaders viewed with concern. For the first time, the 
delegates even refused to elect someone nominated by the AUCECB leaders, criticized the 
electoral procedures and debated revisions to the AUCECB statutes. The “impression” among 
some of the foreign attendees was that “frank” discussions arising from these democratic 
initiatives were “unwelcome” to the leadership. Certain delegates circulated a memorandum to 
the others, advocating specific changes that would give more power to the Congress in terms of 
being a check on the Council leaders and revisions to the statutes. The memorandum also 
indicated time limits “on items irrelevant to the proceedings, such as musical interludes and 
greetings from foreign guests.”175  
Where the emerging youth groups had once served as volunteer staff at the 
conventions, they had become involved as participants since Klimenko’s presidency. Although 
the Council for Religious Affairs, headed by EA Tarasov, helped organize the conference and 
oversaw the preparation of resolutions, Semchenko and others had their own agenda for the 
convention. Delegates watched as, instead of discussing the agenda of the Congress, General 
Secretary Bychkov “came to the pulpit and read the already adopted agenda.” Semchenko and 
others were upset, having agenda issues of their own that mattered to them. Semchenko 
penned a note to the presidium of the congress that “we are outraged by the lack of discussion 
of the items,” and demanded that proper procedure be followed, including discussion of the 
agenda. He addressed the note to Klimenko, who stopped Bychkov from reading the report, and 
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announced, “Brothers and sisters, at the insistence of the congress delegates, let's discuss the 
agenda of the Congress.” Little came of the discussion, and Semchenko felt that Klimenko was 
able to help assuage the “outrage” of the delegates and “extinguish it.”176 Later, during the time 
of elections, several delegates expressed criticisms against certain leaders. Mitskevich was 
unpopular, but he announced his retirement. Others criticized AUCECB General Secretary 
Bychkov, Vice President M. Ia. Zhidkov (Iakov Zhidkov’s son), and Pentecostal Representative 
P.K. Shatrov, and the lattermost was rejected in elections, although the former two just 
achieved the necessary votes to be reelected.177  
Officials felt that this “activation” of younger generations at MoECB was in part due to 
the failures of leadership. Plekhanov argued that an “abnormal situation” developed there due 
to “the weak leadership” of presbyter M.Ia. Zhidkov, as well as “undesirable interference in the 
activity of the church by Klimenko, Bychkov and Mitskevich A.I.” According to officials’ 
information, although church leaders were “educating members of the community in the spirit 
of observing legislation on cults, and increasing their feeling of public spirit and patriotism,” the 
leaders “took a position of flirting with young baptists of extremist attitude,” namely those who 
sought to gather separately or in additional facilities (Semchenko’s memoirs paint Bychkov as 
not amenable to youth, making the official’s reference to him in this regard as questionable). 
Plekhanov accused “these extremists” of getting “loyal members of the church, and above all … 
the leaders” to “compromise,” but he did not specify what that entailed. Other actions by the 
“extremists” included “imposing ‘their’ people for the posts of presbyters and deacons” in 
elections, as well as proposing that the number of people in the church’s executive committee 
be increased,” a suggestion that was “contrary to the legislation on cults.”178  
Officials were indeed concerned about elections to such posts, and they did their best to 
ensure those elected would be vigilantly mindful of state wishes. Thus “many times” CRA 
officials addressed the issue of the election of presbyters and deacons at MoECB, and they 
recommended as candidates those who had experience demonstrating that they “would be able 
to conduct work with a loyal attitude—exposing the negative manifestations among a certain 
segment of young baptists,” as well as “being occupied with their [young baptists’] education” 
and be reliable “in dealing with foreign representatives” at MoECB. To aid existing leaders in this 
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process of naming candidates, officials “recommended” two older presbyters from other 
locales, “people who in agreement with concerned authorities, would very well suit such a role.” 
State authorities even met with these candidates, “bringing their attention to the situation 
arising in the MoECB” and “the necessity in the church’s presbytery [of having] people capable 
of managing it [the church].” Officials felt that these two “fully agreed with the arguments about 
the abnormal situation in the community, insufficiencies in leadership and the weak 
performance of educational work among the members of the church.” In turn, officials claimed 
that the MoECB leadership agreed with CRA suggestions, but then later in a separate meeting 
held “without the corresponding agreement of the raiispolkom [the local district government],” 
the church leaders had  put forward different candidates, electing someone else as presbyter, 
and as deacon, the “extremist” youth leader Epishin. Instead of giving leadership over to “loyal 
people,” the official complained, they gave it “into the hands of people” in a way that 
threatened to reduce their “influence” on the “Moscow community.” The leaders’ “double-
dealing” was “reported.”179 
Authorities had already declared the new (and relatively young) deacon, Epishin, an 
extremist. His appointment did not change his behavior. A few years later authorities noted that 
at a meeting of baptists in Moscow, they discussed youth work within the church. Epishin said 
they needed it, and many agreed, but they couldn’t agree on what to do. Apparently they 
agreed that they had been able to attract more youth and have younger deacons and presbyters 
of late because “conflicts with the authorities and local commissioners became fewer.” Small-
scale youth gatherings had been occurring in in apartments in Moscow. When Epishin and 
others asked for guidance from General Secretary Bychkov, suggesting “the Center” address 
“the future” of the church and a focused work with youth, Bychkov merely asked why they 
weren’t meeting in the church. They replied in a manner not to officials’ liking, saying that 
“there wouldn’t have been the kind of conditions for free exchange of opinions.” Bychkov 
wanted to know who organized these meetings.180 It was a sign of the growing disconnect 
between younger generations and the aging leadership both in Soviet society at large and in the 
ECB Church that church and state authorities continued to blame youth-organizers rather than 
to reflect on the hunger of youth for the free exchange of ideas.  
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But authorities’ patience with youth activism was limited, and youth leaders knew they 
were tracked, and searches happened as well. There were also informers among their groups, 
which sowed suspicion, and participants tried hard to guess who they were. They employed 
ways to escape KGB agents by giving false information, as Semchenko avoided surveillance by 
dressing in disguise and walking with a limp. Before the Olympic Games in 1980, the KGB 
warned Semchenko to get out of Moscow, or risk arrest. Semchenko and a few others were 
arrested in 1982 for illegal distribution of literature, making clear that members at MoECB were 
not exempt from discipline if officials considered their activity illegal. This was, perhaps not 
coincidentally, one month before Billy Graham was scheduled to visit. Around twenty-five house 
searches were reportedly made among Baptists belonging to registered and unregistered 
churches.181 But such cases were uncommon among members of registered congregations.  
The one response officials finally suggested to the problem of crowding and growth at 
MoECB was to try to discourage people with residences elsewhere from attending, as officials 
registered religious societies to meet the needs of those in a given district or city. CRA officials 
Trushin and Plekhanov agreed that members of MoECB living in the oblast (not the City proper) 
be directed to “the corresponding registered community of Moscow oblast.” They also wanted 
to “take measures” to stop the baptisms of people living in Moscow Oblast at MoECB as well as 
presbyters from Moscow baptizing in other communities.182 Evidently the officials felt the 
practice of separating people according to geography would help stymie the spread of a 
particularly effervescent religious community, which the Moscow Church was showing itself to 
be. 
But Trushin, while agreeing to this practice according to Plekhanov’s account, expressed 
annoyance at following through with this plan and blamed the Church. A group was registered 
as an ECB church in the town of Balashikha whose founders had been members of MoECB. Like 
the recently registered group in Mytishchi, Trushin complained that state authorities “were 
forced to register” them as “stand-alone” churches due to the “caprice” of the AUCECB which 
started the process of the “dismissal” of people living in the oblast, “citing ‘the cramped prayer 
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house’” in Moscow.183 By 1982, there were sixteen registered ECB churches in all belonging to 
the AUCECB. Evidently Trushin resented adding to his numbers due to issues in a city church. His 
promotion of registration was not based on his sympathy for ECB churches, and he still wanted 
to keep the number of churches in “his” oblast to a minimum. 
Although Trushin was “forced” to register these groups, he complained about local 
authorities’ “groundless rejection” of groups in Mytishchi and Balashikha attempting to register 
or purchase homes, since it resulted in “conflict situations between religious groups and local 
authorities” as well as complaints by believers. In Mytishchi, the community proposed four 
homes, and authorities rejected each; the situation in Balashikha was similar. One official 
explained his department’s actions of refusal quite simply: “’We don’t want baptists to be active 
in our district.’” Such behavior by local authorities, Trushin argued, went contrary to “the 
undertaken path,” causing his office to have to “‘defend believers’” while spending time 
“convincing officials to observe socialist legality.” Authorities, instead of “relating to religion and 
church on the level of socialist legality,” were applying “unneeded red tape.”184  
Trushin Summarizes the Successes of the Approach under Brezhnev 
Such throwback attitudes of local authorities did not, Trushin asserted, reflect his 
office’s attempts to normalize state relations with the Baptist churches in Moscow Oblast. 
Around the time Leonid Brezhnev died in late 1982, Trushin reflected on church management 
over the past fifteen years. In response to CRA chief Kuroedov’s complaints about the “serious 
problem” of Baptist believers and their “uncontrolled” activity across the Soviet Union recently, 
Trushin responded by claiming that this problem had been “for the most part resolved” in 
Moscow Oblast since 1969. Before then, he admitted, such a problem among “sectarian 
denominations” existed, since before 1965 there were not any registered communities, only 50 
largely unmonitored groups. When thirteen were registered, other nearby groups were 
consolidated into these, taking care of “nearly all the baptists” active in the oblast. He 
downplayed the significance of recent registrations as not signaling expansion.185  
Trushin claimed that officials elsewhere rejected Baptist believers’ applications in order 
to have “‘favorable’ statistics,” presumably to look good by not having any ECB congregations in 
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their jurisdiction. Trushin admitted he likewise “encountered” such “resistance” until “it was 
quickly overcome” by Oblast authorities and party leaders from the Moscow Committee. There 
were some small groups remaining, but they had not submitted petitions to register lately, were 
too small to organize, or were sufficiently close to other registered communities.186 
Although his office did register ECB communities, it does not mean that he had any 
sympathy for their religiosity. When describing the religiosity of protestant denominations, he 
noted that “Sectarianism” was different from other confessions by “particular activity” and 
organization of religious life. The “exceptionally great influence of presbyters and preachers” 
shaped each community. The gatherings, he wrote, “from the beginning to the end are filled 
with speeches by sectarian leaders with sermons, in which they are told all sorts of parables, 
encouraging and frightening the listeners.”187 
Indeed, even though Trushin helped resolve the issue of uncontrolled activity by 
registering, he was still faced with “overcoming” Baptists’ “negative tendencies” and 
“suppressing” their “illegal activities.” The CRA had to “by decree” direct the commissioners and 
the district/city councils with ECB communities to try to stop visiting musical groups, and track 
public reading of the Brotherly Gazette. But the MoECB still played a vital role. Many presbyters 
of these communities told officials that they didn’t consider anything they were doing as illegal, 
even “citing the Moscow Prayer House, where allegedly such things are also practiced.” All of 
the Baptist communities were given “warnings” with “the goal of prophylaxis.” Officials also had 
to keep pace with the occasional emergence of anti-state rhetoric from the preachers. A 
presbyter in Voskresensk spoke about the separation of the church from the state, and about 
not needing to provide officials with “lists” of information on their church, nor “admit their 
presence in our gatherings.” Other pastors in other churches invited those present to “pray for 
our brothers who remain in prisons for faith in Christ.”188 And, of course, the issue of the CCECB 
churches remained, so authorities had to keep tracking interactions between representatives of 
the two bodies.189  
The closely monitored Central Moscow Church was never free from spectacle either. 
The next illustrious visitor after Richard Nixon was the internationally known evangelist 
Reverend Billy Graham who visited the church and even preached there in 1982. At one point in 
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the service, a woman unfurled a banner which read, “We have more than 150 prisoners for the 
work of the Gospel,” and she had to be escorted out by security guards. Despite this incident, 
Graham declared that “there is a lot more (religious) freedom here than has been given the 
impression in the States,” causing U.S. news agencies to depict him as naïve and fooled by the 
Soviets into declaring precisely what they wanted.190 Despite state control, the Moscow Church 
nevertheless presented the opportunity for people of varying attitudes toward state organs to 
come, worship, mingle, and even express themselves. Although agents and church 
representatives attempted to strictly control interactions, Graham had in fact proclaimed the 
Christian faith. Restrictions notwithstanding, visitors witnessed that the core of Christian 
practice—worship in song, reading of the Bible, preaching, and sacraments—was present at 
MoECB or at other congregations. They could see that there was—at least to a degree—some 
“religious freedom.” The trade-off for officials in stressing the importance of such window-
dressing was that they   simultaneously granted some power to the church.  
The Trend until Glasnost 
After Brezhnev’s death, there was no substantive change in Soviet religious policy until 
well into the Gorbachev era with the government policy of glasnost. Even then, the inertia of the 
decades with regard to religious policy or attitude among officials at large carried for several 
more years, even into the late 1980s. Brezhnev’s successor, Yuri Andropov, had long been KGB 
chief. Prior to the 1980 Olympics, repression of any forms of dissent increased, and the number 
of Christian prisoners increased substantially from 1979 through 1983. Andropov died in early 
1984, and his successor Konstantin Chernenko also died one year later. With such short periods 
of leadership, no new change in religious policy was outlined, and officials carried on as 
before.191 
The framework for understanding “sectarian” religion was a constant of the post-
Khrushchev era. In 1981 a City of Moscow official summarized the law, along with the attitudes, 
that had prevailed the entire Brezhnev era until glasnost. Under Soviet religious law, the 
constitution guaranteed religious freedom. “However,” wrote the official, “some people from 
among churchmen and sectarians, showing extremist aspirations, especially leaders (preachers) 
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of the baptists-schismatics, Pentecostals, Adventist-reformists and Jehovah’s Witnesses […] 
unlawfully organize prayer meetings, attract those underage to them, and conduct religious 
education with them; they incite believers to other illegal and anti-social acts, the drafting of 
slanderous letters, defaming the soviet government and social system, etc.” As a response to 
this conflict, such groups “distort the essence of these laws and knowingly spread false 
allegations about the alleged persecution of believers by organs of power.192  
The level of harassment against unregistered or CCECB communities varied by oblast. In 
Kiev oblast, commissioner Mishenin was trying to clean up his oblast’s statistical profile, 
pursuing a much more aggressive campaign against Baptist believers. His reports indicate many 
examples where Mishenin told the central CRA office to take certain registered and unregistered 
groups off the list due to such groups “ceasing their organized activities” in various villages, due 
to too few members. Leaders were still periodically arrested.193 
In Dedovsk, the situation with the breakaway Baptists continued in an “unsatisfactory” 
manner. V. Ia. Smirnov had been arrested in 1980, age 67, and released in 1982. He resumed 
unauthorized meetings, so “prophylactic, explanatory, and educational work” was supposedly 
being conducted by unnamed state representatives with this group. Although authorities 
rejected their attempts to register and use facilities on many occasions, Smirnov visited the local 
city council and requested that he hold an Easter gathering at 19 Grazhdanskaya Street, at the 
home of an “extremist” known to them, Kruchinin (also previously imprisoned). Local officials 
granted this request, and thirty people attended a gathering that Easter afternoon. One CRA 
official thought that this fact “could be used in our interests” in the “goals of normalization of 
the activity of this group of baptists-schismatics.”194 The official did not explicitly state what he 
meant, but it appears that officials still desired to have predictable relations and predictable 
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religiosity that could be routinely monitored. But little changed with this community until well 
into the Gorbachev period. The Dedovsk community remained in its “illegal” state in the 1980s, 
as did the “persecuted” Moscow church.195 Rumachik had been sentenced to five years in 1980, 
and his sentence was extended. He was finally released “early” from his extension in February of 
1987 as part of amnesties under perestroika.196 Officials continued conducting educational work 
with CCECB leaders about religious law and the need to register. Fines for holding unauthorized 
religious gatherings continued.197  
If the CCECB were incorrigible in refusing to submit to other authorities, AUCECB 
churches also consistently presented problems until glasnost. Trushin named the most common 
problems in Baptist churches in a 1983 report: incorporating children into services; conducting 
religious activity outside church walls; avoiding registration; having unwanted content in prayers 
and sermons that was against “our” activities or incited violation of laws; maintaining contact 
with CCECB personnel; introducing “new teachings” in the church that were impacted by foreign 
literature, radio, and tourists; displaying “unhealthy or antisocial moods” by pastors; and having 
unauthorized church meetings.198 The examples of such problems over the early 1980s were 
relatively minor.199 The AUCECB was evidently sufficiently acceptable in the eyes of officials that, 
even if its churches presented problems, they still would steer CCECB adherents toward the 
institution and its rules.200 
If monitoring churches for acceptability was endless, the problem of the quality of state 
oversight seemed equally intractable. In 1983 at the end of his career, Trushin was still 
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complaining about district authorities and commissions for monitoring religion, vexed that only 
a third of such district committees submitted information on time; some finally did late, and a 
few never submitted. Some were conducting lectures on atheism, as would have been hoped by 
officials, but such activities did not seem to relate to noticeable change in religious behaviors.201 
In 1985, G.D. Romanov reported on religion in Ramenskii district, asserting that despite 850 
lectures on atheist topics, more educational work was needed, since “Religious ritualism over 
the past years is almost not shrinking and remains high” and “introduction of new civic 
ceremonies goes slowly, often uninterestingly, formally.” Such efforts to replace religion had 
been failing, and it is reasonable to believe that Romanov was exaggerating the extent of such 
educational efforts. Romanov, like Trushin, blamed village commissions’ work as “weak” with 
many “errors,” alongside a lack of “specificity” in the plans of many of these commissions. As for 
unregistered “sectarian” groups, his explanation was “insufficient educational work.” Perhaps if 
these efforts were “strengthened,” Romanov suggested, then the results would be different.202 
Thus despite Trushin’s retirement in 1984, there was no noticeable change in CRA policy 
across Moscow Oblast,203 and the religious situation was not uniform in all regions, as it 
depended on local authorities and CRA personnel. For example, around the time of the 
Chernobyl disaster that would prompt Gorbachev’s initiative toward more openness, a church in 
Odessa had agreed to be registered, but then renounced its registration due to state 
interference. In response, the local council demolished its building in April 1986, even though 
the church had paid for the building itself. For Easter they were meeting in a home, and this 
gathering was "brutally dispersed by a special police detachment," which responded by "forcing 
the Christians out of the house and pushing them into buses."204 But even after the turn in 1986 
toward more openness and amnesties for political-religious prisoners under Gorbachev, there 
were still arrests of believers, fines, and break-ups of gatherings.205  
Until the mid- to late-1980s, youth groups were restricted, yet above-eighteen youth 
activity was common for MoECB youth. They couldn’t meet as youth in the church until the mid-
1980s or do anything as youth in MoECB, but they could participate in the second choir at times 
or in the orchestra. The service was otherwise set, as were the preachers. On weekends and 
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holidays groups traveled to services first in Moscow oblast, but eventually to Riga, St. 
Petersburg, Brest, the Volga, the South of Russia, and other places according to what their 
modest “youth budget” afforded. They were often gone from Friday until Monday morning, and 
churches allowed the services to extend as they recited poetry “without restrictions.” They were 
welcomed as “the Moscow youth,” and in meeting other young Baptist believers, many found 
spouses in this way. Semchenko, prior to his arrest, had enjoyed Riga best of all, as he found 
things “a little freer” there, noting that even formerly imprisoned initsiativniki managed to 
register a church.206 
Although a change did not happen immediately with glasnost or perestroika 
(Gorbachev’s policy of restructuring), the overall trend from 1987 until the fall of the Soviet 
Union was clearly in the direction of more freedoms for the Evangelical Churches. Across the 
Soviet Union, baptisms took a marked jump from around 7,089 reported in 1986 to over 11,000 
in 1989, and over 150 churches were registered. The process of choosing AUCECB leaders 
became more directly democratic, as representative delegates elected these positions instead of 
council members in the Congress of 1990. Delegates tellingly “demanded changes in the 
[Congress] program, reducing the number of greetings from visitors and musical items in order 
to allow more time for discussion and debate.” The discussions during the Congress had a 
noticeable “openness and directness” pertaining to issues like evangelism, youth ministries, and 
charity. In the past, these would have been almost entirely taboo.207 Delegates also voted to 
decentralize the AUCECB, even renaming it the Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists of the 
USSR, granting more autonomy to regional and local leaders, who would not be appointed from 
above, but elected from below. Publications also increased. They composed a letter to 
Gorbachev advocating the legalization of Sunday schools and other church activities, as well as 
supporting an expected new “Law on Freedom of Conscience.”208 Although they could not have 
known that state-sponsored atheism would soon disappear, Baptists responded to societal 
changes with institutional changes that they largely agreed reflected their Church culture and 
beliefs. The same was occurring with numerous institutions across the USSR.  
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Conclusion 
Michael Bourdeaux pointed out decades ago the similarities between the April 1965 
Kriuchkov-Vins document from Baptist believers and the Nov-Dec 1965 Yakunin-Eshliman 
documents from Orthodox priests. They both were intellectual, framed in legal terms, and called 
for less state interference in church matters. Both pairs boldly, without fears of reprisal, signed 
such documents intending church reform, not necessarily schism. In both cases, church leaders 
asked the authors to retract, and in both cases, support of the authors spread.209 
But ultimately, the non-conformist Baptists garnered a large following that led to a 
schism, whereas the non-conformist Orthodox priests were effectively marginalized without 
mobilizing followers. Those priests who persisted in refusing to conform were banned from the 
priesthood. Although state officials succeeded at gradually whittling away at the base of 
supporters of the CCECB, they had to reckon with a cohort of loyal adherents who had based 
their existence upon opposition to the AUCECB and state authorities.  
In the case of the Baptists, the traditional protestant culture of decentralized 
interpretation of Scripture trumped the tradition of submitting to church authority, rendering a 
split. But even after the schism within the AUCECB and Central Moscow Church, the leadership 
had to contend with competing contingents within the church, afforded by the Baptist Church’s 
traditionally democratic structure. Like the Reformed Church in Romania, the Baptist Churches 
also had traditions of pastor-choosing and voting that proved contentious on several occasions. 
Trusted lay believers or untrained pastors could rally members of their congregations against 
Church leaders’ wishes if they could make convincing justifications. In the Orthodox Church, to 
debate truths was, in effect, to question Church authority, thereby limiting dialogue. When 
attempting change, Orthodox reformists took seriously the consequences of contributing to 
disunity in the Orthodox Church, which could include defrocking or schism. Protestant discourse, 
by contrast, has not dwelled on the problems of schism, and church fracturing and divisions 
have been consistent features of Protestant history. In Protestantism, parties can vie for power 
by accusing each other of going against Scriptural truths, of being the arm of Satan, etc, as was 
the case in the Soviet Baptist Church.  
Baptists saw themselves as a worldwide denomination, a minority religious group within 
the USSR, and a historical victim of persecution. Their group identity was robust: with their 
                                                          
209 Bourdeaux, Religious Ferment in Russia, 185, 189. 
 
362 
 
status threatened, the local church served as a refuge. This applied especially to the Breakaway 
Baptist groups. Recollections of those active in breakaway circles commonly contain references 
to the intimacy found in belonging to such a group, and the identification of fellow adherents as 
family (beyond the use of the common familial terms of address among believers, i.e., brother 
or sister so-and-so). One interviewee mentioned that to her, the congregation in Dedovsk was 
“like family, where people knew each other’s wishes, desires.”210 Nina Smirnova, daughter-in-
law of the often-arrested Vasiliy Smirnov, said that the relationship among them was “like 
brothers and sisters, especially in times of persecution.” Persecution increased the importance 
and strength of the community. Orthodox congregations, being geographically (parish) based, 
did not form based on the intense like-mindedness of parishioners—nor do they split due to 
disagreements. The Orthodox communities studied in Chapter VI that became dynamized were 
usually centered on a particularly charismatic priest. Such a priest’s removal often caused 
parishioners to object, but an enduring group identity was not forged in such a scenario. 
The emergence of youth groups in the ECB church in the 1970s resembles youth interest 
in the Russian Orthodox Church and Romanian Reformed Church (see Chapters VI and IX, 
respectively). Thus a distinctive feature of unacceptable religiosity during this time for state 
officials was bourgeoning youth participation. In each of these cases, there were youth 
encouraging the dynamization of religion, and in doing so, they often confronted church and 
state leaders. A notable feature of their confrontations, however, is that they often did not fear 
arrest as previous generations had done, partly emboldened by older generations’ stories of 
arrest and imprisonment. ECB youth expressed pride that as “’protestant’” youth they did not 
readily abide by the rules and would congregate as youth after services at MoECB, getting 
together “almost every day.” Semchenko writes that in the face of threats or police action, they 
“rejoiced” in their “defiance” and “love of freedom.”211 Nina Smirnova recalls “never really being 
afraid as youth.”212 In all of these cases, young people were trying to find ways to gather 
together as co-believers without the didacticism of church leaders or restrictions of authorities. 
It is also worth mentioning that the level of violence officials employed against youth 
was relatively limited in the case of Reformed and Baptist believers, but seems to have been 
more aggressive against Romanian and Russian Orthodox Church youth. Dmitrii Pospielovsky 
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makes an important point that authorities dealt with non-conformist priests more aggressively 
than pastors of Baptist churches, arguing that much more was at stake in the Orthodox case: 
“no matter how active, the Baptists and other sectarians remain on the fringes of Russian 
culture, while the Orthodox Church is seen by the Soviets as a potential threat to their 
monopoly of power.”213 
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St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984), 425. 
364 
IX: Pastors, Their Congregations, and Revolutionary Potential: The Hungarian 
Reformed Church, 1964 – 1989 
The Hungarian Reformed and Catholic Churches have long been the dominant 
denominations for the significant Hungarian minority living in Transylvania, where Hungarian-
Romanian relations have often been poor amid changing political landscapes. When the 
communist party was trying to extend its control over society in the late 1940s, it imprisoned 
and even killed many of the most important church leaders and bishops in the Orthodox, 
Catholic, and Greek-Catholic Churches, and the latter was “united” with the Orthodox Church, 
under duress. But the approximately 700,000-person Reformed Church did not suffer the extent 
of arrests at first as much as steady pressure by state agents in the process of aligning the 
Church with the state vision of acceptable religiosity. As will be argued below, the kind of 
Reformed religion officials found acceptable was un-nationalistic yet traditional, and 
traditionalistic over and against any attempts at revival or innovation. The failed revolution 
attempt in Budapest in 1956 had caused state agents to worry about the loyalty of Hungarians, 
and so they imprisoned many active or prominent members of the Hungarian community on 
charges of “conspiracies” in a preventive act against potentially “disloyal elements” (See 
Chapter V).  
One such group of people imprisoned in the post-1956 crack-down was a group of 
Reformed Pastors and believers who participated in a revival movement that before the war 
was known as the Christian-Endeavor (CE) Society, or sometimes the “Bethany” CE Society (CE 
Bethánia) and labeled the “Bethanist” group by antagonistic state and church agents. The most 
active leaders and participants in this group of “Bethanists” had been arrested, tried, and 
imprisoned (falsely accused as conspirators) with ten- to twenty-year sentences in 1958. Yet 
when Ceauşescu came to power in 1964, he granted an amnesty to “political” prisoners, 
allowing for the release of many people who were imprisoned primarily for their active 
religiosity but charged for political crimes. Many who had been imprisoned as “Bethanists” did 
not give up attempts at revival, nor did state agents cease to be wary of them. 
Reformed Church leaders and state authorities—specifically the Department of 
Religions—continued to try to marginalize this specific renewal problem. But during the 
Ceauşescu era, the potential danger “Bethanism” posed for authorities who desired predictable 
and acceptable forms of religiosity was exceeded by other aspects of Reformed Church life. One 
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such problematic aspect was the power that local congregations had to choose their own 
pastor, which came into conflict with church and state authorities’ desire to control and power 
to interfere in managing personnel according to their own wishes. This congregational “right” 
was subject to contest in two episodes explored below, and in one incident this contest 
(however virulent) ended with an embittered congregation and deflated pastor, but the other 
led to the uprising in Timişoara, the spark to the Romanian Revolution of 1989. These cases will 
serve to illustrate the potential for powers to collide, as the decentralized democratic process of 
pastor-choosing and people’s voluntary participation in church life could clash with a command-
oriented state and state officials’ desire to guide church life as well. These cases also 
demonstrate the at-times symbiotic relationship of the Reformed Church and state in 
communist times, when feuding camps within the Reformed Church called upon the 
Department of Religions to help settle their disputes. Often, the Department was willing to help 
mediate in order to maintain its goal of “normal” religious practice. “Acceptable” religiosity 
would not attract citizens toward any communal effervescence generated by nationalism or 
revival, and it would avoid scandals that would discredit the Reformed Church as a state-
sponsored institution. 
A Qualified Amnesty for Imprisoned Pastors 
A Greek Catholic priest remarked to a Hungarian pastor upon Ceauşescu’s amnesty and 
the release of imprisoned clergy in 1964: “We’re now going from this cramped cell to a more 
spacious cell. But just remember, that, too, is a cell!”1 Most of the released “Bethanist” pastors 
received positions, never at the congregations from which they came, but as associate pastors in 
small congregations.2 By having this status, Hungarian Reformed clergy remained directly under 
the authority of the Bishop, who could move them at his discretion, without reference to the 
head pastor, the congregation, the presbytery, or the diocese. Church and state authorities 
coordinated their efforts toward placement of these pastors, and threatened re-incarceration if 
they did not from this point forward “give signals of their loyalty.” Moreover, they still had to 
                                                          
1 Ferenc Visky, ed., Bilincseket És Börtönt Is: Dokumentum-Kötet [Chains and Even Prison: Document-
Collection] (Marosvásárhely: Kóinónia, 1996), 244. 
2 Ferenc Visky eventually settled as an associate pastor in Hegyközpályi/Paleu (Bihor County) and retired 
in 1982. Sándor Szilágyi became a pastor in Bősháza/Biuşa (Sălaj County), and served until his retirement 
in 1977. After prison Karczagi spent the next 25 years in Mezőbaj/Boiu (Bihor County), 1965-1989. None 
of these reformed pastors left their church or country, although many from other denominations tried to 
emigrate. Some Protestants of other denominations even received money from concerned brethren 
abroad to leave. See Visky (1996), 247. 
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endure some combination of interrogations, threats, temporary incarcerations, house searches, 
the taking of written materials, and the strict watching of their interactions.3 During Sunday 
services, there was always an informer who tracked the goings-on and words of the preacher. 
The one considered the “ringleader” of this group of “Bethanists,” pastor Ferenc Visky, had as 
his organist an informer who kept track of what he said in public. Assured that any wrong moves 
might mean a trip back to prison, pastors also served as a perpetual cautionary tale to others to 
refrain from pursuing active communal religious life. Visky recalled the routine humiliation that 
followed his “release” at local diocese meetings: “There was almost never a gathering of pastors 
in which the issue of the bethanists was not raised. The favorite moments of the diocese 
meetings was the mocking of the ‘devout’ pastors [ . . . ].”4 Thus, their amnesty was a 
conditional favor, a “pause in punishment” more than a clearing of their guilt. 
In March 1966, the inspector from the northern county of Maramureş provided an 
update on the “Bethanists,” whom he described as “formed from the most mystic and most 
fanatic Reformed believers who are not satisfied by the religious services done by priests in the 
churches, meeting separately at their homes where they pray, sing and some of them preach. By 
this they are considered sectarian and their group is forbidden.” The inspector apparently 
considered the “Bethanist” problem a duty shared with the Church, arguing that it “remains as a 
duty for us to supervise the[ir] activity” but that “[other] Reformed priests have the duty to 
eliminate this group.” The inspector named Sándor Szilágyi, Sándor Karczagi, and Zoltán Dézsi, 
as well as farmer Antal Papp (see Chapter V), all of whom had been in prison, but active once 
again. Papp was apparently already leading a group of 26 back in his hometown of Agriş (Egri). 
Despite their “quite intense proselytism,” the inspector tried to assert that “our new social-
political conditions” in the villages meant that the “socialist consciousness of the peasants” was 
raised to the point where most ordinary citizens regarded the “Bethanists” as “enemies of 
progress as well as enemies of the socialist regime.”5 His wariness and the facts of their activity, 
however, sheds doubt on his assertion.  
The Four Main Problems of the Reformed Church 
The problem of revival was just one of the problems of the Reformed Church. Due to the 
particular features of each Church (e.g., religious practices and traditions), each institution 
                                                          
3 Visky, Bilincseket És Börtönt Is, 244. 
4 Ibid., 245. 
5 Arhivele Naţionale ale României, Fond “C.C. al P.C.R. - Sectia Administrativ-Politica”, 144, 155–56. 
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related differently to the political regime and its Department of Religions. The religious culture 
of the Reformed Church consistently presented four main problems that constantly tested the 
boundaries of religious acceptability: the renewal movement of “Bethanism,” the traditional 
practice of catechism for youth, Hungarian nationalism, and local democratic procedures in 
pastor-choosing. More than financial issues, sermon content, creeds, beliefs, religious rites, or 
crowded religious holiday services, these were the thorns in communist officials’ religious sides. 
The problem in the Reformed Church most similar to one of the Orthodox Church was 
revivalism, as the “Bethanist” movement was an inner-church renewal movement like the Lord’s 
Army group of the Orthodox Church (see Chapters III, V, and VII). Unfortunately for state 
officials, “Bethanism” was not a problem gone forever, even if the problem pastors of the 1950s 
had been as marginalized as possible. As was standard procedure for pastors released from 
prison, the bishops placed the released “Bethanist” pastors in remote or decaying 
congregations, meaning that church and state representatives had less to worry about. 
Bishop Papp told the released “Bethanist” Sándor Karczagi that he “should never even 
hope to end up in a city-congregation.”6 The intellectually-inclined Karczagi was first placed in 
the kind of village where there was no transportation, electricity, police, post, people of higher 
education, or passable roads in winter. The previous pastor had only lasted a few months, yet 
the congregation actively attended church and helped repair the parish.7 Likely due to his 
weakened condition from prison, he soon developed a serious lung infection that put him on a 
nine-month sick leave. He was then placed in Boiu (Mezőbaj), where “few went to church” 
though they insisted on there being a pastor, not for holding church services, but for burials. The 
people busied themselves with agriculture, and not even in winter did he succeed in gathering 
them for Bible study or choir practice however much he visited families, attended people on 
their sick beds, and worked on confirmation for those over nine. Karczagi’s disappointments and 
frustrations as village pastor were not at the hand of the state, its agents, or persecution, 
beyond their keeping him there due to the stain of being an unacceptably religious pastor, a 
“Bethanist.” The best way to keep his religiosity within proper boundaries was to find him an 
unreceptive audience. 
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Napoca, RO]: Koinónia, 2010), 119–20. 
368 
 
Ferenc Visky’s parish situation was similar. He was placed in Paleu (Hegyközpályi), an 
isolated village with a known weak congregation, where few went to church and with “many 
alcoholics.” A typical Sunday service would feature only a few from the village and some friends 
of his from other locations.8 In Visky’s diocese, beyond the catechism or confirmation classes 
(which were stipulated for specific ages and held at specific times), no religious education, Bible 
studies for youth, family visitation or spiritual care was typically allowed (some exceptions were 
granted by church authorities, however). Evangelical events and prayer weeks were also 
forbidden, and usually adult Bible studies were only permitted “within the framework of a 
commonplace liturgical church service, without remarks or discussion.” In such a situation, 
discussion-based Bible studies and times of prayer had to be held secretly, in homes.9 But such a 
scenario plus the constant presence of informers rendered it difficult to make church a place of 
authenticity.  
Visky was forced into retirement in 1983 by Bishop Papp. Quite ironically, when one of 
the local heads of the party found out that he was to be retired, she voluntarily traveled to 
Bucharest to complain about this, saying that his presence in the village was completely positive, 
and that work discipline and production were higher because of his influence. The reply in 
Bucharest was that this was the wish of Bishop Papp, and his wish must be respected. 
Perplexed, the woman returned to the village, knocked on the door of Visky, and reported to 
him what she had tried to do on his behalf, but that his own bishop’s wishes took precedence.10 
Visky may have been good for the village, but ultimately, his activity would ever be “Bethanist” 
at heart – an unacceptable variety of religiosity.  Moreover, this example shows just how 
important a high-ranking church leader was, whose opinions were weighed more heavily than 
local civil authorities’. The power of bishops will be seen in more detail in the case of Zalău, 
below. 
The second major problem that officials faced in managing Reformed religiosity was 
catechism, the traditional practice of the church where parish pastors met with youth of specific 
ages to teach them Reformed doctrine and prepare them for confirmation, at which time one 
could become a full member of the church and receive the Eucharist. Catechism was a problem 
because it was a practice where the transmission of religious belief was intentional, seen as a 
less passive form of transmission than regular attendance at Sunday services. There were other 
                                                          
8 Interview with István Halmen, March 27, 2015. 
9 Visky, Bilincseket És Börtönt Is, 246. 
10 Interview with Levente Horvath, April 10, 2015. 
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sites of influence as well, like Bible studies, youth groups, the visiting of families by pastors, but 
at the instigation of officials, church leaders agreed to discourage priests from pursuing these 
activities.11 Catechism, however, remained. 
State agents considered catechism an annoyance because—although regulated by law—
it ran contrary to the spirit of the law, which desired freedom of individual conscience without 
pressure wrought by practices like proselytism or “indoctrination.” Presenting religious content 
to youth overstepped this ideal. Officials therefore saw clergy as peddlers of religious 
propaganda, so they would often complain that pastors were applying direct and indirect 
pressure on parents in sermons and after the services during the informal greeting times when 
they encouraged catechism.12  
To aid management of catechism, Department of Religions officials stipulated the times 
and locations for it to take place. In Sălaj County, the acceptable time was from 2:00 on 
Saturday until 2:00 on Sunday, during the months of the school year, in the parish building. 
Pastors had to fit catechism within this window if they wanted to avoid reprimands or sanctions. 
At a minimum, Department of Religions inspectors ensured that catechismal practices were 
done in accordance with the law, but they also kept an eye out for any evidence that particular 
gatherings were becoming too dynamic. 
Sălaj inspector Gheorghe David, who always tended toward scrutiny, did not find too 
much to worry about. As examples, the pastor of Simleul Silvaniei, Gheorghe Vidits, had quite a 
number of youth attending and being confirmed, but the inspector “did not observe effort in 
attracting children or unpermitted practices on the part of the priest.” In another parish, Boghis, 
Francisc Gall was also holding a Bible study in which many youth were participating on Tuesday 
evening and one on Thursdays for adults, which was “extra indoctrination compared to other 
parishes.” But, after discussing the issue with the priest, David saw Gall’s side of the story: “Bible 
study had to be introduced to counteract the Baptists of the town who were attracting his 
                                                          
11 There were occasions where Bible studies, youth gatherings, and family visits occurred, but these were 
not the norm and without a doubt state agents had reliable informants among the participants. Because 
church and state leaders discouraged family visits, many priests except the most determined discontinued 
such activity (some might have been relieved to not have to do it anyway). Bible studies had to be held in 
parish buildings at known times, and state agents ensured that someone was present to ensure that these 
remained “purely religious,” preferably filled by a pastor’s didactic utterances as opposed to dynamic, 
open, communal discussion. Bible studies required, at a minimum, the parish priest’s participation. It’s 
not clear whether a pastor needed a superior’s approval (he may have in Bishop Papp’s bishopric, but not 
Gyula Nagy’s, for example). 
12 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor,” 1973/24, 190. 
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believers and that since he’s doing this thing he no longer has people turning to the Baptists.”13 
Even among protestant denominations, officials preferred the historically traditional ones. 
When subsequent Sălaj inspector Roman composed a report on catechism covering the 
previous five years, from 1968-1973, the numbers of children attending catechism and getting 
confirmed had declined (I see no reason to assume falsification here). Since officials regarded 
youth work as the “guarantee of the future of the religions,” a decline was a positive 
development for anti-religious officials, but it certainly was not declining at an extraordinary 
rate.14 When it came to confirmation, Roman felt that the practice of confirmation was generally 
carried out according to the law and did not pose any particular problems, nor even any 
“aberrations,” such as failure to correspond to the prescribed dates and times.15 Roman liked 
that Orthodox priests in his territory did not do catechism; the Reformed Church, however, had 
a “system of religious indoctrination much more vast and varied – catechism, confirmation, 
Bible studies, for which supervision is much more cumbersome.” Roman believed the baseline 
religiosity of Reformed believers to be higher than the Orthodox Church, including attendance 
and active participation both in villages and cities. But within the spirit and letter of the law, 
Roman felt that pastors almost universally offered catechism and confirmation according to 
“free consent,” without pressuring parents and children, a claim that contradicted the standard 
line that pastors “indirectly” pressured parents by reminding them to send their children to 
catechism.16  
It was not the specific content, the doctrine, of catechism that concerned officials. They 
did not scrutinize what was being taught. In addition to the basic fact of the “religious 
indoctrination” that was occurring, the practice of catechism helped ensure that future 
generations would consider themselves Reformed believers. Thus, “being Reformed” would 
remain an identity and community of belonging that could easily conflict with the identity of one 
as a citizen of Socialist Romania.  
If officials could optimistically consider catechism as a didactic practice in which youth 
could, ideally, participate unenthusiastically, not all communal religious practices were benign. 
When Roman observed a service at Pentecost at Zoltán Fejer’s Church in Vârşolţ (Varsolc), the 
Lord’s Supper was served, and 123 took part, including a balance of men and women, younger 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 1971/11, 9–10. 
14 Ibid., 1973/24, 189. 
15 Ibid., 1973/21, 36. 
16 Ibid., 1975/48, 3-4. 
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and older. The young women were dressed up in white outfits, including beads and bows of 
green and red color (Hungarian national colors). The youth were found to “participate with 
regularity” at the services, and the pastor “handle[d] the indoctrination of the youth” via the 
ordinary denominational activities like catechism and confirmation. Given the active 
participation of youth in what was not only a religious community but an ethnically marked one 
as well, inspector Roman endeavored “to watch more often the activity carried out by priest 
Zoltán Fejer, in order to be held accountable and for measures to be taken in consequence.” He 
also informed the “appropriate” local organs, who “promised to follow closely the activity of the 
reformed priest, and he will be held accountable in an opportune moment.” Given that certain 
Reformed pastors used measures to “stimulate” youth participation in services, including 
maintaining traditions like certain traditional clothing or putting up Christmas trees in the 
church, Roman proposed a customary response, the promotion of alternative activities featuring 
educational or cultural content to be organized for youth.17  
The third major problem in religious management was Hungarian nationalism. 
Specifically religious practices like catechism, confirmation, and the Lord’s Supper on high 
religious holidays helped foster a sense of “us,” a community of belonging. These practices 
reinforced a cultural institution and cultural identity, in this case a religious one. Yet, there was 
also an at-times parallel, at-times overlapping cultural identity: that of Hungarian-ness. Some 
congregations made an effort to increase participants’ awareness, acknowledgment, or embrace 
of the idea of Hungarian ethnicity. Hence traditional dress, colors, and the like were aspects of 
one of the three main potential problems of the Reformed Church. Any emphasis on ethno-
national cultural products might smell of “nationalism” or “chauvinism” to a state official, and 
these were not considered apolitical. Because of this “problem” that the Reformed Church 
shared with the mostly-Hungarian Roman Catholic Church, the Department of Religions was 
compelled to work among clergy to “prevent any kind of nationalist manifestations in their 
activities,” a “duty” that required them to be “very vigilant and be careful that not a single 
element with hostile intentions finds propitious terrain within religious organizations.” 18 This 
was a serious issue at the beginning of the deepening of communist control,19 during and after 
the 1956 revolution in Hungary (see Chapter V), or sporadically according to particular pastors’ 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 1973/24, 235, 190. 
18 Direcția Județeană Mureș a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor,” 1965-1983/345, 109. 
19 See documents from Fond 594 (Ministry of the Interior), especially files from 1946-1949 dealing with 
the Reformed Church.  
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or congregations’ ambitions. One example that will be explored below of the latter is the case of 
the “revolutionary” László Tőkés in the 1980s.  
The final main problem of the Reformed Church was that congregations still had the 
power to choose their pastor from among those who held appropriate credentials. After 
finishing seminary, gaining state and church authorization, and serving sufficiently as an 
associate pastor, a Reformed minister could be called by parishes to serve in the capacity of 
pastor.  Candidates for available positions often preached as guests in a parish with a vacancy, 
or delegations from congregations in need visited other churches to observe a particular 
candidate. But officials (rightly) saw this decentralized process as creating the possibility for 
“dissension,” factions, and “anarchic manifestations” between layers of power represented by 
the bishopric, deaneries, pastors, and congregations.20 Below will be two examples where 
factions and a loss of church and state control will be featured, in the city of Zalău in the 1970s 
and in 1989 in Timişoara.  
Yet problems that arose from pastor-choosing were not entirely uncommon. Mureş 
County had its own pastor-saga in Ganeşti (Vámosgálfalva) in the late 1960s, where, due to a 
scandal involving a pastor and a young student in the after-hours of catechism, the position 
became vacant. Another pastor had had his eyes set on this post for some time, having grown 
up in the area with relatives in Găneşti. He had many supporters in the town, and these tried to 
immediately call him to the position without the usual deliberation. But not all members were 
convinced, and these wished to go through the entire process whereby pastors would be 
observed and chosen by the customary vote. What transpired was a scandal for the church: 
several years of tension, defiant parishioners locking church doors, accusations of ballot-fixing, 
visits and complaints by parishioners to the Department and Bishopric, the naming of a 
temporary “administrator” to help de-toxify the congregation, and hours and hours of 
surveillance and report-writing.21 In this case, the problem for officials was not excessive 
religiosity but a caustic social environment caused by an inner-church dispute that impeded the 
cooperation of the people in carrying out normal public-social functions. Rather than 
“persecution,” state officials did their best to help bring about a healthy solution. They preferred 
a quiet religious life, not just free from excessive zeal, but from inner-church hostilities and 
scandals as well.  
                                                          
20 Direcția Județeană Mureș a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor” 1965-1983/345, 244. 
21 See documents from the Departmentul Cultelor from 1966 on. 
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Unremarkable Religiosity 
Focusing on the “problems” state representatives faced in managing the Hungarian 
Reformed Church, however, takes attention away from the fact that most of the time, in most 
Reformed Churches, religious practice was quotidian, predictable, and acceptable in this 
“atheist” state. Struggles with religious life were not absent, but they fell comfortably within the 
boundaries of normal religious practice and did not confront the status quo of the relations 
between the church and “atheist” state. 
Most Reformed clergy did not generate causes to concern state officials, and most did 
not warrant any particular attention for overstepping the boundaries of acceptable religious 
practice. Most services, sermons, catechism activities, and the like did not threaten state 
authority or even state ideology. Most of the people in this study are featured because they did 
overstep in some way, thus foregrounding them in officials’ documents. The case of Ödön Nagy 
is one such example of someone whose activity was insufficient to make him the subject of 
reports from the Department of Religions (though knowing the extent of police surveillance, he 
likely had a file with the Securitate).  
Nagy served in three parishes during the reign of Ceauşescu until his retirement in 1976. 
He was in Câmpenița (Mezőfele) for around ten years, from 1958 to 1968, in Solocma 
(Szolokma) from 1968 until 1970, and then finally in Neaua (Havad) until his retirement in 1976. 
His tenure at Câmpenița was marked by tension and division within the community, as some of 
them resented his encouragement of the active believers alongside his supposed disdain for the 
“worldly” members, and one presbyter seemed to have the backing of a number of others when 
he disparagingly remarked in a meeting that Nagy was trying to make Adventists out of them. 
Nagy complained that they were “misers” and “arrogant.” His next appointment in Solocma was 
more positive in terms of his relations with the parish, but he claimed he had been deceived by 
his predecessor there with regard to the living conditions, ones he found detrimental to his 
family’s health and cause to seek a position elsewhere. In Neaua, he encountered a parish in a 
“deteriorated state” materially and religiously, and his six years there were spent in executing 
normal church functions and undertaking renovations. He claimed Neaua had many “divisions,” 
but he did not describe efforts he undertook to heal them, if any.22 
                                                          
22 Ödön Nagy, János Hermán, and Mózes Nyitrai, Palástban: Lelkészek Szórványban [In Cloaks: Pastors in 
Diaspora] (Marosvásárhely: Mentor, 2001), 129–38. 
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Nagy’s travails were not caused by meddlesome state agents, but by various difficult 
pastor-congregation scenarios that could not be traced back to state machinations so much as 
situations that were common before and after the communist era. Religious zeal and 
congregational harmony was not the norm. Rather, the case of Nagy exemplifies the ordinary 
stuff of religious practice in communist Romania. As was argued and explored at length in the 
case of Orthodox priests in Chapter VII, most Reformed pastors, most of the time, performed 
their religious duties according to expectations, in the realm of religious acceptability. Inspectors 
mentioned Reformed priests as contributing in significant ways to social plans and programs. In 
addition, when pastors attended the routinely scheduled and mandatory “orientation” 
conferences, their comments on the “sidelines” were observed, but informers found they made 
comments which were mostly loyal and supportive.23 
Church Democracy and Revolutionary Potential 
Even if the “Bethanists” no longer carried out activity under a specific name following 
their release, due to their being derided by state and church representatives in the trials of the 
1950s, in publications, and at orientation conferences, “Bethanism” was now firmly established 
as a concept and a pejorative. “Bethanism” emerged as the paragon of unacceptable religiosity 
in the Reformed Church, as made evident by the fact that László Papp, who became Bishop over 
the Oradea district after the 1964 amnesty (and lasted until 1989), often deployed the term 
“Bethanism” for its discursive power in his handling of church affairs.  Papp was particularly 
aggressive in rooting out communal activities beyond Sunday worship, including Bible classes, 
choirs, informal worship or prayer gatherings, calling them “pietist deviations.”24 What follows is 
a particularly illustrative case of the ensconced concept of Bethanism-as-unacceptable-
religiosity in an incidence that also demonstrates the potential democratic (or according to 
church and state leaders, “anarchic”) power found in the Reformed Church’s institutional 
culture. The events below provide important context for understanding later ones connected to 
the beginning of the Romanian revolution in Timişoara in 1989. The same raw ingredients that 
made for revolutionary potential in 1989 were present in the 1978 episode which follows. Both 
                                                          
23 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor,” 1975/48, 4, 12. 
24 “Church Life in Romania,” Religion in Communist Lands 17, no. 4 (1989): 357. The personalities of 
church leaders like bishops and deans did matter and have an impact in certain ways. There were two 
bishops over two districts in the Reformed Church (Nagyvárad/Oradea and Kolozsvár/Cluj). In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the two bishops were Laszló Papp and Gyula Nagy, respectively. Bishop Nagy did not 
encourage these activities either, but did not hound their proponents as Papp did. 
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instances involved a major confrontation featuring a complex web of clergy, believers, religious 
leadership, and state officials, but only in 1989 would the conflict spread beyond the 
congregation.  
Just after Christmas in 1970, the pastor of a 4,800 member church (though only a 
fraction participated regularly) died. He was pastor of the main Reformed Congregation and seat 
of the deanery in the medium-sized city of Zalău (Zilah) in Sălaj County. Perhaps surprising to 
those who adhere to a strictly totalitarian view of the Ceausescu regime, there was a democratic 
opportunity in pastoral selection in the Reformed Church, and theoretically, the bishop could 
not oppose a congregation's call or selection of a pastor if it was made by vote of the 
congregation in a meeting. This institutional process that granted congregations the “right” to 
choose or “call” their own head pastor (whereas assistant pastors were placed by the bishop) 
persisted under communist rule. The group of elders, called the presbytery, would invite pastors 
to preach as guests, choose a candidate (theoretically by vote), and then offer him or her a “call” 
to be their pastor. This process, with its authority located locally, meant that the church 
leadership and state officials left some degree of power in the hands of the people, whose 
whims might be undesirable but backed by a legal democratic procedure. 
In February a group from Zalău traveled to the small town of Almaşu to hear the 
preaching of József Sinka to consider him as a candidate. Even before the service, this group of 
fourteen met with him and asked him whether he’d accept a call to Zalău, and he said he would. 
The pastor and his wife invited them back to their home after the service, and served them 
coffee and brandy ‘to warm up.’ 
The inspector from the Department of Religions in Sălaj County at the time, Gheorghe 
David (see Chapter VII), wanted to find out “who the person of the priest Iosif [József] Sinka 
[was].” He found out that Sinka’s village had many “sectarians” like Baptists, Pentecostals, and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, but that “his power to convince is not that brilliant.” Sinka’s son was a 
student at the Theological Institute in Cluj, and during an excursion to Czechoslovakia in 1969 he 
managed to flee to Western Germany, where he still was studying theology. Sinka’s articles in 
various magazines, David found, “tended toward bethanism.” The Sălaj County executive organs 
had “reservations” about him, and the local organs, the bishop, and the inspector all agreed that 
since the called priest would be the dean as well (with Zalău as the seat of the county and the 
deanery), they certainly could not have such an unreliable element with so many potential 
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negatives serving in such a role.25 They required someone with clearer evidence of reliability, 
and Sinka lacked it on more than one front. 
Later that month the presbytery of the congregation was going to meet about choosing 
a priest, and since the bishop would be unable to make it, the clerk asked the inspector whether 
he might attend the meeting. Inspector David, however, knew he could not be seen as 
interfering, telling the clerk that “it’s not good for me to take part.”26 This was an internal 
church process. At the vote, they chose Sinka. 
Although it appeared the presbytery had found their man, their little “warming” toast of 
brandy ended up costing them dearly, and the brandy was just what the church and state 
officials needed to avert having an unreliable element as Dean and pastor in Zalău. The 
Reformed Church’s rules of pastor-calling declared that if the potential priest “bribed, bought 
votes, or made unlawful or illicit promises in writing or orally, personally or through a 
delegation, if he indulged the selectors,” or “if the called or chosen priest in other ways 
employed unlawful methods like: hospitalities, offers of alcoholic drinks, of money,” etc., the 
selection would be void.27 In April Bishop Papp came to Zalău and was joined by a team of 
representatives to investigate the situation. They looked over Sinka’s case and decided to 
“exclude him from the candidacy” due to the violations (the conversation in his house, and the 
serving of brandy). Sinka protested that “they were against him,” but the commission insisted 
upon following proper procedure.28 Drink and procedure did not mix. 
Yet the presbytery insisted on Sinka as their man, forcing the bishop to respond. The 
presbytery already did not like or trust the bishop, and a couple of elders in particular fomented 
the fight, criticizing the Bishop and justifying themselves. Bishop Papp tried to get a temporary 
pastor to stabilize the situation. Considering the existing assistant pastor Ernest Nagy “lacking in 
capacity for guidance,” he appointed Gheorghe Vidits, “a capable and dynamic man” as 
“Managing Priest” in Zalău.29 When the believers found out, they responded by not permitting 
                                                          
25 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor,” 1971/11, 74. 
26 Ibid., 1971/8, 65. 
27 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor,” 1971/11, 73. 
28 Ibid., 75. 
29 Ibid., 75–76. As part of the process of Vidits’ appointment, inspector David wrote up an assessment of 
him: married, one child, only has cousins abroad, and they are only in Hungary, was never sentenced. He 
is well liked and cooperates or supports local initiatives; he maintains connections with local authorities 
and the inspector. Since he started his current position as pastor in 1968 no more Reformed believers 
have joined up with neoprotestants. No evidence of “disloyalty”. He is liked by his colleagues, is “modest”. 
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Rev. Vidits into the church—whose appointment as “Managing Priest” they considered 
unprecedented and “an entirely illegal function.” 
In May inspector David traveled to Oradea to discuss the matter with the bishop, as the 
situation was spiraling out of control and getting ugly. The inspector asked Bishop Papp to clarify 
some rumors David had heard, namely that he had threatened to close the church and abolish 
the position of their priest, and that those who refused to give up on Sinka would have 
disciplinary proceedings taken against them with charges of “hooliganism.” Others complained 
that Papp was trying to replace their “traditional rights” to choose a priest “in a democratic 
spirit” with a “foreign” procedure. 
In response, the bishop replied that he “will not give in to certain anarchistic persons” 
since the possibility might create a “dangerous precedent for the church.” But, he promised to 
keep it a church problem and would not “implicate” either the state organs or Department of 
Religions. He said he would not insist on Vidits and allow Ernest Nagy to remain in the position 
of temporary administrator of the church. The bishop ensured the inspector that he was 
“concerned” about the situation.30 The inspector, although a state representative, could not 
dictate to the bishop, although one might think his status as a church representative made him 
lower.31 
The same scenario—with a democratic process and popular wishes in conflict with the 
meddlesome and authoritarian Bishop Papp while inspector David tried to mediate—was also 
taking place in the choosing of the replacement Dean, now that this position had been 
separated from that of head pastor of Zalău. The locals had their preferred candidate, Carol 
Virág, who was a local pastor and was currently serving as secretary in the Deanery. But Papp 
had his preferred candidate, Pál Várga, of another deanery altogether. Papp wanted Várga to 
help shape the Deanery to Papp’s liking, as opposed to Virág, whom he disparagingly accused of 
sympathizing with “bethanism,”32 even though Virág had not been active in “Bethanist” circles.  
Inspector David did not actively support Papp’s meddling in this affair, so Papp brought 
in support. A dean of another county, Kornel Szablyár, wrote a “declaration” about Virág for the 
benefit of the authorities, which Szablyár suspiciously noted was “unconstrained and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Could be “considered” for future positions of power since he is in good standing with Bishop Papp. He is 
not a “fanatic,” meriting promotion (p. 126).  
30 Ibid., 78. 
31 Some have argued that high-ranking church leaders should also be considered high-ranking members of 
the secret police, since there is considerable evidence for the power and information they wielded. 
32 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor” 1972/16, 226–227. 
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uninfluenced by anyone.” He claimed he had heard of someone named “Virág” with “ultra-
pietist traits, bethanist inclinations” linked to “Visky and others.” At his next parish, he claimed 
Virág was “in the attention of both the church tutelary bodies and of others (local and 
regional),” and that although he was a “conscientious priest” who performed his duties, he was 
guilty of “conduct[ing] himself extremely closed with regard to any local authorities, not 
collaborating with the People’s Council.” He characterized Virág as “totally passive” politically, 
uninterested in supporting improvements for the citizens, not participatory in the church 
conferences, and when confronted about these matters, Virág supposedly responded in a 
“sarcastic” and “scoffing” manner, causing superiors to be “uncertain” about him.33  
Yet when David did his own verification of Szablyár’s and Papp’s accusations, he found 
that Virág was a “smoker,” something “the bethanists did not do.” As to the accusation that he 
“would not collaborate as needed with the local organs,” David found that “he collaborates 
even quite well,” and that what he had observed “obliges us to see that he has changed.” David 
was concerned about the effects Papp’s meddling would have. Papp had somewhat 
scandalously already disallowed from candidacy another local favorite and interim Dean, Zoltán 
Fejer (mentioned above as having popular services with Hungarian colors) for reasons not given 
in the documents, causing Fejer to promise he’d refuse further service in the deanery at all. 
Virág promised to refuse further service if Papp’s favorite Várga was chosen, citing past 
grievances with Várga. The currently serving treasurer also promised to quit if the outsider 
Várga was appointed. Despite the reality of a democratic choosing, the candidates, officeholders 
for the deanery, and local pastors were all prepared for Papp’s favorite to win.34 
In fact, when the ballots were counted, Virág won. But Papp told inspector David that 
“‘he will never let the bethanist play his tricks.” Papp’s plan was to “call the chosen priest, Carol 
Virág, in to him and to send him in front of the discipline consistory where he should justify by 
what means he obtained the majority of votes,” as Papp had “evidence” that a supportive 
pastor conducted “propaganda in favor of [Virág].’” The inspector tried to caution the Bishop, 
replying that “in my opinion much wisdom and tact is needed.” David wanted to avoid “creating 
an unhealthy environment among the priests,” as well as the result that “the new leadership 
team would constantly be under a state of tension.” Although the inspector could agree with 
the Bishop that the choice of Virág was not preferable to Várga, he felt that “going on this path 
                                                          
33 Ibid., 330. 
34 Ibid., 227–28. 
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will be even worse”: “the animosities” that are “smoldering” will “take root,” meaning that Papp 
should try to “win” them over, not “push them aside.”35 A representative of the atheist state 
was trying to smooth relations in the Reformed Church, even when the Church’s own head was 
not. But the bishop got his wish, as Virág backed down without a fight, ultimately at the expense 
of Papp’s reputation in the Zalău Deanery. 
Meanwhile, the congregation in Zalău still needed a pastor. The bishop informed 
inspector David that on March 21, 40 people went to hear the pastor in Teaca, Kálmán Adorján, 
as a possible candidate. Using the same pejorative as before, the bishop “remarked that the 
respective person was bethanist or had a connection with them.” But the inspector found that 
the “competent organs” of the respective county “are of the view that the priest could occupy 
the post, they have nothing against it.” The question lay with the Bishop to decide. The 
presbytery had asked David if he had anything against Adorján (“‘to not lose time and to resolve 
for once the situation’”). His opinion was, “Taking into account that it is only about the function 
of priest in Zalău parish, I personally consider it worth Mr. Bishop using this opportunity to put 
an end to the undesired situation in Zalău parish.”36 
Despite whatever reservations Bishop Papp may have had about this “bethanist” 
Kálmán Adorján, he evidently gave his consent.37 He had long ago worn out the patience of the 
presbytery and was wearing out that of the inspector as well. The distrust and animosity within 
the Reformed Church exceeded any animosity between the Department of Religions and the 
Church; in fact, both sides of the church confided in the state representative, David, and asked 
for mediation. 
Thus, in mid-1972 the Zalău congregation officially called Adorján, while Papp’s favored 
candidate Pál Várga became the Dean, the latter according to the wishes of the Bishop, the 
former less so. Despite the candidate for pastor having a less-than perfect religious profile in the 
state’s or church leadership’s eyes, in the end, the local church and its presbytery managed to 
get someone they wanted by a spirited negotiation with church and state authorities. This 
contest occurred due to a democratic process that held over from pre-communist times and was 
respected as legitimate by the authorities (yet far from unmolested by church leaders!). Yet the 
                                                          
35 Ibid., 228–29. 
36 Ibid., 229–30. 
37 Because inspector David of Sălaj County took up a post in a neighboring county at this time, some of the 
hoped-for files documenting the final stages of this process are not there, making the final stages of the 
presbytery’s call of Adorján unclear. 
380 
 
choosing of the Dean and new pastor in Zalău Deanery was only the beginning of a protracted 
and spirited battle. An acquaintance of Adorján’s warned him that he was entering “a hornet's 
nest,”38 but he came anyway, not knowing that his coming there would far from resolve the 
problems, but only create new ones. 
Starting in 1972, Adorján’s rapport developed quite well with the congregation. The 
church had services or gatherings nearly every day, and as many as 80 came for Bible studies. 
Adorján’s wife re-started the choir with permission of the dean. Over a thousand sometimes 
attended the church on festive Sundays. From 1975 until 1978, however, Adorján and his 
congregation experienced nothing but hardship and difficulty. In 1975 one of his goals was to 
undertake heating the church for wintertime, but Bishop Papp replied that “since our ancestors 
bore the winter cold, [you] should too.” They decided to go by another route and take it upon 
themselves, without support of the Bishopric. Later that year the issue of the heating was 
investigated at the instigation of church and state authorities, and he was fined by the 
investigating parties for “irregularities” in the purchase and installation of a heating system.39  
In fact, several of his own congregation provided information about “irregularities” in 
his activities to the bishop, and inspector Roman and local officials from the civil Popular Council 
were also notified. In addition, in his own parish house, he was accused of “bethanist activity – 
studying of the Bible,” and other local pastors were also present, including two of his friends as 
well as former “Bethanist” convict, Sándor Szilágyi. Also (supposedly), he received visitors in 
1974 who delivered Bibles, but since these Bibles “[did] not coincide with the current Bibles 
being used,” foul play of some sort was insinuated (e.g. unauthorized delivery to others). The 
church’s money-collection boxes were supposedly unlawfully lying in Adorján’s home, 
suggesting that perhaps he was taking from them. A former chaplain of the church passed along 
the information that Adorján had typed out copies of pages on his typewriter used for catechism 
and confirmation without official pre-approval. In addition, he supposedly received money from 
each teen participating in confirmation but did not declare this income for tax purposes from 
1973 through 1975. With this money, he ostensibly bought a television, rugs, and furniture, 
while “the organist” (his wife) purchased a vacuum cleaner. Last on the list was that he 
                                                          
38 László Miklós, Akik Imádkoztak Üldözőikért: Börtönvallomások, Emlékezések [Those Who Prayed for 
Their Persecutors: Prison Testimonies, Memories] (Kolozsvár [Cluj-Napoca, Romania]: Erdélyi Református 
Egyházkerület, 1996), 25. 
39 Ibid., 19. 
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neglected to have the necessary “legal forms” filed for the heating installation in the church, and 
he did not make proper reports of foreign visitors.40  
It is difficult to assert the truth of the situation, whether all of these in fact occurred, or 
whether such “technicalities” might have been easily overlooked or handled otherwise. But it is 
clear that the bishop was not hesitant to take disciplinary measures, and the vice president of 
the local Popular Council and the “local organs” of the county were not “opposed to measures 
which are expected to be taken by the Reformed Bishopric of Oradea” against Adorján.41 
By the bishop's recommendation, the Department revoked Adorján’s work permit in 
February 1976. Adorján managed to get his permission back in May.42 Adorján and his yet-loyal 
elders were at loggerheads with Papp, and Roman remained in the middle and acted as 
mediator by telling all parties to keep this inner-church problem within the church. The bishop 
created additional problems by having the pastor’s checking account frozen to prevent deposits 
of his wages, a situation Adorján and some others from the church circumvented on the side 
while pleading for the account to be reopened all the way until 1977. Papp was even overheard 
declaring that he wanted to find something wrong, so that “they could hit [Adorján] with at least 
two years [in prison].” Adorján often had to go in for interrogations and hearings, while the 
congregation helped to provide for the family’s needs.43 In Adorján’s opinion, “Despite all of 
this, or just because of this, the church was full every Sunday, for Bible study even 200 came.” 
The congregation was with him. Signatures were collected on several occasions for his defense, 
numbering as many as 3,000.44 
In June of 1977, a delegation of two supervisors from the bishopric, the dean, and a 
priest of the local deanery came for “the handover and takeover” of the parish from Adorján, an 
act which “did not succeed” because Adorján and his supporters flatly refused to vacate. Since 
the appropriate church avenues were not successful, Roman had to inform city- and county-
level “competent organs” about the situation. The following week, Adorján and Roman met, and 
the pastor informed the inspector that “he had gone to the Department of Religions [in 
Bucharest], where he was given an audience, saying that he was advised to make an appeal with 
                                                          
40 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor” 1975/43, 50–51.  
41 Ibid., 52. 
42 Direcția Județeană Sălaj a Arhivelor Naționale, “Departmentul Cultelor”, 1976/50, 93. 
43 Miklós, Akik Imádkoztak Üldözőikért:, 26. 
44 Ibid., 27. 
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regard to his transfer, expecting to receive a path for resolution.”45 Adorján was using the 
complex layers of authority to his advantage by negotiating among them. 
At a subsequent meeting with the Bishop, Adorján reported that the “essence of it was, 
'If you leave Zalău, I will have every church and civil proceeding against you stopped.'“46 This 
statement indicates that the problem was not his “aberrations,” but his presence and influence 
in the congregation in Zalău itself. They would not begrudge placing him in a smaller parish, nor 
would they begrudge the congregation a more “acceptable” minister.  
Yet the congregation begged him and his wife to “carry out [their] service and not give 
in to force” at a December 31 meeting in which more than 2,000 were in the church. But since 
Church avenues had failed to remove Adorján, the bishop called for the state authorities to 
remove him from his position and the parish. Meetings in January of 1978 with the county 
police, the religious inspector, and the city police had the same message: he should “obey the 
bishop.” But meanwhile, 50-60, even as many as 100 members of his congregation were 
routinely present around the parish to try to prevent his forceful removal, creating a tense 
environment. On the seventeenth of January the Dean arrived to his home with some 40 police 
and secret police personnel, but he was not at home.47 Some 30 younger men even 
accompanied him to the chief prosecutor, who told him that he must “leave Zalău.”  
When Adorján met the head of the Department of Religions in Bucharest along with 
inspector Roman (who had been ordered to follow him everywhere, even up to the bathroom 
door on the train), the two Reformed bishops were there already. They wanted him to leave his 
post willingly, while he wanted them to admit that he was innocent and claimed that that their 
steps to remove him were unlawful. Eventually Department of Religions Chief Ion Popescu 
threatened him, saying that if he would not renounce, he would be detained, his wife would be 
thrown out of the house, and the five children from their school. Drained by the battle and 
unwilling to endure further threats, he decided to give up. 
At the farewell service on January 29, there were 2,100 people in the church, including 
many “leather-jacketed” Securitate and police officers.48 The years marked by congregational 
enthusiasm were swallowed up by an unyielding church-state alliance with its divisive informers. 
A few days later he handed over his parish, though the congregation did not give in so easily. 
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Some of them had decided to lock up the church and the pastor's office, declaring to the 
authorities “we are awaiting the return of our pastor, and then we'll open up the church.” The 
police and Securitate used their sources to identify the leaders of the “rebellion,” fined them for 
“disturbing the peace,” and re-opened the church. About two months after Adorján left, 
services started again with a temporary pastor, and those who attended services were obliged 
to hear negative allusions to the Adorjáns for some time after their departure. By October 1978 
the congregation had chosen a new pastor to whom the authorities granted permission.49 
During this ten-year period in one Reformed congregation, the potential power of the 
democratic institutions (however compromised or circumscribed) in the church become visible. 
The power to choose a pastor and keep him was formidable, but such power could be limited by 
disciplinary proceedings, denying necessary authorizations, and freezing a bank account. Yet 
church or state officials had to proceed with care in limiting the power of democracy, lest they 
antagonize the believers and their pastor enough to cause them to bond together in defiance.  
As we will witness below, the same raw ingredients that would make for revolutionary 
potential in 1989 were present in 1978 as well: a younger, dynamic, and stubborn Reformed 
Priest, a loyal and determined presbytery and congregation, the same extremely stalwart and 
tactless Bishop Papp, and certain democratic processes within the Reformed Church (more or 
less) respected by church and state authorities. But these ingredients alone do not make a 
revolution; they only create the potential for a confrontation. In 1978 there was simply not 
enough anti-state antagonism among the general population to mobilize the masses for a 
protracted struggle, since “The State” or Ceausescu had not been identified by the masses as 
“Enemy No. 1” or as responsible for all grievances. The grievances in Zalău were considered 
localized; they were not universal enough to unite strangers beyond the Church community. Just 
over ten years later in Timişoara, the church and state authorities would not be so lucky – 
although just how the fight of a stubbornly nationalistic Hungarian Pastor named Laszlo Tőkés 
could become a “Romanian” cause remains a puzzle to be explored below. 
Renewal Reemerges on the Margins 
Although the “Bethanists” were kept under watch in rural parishes, the “embers of 
revival” did not fade out; not everyone was dissuaded from pushing the limits of acceptable 
religiosity. In the years after cobbler-evangelist Jenő Nagy was released from prison in 1964 with 
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the others, on many Sunday afternoons some 35-40 youth gathered together at his house. But 
the authorities visited him and forbade him from holding such large gatherings, forcing the 
worshippers to get more creative. Those who attended such gatherings did so simply as 
“believers,” not as “Bethanists,” and teenage attendee István Halmen grew up seeing himself as 
a “believer” (as opposed to simply “Reformed” or “Lutheran,” for example) whose faith meant 
more than just a family or religious affiliation. At the gatherings, they read the Bible, discussed 
it, and sang (but not too loudly), and they always had a sort of ready excuse for their meeting, 
such as someone’s birthday. But as youth, they found excitement in the gatherings and did not 
really fear the consequences. Being a part of a group brought good feelings, “as in a family” or 
like “home.” As teenagers, they voluntarily held their own meetings apart from their parents, 
since they regarded it as an opportunity for gathering as friends.50 
Youth interest in “community life” increased in the 1970s and 1980s, and the children of 
those imprisoned in the late 1950s often actively pushed the boundaries of acceptable 
religiosity. Like the young Orthodox priests from the Banat (see Chapter VII), many of the youth 
were skeptical of church leaders, having parents or friends’ parents who had been unnecessarily 
harassed. The children of those imprisoned were barred from higher education in many cases or 
could not get the bishop’s approval for theological studies or placement.51 Some pastors even 
tried to provide a sort of “underground seminary education” for interested youth who sought 
more than what the Seminary offered.52 
This group of believers customarily used the occasions of official holidays like New 
Year’s, the First of May (Labor Day), and August 23 (celebrating the liberation from fascism in 
1944) for gatherings. Already in the late 1960s Ferenc Visky had started holding gatherings, and 
word spread by mouth. Taking their own means of transportation, guests ate together and slept 
wherever there was space. Participants saw Visky’s home as a “true pilgrimage site” where 
“youth from every part of the country flocked,” and many of the imprisoned “Bethanists” were 
there as well. Their activities were “kept strictly within the parish and church buildings” to 
minimize the risk of repercussions.53  
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In 1976, some youth spent time bicycling around the countryside looking for a suitable 
place to have hidden camps, and they found Lacu Leşu (Lesi Tó) which was 35 kilometers from 
the train station. Two weeks later, they had their first camp there.54 They paid strict attention to 
being as secretive as they could, but informers were common. Technically, they were there for 
camping, as tourism was not forbidden. Pastors, their families, lay persons, and youth played, 
swam, and hiked. But they also sang songs and studied the Bible. For these latter activities, they 
usually went into the woods, away from the gaze of any others, but sometimes they 
encountered shepherds with their flocks. Visky recalls that “the state security and militia too 
often stepped in right during Bible study, requested documentation [for show their right to 
gather], but there was nothing to show them.”55 They were ordered to gather only by the lake, 
since it was publicly visible.  
The re-emergence of this active group of believers—albeit not going by a specific 
name—did not escape the notice of state agents. In an August 1977 report, the inspector noted 
that “once again a trend of reemergence of the bethanist movement has been observed.” State 
agents had caught them “openly” meeting, as well as speaking at a burial and at a consecration 
of a church. In addition, “at large parishes, vacant, in Tg-Mureş,” some “known bethanist 
elements” were being chosen to fill them.56 
Although active “believers”—whom state and church authorities still labeled 
“bethanists”—still suffered harassment in the 1970s and 1980s, the pitch was not what it was in 
the 1950s. All of those formerly imprisoned had to face periodic interrogations and vague 
threats that another prison term awaited them, and there were moments in which they feared a 
wave of arrests followed by show trials, but state authorities preferred to use “intimidation” and 
warn them to simply “believe what [they] believe” but not keep up the close relationships.57 
Although state representatives were not beyond deploying show trials or violence, they had to 
weigh the costs on an international scale. The state was enjoying some of the economic benefits 
of an improved foreign reputation (Romania was granted “Most Favored Nation” status by the 
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U.S. in 1975), and believers had an ever-increasing network of communication that kept those in 
the West apprised of anything resembling religious persecution.58  
The focus of authorities’ violence, rather, was on the younger generation, whom they 
evidently considered more dangerous.59 But because authorities used retribution more 
sparingly, many youth who were active in believers’ circles looked fondly at the late 1970s and 
1980s and felt that they shared a true religious community. As one such young man put it, 
“From the point of view of my spiritual life, it meant a lot that there was an opportunity to meet 
and live our faith as youth.”60 Another said that as youth, they grew tired of having to remain a 
passive audience and did not want to simply keep their heads down and be quiet. They sensed 
that what made church acceptable was when one authorized person spoke while the others 
listened, but this scenario did not allow for authentic, open discussions where youth could 
debate or question.61 Thus, the void sent them looking and made gatherings marked by 
authenticity and openness all the more attractive. Last, that elements of “risk” and “a little 
conspiracy” were aspects of voluntary, unauthorized youth gatherings made them all the more 
attractive to certain youth and helped bond them, leading many of them to feel that never in 
their lives did they enjoy such “close” and “lively” friendships as they did at this time.62 
Religious, Ethnic, and National Mobilization in Timisoara 
The final episode of this project brings us to the Hungarian Reformed Church in 
Timişoara (Temesvár), where several strands of this story come together: “believer”-
”bethanists,” church democracy, obstinate clergy (again Bishop Papp, but this time with László 
Tőkés), youth, and revolution. This episode will demonstrate that state agents were right to 
worry about managing religion and keeping it benign. 
Youth who had parents with problematic histories were routinely barred from pursuing 
careers in the humanities, arts, or education (locations with more potential for ideological 
influence), and as such, some of the children or relatives of the imprisoned “Bethanists” found 
themselves studying for degrees at the technical university in Timişoara. Visky’s son András 
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(now a well-known writer), Sándor Szilágyi’s grandson of the same name, and István Halmen had 
come to Timişoara to study engineering, but while there, they took part in the religious life of 
the Reformed Church. Halmen had come from Târgu Mureş (Vásárhely) where he had been an 
active participant in the youth groups that centered around Jenő Nagy and later Kálmán Csiha. 
But in Timişoara, the pastor at the Reformed Church was a somewhat notorious figure, Leo 
Peuker, whom many considered a so-called “Red Priest,” someone whose support of the regime 
so far outshined his interest in spiritual or religious matters that the authenticity of his faith 
might be called into question. A typical church service featured some twenty widows along with 
a small group (up to ten) of these “believers,” or spiritually inclined youth, who considered it 
part of their faith commitment to attend church. The youth found Peuker’s preaching “boring” 
and “extremely weak,” and since they “couldn’t get anything out of it,” they sought additional 
sites for religiosity.63 Thus with a dead congregational life, minimal church attendance, and 
certainly no youth group, Halmen and others participated in the youth activities of other 
protestant denominations, like the Baptists. Sometimes they would travel to hear Ferenc Visky 
preach.64 
Yet in time, emboldened by each other, Halmen and András Visky approached Peuker 
and asked him the most unlikely of questions: could there be a youth group like there was in 
Kálmán Csiha’s church? And as a sort of communist miracle, Peuker agreed! (N.b.: Peuker and 
Bishop Papp supposedly did not get along. Peuker had designs on the Bishopric but was 
overlooked in favor of Papp, and it seems they did things to antagonize each other. In this case, 
Peuker may have allowed a youth group out of boredom or to be an annoyance to Papp’s 
attempts to limit any extra-curricular religious activity.65) During the first year of this youth 
group, Peuker attended each gathering. Although the youth were allowed to talk, he made sure 
to didactically correct each one of them after they spoke. The following years he assigned his 
assistant pastor to this duty, but as the assistant pastor would change often, the youth group 
gained momentum, and the fresh-from-seminary pastor became more like a guest.66 
By the early 1980s, there were several youth groups in the Timişoara region, with 
Reformed, Catholic, and Baptist or other protestant denominations each having one. Many 
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youth participated in more than one, giving rise to a sort of ecumenical-Christian-youth 
culture.67 Then a new assistant pastor, László Tőkés, was appointed by Bishop Papp, and Tőkés 
did not come to be passive. 
One of Tőkés’ responsibilities was to oversee the youth group, but he evidently did not 
value this opportunity (in his memoirs, he does not find it noteworthy enough to mention it 
among his activities, only complaining that he was not given the pulpit). In fact, those attending 
the youth group as a place of spiritual openness and authenticity found their new assistant 
pastor to be quite uninterested in spiritual matters compared to activities of a more ethnic 
character, and his attitude toward the “believers” was not particularly congenial. People like 
Halmen felt they “had more in common with Romanian believers than with nationalist 
Hungarians” like Tőkés, for whom the church was more of a bastion for Hungarian national 
identity.68  
But Tőkés’ appointment was far from an accidental, uncomplicated affair; his placement 
in Timişoara was purposeful, and he came with baggage. In fact, it seems quite likely that Bishop 
Papp made Tőkés there as an assistant to annoy his former rival Peuker, as Tőkés had shown 
himself to be a thorny figure. In seminary, he and some friends campaigned to get the student 
body to be filled by elections instead of professorial appointments in hopes that it would 
respond to student desires, but this only got him into trouble. As a young assistant pastor in Dej 
(Dés), he started a Bible study that he catered to youth, and its topics were not strictly 
religious.69 He then started a “study group” as a place for people to discuss ideas, and he also 
initiated many cultural activities (often of a distinctly Hungarian character). He became very 
popular with his congregation, and they tried to appoint him as a “permanent” assistant pastor, 
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free from the bishop’s power to transfer him, but the bishop transferred him anyway, citing the 
congregation’s appointment as uncanonical (while they cited his move  as uncanonical). Tőkés 
refused to accept his new appointment and instead retreated to his parents’ home, where he 
wrote letters complaining of his mistreatment. The congregation of Dej wrote in support of him, 
visited the bishop, shunned the head pastor and asked for his removal, and then tried to elect 
Tőkés head pastor, but church and state authorities would not allow it.70 
When Tőkés arrived in Timişoara in July 1986, the church was operating in the manner 
more or less preferred by the state: poor attendance, no dynamism, and predictable. Leo Peuker 
was doing his job well. Tőkés describes the services as “reduced to a bare minimum […,] to 
forms and rituals.”71 For their residence, Tőkés and his wife were given a small room (essentially 
a closet) without a bathroom or fireplace, even though they were expecting a baby.  
Although Tőkés was not winning over the hearts of the particularly active youth 
“believers” with his sometimes insensitive teasing and disinterest in spiritual matters,72 he was 
winning the hearts of some others in the congregation. He occasionally had the opportunity to 
preach on Sunday afternoons at the remote church site (the Gyárváros Prayer-house), a second 
site of the church further out in town where afternoon services were held. But without much to 
do, he decided to visit people in the parish. At first these visits with parishioners were tense and 
awkward. After a few weeks passed, a few had the courage to speak up. One noted to him that 
Peuker warned them about Tőkés as a “’rebel, an enemy of the State’” and that if they 
“’associated’” with him, “’it could be harmful.’”73 The strategy was clear: to keep Tőkés isolated 
from them.  
One family of regular attenders invited the new assistant Tőkés for dinner after noticing 
how he “sat there on the pastor's bench moping and not getting to talk in the pulpit.” They 
heard about his struggles in Dej with the authorities and how he was placed under Peuker's 
watch. In little informal meetings like these, they say, he began his work of “the enlistment of 
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the scattered congregation,” and invited them to participate at the remote Gyárváros Prayer-
house.74 Though not allowed to preach, do burials, or baptize, and only permitted some of these 
afternoon services, people felt that “Laszlo brought an entirely new spirit, […] and more and 
more people started to come,” including youth. They held a Christmas program with poetry 
readings at the prayer house which youth and parents attended.75 
Members of the congregation grew sympathetic toward Tőkés, for his past fights and 
current plight, especially the very poor living situation for them and their baby. More and more 
felt inclined to support this young pastor, seeing him as energetic, capable, but disenfranchised 
in his desires to make something better out of their congregation. Even in the busyness of the 
first Christmas season of Tőkés’ service in 1986, Peuker undertook all of the responsibilities, as it 
was unusual for a pastor to scorn the help of an assistant. But in a surprise turn of events, 
Peuker soon suffered a stroke and died.76 Tőkés was summoned to the bishop’s office at the 
beginning of 1987, and Papp warned Tőkés while also trying to entice him with offers of future 
power and influence should he behave. Despite his past and record of disloyalty, he was allowed 
to remain as pastor, with the understanding that it was “probationary.” He was expected to 
obey his elders, in return for which he would be given the position in full.77 The position of head 
pastor was left unfilled, as the Bishop wanted to keep control of Tőkés and the position.  
The Tőkés family moved into the parish from the tiny Sacristy, and his efforts expanded. 
He wrote letters to those who had not been attending. His sermons started drawing in more and 
more people.78 Tőkés put energy into catechism and confirmation classes, writing letters to 
encourage parents to send their children, and as in Dej, he organized non-Sunday services and 
other celebratory services with various “special activities” for important religious days. It 
seemed to happen all too often that during services or events the electricity was switched off, 
but they learned to bring candles and felt that the celebration was “more uplifting and 
beautiful” this way.79 Obstacles only heightened a sense of community and belonging, and this 
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community implicitly or explicitly contrasted with the threat of informers and the unreliability of 
the state in just keeping the lights on. 
People were “inspired” by him to get involved, and they became devoted to him. People 
who had only attended on high religious holidays started attending with increasing regularity. 
One woman decided to leave her good-paying job and work for the church as a cleaning woman, 
so inspired was she to make changes in her life. She then began helping the Tőkés family in 
many small ways, getting things for them and running errands.80  
He attempted to preach in a “direct and fearless” way, and some who were not 
members – or even Hungarian – came to hear him preach. Many were drawn to the way in 
which he would preach on issues that were “relevant to their everyday lives.”81 Tőkés not only 
confided his battles with the bishopric to friends , he would even report these from the pulpit at 
times, and word spread around town of a young minister who would say things one never 
expected to hear. It also helped that the contrast was great, as the previous priest had a picture 
of Ceausescu in his office and held services for a handful of people. Now Romanians and people 
of other faiths were coming (neoprotestant women were identified for their bonnets).82 
University students spread the news, and students with other religious backgrounds, including 
Baptists, Catholics, and Orthodox, attended the church as well.83 After some time had passed, 
the church was so full that two services were being held, and loudspeakers were installed to 
reach those who could not enter the church building.84 At Easter they did not fit in the church, 
and speakers were put up for those who could not fit.85 Evidently the leadership of the pastor 
mattered—people were coming. 
Tőkés inspired gatherings like an evening of Jenő Dsida readings (famous Hungarian 
poet) and joint services with Catholics, Baptists, and Pentecostals. The congregation also 
organized an ecumenical celebratory event in which Catholics and Reformed believers held a 
joint service with Hungarian and German priests participating and poetry being read. But the 
gatherings were not strictly “Hungarian.” There were times when parts of the service were 
conducted in Romanian, and one time an Orthodox priest and choir came and conducted the 
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service.86 State representatives feared such spontaneously organized ecumenism, however (see 
Chapter VII). 
The Church initially supported renovations in 1988, but the reactions by church and 
state authorities in late 1988 and early 1989 took a more serious and threatening turn. Clearly, 
the religiosity of this parish was transgressing the lines of acceptability.  In November 1988, 
counteracting months of work and planning, the authorities put a stop to their church 
reconstruction plan, which had become necessary due to the now-crowded church. Tőkés was 
frustrated, as “It was something that bound the church together, that built up our identity as a 
community of people. To stop the rebuilding would have been a serious setback to our growth 
as a fellowship.” He responded as he had in the past: he called the move “illegal,” and he 
“refused to obey.”87 
Feelings of enthusiasm, community, and commitment increased. Attila Csőke says that 
things started getting exciting in 1988-89, and around March 1989, “I made up my mind that on 
Sundays I too will go to the church service—if only because at last there was someone who even 
publicly dared stand up for the right toward the authorities, and especially that he was 
Hungarian too. […] For if we Hungarians do not help one another, then we wait in vain for 
someone else.” Then his parents and friends came too.88 The church had become a place where 
some of them felt that “as Hungarians” they could band together.  
The issue of being Hungarian was central to Tőkés, and he was not alone.  Supposedly 
because Tőkés had joined with János Molnár (his former colleague at Seminary and partner in 
rebellion there) in writing a manifesto against what they perceived as Ceauşescu’s systematic 
destruction of Hungarian villages (his so-called “systematization program”),89 Papp decided to 
                                                          
86 Ibid., 137–38. Others say that Tőkés himself preached in Romanian a few times to accommodate 
increasing numbers of Romanians in attendance. 
87 Tőkés, With God, for the People, 116. 
88 Tőkés, Egymás Tükrében, 204. 
89 Seminary friend and fellow student-activist János Molnár had been relocated to the same deanery as 
Tőkés and lived in neighboring Arad county, in the town of Borossebes/Sebiş. Molnar and Tőkés would 
meet periodically, and they decided they must oppose Ceausescu’s systematization plan, which was to 
reorganize settlements, sometimes by destroying villages (and some contend it had a particular focus on 
Hungarian villages). Using their contacts in all Reformed deaneries, they urged them to present a 
document they had written protesting the plan. Pastors were to sign it and it would be passed on to the 
bishop as a symbol of Reformed Church opposition to this plan. They distributed it to “willing” readers in 
other deaneries, and Molnár read it in the Arad deanery (but no one dared read it in any other one). 
Fellow pastors were quite alarmed and agreed that something needed to be done. Most of them signed 
the memorandum that was to be sent to the bishop. This activity was subsequently halted, and they were 
brought in for interrogation. Molnár was questioned by the bishop, who did not seem concerned about 
393 
 
discipline him by removing him from Timişoara. On March 9, 1989, Administrator of Synod Gyula 
Eszenyi chastised him for his activities and for failing “to maintain the required relations” with 
religious ministry officials.90 
On April 1 they were informed that he was to be removed from his position, but Tőkés 
decided that he would not give in. On April 13, the deanery’s disciplinary committee voted to 
have him suspended and disciplined. His accusations included “disturbing the life of faith” and 
“serious violations endangering the peaceful life of the congregation.”91 Church life was 
supposed to be benign. On May 21, the local presbytery “resolved to support [Tőkés] with a new 
petition” which opposed his transfer and used their “statutory right” to appoint him as full 
pastor.92  
Tőkés and his supporters had a sophisticated system for distributing letters across the 
border to Hungary and concerned people in the West, in attempts to publicize their struggle.93 
Starting in April, Tőkés never went anywhere without being accompanied by some friends or 
colleagues (to serve as bodyguards, deterrents, or witnesses).94 Even to conduct a burial, he was 
always accompanied. The attempt to isolate and deprive the Tőkés family only heightened the 
communal response. 
On August 28 the Department of Religions revoked his permit for this position. 
Heightening tensions, a member of Tőkés’ church and head of the renovation project, Ernő 
Újvárossy, was found dead after mysteriously vanishing in September. He was known to have 
been threatened by the Securitate. Tőkés made a rare exit from his apartment to conduct this 
funeral, where agents photographed the thirty or so who were brave enough to attend. Other 
members and elders suffered attacks in the streets by unknown assailants.95 On October 20, the 
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city court wrote an eviction notice for Tőkés, as he had disobeyed church authorities in their 
transfer of him.96  
The Presbytery traveled to Oradea to meet the bishop, but they were kept waiting; he 
was “busy with foreigners” all day. The next Sunday the congregation collected signatures 
petitioning for Tőkés to remain, putting their names, addresses, and phone numbers. Two from 
the congregation delivered it to their Dean in Arad.97 Soon thereafter on November 2, the 
electricity went out at night in their neighborhood, and four masked men burst in to the parish 
home, armed with knives. A scuffle ensued, Tőkés was wounded, but finding several guests 
(bodyguards and witnesses) there to help repel their attack, the assailants fled.98 Tőkés’ wife 
yelled for the Securitate agents who had been keeping permanent watch outside their home to 
come and help, but they were curiously unresponsive.99  
Tőkés received word that on Friday, December 15, 1989, he was to be evicted by force 
because he had refused to vacate his post and apartment as ordered on August 20. He 
announced this impending action to the congregation on Sunday the tenth and invited them to 
come and witness this “illegal act.” That morning, Tőkés appeared at the window to find several 
dozen people there, many of whom were older women. He suggested they go home, and there 
were some feeble attempts by police to ask the people to leave, which only led to angry 
exchanges. But the crowd grew. By 1:30, there were “hundreds.”100 In addition to the ones from 
Tőkés’ congregation who were there initially, onlookers and other curious people joined them as 
news of the situation spread. Romanians outnumbered Hungarians toward late afternoon, and 
students came as well.  
A little after six the pastor and his wife appeared in a window, and they began to speak 
with the congregants in Hungarian. A Romanian university student named Ion Iştvan, having 
heard about this spectacle, had come for himself to see what was happening. So that he could 
understand what was being said, he shouted out, “in Romanian too!” Tőkés told them that 
“’They want to evacuate us, not today, but they will tomorrow...’” Several of the Romanians 
replied at once, “'Never. We won't leave you!'“ Iştvan said they found themselves shouting as if 
it were “against the political regime,” so badly did they want to induce some sort of change. The 
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crowd gained courage, people mingled, chatted, and “were smiling, as if from our looks too we 
would have understood one another.”101 
By nightfall, the crowd numbered over one thousand. Earlier in the day, a few present 
had worried that they were too few, and that provocateurs would be sent into the crowds to 
create chaos. They had come up with the idea of asking the local Baptist congregation to join 
them, and Pastor Dugulescu was willing. After just an hour of asking them to come on the 15th, 
many of his congregation were joining them at their church.102 A Reformed church member, 
Lajos Varga, had mentioned to a Pentecostal colleague (“with whom our congregation had close 
ties”) what was to happen on Friday, and urged him to ask his congregation to support them, 
and a group of them were there too.103 The Mayor came, met with Tőkés and a small group of 
his supporters, and agreed to Tőkés’ requests in exchange for Tőkés’ assistance in driving the 
crowd away.104 But when they announced this from the window, the crowd remained suspect 
and would not leave. The crowd was beyond Tőkés’ control.  
In the large evening crowd, some youth suggested singing hymns that were familiar to 
the Protestant denominations. “Silent Night” and another popular carol were sung in Hungarian 
and Romanian.105 At one point, people began to sing the old Romanian national anthem, 
Deşteaptă-te române, (“Awaken, Romanian”). Certainly Tőkés’ neighbor Miescu was not the 
only one pondering the regime changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe in the months prior: she 
says that “we became emboldened for a possible opportunity of liberation.”106 Scenes like a 
young man climbing atop the stopped trolley, banging on it, and shouting “Down with 
Ceausescu! May the Revolution live!” made it evident that this had gone far beyond an anti-
eviction gathering of some loyal parishioners. Chanting began, and not all were displaying 
passivity.  A young woman named Krisztina Balaton says that this event was almost like a “good 
party” to her and some of her friends. As “youth, we really enjoyed this,” she recalls—being 
                                                          
101 Tőkés, Egymás Tükrében, 181. 
102 Ibid., 128, 258; Peter Dugulescu, Repenters, ed. Kathleen Tsubata, trans. Dorothy Elford (Jesus the 
Hope of Romania, 2004), 197–99. Dugulescu had never personally met Tőkés, but they now “felt very 
close to one another” because of their situations (Dugulescu had suffered an assassination attempt on his 
life when the driver of an empty truck tried to run him over). 
103 Tőkés, With God, for the People, 15. 
104 Tőkés demanded that the eviction order be revoked, his broken windows repaired, and a doctor 
permitted to see his pregnant wife. 
105 Petru Dugulescu, Ei Mi-au Programat Moartea [They Scheduled my Death] (Timişoara: Marineasa, 
2003). 
106 Tőkés, Egymás Tükrében, 159. 
396 
 
together, lighting candles. She did not fear provocateurs or informers.107 As night fell, most of 
the older generations headed for home, and during the night the Securitate came with clubs and 
drove most of the crowd off, but by morning it had regrouped there. 
Being Saturday, it was easy for a crowd to form, as some from yesterday returned to the 
scene, and many others had heard about it and wanted to see for themselves. After the 
Saturday service at the Baptist Church, a good number of the 2,000 or so that attended his 
church then spilled out toward the trolley stop, some taking part.108 Tőkés appeared and said 
that the eviction notice was nullified, and people cheered and began shouting rhythmically, 
“Freedom, freedom, freedom, for the pastor and people.” By five o’clock, the time when water 
cannon were rumored to appear, some 5,000 were there. Tőkés suggested they leave, not to 
“risk their lives” for him, but they wouldn't go.109 Rather than a “figurehead,” Tőkés felt as 
though he was “a prisoner of [the crowd’s] anger.”110  
Other gatherings were now popping up, and a crowd formed in the city center. Anti-
government chanting, especially “Down with Ceauşescu,” mingled with hymn- and anthem-
singing. Rumors of impending violence were spreading as people witnessed ranks of police and 
other armed militia forming, and soon violent altercations were taking place, as fire trucks 
arrived to blast the crowds with water. Panic broke out, people began to respond by throwing 
stones and bottles, as groups skirmished and chased each other amid shouts and slogans.111 
People fled to new locations, and across town there were scenes of wrecking Ceauşescu’s 
portraits and burning the books attributed to his authorship.112 By morning, government forces 
had controlled the territory and the city was in a sort of lock-down, although Timişoara would 
become the rallying cry for the next stage of the revolution in Bucharest just days later. 
During Saturday night, a group of friends and relatives stayed the night with the Tőkés 
family. Around three in the morning, after the crowds had been driven away from the parish, 
agents broke into the Tőkés’ apartment, where those present were beaten by trained agents 
and hauled off to prison.113 Tőkés was taken to the job he had been assigned, in the village of 
Mineu (Menyő). 
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Mineu was a remote village many hours away that had lacked a pastor for four years. 
The parish, located at a dead end of a road, had been set up for his arrival, with devices, guards, 
and lights all in place to keep an eye on him.114 Having just been arrested during the night and 
driven to Mineu that Sunday morning, he was instructed to give a sermon to “his very new and 
terribly spooked congregation,”115 although he was ordered to clean the blood from his face 
first.116 This moment is an interesting picture of religious life in Romania: guards, guard dogs, 
barbed wire, churchgoers instructed to unpack Tőkés’ things, and the order from the secret 
police to give the people a sermon (it appears that there was not a service that morning amid 
the chaos, as instead they focused on unpacking the belongings, and the villagers gathered 
around Tőkés to meet him and hear his account of the events).117  
The bungling manner in which authorities handled his transfer was due to the tensions 
present in state management of religion. Trying to manage religion while keeping it from 
becoming attractive or sympathetic, authorities depended on religious leaders to enact their 
will. But because religious leaders did not have physical coercion at their disposal, state 
authorities sometimes had to step in. Yet Papp was more than a puppet; on many occasions as 
bishop his will had been heeded. Bishop Papp represented certain church interests, not just 
state interests, and these interests often overlapped. 
Conclusion: Communal Religiosity and (Dis)respecting Authority 
The resemblances between the Adorján and Tőkés incidents are so striking that they 
make evident the fundamental difference: one episode remained an inner-church problem, 
whereas the other ballooned into a city-wide protest. The difference, clearly, had little to do 
with the particularities of the immediate church problem (since they were the same), but with 
the determination of Tőkés and the ripeness of the moment to make what was a particular, 
“inner-church” problem, a universal one. Romanian university student Ion Iştvan recalls that he, 
like most of his colleagues, were against “the system” and they constantly discussed the 
situation and listened to foreign radio broadcasts. They were excited when they heard about 
this courageous priest who was not backing down in the face of pressure. They identified with 
him as a battler against a universal problem, assumed his disappearance was immanent, but 
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became even more excited when it seemed that the spark caused by Tőkés had become a 
conflagration. The awareness of events across Eastern Europe indeed created a state of 
expectation at this time. Iştvan (as did Miescu, above) says many of them felt that the time was 
pregnant with potential, having heard about neighboring states.118 
It is also worth considering the importance of the immediate locale as well: Timişoara, 
the cultural center of the Banat. For reasons too complex to explore here, not only were inter-
ethnic antagonisms lacking there, but what is more, Romanians and Hungarians alike boasted of 
the inter-ethnic and ecumenical fraternization as a beloved and traditional feature of life in 
Timişoara and the Banat. Although this was ostensibly a “Hungarian” or “Reformed” problem 
that might have elsewhere prevented the event from gaining broad support, in Timişoara it 
became a badge of honor that people could band together even as “others.” The mayor had 
supposedly tried to implore the Romanians by saying, "if the Hungarians want to stand here, 
that's their business. This is their church. Whatever happens, they're chauvinists! But you 
Romanians, go home!" But many shouted back, "we're not leaving!"119 
In their accounts of the events, several people echoed the above sentiments. Romanian 
neighbor of Tőkés Ion Roman claimed that “Timişoara is the kind of city in which it never caused 
a problem that you are Hungarian, Serb, Romanian, or Jew.” There, the “hate” that was in other 
cities “did not exist.”120 Friendships commonly spanned such differences. Student Ion Iştvan 
received news of Tőkés from a Hungarian friend with connections to Hungarian sources.121 And 
although these Romanian students found out this was a gathering of Hungarian parishioners in 
support of their pastor to prevent his eviction, they were not deterred. Eventually, members of 
the congregation offered them candles and explained the situation, and a community of trust 
formed among those who chose to remain instead of just fearfully hurrying past (as many did). 
Iştvan recalled the excitement and the smiles, that “something secretive bound us,” proudly 
reflecting that “we did the first, most important step toward the cohesion of the nationalities 
and ultimately among people, toward solidarity.”122 
Ferenc Bárányi (as did Lajos Varga above) emphasized the cross-denominational respect 
they shared, already evident in the life of the Reformed Church in Timişoara prior to the 
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revolution, starting with cross-denominational youth group participation, followed by Tőkés’ 
organization of ecumenical church services with Orthodox, Catholic, and other Protestant 
denominations. Bárányi noted that at Tőkés' request Petru Dugulescu managed to gather 
members of his Baptist congregation, and “arm in arm” they were singing Hora Unirii (a song-
poem about Romanian unity) in front of the church. Bárányi sums up how that day, 
commonalities overcame differences: Rather than “lingual, ethnic, religious antagonism, there 
were only embittered oppressed people, from whom the bitterness erupted and the uprising 
broke out.”123 A “Hungarian” inner-church problem could mobilize masses in 1989 Romania. 
Religious institutions, by their very nature, always carried the potential for mass 
mobilization predicated on a different identity and way of belonging than those promoted and 
desired by representatives of the state. In this respect, communist officials wary of communal 
mobilization were quite right to try to keep “law and order” among the religious bodies. They 
were right to constantly police the boundaries of religious acceptability due to this potentiality, 
not because of a danger of a mass-church forming and rising up as a church, but because any 
site of corporate dynamism and corporate belonging could become a site for mass mobilization, 
irrespective of the particulars of the original contours of belonging. Spontaneous ways of 
gathering (e.g., as “Romanians” against Ceauşescu) could occur at any moment, only needing 
the spark that voluntary religious communities could offer.   
But it was not a guarantee that religious bodies would provide such a spark. Most clergy, 
believers, and religious communities were far from sparking anything. In fact, in the case of 
Tőkés, it’s not clear to what extent the power of religious identity and belonging is 
distinguishable from ethno-national identity and belonging. The so-called “Bethanists,” for 
example, are examples of believers and youth who were mobilized for religious reasons, but 
they rejected ethno-nationalism as central to their identity and belonging. Unlike Tőkés, they 
never tried to mobilize people for a cause predicated on defiance of the church and state; their 
goal was communal religiosity. But Tőkés was unique for making his defiance against the 
Church-State nexus a cause around which he attempted to mobilize people. Because of this 
explicitly defined opposition, when church and state officials fought him together, side-by-side, 
each institution enforcing that which was in its respective sphere, Tőkés thereby could offer a 
mass appeal, far beyond the particulars of his quite small case. 
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This chapter further illuminates what we discovered in the previous chapters as well, 
that as bodies, what are called “the Church” or “the State” were simply too layered to be 
reasonably considered singular actors. Clergy, church leadership, and congregations were prone 
to horizontal and vertical fracturing, and problems often arose without any state meddling. Yet 
as we have also seen elsewhere, disputes between clergy and leadership became most virulent 
when clergy considered their church leaders as simple puppets responding to “state” interests 
that in their minds opposed church interests. In communist contexts, church leaders defended 
their choices as ultimately allowing churches to keep doors open or at least mitigate state 
meddling. The managing body of religious affairs, the Department of Religions, gained legitimacy 
when church staff and laity turned to it as a body to mediate its disputes. 
From its side, “the State” was equally layered and was represented by officials across 
the spectrum of religious sentiment, ranging from amenable to hostile. State agents were 
perpetually caught in a bind between wanting to minimize religiosity while recognizing that 
outright attacks usually only alienated the population from its other goals. State representatives 
usually tried to promote, therefore, a middle road that tried to affirm the “freedom of religion” 
within certain “safe,” or “acceptable” boundaries. Religion was appropriately benign when it 
tended toward predictability or ritualistic or individualistic participation; renewal, scandal, and 
heightened attention to ethnicity threatened to mobilize people. In short, state representatives 
were not flatly “anti-religion” so much as in favor of control, and to the extent that church 
representatives undergirded that control, they were very much “pro-religion.”  
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X. Conclusion 
Acceptable Communist Religion 
The answer to the question of what kind of religious practice communist officials in 
Romania and the Soviet Union considered “acceptable” was revealed in their everyday 
management of churches. Although in theory officials supported a religion-free society, 
pragmatically speaking, officials considered religious practice acceptable when it was 
individualized, ritualistic, formulaic, or predictable. In fact, religion was supposed to remain 
“purely” religious and be separable from the rest of society. When people’s religiosity became 
animated beyond such confines and when communities began to form out of individuals, state 
officials endeavored to restore religious practice to its acceptable state. 
The reason why it is important to make distinctions and to recognize that for pragmatic 
purposes, Romanian and Soviet officials tried to normalize a particular form of religious practice, 
is because it illuminates the nature of communist power in these societies. Communist power 
was built upon a basic undergirding of a materialist ideology that officials needed to maintain to 
keep the political structure from collapsing, but it did not require all people to hold those 
ideological convictions privately. That religious practice and its essentially incompatible truth-
claims could remain in these societies without necessarily threatening the structure is 
fundamentally important. Officials seemed to believe that religious truth claims did not threaten 
communist power when they were proclaimed in ritualistic, formulaic, predictable, traditional, 
or historic ways, as then it was easy for officials and the religious alike to consider religion as 
separable and distinct from the rest of life. Officials acted as though what was “purely religious” 
did not interfere in the workings of society and politics. If religion could be restricted to 
concepts that did not mobilize people, then it was not a powerful social force.  
Yet officials underestimated the power of truth-claims embedded in rituals to endure 
and provide lasting frameworks for alternative communal identities and ideologies. Officials 
believed that when they saw elderly women participating in Orthodox rituals, that the Orthodox 
Church was disappearing. However, the Church and belief endured, as successive generations 
were mobilized by its established cultural structure. In the case of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
as historian Gregory Freeze has argued, the Soviet state may have succeeded in reducing the 
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presence of the Church, the power of parish priests, and church attendance, but there was an 
increase in the laicization of the Church alongside unregulated religious activity.1 
In each Church studied in this work, there were divisions amid the layers of church 
power made up of leaders, clergy, and believers. There were disagreements over proper 
practice, content, the role of renewal, personnel, and more. In the case of the Baptist Church in 
the Soviet Union, disagreements led to a division that has remained to the present day. In the 
other cases, the church hierarchies remained largely intact, supported by state officials. Non-
conforming clergy or believers were successfully quelled or marginalized. In the case of László 
Tőkés’ congregation in Timişoara in 1989, the inner-church division mobilized other citizens into 
a mass protest against the regime, so ready were citizens to identify church and state powers as 
of the same ilk. 
It is also worth noting the peculiar place of ecumenism during this period. Although 
church division has been an obvious piece of this historical narrative, ecumenism—the willing 
cooperation of people from differing faiths—also emerged spontaneously. Ecumenism was 
something of a fad of global Christianity in the postwar period, and delegates from churches in 
communist countries were conspicuous participants in the World Council of Churches (est. 
1948) and tried to improve the reputation of religious freedom in their home countries at WCC 
events. But the research presented here makes clear that spontaneous ecumenism largely 
emerged on the margins: in prison, the underground, or at the initiative of non-conforming 
priests or pastors. While Romanian and Soviet officials supported official ecumenism as window-
dressing to good church-state relations, they—along with church leaders—discouraged and 
attacked grassroots ecumenism for its mobilizing power. 
Unacceptable Religion as Challenge to State and Church 
Not just state officials, but even church hierarchs, clergy, and believers were in dispute 
over what constituted acceptable religious practice. It was not a simple line of division falling 
between state and church. State representatives often did not agree with one another about 
the proper treatment of religion in these ideologically antagonistic states, nor were they always 
properly synchronized in carrying out plans that they agreed upon. This division is more obvious 
in the Soviet Union, where some authorities tried to forcibly bring about the decline of religion 
and willingly flouted supposed legal provisions for religious believers, while others emphasized 
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believers’ legal options or the harm done to government reputation by aggressive anti-religious 
action. The poor cooperation between local officials and religious affairs officials is most obvious 
in the case study of A.A. Trushin of Moscow Oblast.  
Church representatives were not unified in conducting religious affairs either. Leaders—
even when hand-selected by officials—did not always work in unison, nor did leaders, clergy, 
and believers as a rule submit to one another or always cooperate. In both countries and all 
faiths studied, believers disputed their hierarchs’ decisions, and clergy voiced opposition to their 
superiors’ decisions. In the cases of the Reformed Church and Baptist Churches, public protests 
and demonstrations resulted.  
In response to the common assertion that there was no freedom of religion in these 
countries and that the “state” persecuted the “church,” one can say that indeed there was not 
the extent of religious freedom that those sympathetic to religion or religious rights would 
expect in the democracies of the West and many acts by officials against the religious would be 
appropriately described as persecution. Yet such descriptions are incomplete, and when 
describing the entirety of lived religion over the whole course of the communist experiment in 
Romania and the Soviet Union, inaccurate. One would misunderstand the reality of “religious 
management” in these countries if one assumed that the 1930s under Stalin was the same as 
the 1970s under Brezhnev, or that a church’s destruction or desecration describes the whole 
trajectory of events. Furthermore, much of what is typically labeled “religious persecution” 
should be considered “political repression.” Religious persecution most appropriately describes 
those acts that were done on impulse of anti-religious feeling, and although religious 
antagonism persisted throughout the period and motivated many actors and acts, it does not 
describe the whole of state-church relations. State punishment of religious figures was usually 
not the result of an official’s anti-religious impulse so much as concern over religious influence. 
Religious leaders were not the only ones repressed, as they were not the only ones having 
influence.  
Officials recognized that only when citizens felt compelled to go beyond private 
convictions in search of ways of belonging and identifying themselves as groups would they 
threaten the legitimacy and authority of socialism/communism and its way of defining society 
and power relations. Religion was one possible alternative avenue for group-formation, even if 
“religion” was not always indistinguishable from other at-times overlapping group identifiers 
like nationality, ethnicity, or youth. Non-conforming religious groups of Reformed believers in 
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Romania at times were indistinguishable from non-conforming nationally minded Hungarians. 
Non-conforming groups of believers who were young also gathered as young people, something 
that attracted youth independent of religious aspects. 
Thus the nature of religious freedom postwar in Romania and the Soviet Union was 
related to the dynamic nature of religion as an ever-possible site for communal belonging and 
mobilization. Religious gatherings can vary from being the assemblage of independent persons 
attempting to, as officials called it, “satisfy their religious needs” for personal reasons, to a 
community marked by linkages between people who are aiming to act as a group, not just 
independently. When the linkage was only through a dynamic priest or pastor, officials could 
disempower the community by his removal. When the linkages were greater, perhaps 
reinforced by people’s identification with nationality, ethnicity, or youth, the religiously-
informed communities could be stronger. 
Because communal activation was dynamic according to variations in personality, age, 
experience, and more, researchers can attend to changes over time in the situation of religion in 
communist lands. As Scott Kenworthy observed in his study of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra over the 
decades, under Stalin after World War II was the time with the most freedom of action for 
monks and leaders, but that their autonomy was always heavily circumscribed.2 Some hierarchs, 
clergy, and believers tried to stay safely within the limits, others tried to push the boundaries, 
and still others named the limits and spoke out defiantly against them.  
 Those religionists in positions closest to state authorities—whether leading hierarchs, 
church wardens, or others—whom some might label as “collaborators” or as too compromised, 
have often been the subject of scorn from co-religionists or observers who expected a different 
standard. Many have subsequently been identified as collaborators with the KGB or Securitate. 
Some choose to judge them harshly by pointing to their lack of fortitude and complicity in 
carrying out state wishes. Others are more conciliatory in their assessment, pointing to 
instances when such people acted as “shields,” doing their best to maneuver against state 
attacks in ways that would minimize the damage to their churches. It must be noted that only a 
few exceptional individuals would see good in such a situation or have been dedicated to the 
cause of the destruction of religion. People were caught between competing powers and 
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wishes, and it was nearly impossible to resolve the tensions generated by authorities’ demands 
for surveillance against fellow churchmen, backed by threats against themselves or loved ones. 
Religious Cultures and Varied Responses to State and Church Pressures 
The basic pragmatic approach of officials in Romania and the Soviet Union of carrot and 
stick (reward the compliant, punish the non-compliant) is most apparent in the case of the 
“outgroups” that officials, along with disapproving church leaders, identified in the churches. In 
the Reformed Church, the paragon of unacceptability was the “Bethanist” group, the evangelical 
and renewal-minded pastors and believers who were punished and subsequently referenced by 
church and state leaders as the negative exemplar of unacceptable religiosity. For the Romanian 
Orthodox Church, state leaders found most Orthodox clergy to be amenable to marginalizing 
supporters of the renewal-minded and communally dynamic Lord’s Army or the disbanded 
Greek-Catholic Church. In the Soviet Baptist Church, adherents to the breakaway Council of 
Churches (CCECB) group made the division between themselves and the official Baptist Church 
(AUCECB) and the state as obvious as they could. Although there were groups of people 
participating in non-conforming religious activity in the Russian Orthodox Church, there was no 
organization or community sufficiently defined by itself, by other churchmen, or by state 
officials to have a name as in the other cases. Such non-conforming groups were usually named 
by the priest at the center of it all, or simply as “extremists” and “fanatics”—labels that were 
applied to all activists within the above-named outgroups. 
Yet there is a danger in drawing definite lines of religious acceptability between the 
dominant Church group and the “outgroups” named above. The lines between “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” were not just between the registered and unregistered churches, or AUCECB 
and breakaway CCECB, in the Baptist situation. One could be unacceptably religious as a lone 
member of the clergy without any group affiliation simply by dynamizing the religious or 
communal atmosphere. What’s more important than identifying or naming specific outgroups is 
the process by which officials and religious representatives defined acceptable and 
unacceptable religion. The groups identified in the present study belong to the specific churches 
and regions studied; other regions and other churches would yield different individuals and 
groups. 
Although the Churches shared the commonality of having non-conforming, religiously 
unacceptable participants, differences in religious culture figured importantly in the era in terms 
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of church-state relations and inner-church disputes. The differences between Orthodox and 
Protestant religious cultures are evident. Historically and during the communist era, the 
Orthodox Churches have favored the centralization of truth-claims and power, seeing the two as 
interwoven. Generally speaking, to assail the one is to assail, by implication, the other. The 
culture generated in the wake of Martin Luther’s public denunciation in 1517 of what he 
considered corruptions in the faith—Reformation Culture—has generally prized pastoral and 
even lay interpretation of Scriptural truths, and with that, more democracy in church 
governance. But it also has led to almost countless church divisions as well. 
The hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in the postwar period avoided the major 
division that occurred in 1927 due to Sergei’s proclamation of loyalty to the communist 
government. Sergei’s proclamation was a problem with two interdependent aspects, that he did 
something many considered “untrue,” thereby delegitimizing his authority. When truth and 
authority are centralized, when either is sufficiently compromised, both can be implicated. The 
communist parties in the Soviet Union and Romania centralized truth and authority, such that 
both became publicly delegitimized at the same time. Gorbachev’s attempts at open debate and 
democratic reforms merely undermined the entire communist structure built upon a centralized 
ideology and system of command. 
Due to this culture of centralization, the circle of Gleb Yakunin and Dmitrii Dudko, in 
their attempts to make changes in their churches, could easily be marginalized by church 
authorities, who tarnished them as not submitting to church authority and tending toward 
schism. In examples from the Romanian Orthodox Church, too, hierarchs demanded submission 
before they would consider Traian Dorz’s requests. Yet it was a trap: the hierarchs also could 
define submission as they pleased, and in this case, for Dorz to submit was for him to give up his 
ambition to strive for something he believed to be true. Orthodox discourse emphasizing the 
dangers of schism and the need to submit mitigated against change initiated from below or 
within, but it did not preclude attempts.  
Naturally Baptist and Reformed Church leaders also tried to marginalize threats to their 
authority or truth-claims and called on non-conformists to submit. But Protestant church culture 
offered a counter discourse, namely that the interpretation of truth was not the domain of a 
select few but a historical right. The pastor-choosing battles in the Reformed Church are an 
obvious example of this. In the standoffs waged by parishioners, elders, and pastors against 
hierarchs, the former called upon their historic “democratic rights” to choose their own pastor, 
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engaging state-backed hierarchs in fierce battles on two major occasions. In the Soviet Union, 
lay pastors’ call on Baptist Church leaders to “repent” was predicated upon the democratization 
of Scriptural interpretation, and the breakaway Baptists rallied hundreds of congregations to 
their side. In addition, their historically decentralized churches and traditions of democratic 
leader-choosing led to battles and divisions within the church. Yet the corollary to 
democratization and decentralization was disunity and publicly-visible fracturing.  
Other aspects to religious culture were just as important, although less obviously 
marked by the Reformation. In both countries Orthodox believers were the historical majority. 
For this reason, the local parish had not traditionally been a refuge so much as a “kiosk” for local 
religious participation. Being a minority group, some above-ground and especially breakaway 
Baptist groups saw attacks on one member (e.g. a pastor) as an attack on all (both locally and 
internationally) and employed an “us vs. them” mentality. Since Reformed believers in Romania 
were almost entirely Hungarian, an ethnic minority, this meant that an attack on one (being 
Hungarian) could mean an attack on all. Certain nationally-minded groups were most obvious 
around the 1956 revolution and during Ceauşescu’s increasingly anti-Hungarian acts of the 
1980s. Orthodox believers struggled to form a cohesive group identity, as the category 
“Orthodox” was too broad, and schism was anathema to almost every Orthodox believer. Often 
“Orthodox” and “Russian” or “Romanian” were used interchangeably. Lacking a church-
community-as-refuge mentality, Orthodox communities beyond the standard delivery of 
expected rituals proved to be not as durable as those among Baptists. If it was the quality of a 
priest or liturgy which drew people to a particular Orthodox church, then the priest could be 
moved and choir disrupted, for example. If it was a commonality of ideas and interests which 
drew priests together or intellectuals together, then when state agents became aggressive, the 
communities buckled under the significant pressure. Having a concrete “us” or “them” can help 
maintain group identity, and the Orthodox world largely lacked compelling or mobilizing 
versions of these on localized scales. 
With its religious culture long built on identity and its status not in danger (at least 
historically), for the Russian Orthodox Church the kiosk model of church as a dispenser of 
religious goods thrived, making it more likely that people might “shop around” for the best 
product in bigger cities. Although Orthodox believers might have had reasonable justification for 
seeing themselves (like Baptists) as “victims” or “in danger” given the dominant atheist 
discourse and limitations in religious life, such a perspective was mitigated against by the 
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awkward alignment of communist states with national identity. National identity—particularly in 
Romania3, but also to some degree in Russia—could still incorporate Orthodox tradition. 
In both Romania and the Soviet Union, evangelical protestant denominations and other 
modern variants of Western origin like Baptists, Pentecostals, and Jehovah’s Witnesses 
represented the end of a religious spectrum that officials deemed most problematic after World 
War II. Officials saw the “sectarian” Protestants as linked to Western (bourgeois) societies by 
mentality and money, but they also considered such religion problematic for its emphasis on 
proselytism, for being dynamic and active, and for having religion dominate adherents’ identity 
and worldview, making them “obscurantists” and “reactionary.” Such communities offered 
obvious competition to communist worldview by accentuating active belief that translated into 
action and promised a future paradise.4 Such religious communities stressed believers’ 
abstention from the world in direct confrontation with communist emphasis on all citizens’ 
social activity, which was to demonstrate adherence to communist ideology and power. So 
problematic was such religiosity to officials that they supported Orthodox and Reformed 
attempts at preventing the loss of believers to such groups.  
State Cultures and Varied Responses to the Problem of Religion 
Just as religious responses to the problem of religion in these states varied between and 
within religions, states responded differently as well. For the countries of the Eastern Bloc, 
despite the heavy institutional influences of the Soviet Union, one cannot speak of a common 
religious policy or situation for believers beyond the basic recognition of the increased 
limitations and repressions against those who publicly opposed communism. Each state had its 
own mixture of historic church traditions, anti-religious policies, personality differences, and 
awkward coexistence of significant religious participation alongside atheistic ideology. In fact, it 
is difficult to group the various states according to strict patterns, as religious tradition varies 
across the region. In the case of Poland the Catholic Church and Pope John Paul powerfully 
confronted the communist government and its actions there. But there are too many countries 
and denominations to make sweeping comparisons, and not all had obviously dominant 
religious institutions. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Yugoslavia 
3 Lucian Leuştean, Orthodoxy and the Cold War: Religion and Political Power in Romania, 1947-65 
(Basingstoke, England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
4 Catherine Wanner, Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism, Culture and 
Society after Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 7. 
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were each religiously distinct, as were Soviet Republics like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Ukraine. What this research presents is only a small piece of the religious picture in Eastern 
Europe, and the fact that they could all be put into the same category of religiously unfree or 
persecuted only conceals what would surely be diverse realities. Comparative Catholicism, 
Orthodoxy, and Protestantism in a transnational perspective, for example, would tell us much 
more than a study of a single denomination in a single country. The present work has been able 
to comparatively examine the problem of religion in communist lands such that the 
commonalities and variations in state and religious cultures become illuminated. 
Religious Gatherings as Incidental Sites of Mobilization 
In addition to its contributions to narrating the experiences of several religious 
institutions and state approaches to religious management in regional and historical 
perspective, this study addresses the conceptualization of religion itself. First, it aims to view 
religion not just in terms of belief systems, but in terms of collections of people. All too often 
religion has been regarded as separable from society, as though it is nothing more than a 
collection of ideas, beliefs, or simply a perspective. What this study makes clear is the way 
religion functions according to a spectrum of relations, ranging from individualistic and 
consumeristic to communalistic. For some, religion means expressing personal beliefs, but it can 
also create the possibility for powerful associations of people who consider themselves a 
community defined by common identity and purpose. It has the potential for impressive 
mobilizing power, and therefore its study cannot be so easily relegated to intellectual-
theological histories or the margins of human society. 
In the same way, communism was more than a set of ideas, and the problem of religion 
was more than an intellectual battle of atheism vs. religion. While people may tend to identify 
communist parties or religious denominations by their specific ideas or worldviews, people can 
act within such bodies without having unity in terms of ideological knowledge. Although beliefs 
or ideology may be founding principles just as girders form a foundation, people can move and 
act within those structures without being fixated on the precise details of that foundation and 
what it was intended to support or affirm. 
Both communist parties in Romania and the Soviet Union depended on at least a façade 
of legitimacy for communist ideology. It is no easier to say how many people truly “believed” in 
communism any more than it is to say how many people truly believe in, say, certain theological 
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truths. It could be that more people “believed” in religious truths in these countries than truly 
“believed” in communism, but this did not as a rule cause communism’s collapse. Yet what 
officials in the Soviet Union and Romania perceived—though perhaps not directly admitting it—
was that while privately held convictions did not threaten public (communist) truth claims or 
power, mobilized groups of people proclaiming alternative truths could delegitimize those 
claims and those in power. This in part explains why youth movements in many communist East 
European countries in the 1970s and 1980s were active and treated by officials as threatening: 
youth (as they often do) threatened to expose the façade of belief by ignoring it, mocking it, for 
looking for other, more “genuine” alternatives. Religion was just one such avenue by which 
youth acted in this way. Others included consumer culture, political activism, and 
environmentalism. 
Hence, the problem was not religious “ideas” but religious “bodies.” Forms of 
communication include not just the use of words, but gestures and “body language” as well. 
People “sense” body language or feel that gestures communicate messages while sometimes 
lacking concrete evidence to be able to justify such beliefs. This is how officials largely operated 
in discerning acceptable versus unacceptable religiosity. Officials could perceive enthusiasm, 
social energy, openness, and authenticity, without having concrete evidence that something had 
become illegal or stipulating precisely what made such activity unacceptable. Gatherings 
featuring such “body language” were threatening because people were being mobilized and 
forming relationships, but officials defined such gatherings as problematic by other means: 
identifying anti-state utterances (which would be punished even without surrounding 
enthusiasm), labeling such activity as “fanaticism” or “extremism,” or the manufacturing of 
politico-conspiratorial links. The clashes over beliefs, ideas, and legality were the surface of 
battles for identity, belonging, and power. Many believers and clergy attempted to exploit this 
lack of official or legal clarity by posturing unacceptable behavior using acceptable terms. 
Attempts by Lord’s Army adherents to rename their organization’s activities while not changing 
the essence of this activity is one such example. 
The success of communism in Romania and the Soviet Union was indirectly dependent 
on officials’ accommodation of religion. Had officials taken a harder line in preventing religious 
gatherings (like the Soviet Union in the 1930s), religion would have been more underground, 
but it would have been able to present itself as an even more distinct alternative to 
communism. Even with state oversight and control, religion was important for how it created 
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opportunities for people to mobilize, and it offered an avenue for people to express alternative 
allegiances that could call into question the overall legitimacy of communism in society. 
Communism fell because enough people felt it was not making good on its promises for a 
certain kind of society, and it seemed alternative political structures offered more attractive 
futures. However, as in the case of Tőkés, religious communities were sometimes strategically 
poised to offer an alternative community that could provide strength to anti-communist activity. 
Yet in most cases, the accommodation of religion and the cooperation of church and state 
leaders seem to have had more negative lasting effects on the religions than on the politics. 
Post-communist religious institutions have been fraught by debates over the meanings of 
collaboration, debates about hierarchs who remained after the regime change, and continuing 
schisms between the established church institution and nonconformist groups. 
Copyright © Ryan J. Voogt 2017 
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Appendix A. Abbreviations 
ALRC – Comitetul Creştin Român pentru Apărarea Libertăţii Religioase şi de Conştiinţă 
(Romanian Christian Committee for the Defense of Religious Liberty and Conscience) 
AUCECB – All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists 
CARC – Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults 
CCECB – Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists 
CE – Christian Endeavor Society  
CPSU – The Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
СRA – Council of Religious Affairs 
CROCA – Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs 
ECB – Evangelical Christians / Baptists 
G-C – Greek-Catholic 
MoECB – Central Moscow Evangelical Christians-Baptists Church 
LA – The Lord’s Army 
ROC – Russian Orthodox Church 
BOR – Romanian Orthodox Church (Biserica Ortodoxă Română) 
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Appendix B. Population and Religion Statistics 
1. The Soviet Union (Note – the Soviet census did not track religious affiliation, making
estimates vary widely) 
a. Population of the USSR: 260 million in late 1970s; 286 million by 1989
i. Orthodox Church: 10,000 churches in 1945, 14,000 in 1950, and 7,500 in
1965;  40,000,000 – 100,000,000 believers
ii. Evangelical Christians-Baptists Church: over 2,000 registered churches
(prayer houses) in 1958, with more than 200,000 members and
anywhere from 700,000 to 2,000,000 registered and unregistered
believers in the late 1980s
b. Population of Moscow Oblast: over 6 million in 1979; 6.7 million by 1989
i. Orthodox Church: 134 churches (175 in 1958) with 70-80,000 visitors
(according to 1968 CRA report).
ii. ECB Church: 12 prayer houses, over 1,000 members (according to 1968
CRA report). Number of participants higher.
c. Population of the City of Moscow: 8 million in 1979, almost 9 million by 1989
i. 36 Orthodox Churches in 1958, 43 in 1967 (CRA reports)
ii. 1 Central Baptist Church – 4,000-5,000 members and regular attendees
2. Romania
a. Population of Romania: 18 million in 1960; 23 million in 1989
i. Orthodox Church: ~12 million in 1960; ~15.5 million in 1989
ii. Reformed Church: ~700,000 members throughout the era
b. Transylvania: 5.7 million in 1948; 7.6 million in 1989
i. Orthodox Believers: 1.6 million in 1948
ii. Greek-Catholic Believers: 1.7 million in 1948 (subsequently repressed)
iii. Reformed Believers: 650,000 – 700,000
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Appendix C. Reference Maps 
1. Romania (http://www.ezilon.com/maps/images/europe/physical-map-of-Romania.gif)
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Appendix C. Reference Maps (continued) 
2. Sălaj County, Romania (http://pe-harta.ro/judete/Salaj.jpg) 
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Appendix C. Reference Maps (continued) 
3. Soviet Union  
(http://www.worldatlas.com/upload/c3/ea/1f/soviet-union-administrative-divisions-1989.jpg) 
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Appendix C. Reference Maps (continued) 
4. Moscow Oblast (http://marianna-ivanova.com/img/ministerrus/rus50-map.jpg) 
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Appendix D. Cast of Characters. 
These notes are for figures who make frequent appearances in the text but are not 
famous historical figures (e.g., Gorbachev) or lack titles to their names to distinguish 
them (such as “Bishop”). 
Adorján, Kálmán—Pastor in the Reformed Church, Romania. 
Andreicuț, Andrei—Romanian Orthodox Priest since 1978, becoming Bishop of Alba Iulia in 
1990, then Metropolitan of Cluj. 
Avramescu, Cornel—Romanian Orthodox Priest in the Banat region, exiled to the United States 
in 1985. 
Bychkov, Aleksei—General Secretary of the AUCECB from 1971-1990 and presbyter at the 
Central Moscow Baptist Church. 
Calciu-Dumitreasă, Gheorghe—Romanian Orthodox Priest, arrested in 1979, and exiled to the 
United States in 1985. Considered by many a foremost anti-communist “dissident.” 
David, Gheorghe—An official with the Romanian Department of Religions working in Sălaj 
County in the early 1970s. 
Dézsi, Zoltán—Pastor in the Reformed Church in Romania and arrested as a “Bethanist.” 
Dorz, Traian—A leading figure in the Lord’s Army after World War II. 
Dudko, Dmitrii—Russian Orthodox Priest in the Moscow region who gained a following in the 
1970s among youth and new converts to Orthodoxy. 
Dugaru, Dumitru—Secretary General of the Department of Religions, 1957-1975. 
Dumitrescu, Viorel—Romanian Orthodox Priest in the Banat region, exiled to the U.S. in 1982. 
Epishin, Nikolai Il’ich—Youth leader in the Central Moscow Baptist Church. 
Eshliman, Nikolai – One-time priest in the Russian Orthodox Church and signatory along with 
Gleb Yakunin of the “Open Letter” to Patriarch Aleksii in 1965. 
Grossu, Sergiu—A leader in the Lord’s Army after WWII until his migration to France in 1969, 
where he founded Catacombes publishing. 
Iskovskikh, Aleksei F.—One of the pastors of the Baptist church in Dedovsk. He served multiple 
prison sentences, dying in prison in 1970.  
Karczagi, Sandor— Pastor in the Reformed Church in Romania and arrested as a “Bethanist.” 
Karev, Aleksandr—leader of the Evangelical-Christians Church and General Secretary of the 
AUCECB from 1944-1971. Also a renowned preacher in the Central Moscow Church. 
Karpov, Georgii - head over Russian Orthodox Church affairs from 1943-1960 and former NKVD 
colonel who handled the cases of problematic religious personnel 
Klimenko, Andrei – President of the AUCECB, 1974-1985. 
Kriuchkov, Gennadii (Konstantinovich)—Of Tula Oblast, one of the founding participants in the 
Initiative Group (initsiativniki), Orgkomitet, and breakaway CCECB group. 
Kuroedov, Vladimir Alekseevich—President of CROCA and then the CRA, 1960-1984.  
Levitin-Krasnov, Anatolii Emmanuilovich—Religious writer of Orthodox faith and “dissident” 
who emigrated out of the Soviet Union in 1974.  
Lőrincz, János—Pastor in the Reformed Church in Romania and arrested as a “Bethanist.” 
Men’, Aleksandr—Non-conformist Russian Orthodox priest and prolific theological writer, 
murdered in 1990. 
Mitskevich, Artur Iosifovich – Deputy Secretary General of the AUCECB, 1956-1979 and 
presbyter of MoECB. His son, Val’ter, also became a leading figure in the Church. 
Moldoveanu, Nicolae—A leading figure in the Lord’s Army after WWII and prolific writer of 
spiritual songs. 
Nagy, Jenő—Cobbler and evangelist, arrested as a “Bethanist.” 
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Nagy, Ödön—Pastor in the Hungarian Reformed Church in the Mureş region.  
Negoița, Liviu—Romanian Orthodox Priest in the Banat region in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
He was exiled to the U.S. but returned to Romania in 1985. 
Papp, Antal—Farmer, village elder, and one of the arrested “Bethanists.” 
Peuker, Leo—Reformed Pastor in Timişoara until his death in early 1987. 
Plekhanov, A.C.—He seems to have been a commissioner for the CRA for the City of Moscow in 
the 1960s and 1970s. I did not locate his file in the state archive as an employee of the 
CRA. 
Pop, Alexandru—A leader in the Lord’s Army until his imprisonment and falling out in 1959. 
Note to be confused with Alexandru Pop, Orthodox Priest of Arad in the 1980s. 
Ramba, Gheorghe—Romanian Orthodox Priest who served with Andreicuţ in Turda in the 1980s. 
Roman, Ioan—Inspector with the Department of Religions in Sălaj County in the mid-1970s. 
Rumachik, Petr—Pastor of the Baptist church in Dedovsk and active leader of the CCECB. 
Imprisoned five times. 
Semchenko, Aleksandr—Youth leader in the Central Moscow Baptist Church. 
Sinka, József (Iosif)—Pastor in the Reformed Church whose candidacy for the vacant pastorship 
in the Reformed Church in Zalău caused considerable inner-church dispute. 
Ștefănescu, Marian Ilie—Romanian Orthodox Priest in the 1980s and sympathizer with many 
other Christian expressions, including the Lord’s Army, Greek-Catholicism, and 
Protestantism. 
Szilágyi, Sandor—Pastor in the Reformed Church in Romania and arrested as a “Bethanist.” 
Tőkés, László—Pastor in the Reformed Church whose congregation in Timişoara helped initiate 
the uprising there in December 1989. 
Trifa, Iosif – along with Metropolitan Bălan, one of the founders and leading figures of the Lord’s 
Army until his death in 1938. 
Trukhanov, Mikhail V.—After two prison terms, he became a Russian Orthodox Priest who 
served from 1960-1979 in a number of parishes for short durations. 
Trushin, A.A.—Commissioner for CROCA and CRA of Moscow Oblast from 1943-1984. 
Vins, Georgii—Baptist minister of Kiev who was one of the founding participants in the Initiative 
Group (initsiativniki), Orgkomitet, and breakaway CCECB group. He served multiple 
prison terms and was exiled to the U.S. in 1979. 
Vins, Lydia—Mother of Georgii Vins and one of the founders and leaders of the Council of 
Prisoners’ Relatives since 1964. Was imprisoned in 1965 at age 64. 
Vins, Natasha—Daughter of Georgii Vins and in adolescence and adulthood became an active 
participant in the underground Baptist church until the family’s exile in 1979. 
Visky, Ferenc—Pastor in the Reformed Church and leading figure in the Christian Endeavor 
movement, dubbed “Bethanist” by state and church organs. 
Wurmbrand, Richard—Famous Lutheran pastor from Romania, served multiple sentences in 
prison and was ransomed in 1964 after Ceausescu’s amnesty. He then lived in the U.S.  
Yakunin, Gleb—Russian Orthodox priest and well-known political dissident. Along with Nikolai 
Eshliman, he was one of the signatories of the “Open Letter” of complaint to Patriarch 
Aleksii in 1965. Was forbidden to serve as priest in 1966. 
Zhidkov, Iakov I.– President of the AUCECB, 1944-1966 and presbyter in the Central Moscow 
Baptist Church. His son, Mikhail, also became a leading figure in the ECB community. 
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